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*National Intelligence Estimate*

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# Haiti Over the Next Few Months (C NF)

NEB |-----| NIE 93-2

APPROVED FOR RELEASE  
DATE: SEP 2001

*This National Intelligence Estimate represents  
the views of the Director of Central Intelligence  
with the advice and assistance of the  
US Intelligence Community.*

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
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# Haiti Over the Next Few Months (CNF)

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
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## Key Judgments

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A viable and enduring negotiated settlement between deposed President Aristide on the one side and the de facto Bazin regime and its military and civilian backers on the other is unlikely in the absence of substantial and continuing external pressure or inducements. Both sides probably would want any agreement to include peacekeeping forces with US involvement to preserve stability and to protect each side from the other:

- Aristide insists on his early return to Haiti with minimal restrictions on his power. He believes that the new US administration will take tougher actions to restore him.



In the absence of a settlement, some coalition of anti-Aristide forces will retain power. But Bazin's relations with the military are increasingly strained, and there is a good chance that he will be replaced by more repressive hardliners less amenable to US influence. Whether under Bazin or such a successor regime, we believe the economy will contract further and that emigrants will have increased incentive to leave for the United States. (~~S~~ ~~NP~~)

Ending the embargo in the absence of progress toward a negotiated settlement would strengthen Bazin, postpone a hardline takeover, and improve prospects for the economy. However, that would remove virtually every incentive for the regime to reach a settlement with Aristide. (~~S~~ ~~NP~~)

Conversely, neither tougher sanctions nor a blockade alone would lead the de facto regime to capitulate to demands for Aristide's return. A blockade would further devastate the economy, threaten stability, and increase the flow of emigrants. (~~S~~ ~~NP~~)

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Until recently, there has been little international pressure on Aristide to compromise. We believe, however, that there would be a good chance he would agree to a settlement similar to the February 1992 Washington Protocol if he believed the United States were about to withdraw from the embargo. (S, NF)

The credible threat of force to restore him could persuade the military to reach an agreement. However, Aristide would exploit the threat of intervention to avoid compromise. In addition, many enlisted personnel would most likely desert, and the Army and police would probably be unable to uphold law and order. (S, NF)

A credible international military force would face little or no organized opposition from the Haitian military or the populace but probably would meet isolated resistance and small-scale attacks. A peacekeeping force would probably have to remain at least as long as Aristide were in power. (S, NF)

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

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## Discussion


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The recent appointment of a UN envoy to Haiti and change of US administrations have heightened expectations that the international community will broker and enforce a resolution of the 15-month-old political impasse there. A viable negotiated settlement would encompass the following contentious issues:

- *Amnesty* for military personnel involved in the coup that toppled Aristide in September 1991 and for the deposed President because of the abuses he committed while in office.
- *Security* both for Aristide, who justifiably fears assassination if he were to return to Haiti, and his opponents who fear he would inspire mob violence against them.
- *Power-sharing* arrangements under which Aristide would accept an independent prime minister and the limited presidential powers that apply under the Constitution.
- *Peacekeeping forces* would be desired by all of the principal parties in order to preserve order and broker disputes.
- *Timing* for Aristide's return, which his opponents want deferred indefinitely. (S NF)



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Figure 1. Jean Bertrand  
Aristide (U)

likely. But there is only a small chance that an organized violent opposition movement will coalesce as long as the military remains viable. (S ~~MF~~)

Aristide's reluctance to resume negotiations has been reinforced by his reliance for advice on figures associated with "Lavalas" (deluge), a loosely knit, predominantly rural grassroots movement he created to avoid dependence on the professional politicians he despises. These figures—leaders of peasant associations, activist priests, and community support groups—have little experience in politics, view technocrats and academics with suspicion, and reinforce Aristide's tendency to view the world in terms of moral absolutes. His reliance on such individuals increased following the failure of the OAS-brokered Washington Protocol. (S ~~MF~~)

The pro-Aristide National Front for Change and Democracy (FNCD), a coalition of moderate leftist and socialist parties in the legislature, has no significant independent base of support. It made a strong showing in the December 1990 elections only because Aristide was at the top of its ticket. Subsequently, however, he dissociated himself from the FNCD and at one point inspired mobs to gut its headquarters. Some FNCD leaders continue to counsel him to compromise. Aristide's international backers—particularly France, Canada, and some Caribbean nations—remain convinced that his return is key to defending Haitian democracy, and they have taken an active role on his behalf in international efforts to resolve the crisis. (S ~~MF~~)

#### Aristide's Support

To the impoverished, mostly illiterate masses, Aristide, who became the country's first freely elected president—with about two-thirds of the vote—is a messianic symbol of hope and change. He also enjoys strong support among the sizable Haitian exile communities in the United States and Canada. He would be likely again to win a strong majority if permitted to run in a presidential election even though his backers are poorly organized. Small groups of them have engaged in isolated violence against the de facto regime, and additional incidents are

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On 23 February 1992, a US- and OAS-brokered agreement was reached between Aristide and leaders of the Haitian legislature. The protocol called for:

- Recognition of Aristide as the legitimate President of Haiti and agreement to his eventual return, but with no date specified.
- A Prime Minister acceptable to Aristide and the legislature.
- General amnesty (excluding common criminals).
- Deployment of an OAS civilian observer mission.
- Lifting of the embargo and other sanctions upon ratification of the new Prime Minister and installation of a consensus government. (U)

In an interview the next day, Aristide disavowed some of these conditions, in particular including military commander Cedras in the amnesty. The high command tacitly approved the agreement but began backing off as Aristide continued to

call for Cedras' removal and prosecution and as the opposition of enlisted military grew. The legislature was inclined to approve the agreement, but failed to maintain a quorum despite various attempts through March 1992, due to both intimidation by elements of the military and bribery by civilian opponents of Aristide. On 27 March, the rightist-dominated Haitian Supreme Court ruled the accords unconstitutional and issued thinly veiled threats to legislators not to question the ruling. (S)

Subsequent weak efforts on the part of the legislature to vote approval of the agreement were met with coup rumors and threats to dissolve the legislature. On 25 April, the legislature agreed to participate in a Tripartite Commission with the former de facto Prime Minister and the Army to reach a negotiated settlement. The Tripartite Commission proposal, approved by the legislature in May, declared the presidency vacant and called for the resignation of the de facto Prime Minister and the naming of a new one to be approved by the legislature. Marc Bazin assumed that position in June. (U)

**The De Facto Regime****Enduring the Embargo**

The embargo has had a limited impact on its intended targets—the military and economic elite—who have concluded that the hardships are tolerable and, in any case, preferable to Aristide's unconditional return. Consumer goods are widely available, and

regular supplies of fuel have been received. Shipping traffic is close to normal levels due to indifferent Latin American observance of the sanctions and continued trade with European countries. The embargo has created opportunities for some in the military and the elite to enrich themselves through graft and smuggling, at the expense of legitimate businessmen. (S)

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But it has had severe consequences for the remainder of the population, especially the poor, while also increasing the pool of potential seaborne emigrants. An estimated 145,000 jobs in industry and services have been lost, and the assembly sector has probably been damaged beyond revival for at least the next few years. Cash crop farmers have been hurt, and many in the countryside have felled trees to produce charcoal, contributing to deforestation. Inflation is running at about 30 percent due to deficit financing and the downward slide of the currency. Remittances from Haitians abroad have played a key role in keeping the economy afloat. (S/NF)

#### **Intimidating Aristide's Supporters**

Since consolidating its authority in the weeks following the coup, the military has intimidated Aristide's supporters with infrequent resort to violence. Dissent is tolerated in the press and legislature, but antigovernment demonstrations are generally prohibited and few have been attempted. Key Aristide supporters operate freely in the capital. The military would use whatever force necessary to suppress protests or mob violence, but, with only 8,100 personnel, it could be overwhelmed by large and widespread popular uprisings. To prevent such a possibility, security forces have hounded most of Aristide's grassroots organizers into hiding or have frightened them into silence. (S/NF)

We have scant information about politically motivated murders or other extreme human rights violations of Aristide supporters and can only confirm a small number of cases. Sporadic reporting about corpses left in conspicuous places in Port-au-Prince suggests that military personnel or rightwing thugs—some apparently associated with police chief

Michel Francois—have murdered Aristide supporters as a means of terrorizing others. Despite concerted efforts, the US Embassy in Port-au-Prince has been unable to corroborate claims of reprisals against repatriated emigrants. (S/NF)

#### **Seeking To Consolidate Power**


De facto Prime Minister Marc Bazin and other politicians hope to nullify Aristide's international legitimacy and are maneuvering to impeach him with the intention of holding a new presidential election that excludes his candidacy. It is unlikely, however, that any impeachment process over the next few months would provide Bazin or an elected successor with substantially greater international legitimacy. Impeachment probably could be achieved only through the intimidation of Aristide's supporters in the legislature and conspicuous constitutional chicanery. (S/NF)

#### **Negotiating Positions**

##### **Military Attitudes**

Moderate armed forces chief Raoul Cedras and other top military leaders, fearing the new US administration may be less tolerant of their intransigence, recently have shown greater interest in pursuing a negotiated settlement. They prefer to concede only a figurehead role for Aristide as president in absentia, but continue to oppose his return to Haiti. Cedras and moderate associates are constrained by strong opposition in the military to a compromise. Cedras' authority over such senior officers as chief of staff Philippe Biamby and police chief Michel Francois is

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Although the authority of commanders has increased somewhat since then, we believe there is a substantial danger that enlisted personnel would again resort to extreme violence if they believed their leaders were prepared to accept Aristide's return. There is some chance that their fears could be assuaged if their security were guaranteed by an international peacekeeping force. Haitian military leaders have stated that they would have confidence only in forces in which the United States played a major role. (S NF)

#### **Civilian Positions**

Hardline attitudes in the military will continue to be reinforced by some rightwing civilian politicians and wealthy businessmen. Aristide's intransigence and the de facto government's inability to get the embargo lifted have raised the hopes of rightists and former Duvalierists and have eroded the credibility of Bazin, his foreign minister, and other regime moderates. Ex-President Leslie Manigat and Mobilization for National Development leader Hubert de Ronceray in particular hope to enlist the support of rightist military figures to advance their own presidential ambitions. Rightwing civilians have bribed enlisted personnel in key military units to support their interests, and will continue to do so. (S NF)

limited. He has been able to rein in the personal ambitions and competing interests of his subordinates by playing them off against each other and presenting himself as the officer most capable of dealing with the United States. But he would be increasingly vulnerable to such rightist subordinates if he were to show signs of agreeing to Aristide's return. (S NF)


Although we have no recent information about the attitudes of most enlisted and noncommissioned personnel, we believe they remain antagonistic to and fearful of the deposed President. Agitated enlisted personnel initiated the 1991 coup without high command connivance, and limited command and control over them was only reestablished after Cedras and other leaders belatedly joined the rebels. (S NF)

#### **Aristide's Approach to Negotiations**


Aristide has recently shown some flexibility, stating publicly that he would accept a prime minister from the "opposition" to run the government, grant general amnesty to the Army except for a "small group" of coup leaders who would be removed, and welcome observers from the OAS and UN. These

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positions appear to modify his heretofore intransigent stance. But he has reneged on earlier compromises and remains adamant that Cedras must be removed (



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We believe that a viable and enduring negotiated settlement is unlikely in the absence of substantial and continuing external pressure or inducements affecting one or more of the parties. Without a negotiated settlement, we believe that some coalition of anti-Aristide forces will remain in power through the period of this Estimate. Bazin hopes he can shore up his position in mid-January when legislative byelections are scheduled, but they will not improve his legitimacy at home or abroad. (S ~~XF~~)

His relations with the military are increasingly strained, however, and there is a good chance that he will leave office voluntarily or be forced out. In either event, we believe a successor regime would be less amenable to US influence and more repressive. The economy would continue to contract, and emigrants would have greater incentive to leave for the United States. (S ~~XF~~)

**If the Embargo Were Terminated**

Bazin's position would be strengthened if the OAS embargo were terminated without progress toward a negotiated settlement, and the threat of a rightist takeover would at least temporarily be postponed. Such a development would remove much of the pressure on the economy and would slow inflation, permitting a gradual recovery. Even so, large-scale international food programs would still be required. (S ~~XF~~)

Ending the embargo would also remove virtually all incentive for the de facto regime to reach an accord with Aristide, whose popular appeal would remain high and wane only slowly. His supporters would see the United

States as having sold them out, and there would be some possibility of increased violence directed at the regime and perhaps at US targets [REDACTED]

**If a Blockade Were Imposed**

Neither tightened sanctions nor a blockade alone would lead to the quick capitulation of the de facto regime to demands for Aristide's return. UN-mandated sanctions would make circumvention more difficult but not impossible, since many Third World governments lack the resources to enforce compliance, and rogue suppliers of oil could be found. Interdicting fuel deliveries would create more severe hardships within three to four months, strangling what is left of the modern economy, worsening food shortages, and crippling the distribution of humanitarian aid outside of port cities. Nevertheless, elites and soldiers fearful of Aristide's restoration would at first believe they could beat the blockade, changing their minds only as rapid economic decline began to threaten widespread instability, increasing the flow of seaborne emigrants to the United States. (S ~~XF~~)

**If Pressure on Aristide Is Increased**

Until recently, few pressures or inducements have been employed by the international community to persuade Aristide to compromise. By themselves, impeachment or denial

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of access to official Haitian funds held overseas would probably not cause him to capitulate. If the United States and other countries were about to withdraw from the embargo and recognize the de facto regime or if he believed US patience with his intransigence were about to expire, there is a good chance he would again agree to a settlement like the Washington Protocol. (~~S/NF~~)

#### **If the Military Is Threatened**

The credible threat of force to restore Aristide could persuade Cedras and other military officers to reach a deal that would preserve their own interests. They would also continue, nonetheless, to place a high priority on the viability of the military and the safety of its personnel. Aristide would exploit the threat of intervention to avoid compromise. If he returned to Haiti through the use of force, many enlisted personnel would likely desert fearing reprisals, and the Army (including the police) would probably then be unable to play any significant role in upholding law and order. (~~S/NF~~)

#### **What Would an International Peacekeeping Force Encounter?**

Any credible international military force would face little or no organized opposition from Haitian military personnel. If an intervention occurred in the absence of a negotiated settlement supported by military leaders, we believe Haitian units would dissolve or retreat (see map). In the event a settlement were negotiated that did not provide for Aristide's imminent return, the military would probably remain in place and could play a useful role in preserving public order:

- Many officers are US trained, and most have a positive view of the United States;

in any event, we believe the general staff would be unlikely to order resistance.

- Enlisted personnel are poorly trained and equipped; morale is generally low and many are corrupt.
- The primary ground units—the Heavy Weapons Company and the Headquarters' Defense Unit—have not exercised together in years and would have difficulty organizing resistance even if ordered to do so. (~~S/NF~~)

Nonetheless, individuals and small groups of military personnel would probably engage in sporadic firing on foreign forces. Casualties would most likely be inflicted by a few competent and well-trained officers and non-commissioned personnel stationed in rural areas where they would have better prospects of conducting small unit ambushes or guerrilla-type actions. Such retaliation would probably be short lived, however, as combatants would have no access to logistics or communications. (~~S/NF~~)

Once consolidated, an international peacekeeping force would confront formidable challenges that would be greatly magnified after Aristide were restored to power. Haitian military leaders and their civilian allies probably would demand that foreign forces remain as long as Aristide or an ally were in office. (His presidential term ends in February 1996.) (~~S/NF~~)


Foreign forces concentrated in Port-au-Prince and coastal towns would probably have little difficulty maintaining order, but the densely populated countryside is relatively inaccessible. Violence between Aristide's supporters and enemies there would be likely

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Figure 2  
Military Departments and Urban/Rural Population





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unless large numbers of peacekeepers were stationed throughout the country. Finally, once there, a peacekeeping force would probably have to remain in Haiti for an extended period as wholly or substantially new security services were created, trained, and supplied through international efforts. (S NF)




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
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