

The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

25

31 October 1986

The Honorable Alton G. Keel, Jr.  
Deputy Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs  
The White House  
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. Keel:

Thank you for your note. I read the draft NSDD and have a number of observations and comments.

This workplan is welcome because, though daunting, it is essential and long overdue.

Assignment of this workplan to the JCS seems appropriate. I am particularly pleased to see that the issue of risk will be included in the JCS' work.

At the same time, there is some important other work needed as companions to the JCS' effort.

- One is an assessment by the DCI of the USSR's intentions and capacity, both military and economic, to satisfy its own national strategy and strategic force objectives. We also need to look at the intentions and potential capabilities of the significant number of other countries which either currently have, or could obtain, ballistic missiles.
- One is an assessment by the DCI of the intelligence resources needed to monitor Soviet compliance with both the 50 percent reduction in strategic offensive forces and the elimination of offensive ballistic missiles, as well as the resulting changes in the USSR's military.
- And it may be useful for State to provide an assessment of the diplomatic steps necessary to achieve US objectives.

OK

OK

No

The issue of Soviet breakout from the transition to a different world must be added. This breakout could occur from Soviet cheating (by covertly retaining ballistic missiles which should have been destroyed) or by conversion back to weapons use of ballistic missiles earlier converted to space-launch applications.

no fix


The initial and final reports ought to include an assessment of how the recommended courses of action, when adopted by the President, can and will be meshed with the ongoing budgetary planning of the Executive Branch and the Congress.

no

*Wafix*  
Meanwhile, we must be careful not to let our dialogue with the Soviets, or our Allies, get ahead of our understanding of our strategic needs.

*OK*  
The classification should be raised to TOP SECRET/NOFORN, with access severely limited to those who must know and assist in the work. The impact of the document's unauthorized disclosure, much less that of the reports themselves, would be extremely damaging.

Sincerely,



William J. Casey