

~~SECRET
CONTROLLED DISSEM~~

SNIE 14.2-67
29 February 1968

Hoffman

S. M. ...

Cy 7 To ...

3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: OCT 2001

MEMORANDUM TO HOLDERS
SPECIAL
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
NUMBER 14.2-67

100-278
3

North Korean Intentions and Capabilities With Respect to South Korea

Submitted by

Richard Helms

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Concurred in by the
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

As indicated overleaf
29 February 1968

Authenticated:

James A. Layton
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, USIB

~~SECRET
CONTROLLED DISSEM~~

No 1

~~SECRET~~

The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate:

The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, and the NSA.

Concurring:

Dr. Edward W. Proctor, for the Deputy Director, Central Intelligence

Mr. George C. Denney, Jr., for the Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State

Vice Adm. Vernon L. Lowrance, for the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

Lt. Gen. Marshall S. Carter, the Director, National Security Agency

Abstaining:

Mr. Howard C. Brown, the Assistant General Manager, Atomic Energy Commission and Mr. William O. Cregar, for the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, the subject being outside of their jurisdiction.

~~WARNING~~

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited.

~~GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

NORTH KOREAN INTENTIONS AND CAPABILITIES WITH RESPECT TO SOUTH KOREA, dated 21 September 1967

1. Events since last September tend to confirm the conclusions of SNIE 14.2-67, that North Korean activities will include a campaign of military harassment in the DMZ area, continued attempts to infiltrate guerrilla teams, and the dispatch of terrorist and sabotage missions. The raid on the Blue House represents the most dramatic and flagrant manifestation of the campaign begun in late 1966 to disrupt political order in South Korea, to tie down large ROK forces, and to encourage insurgency in the South. North Korean handling of the *Pueblo* crisis reflects an intention to heighten tensions and exploit US preoccupations with Vietnam. Kim Il-song's recent speeches indicate he is still determined to maintain a bellicose posture.

2. These developments have hardened Seoul's attitude and increased the likelihood of a major ROK reaction to North Korean harassments. The North Koreans probably believe that the US will impose restraints on the ROK and will be reluctant to escalate its own responses in Korea. The North Koreans now probably see great and continuing opportunities to exacerbate relations between Seoul and Washington.

3. We continue to believe that Pyongyang realizes that an intensification of incidents and attacks could escalate to the point of open warfare. We still estimate, however, that North Korea does not plan to invade South Korea and will not deliberately provoke hostilities on a scale which would amount to a resumption of the war.

4. Nevertheless, the general situation in Korea is more dangerous than it was last fall, since the possibilities of miscalculation are greater. The North Korean attitude is more openly truculent than at any time since 1953. The raid against the Presidential residence indicates that the North Koreans are willing to run high risks; they must have been aware that assassination of President Pak would have provoked a major ROK retaliation. They may be counting heavily on US preoccupation with Vietnam, and on the deterrent value of their own mutual defense treaties with China and the Soviet Union.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

5. We believe that North Korea is pursuing an independent policy. Pyongyang probably does not consult with Moscow and Peking on the tactical development of its policy against the ROK and the US. North Korea's relations with China are cool, and thus Peking's influence is quite limited. In any event, we believe Peking does not want to be involved in a new Korean War at this juncture. As for the USSR, recent events have probably forced it to pay somewhat more attention to developments in Korea. We believe that the USSR does not want a major war in the area. In the event of a crisis in Korea, the Soviets would probably be reluctant to apply immediate pressures on Pyongyang, lest they jeopardize the position they have built up there. And in any case their influence would not necessarily be decisive. However, we believe that if major hostilities seemed imminent the USSR would try to exert some restraint over North Korea.

6. Additional evidence since our last estimate suggests that North Korea will continue its efforts to establish guerrilla bases in the South. But we believe that their prospects for success in this endeavor remain poor.

7. We now believe that the North Korean Navy has at least four "W"-class submarines, at least seven "KOMAR"-class guided missile boats and associated Styx missiles, and two "SHERSHEN"-class fast patrol boats. Eighteen surface-to-air missile (SA-2) sites, 14 of which are occupied, have been identified. Otherwise, the general level of equipment and strength of the North Korean forces is as described in Annex I of SNIE 14.2-67.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

DISSEMINATION NOTICE

1. This document was disseminated by the Central Intelligence Agency. This copy is for the information and use of the recipient and of persons under his jurisdiction on a need-to-know basis. Additional essential dissemination may be authorized by the following officials within their respective departments:

- a. Director of Intelligence and Research, for the Department of State
- b. Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, for the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
- c. Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, for the Department of the Army
- d. Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Intelligence), for the Department of the Navy
- e. Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, for the Department of the Air Force
- f. Director of Intelligence, AEC, for the Atomic Energy Commission
- g. Assistant Director, FBI, for the Federal Bureau of Investigation
- h. Director of NSA, for the National Security Agency
- i. Director of Central Reference, CIA, for any other Department or Agency

2. This document may be retained, or destroyed by burning in accordance with applicable security regulations, or returned to the Central Intelligence Agency by arrangement with the Office of Central Reference, CIA.

3. When this document is disseminated overseas, the overseas recipients may retain it for a period not in excess of one year. At the end of this period, the document should either be destroyed, returned to the forwarding agency, or permission should be requested of the forwarding agency to retain it in accordance with IAC-D-69/2, 22 June 1953.

4. The title of this document when used separately from the text should be classified: ~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

DISTRIBUTION:

White House
National Security Council
Department of State
Department of Defense
Atomic Energy Commission
Federal Bureau of Investigation