

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: OCT 2001

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs
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TCS #3082-65

ANNEX C

INCREASED COMMUNIST CAPABILITIES

FOR VIETNAM

- I. Recent intelligence has pointed to a continuing increase in the capabilities of the Viet Cong, the North Vietnamese, the Soviets, and the Chinese Communists for action in Vietnam.
- II. We continue to accumulate reports and evidence of re-training, re-grouping, and re-arming of the Viet Cong main force units, pointing to a probable new offensive when the rainy season starts this month.
 - A. A gradual increase in Viet Cong activity has been noted over the past few days.
 - B. The extensive arms cache discovered last week in Kien Hoa Province, southeast of Saigon in the delta, provided fresh evidence of a concerted program to modernize Viet Cong equipment and increase firepower. The cache had such items as Chinese Communist flame throwers and ammunition for 70 millimeter pack howitzers.
- III. A number of recent reports point to a step-up in training programs for North Vietnamese pilots.

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[REDACTED] Chinese fighter pilots are still stationed at Phuc Yen airfield near Hanoi, where the North Vietnamese MIGs are based. So far, the only activity by Chinese pilots in Vietnam that we have detected has been in a training role. Chinese

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pilots previously were last noted at Phuc Yen in late March, shortly after the first group of Vietnamese pilots to be trained in North Vietnam were thought to have completed their training.

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- B. According to a recent report from an untested source, Vietnamese pilots, radio operators, and radar specialists were being trained in Poland prior to last November.
- C. We know from Laotian pilots who have been in the Soviet Union that large groups of Vietnamese had been trained in the Soviet Union for several years prior to the Tonkin Gulf incidents last August, when many of the trainees were called home.
- D. The training of this many pilots and other specialists for aviation duties suggests that there must also be plans to make more combat aircraft available to the North Vietnamese. Our latest reconnaissance shows that they have a total of 44, all based at Phuc Yen.

IV. Recent photographic analysis indicates that the North Vietnamese are engaged in construction at several other airfields -- probably to use them as recovery or dispersal bases. New revetments, with exhaust vent slits indicating that they are meant for jets -- are under construction at four airfields.

- A. At least 20 revetments are being built at Phuc Yen, in a dispersal area some four miles from the main runway. A taxi-way is being built to connect the revetments with the base.

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- B. At the Haiphong Cat Bi airfield, eight revetted hardstands are being built.
 - C. At Kep, a small airfield about 40 miles northeast of Hanoi, two new revetments and a new taxi-way are being built, and several older revetments and the short sod runway are being improved.
 - D. At Vinh, in the southern part of the country, 25 new revetments are completed or under construction.
 - E. Neither Vinh nor Kep is considered capable of sustained jet fighter operations, but they could extend the combat time of fighter missions in emergencies by affording additional dispersal and recovery bases.
- V. Our latest photography shows that the surface-to-air missile site 15 miles from Saigon is virtually complete, but still had no equipment in evidence at that time.

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VI.

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since at least May 5, there have been restrictions on the movement of both passengers and freight on the main north-south rail lines in Communist China. The restrictions apparently apply to the lines from Shanghai to Canton and from Peiping to Canton.

A. These restrictions may be of short duration. [REDACTED]

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B.

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C. The restrictions appear consistent with priority movement of military equipment across China to North Vietnam, and a desire to shield these movements from view. A speculation is that this could reflect the expected movement of Soviet surface-to-air missile equipment across China. There is as yet no evidence of any Chinese troop movements.


VII.

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A.

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- B. There is also evidence that the Soviets, to ensure prompt and reliable communications with shipping in the area of Vietnam, have reinstated a system they used once before in Cuban waters at the time of the 1962 missile crisis. Apparently one specific ship is designated as a "communications duty ship," maintaining a 24-hour watch, and all other shipping in the area is to maintain contact. If any ship then loses communication with stations in the USSR, messages will be relayed by the duty ship.