


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The WEEKLY REVIEW, issued every Friday morning by the Office of Current Intelligence, reports and analyzes significant developments of the week through noon on Thursday. It frequently includes material coordinated with or prepared by the Office of Economic Research, the Office of Strategic Research, and the Directorate of Science and Technology. Topics requiring more comprehensive treatment and therefore published separately as Special Reports are listed in the contents pages.

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
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
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
SINO-SOVIET TALKS RESUME INAUSPICIOUSLY IN PEKING 10
Because of the virulence of recent Chinese polemical assaults on the USSR, Soviet diplomats in Peking are less sanguine than before about prospects for early progress in discussions, which resumed this week.

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
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SINO-SOVIET TALKS RESUME INAUSPICIOUSLY IN PEKING

The second round of the Peking border talks opened this week accompanied by rising propaganda exchanges and a thinly veiled war of nerves. Soviet delegation head Kuznetsov returned to Peking on 2 January and talks reportedly resumed three days later. Unlike his reception last October, Kuznetsov was met at the airport by only lower ranking members of the Chinese delegation, almost certainly because the Chinese wanted to demonstrate their unhappiness over his two-and-a-half week stay in Moscow. The announcement by the New China News Agency (NCNA) of his departure last month had pointedly stated that he would be gone only about a week.

Kuznetsov's arrival was preceded by strident Chinese polemical assaults against Moscow, apparently designed to show that Peking's resolve had not lessened and that it would continue its tough stance at the talks. An authoritative editorial on 31 December denounced Soviet party leader Brezhnev by name for the first time since the Chou-Kosygin meeting in September. On the very eve of the resumption of the talks, NCNA once again blasted the Soviet leadership, accusing it of pursuing policies of nuclear blackmail.

For its part, Moscow relaxed its own polemical restraint and, while not matching Peking's stridency, attacked China more openly and directly than at any time since the talks began. In addition, some of the more vicious anti-Mao

propaganda tracts, which had disappeared from Moscow's bookstores after the Kosygin-Chou meeting, are reported to be reappearing. The Soviets probably intend that Peking should interpret the shift as a sign that their patience with the lack of progress is wearing thin.

The resumption of Soviet polemics, even with a less abrasive tone than before the talks began, could also be intended to prepare the Soviet domestic audience in case the negotiations do not reach an acceptable conclusion. Reports from Peking indicate that Soviet diplomats there have been taken aback by the virulence of the recent Chinese polemical assaults, and appear less sanguine than before about prospects for early progress in the discussions.

Kuznetsov reportedly will be making new efforts to move the talks along but there has been no hint that either side is ready to give on matters of principle. A commentary in Hungary's party journal Nepszabados probably reflected Moscow's view when it warned against "exaggerated expectations" for the negotiations, but indicated that the talks would be considered useful even if they resulted only in a cessation of border incidents and a "normalization to some extent" of relations between the two states. Although the talks do appear to have contributed to the cessation of border clashes, relations between the two countries have yet to show any significant improvement. [REDACTED]