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POLITICO-MILITARY CONTINGENCY PLAN

HAITI

(Drafted June 24, 1966; Revised October 11, 1966)

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Mandatory Review
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I. Summary

This contingency plan for Haiti conceives of two categories of contingencies:

- (1) Duvalier falls from power and unacceptable Haitians achieve dominance; and
- (2) Duvalier remains in office but Communists or other unacceptable Haitians mount a potentially successful operation to overthrow him.

An external attack on Haiti involving a few guerrillas could occur without detection or interception by the United States and therefore might be in a position to succeed before we are able to react. Similarly, the overthrow of Duvalier and his replacement by an unacceptable successor could occur without giving us needed reaction time.

Very little military force is needed to take the capital and no other single city or area is necessary to control the existing governmental organizations of Haiti. The introduction of even a small military force in Port-au-Prince would therefore be a major, if not decisive, influence on the crisis situation. The employment of a US military force is contemplated to prevent a Communist government from controlling Haiti and, if necessary, to evacuate American and other foreign nationals whose lives are threatened.

Duvalier's successor will probably seek our military and/or economic assistance to stabilize his regime, but withholding that assistance would not necessarily insure his downfall.

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III. The Problem

The US may be confronted with two basic types of situations involving Haiti: a) loss of control by Duvalier with resulting internal chaos; and b) his removal from the scene by natural causes or otherwise. In such eventualities we may be faced with decisions regarding the possible deployment of US forces in order to protect the lives of Americans and third country nationals, in order to influence a successor government, or both. Having an important bearing on our decision would be the attitude of the OAS toward participating in or sanctioning such actions and the extent to which any unilateral steps the US might take could commit us to an unacceptable degree in a long term, costly involvement in Haiti's internal situation.

IV. US Objectives in the Area

1. Deny Haiti to Communist domination, control or significant influence.
2. Prevent the loss of American and third country-national lives.
3. Prevent further deterioration in Haiti's political, economic, and social life.
4. Establish law and order and respect for civil liberties in Haiti.

V. Assumptions

1. The Dominican Republic will not invade Haiti or openly support efforts to overthrow Duvalier during the foreseeable future.
2. A permanent IAPF will not have been established.
3. Duvalier will not significantly ameliorate the undesirable characteristics of his regime.

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VI. The Situation

A. The Political-Military Equation

The Duvalier regime is a brutal dictatorship that has successfully eliminated all major internal opposition, cowed potential enemies and rendered itself relatively immune from external pressures. Duvalier has eliminated virtually all professional military officers. (Police functions have always been and continue to be performed by the military.) Enjoying some popularity with the rural masses, Duvalier created a "volunteer militia" as a counter to the military but does not permit the military nor the militia to have access to more than token quantities of arms and ammunition. He created an armed terror group known as the Ton Ton Macoutes whose organization and command are obscure but which is clearly responsive to Duvalier's will. Money to pay for Duvalier's security apparatus is extracted from legal and extralegal taxation, from "contributions" from those granted special privileges and from outright extortion and gangsterism. The economy continues to decline, but Duvalier is still able to obtain the resources necessary to maintain his rule.

Haiti's two Communist parties, the principal organized opposition to Duvalier within Haiti, do not currently at least have the membership, leadership, organization and capabilities necessary to move to overthrow Duvalier, nor could they be expected at the outset to assume a strong position in a post-Duvalier struggle for power. In either case they would require the support of the military, militia, or the TMM's. It is unlikely that they could attract such support openly, though they would no doubt try to infiltrate any group that has the potential to succeed Duvalier. If they should receive substantial assistance from an international Communist organization in the form of trained men and funds, they could be expected to play a more significant role in a struggle for power. Communist-trained Haitian exiles living in Cuba and elsewhere are capable of invading Haiti if given adequate support and Castro's Cuba is capable of

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providing it. While an open invasion of Haiti would probably be immediately known to us, small groups of infiltrators from Cuba could enter Haiti clandestinely without detection by the United States. (See Annex 4.)

There is at present no effective force in Haiti prepared to overthrow Duvalier. Unless an external force is supported by a third country, Duvalier will probably be succeeded, at least initially, by one or more persons, including military personnel, who are close to the Duvalier center of power. Duvalier's entourage includes some persons who are probably Communists. Dissatisfaction of his key followers might lead to Duvalier's overthrow, a power struggle, or at the least a period of chaos and anarchy. A prolonged power struggle would be apt to result in chaos which might threaten American lives in Haiti. A prolonged power struggle might also tempt internal Communists or Castro's Cuba to influence the result, perhaps making a bid for complete control.

Except in the unlikely event that Communist countries would be prepared to provide the required resources, potential or actual successors to Duvalier will seek United States economic and possibly military assistance for their successor governments.

In considering requests for long-term support, account should be taken of the country's ability to use development assistance effectively.

B. Summary of Possible Developments of the Situation

1. Duvalier falls: an acceptable successor assumes control of the country. (Contingency A)
2. Duvalier falls: an undesirable non-Communist individual or group assumes control of the country. (Contingency B)
3. Duvalier falls: a struggle for power ensues among non-Communist groups. (Contingency C)
4. Duvalier remains in office: though anarchy and chaos occur, no group moves to take power. (Contingency D)
5. Duvalier remains in office: a Cuban supported force of Cuban trained Haitians invades or attempts to invade. (Contingency E)

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6. Duvalier remains in office: an initially unidentifiable force infiltrates Haiti. If it were a well planned Communist infiltration it might well go undetected and unintercepted and could, therefore, succeed with surprising speed. (Contingency F)

7. Duvalier falls: a Communist or Communist-dominated group of Haitians in Haiti threatens to succeed to power. (Contingency G)

8. Duvalier falls: a Communist or Communist-dominated group of Haitians in Haiti succeeds to power. (Contingency H)

C. Key Issues

1. Use of military force to prevent Communist or other unacceptable government from achieving or maintaining power.

2. Influencing a Haitian crisis by a military-supported evacuation operation.

Any landing of United States military forces in Haiti, even to evacuate Americans and third-country nationals, will influence the crisis, perhaps decisively. Rapid withdrawal would not return the situation to the status quo ante and we would be held responsible for the result in hemisphere opinion. Therefore, a key issue will be whether to withdraw the troops upon completion of evacuation or to maintain them in Haiti to control the situation.

3. Encouraging and assisting acceptable Haitian exiles to try to form a part of a new Government in Haiti.

D. Factors governing U.S. decisions

1. Conditions under which use of unilateral US military force is contemplated

Unilateral military force is contemplated:

a. in an E & F operation when commercial evacuation is not feasible because present Haitian security forces could not effectively cope with widespread violence threatening American lives.

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b. in an external attack upon Haiti by Communist forces since Haiti is not able to defend itself against a well organized and determined attack. Other OAS members might join us in the defense of Haiti from external aggression but this is not certain.

c. in an internal and relatively non-violent assumption of power by Communists, because means short of military force would not prevent a Communist state and a multilateral force under OAS sponsorship in this situation is unlikely. In this situation, a military evacuation of Americans might be the means of introducing the US force.

2. Intelligence on possible infiltration from abroad

Since there is no AID mission in Haiti, U.S. Government personnel are resident only in the areas of Cap Haitien and Port-au-Prince. Embassy and Defense attache personnel travel to other parts of the country with some frequency

Our Embassy would probably learn of a palace revolution or trouble within the Duvalier regime within eight hours after the event but it might not learn of a foreign infiltration in isolated areas any sooner than the Duvalier Government. Although it is unlikely it is possible that Duvalier himself might not know of it for a considerable time following the infiltration. OAS members states would probably not accept and act upon intelligence presented by the Duvalier Government unless it were substantiated by their own embassies or by documentary evidence we are able to produce.

3. Willingness of the OAS to act in a Haitian crisis

The OAS would probably muster the necessary majority to sanction military intervention and economic pressures on Haiti in the event of a Communist invasion, infiltration or subversion if clear, convincing and publishable intelligence could be provided the OAS showing that Communists are, in fact, controlling or dominating the operation. The OAS would probably sanction operations not involving military intervention such as fact-finding commissions, cease fire supervisory groups and the like in crisis situations even in the absence of convincing proof of Communist involvement.

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4. The Problems of acceptability of a Duvalier successor

Few Haitians who might succeed Duvalier are likely to be wholly desirable rulers of Haiti. Those who can be identified as acceptable (see listing in Annex 3) are mostly in exile and have probably lost much of their following in the country. They could not by themselves form a viable government and would therefore have to be allied with less acceptable or unknown Haitians. Haitian exiles cannot be kept out of Haiti once Duvalier falls and regardless of what we do many including acceptable ones would return hoping to enter a new government. U.S. encouragement and assistance to those considered acceptable would improve their prospects of success but would not insure them.

5. Reestablishment of public safety capability

Once a reasonable degree of control of Haiti has been established by a successor regime we consider acceptable, it will require our assistance in reorganizing its public safety forces. Prior to the Duvalier regime police functions were performed by the Haitian military who, in fact, have not had any other achievable mission. Duvalier has greatly weakened the military forces and created a rival voluntary militia to counterbalance it. Reestablishment of a public safety capability will involve delicate political decisions.

/II. Courses of Action

(see following spread sheets)

CONTINGENCY A: Duvalier falls: an acceptable successor assumes control of the country

ESTIMATED DEVELOPMENT OF THE SITUATION

Immediate Developments - Internal	Reaction in other IA Countries	Soviet, Cuban and Comcon Reaction	Potential Dangers
<p>Tension and some civil disorders may develop as the new Government consolidates its position.</p>	<p>Generally favorable or disinterested. If widespread violence occurs and lives are lost, some IA countries will be concerned for the safety of their nationals in Haiti.</p>	<p>Cuba attempts by use of propaganda to weaken or destroy the new Government in order to increase Communist influence.</p>	<p>Government unable to consolidate its position; power struggle occurs. Undesirable concessions to Communists. Cuba may attempt to infiltrate agents and supplies into Haiti. Threats to American lives.</p>

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CONTINGENCY A: Duvalier falls: an acceptable successor assumes control of the country

SPECIFIC UNITED STATES OBJECTIVES AND ACTIONS

Objectives	Political-Economic Actions	Military Actions	Other Actions
<p>The establishment of a stable, progressive government.</p>	<p>Point out to the new Haitian government that it must impose immigration controls in Haiti if it wishes to prevent the return of Communists and other exiles who would be a disruptive influence in Haiti.</p> <p>Urge the new government to adopt economic and social policies to reverse the general declining trend of the Haitian economy; urge a commitment to return to a freely-elected government; urge it to curb the violence and excesses which characterized the Duvalier regime including abolishing the TTM's and VSN.</p> <p>Discuss possible US assistance. Keep United States plans and Haitian expectations at a very low level in view of the inherent limitations upon (a) the stability of any Haitian regime and (b) the ability of Haiti to make effective use of external assistance.</p> <p>Grant recognition to the new government after consultation with Latin American governments.</p> <p>Undertake a broad informational campaign to explain events and enlist support for US policies and actions.</p>	<p>Initiate surveillance of air space and seas around Haiti and be prepared to interdict to prevent Cuba-based Communists from infiltrating Haiti.</p> <p>If military assistance is requested and a decision is made to grant it, keep it at a modest level, aimed at improving capabilities to maintain law and order and to provide essential services.</p>	<p>Urge selected Haitian exiles to exert influence to achieve the necessary control and to adopt certain economic and social measures as suggested by the U.S.</p>

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CONTINGENCY A: Duvalier falls: an acceptable successor assumes control of the country

POSSIBLE RESULTS/REACTIONS TO U.S. COURSES OF ACTION		
Internal	International	Communist
New Government begins process of reform and development in order to attract US and international assistance and private investment and to increase tourism.	If new Government undertakes reforms, reaction will be favorable. Some additional LA governments may establish diplomatic relations with Haiti. Rest of free world will have little or no reaction to new Government.	Propaganda attempts to paint new Government as US -puppet.

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CONTINGENCY B: Duvalier falls: An undesirable non-Communist individual or group assumes control of the country

ESTIMATED DEVELOPMENT OF THE SITUATION			
Immediate Developments - Internal	Reaction in Other LA Countries	Soviet, Cuban and Chicom Reaction	Potential Dangers
Tension and some civil disorders may develop as the new government consolidates its position.	Reaction, if any, will be minimal. If widespread violence occurs and lives are lost, some LA countries will be concerned for the safety of their nationals in Haiti.	Mount strong anti-US propaganda campaign.	Outbreaks of violence. Regime follows policies promoting violence and repression. Cuba may attempt to infiltrate agents and supplies into Haiti. Threats to American lives.

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CONTINGENCY B: Duvalier falls: an undesirable non-Communist individual or group assumes control of the country.

SPECIFIC UNITED STATES OBJECTIVES AND ACTIONS

Objectives	Political-Economic Actions	Military Actions	Other Actions
<p>Attempt to influence the government to eliminate its undesirable characteristics, using means short of US military action.</p>	<p>Consult with other LA countries concerning Haitian situation.</p> <p>Maintain US presence in Haiti. Discuss with the government means of making it acceptable including as a <u>guid pro quo</u> US assistance.</p>	<p>Conduct air and sea surveillance of the area and be prepared to interdict to prevent Cuba-based Communists from infiltrating Haiti.</p>	<p>Obtain the assistance of the Haitian exile leaders to utilize their media in support of U.S. policies.</p>
<p>A cessation of acts of violence against American lives.</p>	<p>If the government takes action against US citizens or is unable to prevent attacks on American lives, implement the E & E plan by commercial means, if possible. In advance of such action notify LA heads of state of the planned evacuation, inform them (and other countries having citizens in Haiti) that the US will assist in protecting their nationals should a military evacuation be required.</p>	<p>Implement approved evacuation plan if commercial transportation is not possible.</p> <p>Send to Haiti a US force capable of evacuating US citizens. Withdraw force at earliest opportunity.</p>	
	<p>Request an immediate meeting of the COAS to apprise the members of the situation and to request convocation of an MM under Articles 39 and 40 of the Charter, to seek approval for joint action to protect lives of foreign nationals.</p>		
	<p>Undertake a broad informational campaign to explain events and enlist support for US policies and actions.</p>		
	<p>If a UN Security Council meeting is called, defend US actions and urge that the matter be left with the OAS. SYG of the OAS should inform the Security Council of the OAS actions being taken. If there is substantial pressure for debating the issue in the UNGA, assess carefully the political implications of opposing it.</p>		

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CONTINGENCY B: Duvalier falls: an undesirable non-Communist individual or group assumes control of the country

POSSIBLE RESULTS/REACTIONS TO U.S. COURSES OF ACTION

Internal	International	Communist
<p>Government demands "no strings attached" aid; fails to abide by conditions for granting aid. May take action against US interests such as travel restrictions and discriminatory actions against US firms.</p> <p>Government might permit non-Communist Cuban exiles to use Haitian territory to carry out actions against Cuba.</p>	<p>Many IA governments may refuse to recognize the new government if it clearly tied to Duvalier supporters. They may criticize US efforts to deal with new government. US may face criticism in Europe and elsewhere for dealing with "unacceptable" regime.</p> <p>If evacuation required and undertaken subsequent to OAS notification, IA reaction will be generally acquiescent to this action to save US and foreign lives provided US forces are limited in number and withdraw upon completion of the evacuation.</p>	<p>Communists undertake propaganda campaign to discredit US.</p> <p>If US recognizes government and grants economic assistance, Communists cite this as example of US support for "oppressor" governments. If US undertakes evacuation, Communists use this as example of "military intervention."</p> <p>Communists may take issue to UN, particularly if non-Communist Cuban exiles associated with new government plan actions against Cuba.</p>

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CONTINGENCY C: Duvalier falls: a struggle for power ensues among non-Communist groups.

ESTIMATED DEVELOPMENT OF THE SITUATION			
Immediate Developments - Internal	Reaction in other IA Countries	Soviet, Cuban and Chicom Reaction	Potential Dangers
<p>Disagreement among factions over who occupies positions of power.</p> <p>Substantial violence, looting and destruction of property.</p> <p>Some fighting among followers of contending leaders, but not a full-scale military confrontation.</p>	<p>Some concern and uncertainty, particularly among the Caribbean countries; some fear that US might intervene.</p>	<p>Cuba may infiltrate one of the factions with Haitian exiles and/or third country nationals (probably from the DR) in an effort to influence the outcome.</p>	<p>Communist (Cuban-based) intervention or active subversion.</p> <p>Threats to American lives.</p> <p>Unpredictable influence on the political situation in the DR.</p> <p>Development into full-scale military confrontation or civil war.</p>

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SPECIFIC UNITED STATES OBJECTIVES AND ACTIONS

Objectives	Political-Economic Actions	Military Actions	Other Actions
<p>An end to violence.</p>	<p>Consult with other IA countries concerning Haitian situation.</p>	<p>Conduct air and sea surveillance of the area and be prepared to interdict to prevent Cuba-based Communists from infiltrating Haiti.</p>	<p>Arrange for the return to Haiti of responsible Haitian exiles who may have a popular following in Haiti and who have governmental, labor, and administrative experience. These same people could assist in preventing Haitian Communists from taking over.</p>
<p>The emergence of an acceptable stable non-Communist government.</p>	<p>Alert the Dominican Republic, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana, Barbados, each of the Leeward and Windward Islands, Guadeloupe, Martinique, the Netherlands Indies, the Central American republics, Panama, and Venezuela to the possibility that Communist groups may attempt to dispatch Haitian Communist exiles from these territories to Haiti in order to take advantage of the situation in Haiti.</p>	<p>Implement approved evacuation plan if commercial transportation is not possible. Send to Haiti a force capable of evacuating US citizens.</p>	<p>Assist Haitian exiles with radio and press experience to obtain influential positions in the public information media field inside Haiti to promote U.S. interests.</p>
<p>Protection of American lives.</p>	<p>We may encourage acceptable Haitian exiles to return to Haiti to assist in establishing a stable government.</p>	<p>Withdraw forces at earliest opportunity unless these troops are committed by the US Government as a part of an OAS sponsored peace keeping force.</p>	<p>Assist Haitian exiles with radio and press experience to obtain influential positions in the public information media field inside Haiti to promote U.S. interests.</p>
<p></p>	<p>If American lives are threatened, implement the E & E plan by commercial means if possible. In advance of such action, notify IA heads of state of the planned evacuation, inform them (and other countries having citizens in Haiti) that the US will assist in protecting their nationals should a military evacuation be required.</p>	<p></p>	<p></p>
<p></p>	<p>Pursuant to prior consultation with OAS members, request an immediate meeting of the COAS to apprise members of the situation and to request either convocation</p>	<p></p>	<p></p>

COMPETENCY C: Duvalier falls: a struggle for power ensues among non-Communist groups

SPECIFIC UNITED STATES OBJECTIVES AND ACTIONS

Objectives	Political-Economic Actions	Military Actions	Other Actions
	<p>of an EFM under Articles 39 and 40 of the Charter or invocation of the Rio Treaty, whichever seems preferable. In either case, seek initially OAS call for a cease fire, the dispatch of OAS representatives and, possibly, authorization of the use of military force for peace keeping purposes under the control of the OAS.</p> <p>If a UN Security Council meeting is called, explain US E & E action and urge that the Haitian problem be left with the OAS. SYG of the OAS should inform the Security Council of the OAS actions being taken. If there is substantial pressure for debating the issue in the UNGA, assess carefully the political implications of opposing it.</p> <p>If OAS action results in the formation of a provisional government, use the enforced peace to urge a commitment for a return to a freely elected Government and initiating sound economic and social measures.</p> <p>Undertake a broad informational campaign to explain events and enlist support for US policies and actions.</p>		

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CONTINGENCY C: Duvalier falls: a struggle for power ensues among non-Communist groups

REACTIONS/RESULTS OF U.S. COURSES OF ACTION		
Internal	International	Communist
<p>A group achieves reasonably clear control of the country and seeks economic and/or military assistance from the U.S. If assistance rejected or not forthcoming, new government is unable to consolidate its control and struggle for power among opposing groups breaks out again. One such group might be Communist controlled or supported.</p>	<p>Reaction of Free World generally favorable to OAS involvement.</p> <p>If there is military intervention with or without US troops, some popular criticism.</p>	<p>Anti-US propaganda.</p> <p>No direct involvement in the Haitian situation.</p>

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CONTINGENCY D: Duvalier remains in office: though anarchy and chaos occur, no group moves to take power

ESTIMATED DEVELOPMENT OF THE SITUATION			
Immediate Developments - Internal	Reactions in other IA Countries	Soviet, Cuban and Chicom Reactions	Potential Danfers
Though situation unclear, American lives appear seriously endangered.	Some concern and uncertainty, particularly among Caribbean countries; some fear that US might intervene.	Propagandize situation as peoples' struggle, whether organized Communist effort occurring or not; make most of Duvalier evils and US alleged acquiescence thereto.	Unpredictable influence on the political situation in the DR.

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CONTINGENCY D: Duvalier remains in office: though anarchy and chaos occur, no group moves to take power

SPECIFIC UNITED STATES OBJECTIVES AND ACTIONS

Objectives	Political-Economic Actions	Military Actions	Other Actions
<p>Protection of lives of US nationals.</p>	<p>Consult with other IA countries concerning Haitian situation.</p> <p>Consult with Dominican Republic, urging them not to do more than secure own borders.</p> <p>Consider whether to take matter to OAS and support non-military multilateral action to establish order in Haiti.</p> <p>If American lives are threatened, implement the E & E plan by commercial means if possible. In advance of such actions notify IA heads of state (and other countries having citizens in Haiti) that the US will assist in protecting their nationals should a military evacuation be required.</p> <p>Consider whether time has arrived to achieve the departure of Duvalier. If so decided,</p> <p>a. take immediate steps to locate and promote the formation of an acceptable government to replace him. Assure it of a reasonable degree of support if it achieves power.</p> <p>b. Urge Duvalier to leave Haiti in his own and his country's interest. Should he fail to depart consider whether to employ force to require him to do so.</p>	<p>Alert forces for evacuation of US nationals.</p>	<p>Encourage recognized Haitian exile groups to petition OAS to reestablish order.</p> <p>Consult with responsible Haitian exile leaders including former government officials to promote the formation of an acceptable government.</p> <p>Persuade local or exile Haitian emissaries to advise Duvalier, by return to Haiti if necessary, or through contacts in the military to leave the country for the good of the country. If Duvalier agrees to depart, arrange for the return to Haiti of responsible Haitian exiles who have a popular following in Haiti and have governmental, labor and administrative experience. These same people could assist in preventing Haitian Communists from taking over.</p> <p>Assist Haitian exiles with radio and press experience to obtain influential positions in the public information media field inside Haiti to promote U.S. interests.</p>

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CONTINGENCY D: Duvalier remains in office: though anarchy and chaos occur, no group moves to take power

POSSIBLE RESULTS/REACTIONS TO U.S. COURSES OF ACTION

Internal	International	Communist
<p>If US simply carried out evacuation exercise, internal situation affected but chaos/anarchy could begin again and Duvalier or one of his cohorts likely to eventually prevail.</p> <p>Duvalier might ask military evacuation force to remain and maintain order.</p>	<p>Some popular criticism of US along "imperialistic" theme but generally sympathy regarding humanitarian aspect of action.</p> <p>Widespread diplomatic support by free world nations.</p>	<p>Some anti-US Soviet-propaganda.</p> <p>Chinese condemnation of Duvalier; point made that original US "support" of him had "caused" intervention.</p> <p>Cuba urges through propaganda uprising against Duvalier.</p>

CONTINGENCY E: Duvalier remains in office: a Cuban supported force of Cuban trained Haitians invades or attempts to invade

ESTIMATED DEVELOPMENT OF THE SITUATION			
Immediate Developments - Internal	Reaction in other IA Countries	Soviet, Cuban and Chicom Reactions	Potential Danfers
<p>Duvalier requests US and/or OAS assistance.</p> <p>Groups within Haiti seize on this opportunity to try to assassinate Duvalier.</p> <p>Duvalier retreats to Palace and loses control of Port-au-Prince area.</p>	<p>Mixed reaction could be expected. Certain countries would advocate OAS action and others would publically say nothing and await US reaction.</p>	<p>Should the invasion be openly discussed in any international forum (UN-OAS) the Soviets would warn the US not to take any action against Cuba.</p> <p>Chicom reaction might be that of announcing readiness of Chicom volunteers to assist in freeing Haiti from imperialism of the US.</p> <p>Cuba intensifies pro-paganда urging Haitian people to rise against Duvalier though not admitting Cuban complicity in invasion.</p>	<p>Immediate USG military response to assist Duvalier would commit US to open support of an unsavory regime in Haiti.</p> <p>Threat of/or real invasion could cause Duvalier to panic and create a struggle within the government with subsequent chaos and disorder and no organized resistance to invasion force.</p> <p>A Communist oriented government could be established in Haiti.</p> <p>Threats to American lives.</p>

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CONTINGENCY E: Duvalier remains in office: a Cuban supported force of Cuban trained Haitians invades or attempts to invade

SPECIFIC UNITED STATES OBJECTIVES AND ACTIONS

Objectives	Political-Economic Actions	Military Actions	Other Actions
<p>Protection of US and foreign nationals in Haiti.</p>	<p>Consult with other LA countries concerning Haitian situation.</p>	<p>Implement air and sea surveillance operations and be prepared to interdict to prevent Cuban support of invasion force.</p>	<p>Publish list of Haitians training in Communist countries and re-publish broadcasts from Radio Havana which have urged the overthrow of Duvalier and the establishment of a peoples' government.</p>
<p>Prevention of the establishment of a Communist government in Haiti.</p>	<p>If American lives are threatened, implement the E & E plan by commercial means if possible. In advance of such action, notify LA heads of state (and other countries having citizens in Haiti) that the US will assist in protecting their nationals should a military evacuation be required.</p>	<p>Implement approved evacuation plan if commercial transportation is not possible. Send to Haiti a force capable of evacuating US citizens and other foreign nationals.</p>	<p>Consult with responsible Haitian exile leaders including former government officials to promote the formation of an acceptable government to succeed Duvalier.</p>
<p>Replacement of Duvalier with an acceptable regime.</p>	<p>Procure and assemble the best available evidence of outside Communist interference.</p> <p>Request immediate OAS action to obtain a resolution under the Rio Treaty recommending that governments of member states take individually or collectively such steps as may be necessary to defend a member state against invasion. This may include the dispatch of OAS representatives and an inter-American peace force.</p> <p>Urge the Latin American governments to act quickly on the OAS resolution.</p>	<p>Be prepared to provide military forces to an IAPP should the proposed resolution of the OAS sanction such a force.</p>	
	<p>If a UN Security Council meeting is called, explain US actions and urge that the Haitian problem be left with the OAS. SYG of the OAS should inform the Security Council of the OAS actions being taken. If there is substantial pressure for debating the issue in the UNGA, assess carefully the political implications of opposing it.</p>	<p>Be prepared to execute CINCLANTP contingency plan for Haiti should the OAS fail to take adequate action to prevent a Communist government from being formed in Haiti.</p>	

CONTINGENCY E: Duvalier remains in office: a Cuban supported force of Cuban trained Haitians invades or attempts to invade

SPECIFIC UNITED STATES OBJECTIVES AND ACTIONS

Objectives	Political-Economic Actions	Military Actions	Other Actions
	<p>Consider whether the time has arrived to achieve the departure of Duvalier. If so decided,</p> <p>a. take immediate steps to locate and promote the formation of an acceptable government to replace him. Assure it of a reasonable degree of support if it achieves power.</p> <p>b. Urge Duvalier to leave Haiti in his own and his country's interest. Should he fail to depart consider whether to employ force to require him to do so.</p> <p>c. If OAS action should result in the formation of a provisional government urge a commitment for a return to a freely elected government and the initiation of sound economic and social measures.</p> <p>Discuss possible US assistance. Keep US plans and Haitian expectations at a very low level in view of the inherent limitations upon (a) the stability of any Haitian regime and (b) the ability of Haiti to make effective use of external assistance.</p> <p>Undertake a broad informational campaign to explain events and enlist support for US policies and actions.</p>		

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CONTINGENCY E: Duvalier remains in office: a Cuban supported force of Cuban trained Haitians invade or attempts to invade

POSSIBLE RESULTS/REACTIONS TO U.S. COURSES OF ACTION

Internal	International	Communist
<p>Failure of the US to respond to Duvalier's request for assistance could result in a takeover by the Cuban sponsored invaders.</p>	<p>Probably sufficient support of OAS members could be obtained so that some countries would provide units to form an IAPF in Haiti, particularly if Duvalier should leave.</p>	<p>The US and OAS would be the object of the "imperialist" propaganda from the Communist countries.</p>
<p>Use of US forces to implement the E & E plan could strengthen Duvalier's position.</p> <p>US surveillance and/or military E & E operations could be used by Duvalier as propaganda for US support of Duvalier and could also demoralize the invasion forces.</p>	<p>Some criticism could be expected from OAS and African nations.</p>	<p>Castro might be afraid of being attacked by the US and mount a large invasion threat propaganda campaign to strengthen his position in Cuba. He might even provoke the US by shooting down a surveillance plane or harrassing the Guantanamo Naval Base. Castro might also use US intervention in Haiti as a reason for a build up in Soviet military assistance in Cuba.</p>
<p>An IAPF deployed to Haiti would be welcomed by many Haitians provided a government could be established in lieu of Duvalier.</p>		<p>Communist directed disorders might occur in the DR.</p>

CONTINGENCY F: Duvalier remains in office: an initially unidentifiable force infiltrates Haiti

ESTIMATED DEVELOPMENT OF THE SITUATION			
Immediate Developments - Internal	Reactions in other IA Countries	Soviet, Cuban and Chicom Reactions	Potential Dangers
<p>Small groups of infiltrators (5-10 personnel each) are detected.</p> <p>Individual enclaves of infiltrators initiate disturbances in outlying areas and harassment of local officials leading up to a concentrated attack on the Port-au-Prince area.</p> <p>Duvalier requests US/OAS assistance.</p>	<p>Very little initial reaction could be expected from most IA countries until the positive identity of the infiltrators can be determined.</p> <p>If the infiltrators prove to be Communists or Communist-sponsored the US could expect favorable reaction to US actions within the OAS.</p> <p>If the infiltrators are not Communists, very little public reaction could be expected.</p>	<p>Should the infiltrators be non-Communist or rightist, strong anti-US propaganda would be expected, alleging US-sponsored "imperialist" invasion, etc.</p> <p>If the infiltrators are Communist-sponsored and the infiltration is openly discussed in an international forum, Communist countries would mount propaganda campaign that infiltrators are "democrats" engaged in anti-imperialist war of national liberation.</p>	<p>An overthrow of Duvalier by infiltrators could result in a successor government worse than Duvalier.</p> <p>US or OAS failure to respond promptly to Communist threat to assume power could result in a Communist government in Haiti.</p> <p>Immediate US response to assist Duvalier could commit US to supporting an unsavory regime in Haiti.</p> <p>Communist infiltration could cause Duvalier to panic with subsequent chaos and disorder and no organized resistance to the infiltrators.</p> <p>US involvement in Haiti could lead to a long-term, costly involvement in Haiti's internal situation.</p> <p>Threats to American lives.</p>

SECRET

SPECIFIC UNITED STATES OBJECTIVES AND ACTIONS

Objectives	Political-Economic Actions	Military Actions	Other Actions
<p>Protect US and foreign nationals in Haiti.</p> <p>Prevent the establishment of a Communist government in Haiti.</p> <p>Establish an acceptable Government in Haiti.</p>	<p>Consult IA countries concerning situation.</p> <p>If American lives are threatened implement the E & E plan by commercial means if possible. In advance of such action, notify IA heads of state (and other countries having citizens in Haiti) that the US will assist in protecting their nationals should a military evacuation be required.</p> <p>Should Duvalier request US assistance send specialized US personnel to Haiti to evaluate the extent and nature of the infiltrating force. If the force is non-Communist advise Duvalier to appeal to the OAS for assistance.</p> <p>Should Duvalier fail to request external assistance, assemble the best evidence obtainable regarding the identity of the infiltrators.</p> <p>If the infiltrators are Communist request immediate OAS action to obtain a resolution under the Rio Treaty recommending that governments of member states individually or collectively take such steps as may be necessary to defend a member state against Communist subversion. This may include the dispatch of OAS representatives and an Inter-American Peace Force.</p> <p>Urge Latin American governments to act quickly on the resolution.</p>	<p>Implement air and sea surveillance operations and be prepared to interdict to prevent Cuban support of infiltrators.</p> <p>Implement approved evacuation plan if commercial transportation is not possible. Send to Haiti a force capable of evacuating American citizens and other foreign nationals.</p> <p>Take immediate steps to assist in determining the identity of the infiltrators.</p> <p>Be prepared to provide military forces to an IAPF should the proposed resolution of the OAS sanction such a force.</p> <p>Be prepared to execute CINCLANT's contingency plan for Haiti should the OAS fail to take adequate action to prevent a Communist Government from being formed in Haiti.</p>	<p>Encourage recognized Haitian exile groups to petition OAS to reestablish order.</p> <p>Consult with responsible Haitian exile leaders including former Government officials to promote the formation of an acceptable government to succeed Duvalier.</p> <p>Persuade Haitian emissaries to advise Duvalier to leave for good of country, and/or infiltrate certain Haitians with contacts in military for purposes of pressuring Duvalier to leave. If Duvalier agrees to depart, arrange for the return to Haiti of responsible Haitian exiles who have a popular following in Haiti and have governmental, labor and administrative experience. These same people could assist in preventing Haitian Communists from taking over.</p>

SECRET

CONTINGENCY F: Duvalier remains in office: an initially unidentifiable force infiltrates in Haiti.

SPECIFIC UNITED STATES OBJECTIVES AND ACTIONS

Objectives	Political-Economic Actions	Military Actions	Other Actions
	<p>If a UN Security Council meeting is called, explain US actions and urge that the Haitian problem be left with the OAS. SYG of the OAS should inform the Security Council of the OAS actions being taken. If there is substantial pressure for debating the issue in the UNGA, assess carefully the political implications of opposing it.</p> <p>If OAS failure to act seriously risks a Communist victory consider whether to provide military and public safety assistance to Haiti on the basis of the Duvalier request.</p> <p>Consider whether the time has arrived to achieve the departure of Duvalier. If so decided,</p> <p>a. take immediate steps to locate and promote the formation of an acceptable Government to replace him. Assure it of a reasonable degree of support if it achieves power.</p> <p>b. Urge Duvalier to leave Haiti in his own and his country's interest. Should he fail to depart consider whether to employ force to require him to do so.</p> <p>c. If OAS action should result in the formation of a provisional government urge a commitment for a return to a freely elected government and the initiation of sound economic and social measures.</p>		<p>Assist Haitian exiles with radio and press experience to obtain influential media field inside Haiti to promote U.S. interests.</p>

SECRET

CONTINGENCY F: Duvalier remains in office: an initially unidentifiable force infiltrates Haiti.

POSSIBLE RESULTS/REACTIONS TO U.S. COURSES OF ACTION

Internal	International	Communist
<p>Implementation of surveillance and/or use of military force in an E & E action might stop bid for power by Communist group, even though this was not intended. An acceptable group would believe the actions were intended to support it.</p> <p>An IAPF deployed to Haiti would be welcomed by many Haitians provided a government could be established in lieu of Duvalier.</p>	<p>Criticism could be expected from OAS, African and other non-Communist countries.</p> <p>Depending upon the clarity of Communist threat to assume power, sufficient support of OAS members could be obtained so that some countries would provide units to form an IAPF in Haiti, particularly if Duvalier should leave.</p>	<p>The US and the OAS would be the object of "imperialist" propaganda from Communist countries.</p> <p>Communist directed disorders might occur in the DR.</p>

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL G: Duvalier falls: a Communist or Communist dominated group of Haitians in Haiti threatens to succeed to power.

ESTIMATED DEVELOPMENTS OF THE SITUATION

Immediate Developments - Internal	Reactions in other IA Countries	Soviet, Cuban and Chinese Reaction	Potential Dangers
<p>Various individuals or groups maneuver within power structure to achieve dominance.</p> <p>Violence breaks out among competing successor groups.</p> <p>Communist group/begins to achieve dominance in power struggle and may seize the major instruments of power.</p> <p>Threats to American lives.</p>	<p>Unless violence is involved reaction, if any, will be minimal.</p> <p>Many IA governments and public do not understand nature of new government and its participants, nor extent of Communist domination.</p>	<p>Mount strong anti-US propaganda campaign but no open or identifiable support for Communist group.</p>	<p>Available intel- ligence on Communist involvement may be inconclusive.</p> <p>Violence may become widespread.</p> <p>Cuba may attempt to infiltrate agents and supplies into Haiti.</p>

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL: Duvallier falling; a Communist or Communist-dominated group of Haitians in Haiti threatens to succeed to power.

SPECIFIC UNITED STATES OBJECTIVES AND ACTIONS

Objectives	Political-Economic Actions	Military Actions	Other Actions
<p>Protect the lives of US and foreign nationals in Haiti.</p> <p>Prevent establishment of Communist Government in Haiti.</p> <p>Establish an acceptable government in Haiti.</p>	<p>Consult with other IA countries concerning Haitian situation.</p> <p>If American lives are threatened, introduce US troops to protect lives of Americans and other foreign nationals and to prevent a Communist government from controlling Haiti. In advance of such action, notify IA heads of state (and other countries having citizens in Haiti) that the US will assist in protecting their nationals should a military evacuation be required.</p> <p>Maintain US presence in Haiti.</p> <p>Take immediate steps to locate and promote the formation of an acceptable government. Assure it of reasonable degree of support if it achieves power.</p> <p>Procure and assemble the best available evidence of Communist involvement.</p> <p>Request immediate OAS action to obtain a resolution under the Rio Treaty recommending that governments of member states take individually or collectively such steps as may be necessary to defend a member state against subversion. This may include the dispatch of OAS representatives and an inter-American peace force to maintain the peace, using US forces in Haiti as a contingent, if desired.</p> <p>Urge the Latin American governments to act quickly on the OAS resolution.</p>	<p>Implement air and sea surveillance operations and be prepared to interdict to prevent Cuban and/or other Communist support.</p> <p>Send to Haiti a force capable of evacuating US citizens and foreign nationals and preventing a Communist Government from achieving power.</p> <p>Be prepared to provide military forces to an IAPP should the proposed resolution of the OAS sanction such a force.</p>	<p>Encourage recognized Haitian exile groups to petition OAS to re-establish order.</p> <p>Consult with responsible Haitian exile leaders including former government officials to promote the formation of an acceptable government.</p> <p>Arrange for the return to Haiti of responsible Haitian exiles who have a popular following in Haiti and have governmental, labor and administrative experience. These same people could assist in preventing Haitian Communists from taking over.</p> <p>Assist Haitian exiles with radio and press experience to obtain influential positions in the public information media field inside Haiti to promote U.S. interests.</p> <p>Publish list of Haitians trained in Communist countries and re-publish broadcasts from Radio Havana which have urged the overthrow of Duvallier and the establishment of a peoples' government.</p>

SECRET

CONTINGENCY G: Duvalier falls: a Communist or Communist-dominated group of Haitians in Haiti threatens to succeed to power.

SPECIFIC UNITED STATES OBJECTIVES AND ACTIONS

Objectives	Political-Economic Actions	Military Actions	Other Actions
	<p>If a UN Security Council Meeting is called, explain US actions and urge that the Haitian problem be left with the OAS. SYG of OAS should inform the Security Council of the actions being taken. If there is substantial pressure for debating the issue in the UNGA, assess carefully the political implications of opposing it.</p> <p>Undertake informational campaign to explain US and OAS policies and actions.</p>		

CONTINGENCY C: Duvalier falls: a Communist or Communist dominated group of Haitians in Haiti threatens to succeed to power.

POSSIBLE RESULTS/REACTIONS TO U.S. COURSES OF ACTION

Internal	International	Communist
<p>US Failure to respond promptly to Communist threat to assume power could result in a Communist government of Haiti.</p> <p>Implementation of surveillance and/or use of military force in an E & E action might stop bid for power by Communist group, even though this was not intended.</p> <p>A US force deployed to Haiti would be welcomed by many Haitians.</p>	<p>Criticism could be expected from OAS, African and other non-Communist countries.</p> <p>Depending upon the clarity of Communist threat to assume power, sufficient support of OAS members could be obtained to provide units to form an IAPF in Haiti.</p>	<p>The US and the OAS would be the object of "imperialist" propaganda from Communist countries.</p> <p>Communist directed disorders might occur in the DR.</p>

SECRET

CONTINGENCY II: Divalier falls: a Communist or Communist-dominated group of Haitians in Haiti succeeds to power.

ESTIMATED DEVELOPMENT OF THE SITUATION

Immediate Developments- Internal	Reactions in other LA Countries	Soviet, Cuban and Chicom Reaction	Potential Dangers
<p>An individual or group of Communists succeeds to power.</p> <p>Anti-Communists removed from positions of responsibility. Some are assassinated or executed. Others seek asylum.</p> <p>Anti-American propaganda is circulated internally. Threats against the lives of resident Americans.</p>	<p>Unless violence is involved reaction if any, will be minimal.</p> <p>Many LA governments and public do not understand nature of new government and its participants, nor extent of Communist domination.</p>	<p>Propaganda support of new government.</p>	<p>Available intelligence on extent of Communist domination of government may be inconclusive.</p> <p>Castro's Cuba and/or USSR may supply military support.</p> <p>If US fails to act promptly Communist government may become solidly entrenched.</p>

SECRET

SPECIFIC UNITED STATES OBJECTIVES AND ACTIONS

Objectives	Political-Economic Actions	Military Actions	Other Actions
<p>Protect American lives.</p>	<p>Consult with other LA countries concerning Haitian situation.</p>	<p>Implement air and sea surveillance operations and be prepared to interdict to prevent Cuban and/or other Communist support.</p>	<p>Consult with responsible Haitian exile leaders including former government officials to promote the formation of an acceptable government.</p>
<p>Replace a Communist government in Haiti with an acceptable government.</p>	<p>If American lives are threatened, land US troops to protect American and third-country lives and to ensure a non-Communist government in Haiti. In advance of such action, notify LA heads of state (and other countries having citizens in Haiti) that the US will assist in protecting their nationals should a military evacuation be required. Maintain US presence in Haiti.</p>	<p>Be prepared to send to Haiti a force capable of evacuating US citizens and foreign nationals and of insuring a non-Communist government.</p>	<p>Urge responsible Haitian exile leaders who are pro-U.S. to return to Haiti as soon as it is possible and urge their participation in achieving OAS objectives.</p>
	<p>Take immediate steps to locate and promote the formation of an acceptable government. Assure it of reasonable degree of support if it achieves power.</p>	<p>Be prepared to provide military forces to an IAPF should the proposed resolution of the OAS sanction such a force.</p>	
	<p>Procure and assemble the best available evidence of Communist involvement. Request immediate OAS action to obtain a resolution under the Rio Treaty recommending that governments of member states take individually or collectively such steps as may be necessary to defend a member state against subversion. This may include the dispatch of OAS representatives and an inter-American peace force to maintain the peace, using US troops in Haiti as a contingent if desired.</p>		<p>Urge the Latin American Governments to act quickly on the OAS resolution.</p>

SECRET

SPECIFIC UNITED STATES OBJECTIVES AND ACTIONS

Objectives	Political-Economic Actions	Military Actions	Other Actions
	<p>If a UN Security Council meeting is called, explain US actions and urge that the Haitian problem be left with the OAS. SYG of the OAS should inform the Security Council of the OAS actions being taken. If there is substantial pressure for debating the issue in the UNGA, assess carefully the political implications of opposing it.</p> <p>If OAS action results in the formation of a provisional Government, use the enforced peace to urge a commitment for a return to a freely elected Government and initiating sound economic and social measures.</p> <p>Undertake a broad informational campaign to explain US and OAS policies and actions.</p>		

CONTINGENCY II: Duvalier falls: a Communist or Communist-dominated group of Haitians in Haiti succeeds to power.

POSSIBLE RESULTS/REACTIONS TO U.S. COURSES OF ACTION

Internal	International	Communist
<p>Implementation of surveillance and/or use of military force in an E & E action might dislodge Communist government even though this was not intended.</p> <p>A U.S. force deployed to Haiti would be welcomed by many Haitians.</p>	<p>Criticism could be expected from OAS, African and other non-Communist countries.</p> <p>Depending upon the clarity of Communist domination of the government, sufficient support of OAS members could be obtained to provide units to form an IAPF in Haiti.</p>	<p>The US and the OAS would be the object of "imperialist" propaganda from Communist countries.</p> <p>Communist directed disorders might occur in the Dominican Republic and other LA countries</p>

Concept of Operations

VIII.

A. Political

In a crisis situation involving the downfall or serious weakening of the Duvalier regime, we might have an opportunity to increase United States influence without paying a disproportionate price. If the present regime is replaced by a reasonably acceptable one, small amounts of economic and military assistance would probably be enough to reestablish our influence. If, in a struggle for power, one of the fighting factions is more acceptable than the other, we could provide relatively small-scale assistance to the favored side to influence the result, in such a way that we would not risk a long-term, costly commitment. If there is nothing to choose between two competing factions we would probably not want to influence the power struggle, though we might influence the resultant regime by extending modest amounts of assistance. An operation designed to use military force to control the situation would involve long and costly involvement in Haiti.

The basic interests of the United States would be affected by a situation in Haiti in which American lives are endangered or there is a serious threat of Communist (probably Cuban) control of Haiti. Every effort would be made in an evacuation situation to avoid the use of military force, but in the last analysis the introduction of such a force might be required to ensure the safety of American lives or to prevent a Communist takeover in Haiti. The force should have the capability of reestablishing law and order, which may be necessary to permit the withdrawal of the military force under conditions that would not seriously risk a resurgence of chaos.

SECRET

Communist attempts to control Haiti might be by means of a fairly open invasion mounted from and logistically supported by Cuba, by infiltrating small groups of trained men clandestinely, or through a seizure of power by Communist groups within Haiti. An open invasion might be countered militarily if necessary and if the existence of foreign Communist support is clearly proven, the OAS or a group of OAS member states would be likely to agree to undertake responsibility for the action. If the existence of foreign Communist support is not demonstrably clear, OAS counteraction would not be forthcoming and we would have to decide whether we should undertake unilateral military action.

An internal seizure of power by Communists might induce the OAS to act decisively but this is not likely. To the extent we are able we would attempt to counter the Communist effort by means other than military intervention. If all else failed, however, we would have to decide whether to act unilaterally with military force.

B. Military

1. Military operations for the contingencies described in this paper could involve one of the following three types of operations or a combination of each:

a. Surveillance

A Surveillance Plan is available which can provide the capability to detect, identify, track, report, intercept, search and seize ships/aircraft departing Cuba to the Caribbean Sea. The forces assigned to implement this surveillance plan (See Annex 6) could be made available to conduct surveillance operations

in a Haitian contingency. However, the actual circumstances existing at the time the plan is executed (magnitude of threat, source of threat etc.) may require fewer forces. At the present time one mine sweeper maintains a continuous patrol in the Windward Passage and two flights/per day of ASW aircraft are conducted from either Guantanamo or Roosevelt Roads. Under the present circumstances it would be possible for small groups of infiltrators (5-10 men each) to land in Haiti from Cuba, the Bahamas, or other Caribbean Islands. The reaction time to implement the full scale surveillance plan is 96 hours.

b. Evacuation of US and Third Country nationals utilizing US military forces

There are an estimated 1382 American and 2185 Third Country nationals who may seek our assistance in an emergency and evacuation operation in Haiti. Approximately two-thirds (2220) of the possible evacuees are located in the Port-au-Prince area. The remainder are distributed throughout the country with the next largest group (233) in Cap Haitian, approximately 120 miles from Port-au-Prince. Should the military be requested to assist in executing the E & E Plan, the following capability exists:

(1) Surface Lift. The Ready Amphibious Squadron stationed in the Caribbean has the current capability to evacuate 3,273 evacuees.

If some Marines are debarked prior to loading evacuees, 4000 evacuees can be accommodated. The Amphibious Ready Squadron is normally within a 72 hour reaction time from Haiti.

(2) Military Air Lift. Should that part of CINCLANT's contingency plan calling for landing an Airborne Brigade in Haiti be executed, adequate military airlift capacity could be made available for evacuation plans utilizing the air lift employed in landing the

Airborne Brigade subject to (1) the recycle requirements for follow-on tactical and support units and (2) the capabilities of Haitian airfields to accommodate parked aircraft to await evacuation. Evacuation of US and Third Country nationals would require the landing of some US troops in the Port-au-Prince area to secure the airfield and protect the evacuees prior to evacuation.

c. Military Intervention

The CINCLANT Contingency Plan for Haiti is a flexible plan in which show of force operations are planned with other operations with an ascending order of magnitude being undertaken as required. Military intervention, if required, will include amphibious operations, airborne/air landed operations, or a combination of both. Operations will initially concentrate on restoring law and order. If so directed, emphasis could be shifted to reconstituting the Haitian Armed Forces while using Civil Affairs units to direct government activities. The maximum reaction time for execution of this plan is 96 hours.

2. Overflight rights would not normally be required for surveillance and evacuation operations. However, if full scale implementation of the intervention plan is envisioned (including the airborne/air landed operations) overflight rights, emergency landing and refueling rights for the Bahamas, Jamaica, and the Dominican Republic may be required.

C. Other operations

Should some of the contingencies described in this paper occur, there would be a need for an emergency program to provide food and medical supplies and essential services. An annex is attached which provides an outline of a program of short-term emergency assistance for Haiti.

SECRET

In the 1965-66 Dominican Republic operation, the cost to the United States of relief and reconstruction of the Dominican economy was about \$120 million. Haiti, with a per capita GNP one-third that of its neighbor, would be an even more expensive operation if conducted on a similar scale. In order to limit these costs in Haiti to the extent possible, emergency economic programs, including any civil affairs program to support a military operation, should have as their objectives the reestablishment of law and order and the maintenance of services essential to the military operation and those traditionally enjoyed by the Haitian people. Activities designed to improve basic economic conditions should be limited to those that can be continued after the withdrawal of the military force with Haiti's own financial and human resources supplemented by such foreign economic assistance as Haiti can reasonably be expected to obtain.

Once a successor government is installed, it can be expected to request U.S. economic and military assistance. If a decision is made to grant assistance, it should not be in excess of Haiti's capacity to absorb it productively for development and should be designed to serve as leverage on the new government to promote the needed reforms.

D. Coordination of operations

1. Washington Inter-Agency Coordination

The Country Director for Haiti is responsible for coordinating this paper with CIA and DOD. He will establish a schedule for quarterly reviews of the paper and will chair the inter-agency meetings (JCS and ISA of DOD, CIA, and State). He will also call additional meetings on the paper should there be indications that a crisis situation may be approaching in Haiti.

SECRET

IX. Further Attention Recommended

A. Factors Which May Increase the Seriousness of the Situation

The declining economy has meant that Duvalier has been under increasing pressure for funds to pay his retainers. At least two foreign companies in Haiti were recently requested to make advance tax payments--presumably because of the need for cash. There are reports that some of Duvalier's supporters are restive because of lack of salary payments and declining opportunities for personal profit. These indications of deepening economic troubles and disaffection among Duvalier's clique may presage moves among Duvalier's followers to topple him. It should be recognized that the traditional economic indicators are hardly relevant in assessing the future of the Duvalier Government. The significant factors are those which affect the actual cash available to Duvalier to disburse to his retinue and their prospects for profiteering. For this reason, special attention should be devoted to information on lags in salary payments to Haitian officials, additional requests for advance tax payments, etc. Such reports in themselves cannot be depended on as "signals" of an imminent crisis but they are useful in gauging the effect of economic pressure on the regime.

Continued attention should be given to reporting on Duvalier's health. Any confirmed report of a serious illness would merit reexamination of this paper. Approaches to the Embassy by persons purporting to represent groups ready to move against Duvalier may indicate the beginning of a crisis but must be treated with extreme caution because of the possibility that such an approach is directed by Duvalier as a means of identifying potential conspirators against his regime.

B. Factors Which May Affect U.S. Capabilities to React and Intervene

(None, see Concept of Operations - Military)

X. Supporting Material Available

A. Personnel - Persons who have worked on this paper who are acquainted with its contents include:

State Department

- ARA - Francis X. Lambert
- GPM - George Muller
- ARA/CAR - Melville E. Osborne
- Maureen Harris

Department of Defense

- OSD/ISA - Sheila Buckley
- JCS - Captain K. C. Gummerson, USN

Central Intelligence Agency



B. Documents

- State Department - Emergency and Evacuation Plan - Haiti A-348, April 28, 1966 from Port-au-Prince
- Latin American Policy Paper - Haiti, January 19, 1966

- Biographic information on Haitians



C. Annexes

1. Haiti: Situation in mid-1966.
2. The Communist and Non-Communist Opposition.
3. List of Unacceptable Haitians.
4. Cuban Capability for Landing Men and Arms in Haiti.
5. Haitian Security Forces.
6. U.S. Military Annex.
7. List of USG Personnel with Experience in Haiti.
8. Estimated Requirements for Emergency Relief Operations in Haiti.
9. Mass Communications Media in Haiti.

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HAITI CONTINGENCY ANNEX I

Haiti: Situation in March 1967

Since coming to power over eight years ago, President Francois Duvalier has throttled even the most rudimentary form of political dialogue in Haiti. He has erected a facade of legality around his regime but has remained in power only by destroying or neutralizing all sources of opposition. Government and military leaders have been transferred often and, at times, involuntarily retired, to keep them from developing personal followings or becoming potential rivals to Duvalier's dictatorial leadership. As a result, there is probably no person or group in the government with sufficient backing to be able to mount a coup.

Even so, opposition to the Duvalier regime is believed to be widespread among the relatively few politically minded Haitians. This opposition is unorganized, nonvocal, and ineffective against the internal security forces, especially the secret police. Two small Communist parties comprise the only organized internal opposition. In the past their activities have been hampered by intramural rivalries. However, there are good indications that these two parties are attempting to unite their efforts against Duvalier. The politically apathetic majority--probably 90 per cent of the population--is illiterate, physically and culturally isolated, and subsists on the fringe of starvation.

Plotting within the military has been the norm since Duvalier's accession to power. However, premature disclosure invariably has led to imprisonment and death or exile for the plotters.

Two military plots were deflated during the past twelve months. In April 1966 Duvalier reacted with characteristic speed and ruthlessness to quash an incipient plot by elements of the Presidential guard to topple him from power. Rumors of Haitian exile plans to invade Haiti reportedly led to Duvalier's order to execute summarily all Haitians caught returning to

their homeland from the Bahamas. When in November Duvalier received word of a suspected invasion of Haiti by a Florida-based exile group, he fired a number of high-ranking officers on suspicion of plotting against the regime. Ten of the officers immediately took asylum in foreign embassies and subsequently were courtmartialled and condemned to death in January 1967. These officers have left the country.

Members of the same Cuban-Haitian exile conspiracy rumored in November were arrested on 2 January 1967 while attempting to launch their invasion.

Contrary to some reports that have been widely circulated, available evidence does not support the belief that Duvalier's departure from the Haitian scene is imminent. He is reported to be in good health, he has been successful in suppressing all plots to overthrow him, and there is nothing in his past behavior to indicate that he would abandon power willingly, as has been rumored. Assassination is of course always a possibility.

There has been little in the past six months to indicate that the regime is modifying its repressive political practices or that it is coping effectively with Haiti's economic and social problems. Corruption, apathy, favoritism, irresponsibility, and brutality continue to permeate the regime. In these circumstances there is little prospect of improving internal conditions. The economy has continued its slow but steady decline during the past year, and all signs point to a continuation of this trend. Throughout 1967 the government's financial situation will continue to be tight, and, on the basis of the general economic conditions, is expected to continue so as long as substantial revenues remain outside the national budget.

Thus, the situation in Haiti in March 1967 is neither better nor much worse than at any time during "President-for-Life" Duvalier's regime.

SECRET

The Communist and Non-Communist Opposition

A. The Communists

Haiti's two Communist parties--the Party of Popular Accord (PEP) and the Popular Party of National Liberation (PPLN)--are small, lacking in discipline, and poorly indoctrinated. With a maximum of from 500 to 650 members and up to 2,000 fellow travelers, both inside and outside Haiti, the Communists constitute the only internal opposition with any degree of training and organization--however primitive. The split between the parties stems from personal rivalry among the leaders, rather than any real ideological differences. A good source has indicated that the PPLN inside Haiti now goes by the name of the United Haitian Democratic Party (PUDA).

The Moscow-oriented PEP is recognized by the international Communist movement as the Haitian Communist Party. It is believed to be receiving Soviet financial assistance and guidance via Mexico through a Haitian exile, Gerard Pierre-Charles.

The PPLN is Castro-oriented and received ideological guidance from Radio Havana, which beams one program in French and another in Creole daily. No direct contact between Moscow and the PPLN has been detected.

Most of the exiled Haitian Communists are in Europe or Mexico. The largest group is in France, where there is an organization of approximately 150. About 40 are in Mexico, where they reportedly publish a bulletin called Ralliement which is also circulated in Europe. In addition, there are probably 70 to 80 Communist exiles studying in bloc countries and in Cuba. Approximately 8 to 10 PPLN leaders have established a group in Canada.

Communists appear to lack the membership, leadership, arms, and organization to become serious contenders in a post-Duvalier power struggle. Their fortunes would be improved under any circumstance in which a successor to Duvalier were not immediately named. They probably would find it to their advantage to prolong any indecision over a new government, possibly to make a stab at seizing power themselves. To seize a pre-eminent position, however, the Communists would require the effective support of the military, and probably the Ton Ton Macoutes and the militia. At the present time there is no indication that they could attract such support. Latest indications are that these two parties are attempting to solve their differences and unite their efforts.

B. The Non-Communist Opposition
Most of the non-Communist Haitian exile opposition is located in New York and Miami, with smaller groups scattered around the Caribbean in Venezuela, Puerto Rico, the Dominican Republic, and perhaps in the Bahamas. Other large groups of uneducated Haitian workers in the Dominican Republic, Cuba, and the Bahamas are not active politically.

Of those with political pretensions, about ten leaders in New York have grouped their individual followings into the International Haitian Union. It is presently active and sponsors a half-hour daily short-wave broadcast to Haiti in Creole over New York Station WRUL. The program, consisting of music, news, and poetry, carefully attempts to avoid any direct inflammatory references to Duvalier or his regime, but does attack their excesses. Duvalier has complained to the U.S. Government that these broadcasts are inciting the Haitian population to revolt.

In the event of Duvalier's departure from the scene, the more affluent exiles could be expected to try to return to Haiti. The exiles,

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in attempting to establish one of their own number in power in Haiti, would be handicapped by the divisiveness, discord, and absence of recognized leadership that have impeded their activities in exile. It seems unlikely that any exile or group of exiles would be able to seize power without substantial foreign support.

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HAITI CONTINGENCY ANNEX 3

I. List of Unacceptable Haitians

Adolphe, Mrs. Max
Apollon, Hoshherre
Arcelin, Paul
Arty, Colonel Frederic Marc
Aubourg, Michel
Auguste, Maurepas
Baboun, Rodolphe
Baptiste, Fred
Barbot, Yves
Belizaire, Jean
Bissainthe, Father Gerard
Blanchet, Jules
Blanchet, Louis
Blanchet, Paul
Borges, Major Jose
Boyer, Herve
Bredy, Michel
Brierre, Jean F.
Brunet, Captain Gabriel
Cadet, Fastei
Cambronne, Luckner
Camille, Ramses
Cayard, Colonel Octave
Chancy, Max
Charles, Clemard Joseph
Chauvet, Lucien
Cineas, Fritz
Coulanges, Ernst

Daumec, Lucien (probably dead but in case not,
should be included as he is, or
was, Duvalier's brother-in-law)
Day, Windsor
Delva, Zacharie
Desir, Luc
Dominique, Captain Max
Dominique, Mme. Max (nee Marie-Denise Duvalier,
President's daughter)
Duvalier, Mme. Simone Ovide (Mme. Francois
Duvalier)
Duvalier, Jean-Claude (President's son)
Duvalier, Melle. Simone (President's daughter)
Foucard, Luc-Albert
Foucard, Mme. Luc-Albert (nee Nicole Duvalier--
President's daughter)
Fourcand, Jacques
Francois, Rodolphe
Francois, Mme. Rodolphe
Gallard, Fritzler Camille
Gallard, Roger
Giordani, Pierre
Hector, Michel
Jacques, Colonel Gracia
Jerome, Captain Abel
Jolly, Ulrick
Laroche, Colonel Jacques
Lasseque, Seymour

Leroy, Andre
Maitre, Elois
Moise, Claude
Moise, Rodolphe
Philippe, Major Monod
Pierre-Antoine, Paul
Pierre-Louis, Lt. Colonel Luc
Pierre-Louis, Rossini
Petit, Antoine G.
Romain, Major Frank
Saint-Amand, Edris
Saint-Phard, Jean
Saint-Victor, Mme. Yvon (sister of Foucard)
Saint-Victor, Yvon (husband of above)
Siclait, Henri
Tassy, Captain Harry
Tassy, Major Jean
Viau, Clement
Viaud, Leonce

II. Haitians Who Might Take Positions in Government Successor to Duvalier

A. Those Inside Haiti as of November 15, 1966

With one exception the military officers on this list were dismissed from their positions on November 10, 1966. The civilians are not closely identified with the Duvalier regime and are to a greater or lesser degree favorably known to official American personnel. They are not of such stature or ability that they could be expected to head a successor government, though they might occupy positions of cabinet or sub-cabinet rank in such a government.

ANDRE, Antonio - President of National Bank of Haiti. Pro-American, best available financial specialist.

BEAUVOIR Colonel Daniel - Until recently chief of Army Logistics. Dismissed November 10, 1966 and in asylum in Brazilian Embassy. Energetic, able, with some influence among TMM's, much among military; somewhat brutal, once had reputation as playboy.

CADET, Georges - Technical Director of Institute for Agricultural and Industrial Development (IDAI), agronomist, writer, liked by Haitian exiles. Colorless, moderate, little following but competent in agriculture.

CAUVIN, Pierre - Former top economist of National Bank of Haiti. Theoretician of Personaliste Movement, teacher. Honest, energetic, progressive, perhaps too idealistic. Critical of both Communist and United States "imperialism," but said to be capable of playing footsie with Communists to advance Personaliste Party interests.

CAYARD, Colonel Octave - Commandant of Coast Guard. Said to be able and respected Army officer, sadistic, open supporter of Duvalier. Friendly but not close to Americans.

CHARLES, Joseph Dorcius - Former Ambassador to United States, former Secretary for Education, Public Works, and Foreign Relations. Friendly to United States officials, not prominent but good lawyer and statesman. Mentioned as possible provisional president upon fall of Duvalier.

LEMARRE, Colonel Joseph - Former Chief of Operations, Army General Staff. Dismissed November 10, 1966 and probably in asylum in Port-au-Prince. Pro-United States and anti-Communist. Not a top leader but good potential.

LEGER, Georges N. Jr. - Able lawyer and attorney for all American business firms in Haiti. No government and little political experience. Anti-Duvalier, pro-American.

LEVEQUE, Louis R. - Former Minister of Public Works, pro-American. Probably associated with Cleward Charles in business ventures. Said to be honest and patriotic. Seeks out Americans. Speaks good English.

MEHU, Boileau - Former Prefect of Port-au-Prince and former Minister of Interior and National Defense. Closely associated with exile Jean H. ELIE (see below). Pro-United States. Has some following in capital and northern Haiti.

NELSON, Colonel Edner - Former Army Paymaster, mother is American negress. Respected by military officers in exile. Dismissed November 10, 1966 and probably in asylum in Port-au-Prince

B. Haitians Outside Haiti, Mostly Exiles

There are no known Haitians who would be completely satisfactory from every point of view to serve in a government successor to Duvalier. Virtually all of them have personal or moral defects to a marked degree by American standards. Those listed are believed to be the least unsatisfactory of known Haitians and with few or minor personal or moral defects by Haitian standards. Honesty, competence, and other terms used to describe the Haitians listed in this document are used within Haitian terms of reference. Criticism of the United States for supporting these Haitians could be expected since foreign reporters would apply their own, not Haitian, standards. The first four names on the list below are those believed to be the most reliable and the most likely to be able to pick up the pieces once Duvalier has been overthrown and a power vacuum exists. They could not be expected to assume control if substantial opposition to them still existed in the Haitian power structure unless they received very strong support from abroad, probably including any necessary military support. No Haitian or group of Haitians is known to be capable of overthrowing Duvalier and forming a reasonably stable successor government. If, following his overthrow, the reins of power are seized by some Duvalier lieutenant it is highly doubtful that any exile group could dislodge the successor without substantial economic and military support from abroad.

1. Most Reliable Known (All in United States)

MAGLOIRE, Paul - President of Haiti before Duvalier. Generally believed to have taken public money for own use, more so than previous Presidents. Only exile with significant personal following in Haiti. Pro-United States and anti-Communist. Has strength, leadership and toughness necessary for top jobs. States he does not want to be President again, but willing to do anything that would help his country. Resides in New York City.

FOUCHE, Luc - Former ministerial positions in Agriculture, Education, Labor, Public Works and Interior. Former Ambassador to Canada. Close associate of Magloire. Wants to succeed Duvalier as elected not provisional president. Able, moderate, respected generally but probably opportunist. Resides in New York City.

JOSEPH, Raymond Alcide - Young, no government experience. Educated in United States universities. Son of Baptist missionaries. Possible Minister of Information in successor government. Married to United States citizen. Excellent potential for future positions of importance in Haiti. Resides in New York City.

MONTREUIL, Major Raymond - Nephew of Magloire's wife. Former Presidential Aide to Magloire. Serious, capable military officer. Duvalier believes he was killed in Haiti in 1963. Fact that he is alive is sensitive information. Resides in New York City.

2. Other Haitians - Civilians

DEJEAN, Joseph - Former diplomat, Ambassador to Mexico and Great Britain. Presently teaching at Howard University, Washington, D. C. Reputation for honesty and integrity.

HUDICOURT, Pierre - Former Ambassador to Panama. Employed in Pan American Union in CIAP staff, Washington, D. C. Twenty years ago had anti-United States, racist, pro-Communist biases, but has since moderated his views and is friendly to United States officials.

ROY, Dr. Louis - Medical doctor, residing Montreal, Canada. Sometimes mentioned by exiles as candidate for provisional presidency. Studied in Italy, practiced in Canada and United States. Good administrator. Said to be too self-important.

DESMANGLES, Heine - Former labor leader in Haiti of union affiliate of IFCTU, anti-Communist, possible candidate for Labor Minister. Pro-United States and friendly to American officials. Resides in Belgium.

ELIE, Jean H. - Businessman, former Haitian banana exporter. Leader of exile group in Miami. Anti-Communist, pro-United States. Associate of Boileau MEHU. (see above)
Rather emotional and excitable. Resides in Miami, Florida.

BAZILE, Robert - Formerly military careerist and Commander of Coast Guard, but also held civilian positions such as head of National Lottery. Something of fence straddler but able in civil service. Pro-United States. Friend of Francois LATORTUE (see below). Resides in Washington, D. C.

LATORJUE, Francois - Lawyer and professor. Former Undersecretary of State for Commerce. Left of center. Pro-United States but somewhat critical of United States policies. Fence straddler and weak personality but would do in subordinate capacity in government. Resides in Washington, D. C.

MANIGAT, Leslie - Professor, writer, formerly held post in Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Teaches at Paris, France at Fondation de Sciences Politiques. Has strong ties with Personaliste Movement, if not its head. Susceptible to Communist influence but has following among Haitian youth and will be a force in post-Duvalier Haiti whether encouraged or not. Wife a cripple. Resides in Paris, France.

AUGUSTE, Carlet R. - Currently Haiti's Permanent Representative to the United Nations in New York. Lawyer, from prominent Cap Haitien family. Cautious, worried, but no fool. Friendly to United States. Supporter of Duvalier at least in the past. Resides in New York City.

FOMBRUN, Marcel - Former Minister of Commerce and ex-Ambassador to Cuba and other countries. Lawyer. Pro-United States. Graduate of Harvard Business School. Modest, friendly individual. Presently employed by UNICEF in Leopoldville, Congo.

3. Other Haitians - Military

BOUCICAUT, General Jean Rene - Former Army Chief of Staff. Godson of Duvalier and initially pro-Duvalier but turned against him. Anti-Communist and pro-United States. Competent military leader and good officer. though not particularly forceful. Would be good reorganizer of Haitian military. Resides in New York City.

ANDRE, Major Robert - Radio technician. Former Assistant Director of School of Military Communications. Pro-United States. Anti-Communist. Resides in New York City.

DOUBLETTE, Colonel Antionio - Former Commandant Military Transportation Service and former Assistant Military, Naval and Air Attache to Washington. Resides in the United States.

ARMAND, Colonel Pierre - Former Chief of Police in Port-au-Prince, and former Chief of Staff of Army. Sincere and honest. Resides in New York City.

ALVAREZ, Lt. Colonel Roger - One of few Haitian military capable of good staffwork. Hard worker, keen mind. Line officer. Once commanded Military Department of the South. Resides in New York City.

BAYARD, Colonel Franck - Former Commandant of Military Department of the North. Soccer player. Ex-military attache to Washington. Good leadership potential, competent officer. Resides in the United States.

CHAM, Colonel Yves - Former Chief of Operations and Training of Chief of Staff. Intelligent, well educated, and capable staff officer with good leadership potential. Believed to reside in New York City. ✓

CHASSAGNE, Lt. Raymond - Former officer at National Penitentiary. Anti-Duvalier, pro-United States and believed anti-Communist. Resides in New York City.

HONORAT, Colonel Lionel - Former Chief of Military Justice Section. Trained in law. Brother-in-law of Victor Constant, current Minister of Agriculture. Well and favorably known to American officials. Not strong leader. Resides in New York City.

RAMIREZ, Captain Joseph - Attended United States radio school Fort Monmouth, New Jersey. Pro-United States and anti-Duvalier. Held private business and Army positions simultaneously. Resides in New York City.

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HAITI CONTINGENCY ANNEX 4

60.

Cuban Capability for Landing Men and Arms in Haiti

Cuban air and naval forces have the capability to put considerable numbers of men and amounts of material into Haiti quickly--by sea, air or airdrop. More than 1,000 men could be landed in a few hours' time, if the Cubans were not constrained by the need for secrecy and by the recognition that US counteraction would, at the least, prevent resupply and support of their force. In any case, we have no indication that the Cubans are considering such offensive military action.

Cuba's military transport fleet has a capability of airlifting about 600 troops of 60 tons of cargo in a single lift, but little training has been conducted on logistical support operations. The Cuban civilian airline has a capability of airlifting in a single airlift as many as 1,100 troops or 150 tons of materiel if its resources were pressed to the limit.

Altogether, Cuba has approximately 20 IL-14 (GRATE) transports, which could be used to support insurgency operations in Haiti. Each of these planes is capable of carrying up to 36 personnel or about 4,750 pounds of military cargo. The Cubans also have 35 to 45 AN-2 (COLT) short-takeoff-and-land planes capable of carrying up to 12 men or 3,000 pounds. In addition, the Cuban Air Force has a few C-46 and C-47 transports which could be used. Cuba also has about 70 MI-4 (HOUND) cargo and troop carrier helicopters. They can carry a maximum of 16 passengers or 3,500 pounds of cargo.

The Cubans have a capability to provide arms assistance by means of clandestine airdrops. A Cuban cadet who defected to the US in March 1964 reported that a paratrooper school had been established at Libertad Air Base near Havana in October 1962, and that classes of several hundred men were being trained there each year.

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Consideration must be given to the availability of Communist-oriented Haitian exile manpower in Cuba and their potential for directing the activities of an invasion force. A leading Haitian Communist exile in Cuba, Rene Depestre, reportedly said in January 1966 that 5,000 Haitian citizens resident in Cuba have had military service in the Cuban Army or militia and that 500 of them have indicated a willingness to participate in armed action against the Duvalier regime. However, the bulk of the 5,000 are from Haitian families who were brought in originally as cane-cutters and have lived in Cuba for many years; they most probably regard themselves as Cubans rather than Haitians and probably have little desire to return to Haiti.

Although we have had occasional reports that Haitians have been among the groups from various Latin American countries receiving guerrilla warfare training in Cuba, we have not been able to confirm this. It is probable that some Haitians have been given this kind of training in Cuba; it is also probably that the number has been small (50 or less.)

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HAITI CONTINGENCY ANNEX 5

Haitian Security Forces

A. FAD'H: The Haitian armed forces (FAD'H), including air and coast guard personnel, number approximately 5,000 officers and enlisted men. They perform police, immigration, fire department, commercial air transport, and other service activities in addition to their regular "military" functions. The continuing deterioration of equipment, the removal and transfer of capable officers for political reasons, and the lack of an effective training program have made the armed forces only marginally effective as military organizations. However, the armed forces continue to be a suitable instrument in Duvalier's hands for his special, limited purpose of keeping order inside Haiti and suppressing any small opposition groups that may appear. Sweeping reforms in the military, though needed, are unlikely to be undertaken in Duvalier's time in view of his deliberate policy of keeping the armed forces divided, relatively unorganized, and responsible directly to himself. Poorly equipped and led, the armed forces could, if united, defeat the even more poorly trained, equipped and led militia in a post Duvalier struggle for power. The secret police (TTM's) have no military capability.

B. VSN: The National Security Volunteers (VSN), a civil militia of perhaps as many as 7,000 members, was created by Duvalier as a counterforce to the regular armed forces. The VSN is made up of weekend soldiers who are administratively separate from the regular military but assist the army. They are poorly trained and armed--about one third have weapons--and could not cope with a trained and disciplined foe. Many of the VSN leaders have been hand-picked for their personal loyalty to Duvalier and for this reason as well as their personal brutality may become the object of a vendetta by parties injured by them personally or by the regime should Duvalier be toppled from power. The resulting moves and countermoves could lead to a widespread breakdown in law and order. The

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Lack of training, discipline and tight control over such a large group plus the possible fanaticism of some of its leaders could seriously hinder efforts to stabilize the internal situation in Haiti in case of a change in government.

C. TM: The secret police (TM) have no official name or status nor is it an organized cohesive group and little is known about the internal organization of the group. Haitians refer to them as the Ton Ton Macoute, a Creole phrase meaning "bogeyman." Numbering about 1,500 (some are members of the armed forces or the VSN), the TMs are little more than armed thugs who carry out special assignments--i.e., murder, arson, extortion, and other violence. Occasionally, the TMs overstep their rather broad authority and Duvalier is forced to curb them temporarily; however, they are too useful to him to limit their power for long. If an anti-Duvalier group took or threatened to take over the government individual or small group TM's might resort to violence for reasons of self-preservation, striking at members of the former ruling classes out of fear that those groups would seek revenge against them. Many TM's, however, would fade into the background or go into exile to avoid such revenge. If power were assumed by a Duvalier lieutenant he would probably seek to gain control of the TM's in order to secure his position.

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HAITI CONTINGENCY ANNEX 6

United States Military Annex

A. Outline Contingency Plan for Haiti

1. Concept of Operations. This is a flexible plan in which show of force operations are planned with other operations with an ascending order of magnitude being undertaken as required. Military intervention, if required, will include amphibious operations, airborne/air-landed operations, or a combination of both. Operations will initially concentrate on restoring law and order. Emphasis will then shift to reconstituting the Haitian armed forces, using CA units to direct government activities and improving the Haitian counterinsurgency capability.

2. Objective Areas. Port-au-Prince (Bowen Airfield, Mais Gate Airfield, the Presidential Palace, dock facilities, National Penitentiary and Fort Demanche).

3. Base and Overflight Rights Requirement. Rights for overflights, emergency landings and refueling for the Bahamas, Jamaica, and the Dominican Republic may be required.

<u>FORCES REQUIRED</u>	<u>SOURCE</u>	<u>DEPLOYMENT TIME</u>
Army		
1 Abn Div (-) (2 Bde)(6 BCT)	STRICOM	96 hours
1 Civil Affairs Co.		
Psychological Opn Co (-)		
Special Forces Co.		
Command, Control and		
Support Forces as required		
1 Air Mobile Co (Lt)		
1 Abn Bde (3 BCT) (on call)		

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FORCES REQUIRED

SOURCE

DEPLOYMENT TIME*

Navy

LANVCOM

96 hours

1 CAG/CLG

Screening and Naval Gunfire

Support Ships

Carib Amph Ready Gp

1 Mine Division

Marine Expeditionary Force

Hq MEB

1/9 Div/Wing Team**

2/9 Div/Wing Team

on call

60 hours

Seal Contingent

STRICOM

72 hours

Air Force

2 Tactical Fighter

Squadron

1 Composite Tactical

Recon Detachment

Troop Carrier Airlift

as required

Special Air Warfare Contingent

* Deployment time shown is the time of closure of destination for the final elements of the force concerned. Initial elements will arrive considerably earlier in most cases.

** Embarked on ships of Carib Amph Ready Gp.

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B. Surveillance Plan for Caribbean Area. This plan provides for surveillance of the Caribbean Basin by naval sea and air forces to control the clandestine shipment from Cuba of personnel, arms, and other materials into countries in or bordering on the Caribbean Sea. Forces earmarked under this plan could include:*

<u>FORCES REQUIRED</u>	<u>SOURCE</u>	<u>DEPLOYMENT TIME**</u>
1 CVSG (CVSG Embarked)	LANTCOM	
3 Des Div		
1 Sub Div		
2 1/2 VPRON (P 3/P2)		
1 VMA/VMP Det		
1 MSC/MSO		

* This force represents the requirements for a Caribbean - wide surveillance effort. If intelligence indicates a threat directed only at a particular area, the force may be decreased accordingly.

** Arrival time on station for the total force would be 5 days after the day the plan is ordered executed; however, certain forces could initiate surveillance immediately upon exemption and other forces would arrive on station during the 5 day deployment period.

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HAITI CONTINGENCY ANNEX 7

United States Government Personnel Experienced in Haiti Who Might be Available for Temporary Duty Assignments to Haiti on Short Notice

A. State Department

Dates in Haiti

Political Officers

Charles Wm. Thomas
Norman A. Warner

1961-1963
1963-1966

Economic Officers

David R. Thomson
Donald W. Bonn
Robert B. Hill
Valentin Blacque
Ralph C. Porter

1959-1962
1959-1961
1962-1964
1962-1965
1962-1964

Consular Officers

A. Hugh Douglas
Harry M. Montgomery
Richard Hines
Robert W. Maule

1959-1963
1960-1963
1962-1964
1962-1966

Administrative Officers

Leo W. Garvey
Harry E. Christie
Kenneth J. Ruch

1959-1963
1960-1963
1963-1965

AID

Earl O. Finnle	1961-1963
David J. Keough	1961-1964
Leonard D. Brooks	1961-1963
Albertana C'ide Baca	1961-1963
Philip E. Smart	1962-present
John Mason	1964-present
Walter C. Baker	1963-1965
George L. Moore	1962-1965
Harry Yoe	1958
Norman Ward	1959

B. U.S. Military

Navy

Col.	Batterton, Roy J.	06629	USMC
Lt. Col.	Quint, Frederick A.	019557	USMC
Cdr.	McLean, Donald H.	237180	USN
Lt. Col.	Beckett, John W.	023105	USMC
Cdr.	Seabaugh, Raymond R.	422808	USN
Major	Babe, George A.	047597	USMC
Major	Magruder, Bruce, Jr.	048866	USMC
Major	Lillich, Gerald J.	049315	USMC
Major	Buck, John A.	049497	USMC
Captain	Klinedinst, John C.	056788	USMC
Captain	Angelo, Leon N.	058025	USMC
Captain	Laporte, Alfonso A., Jr.	059346	USMC
Lt. (j.g.)	Cueroni, Richard P.	5118	USN
Captain	Layne, Donald F.	062461	USN

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Captain	Sullivan, Thomas L.	061181	USN
Captain	Paro, Eugene E., Jr.	061166	USN
Captain	Guinee, Vincent J., Jr.	064735	USN
Captain	Wahlstrom, Donald H.	060842	USN
Captain	Gordon, James T.	069896	USN
Captain	Preble, Lee A.	070447	USN
Captain	Heald, Ronald E.	073991	USN
Captain	Garcia, Robert E.	073638	USN
Captain	Bailey, Gene E.	076205	USN
1st Lt.	Snodgrass, Clyde R.	060800	USN
CWO 3	DePreaux, Paul R. G.	542410	USN
CWO 2	Sheridan, Lawrence V.	072120	USMC
CWO 2	Newtown, Glenford	072133	USMC
CWO 2	Belacqua, Raymond J.	078522	USMC

Air Force

Col. Richard Curtis
Lt. Col. Gail Poulton
Capt. Eugene J. Heider
Capt. John G. Stewart
M/Sgt. Maurice F. Paulin
S/Sgt. Jean Cote
T/Sgt. John W. Davis

Defense Attache Personnel

Present ARMA
Present ALUSNA
Former ALUSNA
Former ARMA

Lt. Col. James F. Butler
Lt. Cdr. William F. Hahnert
Cdr. Comer H. Byrd, Jr.
Col. John Warren

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C. USIA

Edmund R. Murphy
Stanley D. Moss
Homer G. Gayne
Theodore S. Arthur
Donald Creager
Eugene F. Quinn
Joan A. Graffis
Edward A. Eilly

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HAITI CONTINGENCY ANNEX 8

Estimated Requirements in Haiti Crisis

A. First Stage - emergency relief

1. a. Commodities for first 4 weeks

Dried milk	500	1,000 pounds
Rice	1,300	
Beans	1,300	
Oil	300	
Corn Meal	600	
	<u>4,000</u>	pounds

b. Amounts by area

Port-au-Prince	2,450	
Cap Haitien	350	
Port de Paix	150	
Gonaives/St. Marc	400	
Cayes/Jacmel	400	
Jeremie	250	
	<u>4,000</u>	pounds

c. Capabilities by distributing agency
(one month period)

	<u>Food distribution</u>	<u>Warehousing</u>	<u>Truck</u>	<u>Transportingc/</u>
CARE	600 to 1,000a/	1,800b/	5	5
CWS	1,000	2,500d/	1	1
CRS	2,000	800e/	3	3
	<u>3,600 to 4,000</u>			

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- a/ Depending on the distance of the localities from the distribution points.
- b/ In Cap Haitien, Port-au-Prince, Port de Paix, and Gonaives.
- c/ Truck transport availability has been taken into account in determining food distribution capability in first column. Although only the number of trucks owned by each agency is listed in the third column, a large number of trucks are available on a rental basis on a few hours notice. CWS uses such rental trucks for most of its regular program distribution.
- d/ In Port-au-Prince.
- e/ In Port-au-Prince and Cayes.

2. Stocks and Consumption: Commodities and POL

	<u>Estimated normal minimum stocks</u>	<u>Estimated consump- tion per month</u>
Flour (at Port-au-Prince mill)	15,000 cwt	50,000 cwt
Rice (at St. Marc)	unknown--depends on time of year.	3,500 MT
	Annual production	
	42,000 MT	
Gasoline	54,000 bbl	18,000 bbl
Kerosene	6,000 bbl	2,000 bbl
Diesel oil	73,500 bbl	24,500 bbl
Fuel oil	37,500 bbl	12,500 bbl
AVgas	1,325 bbl	475 bbl
Jet fuel	4,200 bbl	1,400 bbl

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3. Commercial banks needed to provide normal economic operations

<u>National Bank</u>	<u>Gourdes</u>	<u>\$</u>
Port-au-Prince	14.0 million	3.0 million
Cap Haitien	1.2	
Gonaives	.6	
Cayes	.6	
Jeremie	.6	
Jacmel	.4	
Port de Paix	.2	
St. Marc	.4	
Miragoane	.2	

4. and 5. Public Health and Medical Supplies (both existing resources and anticipated assistance requirements from abroad)

Water: It is unlikely that water supply would be seriously disrupted during an emergency. Furthermore, much of the population is accustomed to prolonged water shortages and to use of impure water, with or without treatment. No special contingency measures are therefore advocated.

Garbage collection: There is a very limited organized program of garbage disposal, and even complete breakdown of this program would not constitute much of a problem. All it takes to restore service is local manpower, which is readily available, and a few trucks, which would also be available in sufficient numbers.

Sewer cleaning: Of more importance in Port-au-Prince, and to some extent in Cap Haitien, is the necessity, after every heavy rain, of cleaning the sewers of rocks and debris. Otherwise, parts of the city become quagmires.

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But again, this simply requires a few vehicles and abundant local manpower.

Insect control: There is no organized program of insect control in normal times. Pest insects would not be a problem during an emergency. The density of malaria mosquitoes might increase at certain times and might become a health problem. However, SNEM could cope with such a problem through a combination insecticide/drug program.

Emergency medicines and medical supplies: There is probably little stockpiling of medical supplies in Haiti, and during an emergency the available supplies probably would soon be used up. The necessary supplies and equipment could be provided quickly by making one or more completely outfitted portable hospitals available. Additional supplies could rapidly be flown in, but it is virtually impossible at this time to estimate the nature or quantity of such supplies.

B. Second Stage - reestablishment of civil order

1. Reorganization, training and reequipment of public safety forces in Haiti. MAP and AID Public Safety to send advisory teams promptly after a request from the Haitian Government.

Public Works

a. If IDB sponsored water works project has been halted as a result of the crisis or for other reasons, take prompt action to reactivate it.

b. Consider providing funds needed for street and highway rehabilitation and maintenance. This should extend only to rehabilitation of streets

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and highways damaged during the crisis. Maintenance should be the minimum to which Haitians have become accustomed over the past years. Any other rehabilitation should be studied as part of a wider and longer-range economic development assistance program.

c. Consider temporary repairs to wharf in Port-au-Prince to repair any damage incurred during the crisis.

d. Consider rehabilitation of tourist facilities (roads, paths to sites of scenic interest, etc.) if public works projects are necessary as an emergency measure.

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HAITI CONTINGENCY ANNEX 9

A. Summary Mass Communications Media in Haiti (as of October 1966)

1. Radio and TV

There is 1 television station in Port-au-Prince and 17 radio stations in Haiti--13 in the capital city and 4 in other towns.

There are an estimated 75,000 radio and 8,000 television receivers in Haiti.

2. Printing Facilities

Printing machinery, supplies and equipment are not manufactured in Haiti. Manufacturers' agents carry only minimal stocks; most items must be special ordered.

3. Newspapers

There are six daily newspapers in Port-au-Prince (none outside) with an estimated total circulation of 9,500. They are, in order of importance: Le Nouvelliste, Le Matin, Panorama, Le Jour, Haiti Journal and Oedipe.

There is one large weekly newspaper, Le Nouveau Monde, now published in a new and expanded plant in the capital city. There are 18 other small weekly and irregularly published newspapers.

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B. Daily Newspapers in Haiti

LE NOUVELLISTE

Mr. Max Chauvet, Editor
Rue du Centre, P-au-P

tel: 2232-2432

LE MATIN

Mr Franck Magloire, Owner
Mr Dumayric Charlier, Editor
Rue Americaine, P-au-P

tel: 2242

HAITI JOURNAL

Mr Edouward Charles, Editor
Rue Hammerton Killick, P-au-P

tel: 3463

OEDIPE

Mr Jean Magloire, Editor
72 Rue Capois, P-au-P
Office: Cite' Estimé, P-au-P
Mr Paul Blanchet, Editor
Rue du Peuple 171, P-au-P

tel: 3996

PANORAMA

Staff: Wilson Florestal
Hermann Louis Charles

tel: 3166

LE JOUR

Mr Weber T. Alexander, Editor
Av Marie Jeanne
Cite de l'Exposition

tel: 3177

Chief Editor: Andre F. Bistoury

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C. Weekly Newspapers in Haiti

NEW HAITI TIMES (English
language)

Editor: Victor N. Constant, Rue Dr. Aubry
Chief Editor: Roger Constant

LE MERCURE

Editor: Alcide Edouard
15 Avenue N

LE NOUVEAU MONDE

Editor: Gerard de Catalogne tel: 3835
c/o Office du Tourisme
Cite de l'Exposition

PRESENCE HAITIENNE

Office: Place de l'Hotel de Ville
Editor: Dr. Andre J. Cantave tel: 3220
c/o Faculte d'Art Dentaire
Rue Oswald Durand

Office: Etage Dry Cleaning
Boucheureau, Rue Pavée 7

AD LIBITUM

Editor: Frederic Tardieu Duquella
Avenue Ducoste

TRIBUNE des JEUNES

Editor: Max St. Phard
202 Rue du Centre

LE CITOYEN

Editor: Claude Gerome
Blvd Dessalines 154

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Weekly Newspapers in Haiti (cont'd)

LA LANTERNE

Editor: Raphael Lalanne
Etage Blanchisserie Bouchereau
Rue Pavée

LE MILITANT

Editor: Michel C. Ambroise
Etage Dry Cleaning Bouchereau
Rue Pavée

LE RADICAL

Editor: Yves Fourcand
Avenue Marie Jeanne
Cite de l'Exposition

LA GAZETTE DU MIDI

Editor: Paul A. Severe
Rue Pavée, Apt 6, Etage Dry Bouchereau

LE SEPTENTRION

Editor: Henriquez Victor
Cap-Haitien

LA MONTEE

Editor: Nelson Bell
Cap-Haitien

HAITI VOLLEYBALL

Capt Jacques Joachim, Editor
c/o Ecole Freres St Louis, Rue du Centre, P-au-P

ATLANTIDE

Moliere Joseph Compaz, Editor
402 Blvd J-n-J Dessalines, P-au-P

ACTION DOCTRINALE

Michel Aubourg, Editor
Jacques S. Andre, Chief Editor
Camille M. Pierre, Administrator
(cont'd.)

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D. Radio Stations:

<u>STATION</u>	<u>CALL LETTERS</u>	<u>MEDIUM WAVE</u>	<u>SHORT WAVE</u>	<u>KILO-CYCLES</u>	<u>METERS</u>	<u>KILO-WATTS</u>	<u>DIRECTOR</u>	<u>ADDRESS</u>
Voix de la Revolution Duvalieriste (Govt. owned)	4VC 4VB 4VA	X	X	9485 5985 1080	31.61 50.13	3.5 3.5 1.5	Georges Figaro & Capt. Jose Borges	Carthe Darmiens
R. Diffusion Haitienne	4VM 4VYM	X	X	4940 1250	60.7	0.2 0.5	Yvan Michel	Ruelle Jeanty
R. Caraibes	4VEB 4VAB	X	X	6015 1150	49.88	.75 1.00	Franck Andre	Ruelle Chavanne 23
R. Union	4VG 4VF	X	X	6050 1120	49.59	0.8	Camille Toussaint	1 Ruelle Louverture
R. Haiti	4VHW 4VW	X	X	6195 1330	49.34	1.0	Felix Guery	342 Blvd. J.J. Dessalines
R. Nationale	4VZA	X		880		0.15		Route de Carrefour
R. Carillon	4VCD	X		960		1.00	Max Rigal	Rue Dr. Aubry 157
R. Cacique	4VCPS	X		990		0.2	Jean C. Carrier'	Rue Traversiere 3
R. Tropiques	4VRD	X		1170		0.5	Dambreville Bros	Ave John Brown
R. Progres	4VLS	X		860		1.0	Lucien Gautier	Bld. J.J. Dessalines 758
R. Port-au-Prince	4VVS	X		1385		1.0	Albert Mouchi	Stade Sylvio Cator

(* Intermittent)

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Weekly Newspapers in Haiti (continued)

ACTION DOCTRINALE (continued)

c/p Dept. de l'Interieur
Rue de la Revolution, P-au-P

CONVICTION

Ulrick St. Louis, Editor
Administrator: Renaud Pierre
Rue du Centre 123, P-au-P tel: 3188

NOS COOPERATIVES

Roger Labonte, Editor
Odette Cajuste, Chief Editor
c/p Imprimerie La Phalange, Rue Pavée,
P-au-P

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<u>STATION</u>	<u>CALL LETTERS</u>	<u>MEDIUM WAVE</u>	<u>SHORT WAVE</u>	<u>KILO CYCLES</u>	<u>METERS</u>	<u>KILO-WATTS</u>	<u>DIRECTOR</u>	<u>ADDRESS</u>
Magloire Broadcasting Circuit (MBC)	4VBM 4VCM	X	X	1430	49.00	1.0	Alphonse Cameau	Rue Americaine (local le Matin)
R. Lumiere	4VUE	X		FM 780 97.9MC		.25 .25	Louis Markwood	Cote Plages, P-au-P
R. Lumiere	4VI 4VU 4VO 4VOX	X	X	760 2410 6100 9635	49.00 31.00 (FM95.9)	1.0 .25 .25 .05	" "	Cite Lumiere, Cages
R. Citadelle	4VWA	X		1550	49M	1.0	Georges Boneg	Cap-Haitien
La Voix du Nord	4VEA 4VCP	X	X	1450 6175	49M	3.5	Emile Anaereon	Cap-Haitien
La Voix Evangelique	4VEH		X		25M 31M	3.5 0.5	Rev. Pizacato	Cap-Haitien
Intermittent				1035		10.0		
Television Station								
Tele-Haiti	4VMR			Channel A5		2.0	Director-General A.S. Apaid, Technical Director E.C. Gentil	13 Grande Rue Tintuna, Perchoir

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F. Printers, Lithographers, Engravers and Publishers in Haiti

1. Port-au-Prince

a. PUBLISHERS, BOOKBINDERS AND COMMERCIAL PRINTERS

**Compagnie Lithographique d'Haiti, 1348 Rue Eugene Bourjolly. Publisher and commercial printer. Publishes maps, textbooks, poetry and advertising literature. Printing by engraving and lithography. Printer of all types of postage stamps for the Haitian Government. Also prints commercial labels and calendars for most local firms. Largest lithographic company. No representative in the U.S. Haitian.

*Imprimerie Beaubrun, Rue du Magasin de l'Etat. Publisher, bookbinder and commercial printer. Publishes novels, history books and textbooks. Printing by letterpress. No U.S. representative. Haitian.

*Imprimerie Bissainthe (Serge Bissainthe), Rue Dantes Destouches. Publisher, bookbinder and commercial printer. Publishes poetry, textbooks and advertising pamphlets and leaflets. Printing by letterpress. Haitian.

**Imprimerie Deschamps, Rue Bonne Foi. Publisher, bookbinder and commercial printer. Publishes novels, books on Haitian literature and history, textbooks, maps and magazines. Modern printing shop and bookbindery. Printing by letterpress. Most important publishing and printing establishment in Haiti. Importer, wholesaler and retailer of complete printers supplies and equipment including printing paper, printing inks, etc. Representative in the U.S.: Westrade, 4623 Ponce de Leon Blvd., Coral Gables, Florida. Covers Haiti. Haitian.

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*Imprimerie du Commerce, Rue du Peuple. Commercial printer. Printing by letterpress. Haitian.

**Presses Nationales Reunis (formerly Imprimerie de l'Etat, Government Printing Office), Rue Hammetton Killick. Publisher, bookbinder and commercial printer. Publishes all official publications including the state budget, regulations of various ministerial departments and official speeches. Also publishes books on Haitian history, poetry and novels. All Government offices give their publishing, binding and printing jobs to the Government Printing Office. Printing by letterpress and engraving. Imports directly from abroad or through local agents printing supplies and equipment for personal use. Haitian.

*Imprimerie Les Presses Libres, Blvd Jean-Jacques Dessalines. Publisher and commercial printer. Publishes historical brochures, novels, books on poetry. Printing by letterpress. Haitian.

*Imprimerie Telhomme, Rue Dr. Aubry. Publisher, bookbinder and commercial printer. Publishes novels, books on Haitian literature and history, textbooks. Printing by letterpress. Orders printing papers and paper envelopes. Haitian.

**Imprimerie Theodore, Rue Dantes Destouches. Publisher and printer. Publishes novels, books on Haitian literature and history, textbooks, magazines and advertising literature. Has recently printed de luxe edition of works of President Duvalier. Modern printing shop. Printing by letterpress. No representative in the U.S. Imports directly blank books, printing paper ink. Haitian.

**Seminaire Adventiste (Seventh Day Adventist), Diquini. Publisher, bookbinder and commercial printer. Publishes biblical pamphlets, textbooks.

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**Imprimerie Nazarien (Nazarene Missionaries), Box 1323. Offset and lithographic equipment. Prints religious, educational and small job commercial American.

*La Falange. Catholic diocese, religious and commercial.

**Imprimerie des Antilles, Rue Bonne Foi. Commercial, offset and letterpress.

b. Service Industries to Printing Industry

There are no service industries to printing industry in Haiti.

c. Dealers in Printing Supplies and Equipment (also see under 1)

*Dantes Colimon, 9 Avenue M. Commission agent handling general merchandise including printers supplies and equipment. Covers Haiti. No representative in the U.S. Haitian.

*Carl H. Decatrel, Rue Dantes Destouches (P O Box 522). Commission agent handling general merchandise including printing machinery, newsprint and other printing paper, printing ink. Covers Haiti. Haitian.

**G. Gilg, Rue Roux (P O Box 5). Importer, wholesaler, retailer and commission agent handling general merchandise including printing machinery, newsprint and other printing paper, book cloth and printing ink, etc. Number of employees: 15. Covers Haiti. No U.S. representative. Swiss.

*L'Abelle, Place Geffrard. Importer, wholesaler, retailer and commission agent handling various lines including newsprint and other printing paper, book cloth, printing ink. Number of employees: 50. No representative in the U.S. Covers Haiti. French.

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**Maison L. H. Deschamps, Rue du Peuple (P O Box 164). Commission agent handling complete printing supplies and equipment such as printing machinery, newsprint and other printing paper, book cloth, printing ink, etc. Number of employees: 5. Representative in the U.S.: Rue Forwarding Co., 82 Beaver St., New York 25, NY. Covers Haiti. Haitian.

*Don Mohr Sales Corporation, 48 Rue Roux (P O Box 688). Importer, wholesaler, retailer and commission agent handling general merchandise including printing machinery, newsprint and other printing paper, book cloth, printing ink, etc. Number of employees: 10. No representative in U.S. Covers Haiti. American.

**Valery Sicard, Avenue Marie-Jeanne (P O Box 1336). Commission agent handling various lines including printers supplies and equipment such as printing machinery, newsprint and other printing paper, book cloth, ink, etc. Number of employees: 2. No representative in the U. S. Covers Haiti. Haitian.

LEGEND: denotes size of firm

* small

** medium

*** large

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