


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Soviet and Cuban Support to Chilean Opposition




An Intelligence Assessment

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
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
Unauthorized Disclosure
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Derived from multiple sources

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Soviet and Cuban Support to Chilean Opposition [Redacted]

An Intelligence Assessment



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Soviet and Cuban Support to Chilean Opposition

Scope Note

This assessment outlines the strategies of the Soviet Union and its allies in supporting the opposition and analyzes how their differing approaches could affect the outcome of events in Chile.



Soviet and Cuban Support to Chilean Opposition

Key Judgments

*Information available
as of 1 September 1987
was used in this report.*

Vulnerabilities in the regime of Augusto Pinochet have encouraged Moscow to actively promote revolution in Chile. An economic downturn in 1983 spawned widespread discontent and an anti-Pinochet opposition that has continued to grow. Part of Pinochet's response has been repression. The demise of neighboring military regimes and the formation of democratic governments in several key South American countries have increased regional antipathy toward Pinochet's regime.

Both the USSR and Cuba consider the Chilean Communist Party (PCCh), for many years the Latin American Communist party closest to Moscow, to be the most important Chilean leftist opposition party. They are seeking to position the party to emerge as the dominant group within the successor government. Notwithstanding, both Moscow and Havana, but particularly Havana, support a variety of left-leaning opposition parties so as to maximize resistance to Pinochet and achieve their goal of turning Chile into a Communist state. Both have supported violence as a legitimate means to oust Pinochet.

The USSR, Cuba, and their allies have together or individually provided guidance, funding, training, and other assistance not only to the PCCh but also variously to the PCCh's terrorist ally, the Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front; the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR); and the Almeyda faction of the Chilean Socialist Party. Probably as a result of such assistance, the opposition to Pinochet has become more violent, culminating in a well-organized attempt by the Patriotic Front to assassinate him.

Soviet and Cuban approaches to revolution in Chile vary. Moscow's most important objective is to guarantee that the PCCh will someday govern Chile—as the immediate successor to Pinochet, if possible.

the Soviets do not want to jeopardize the long-term prospects of the party through a premature or ill-conceived attempt to overthrow Pinochet. They are content for now to have the PCCh work with other groups, although they do not support the others enough to enable them to challenge the Communist leadership of the leftist opposition. Soviet academic literature makes clear that Moscow is, in fact, hostile to the radical MIR for pursuing policies that undermined Salvador Allende's presidency, and the Soviets do not support this movement directly. While supporting violence and terrorist activities, the Soviets caution that the potential political impact of each action must be thoroughly examined before it is carried out.

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Havana, by contrast, is primarily concerned that Pinochet be driven out of office and works with a range of parties to achieve this objective.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Castro is less concerned with long-term strategy or with which group leads the revolution; his support to the PCCh is as much a recognition of the party's strength as a reflection of preference. The Cubans apparently assume that the PCCh will emerge as the dominant group in the successor government, but they do little to guarantee that outcome by, for instance, reining in potential rivals such as the pro-Cuban MIR. Havana's support to the MIR indicates that the Cubans are more broadly committed to the use of violence in Chile than the Soviets.

[REDACTED]

If Moscow forces the issue, the Cubans are likely, even if reluctantly, to follow the Soviet lead in determining their future support to the Chilean opposition, but old controversies between Moscow and Havana concerning when and how to bring about revolutionary change in Latin America may be resurfacing. Moscow has shown a greater desire than Havana to ingratiate itself with the governments of several Central American states where it had previously supported antiregime insurgents. Castro appeared unabashed by the discovery last year of over [REDACTED] of Cuban-supplied arms cached by the PCCh and its allied Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front. The Soviets have kept a very low profile on the incident. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Some evidence suggests that negative public reactions both in Chile and the region to leftist-instigated violence and the caching of arms in late 1986 have induced more caution in Moscow in supporting the violence. [REDACTED]






[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Moscow may be prompting the PCCh leadership to reestablish tight party control over when and how PCCh and Front members carry out terrorist acts. If an intransigent Pinochet retains the presidency after his term ends in 1989, Moscow will probably encourage the PCCh to step up its violent tactics in the hope of promoting an all-out insurrection. If Pinochet leaves office peacefully by 1989, and a civilian government with broad popular support is established, Moscow will probably press the Communists to return to nonviolent tactics to obtain legal status. [REDACTED]

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Chile's Regional Setting



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Soviet and Cuban Support to Chilean Opposition

Introduction

Since the overthrow of Chile's Socialist President Salvador Allende in a violent coup 14 years ago, the USSR and most other Communist states have had no diplomatic relations with Santiago and have officially opposed Augusto Pinochet's regime.


stung by Allende's defeat and by the Pinochet government's easy reversal of Allende's leftist policies, believed that a leftist resurgence was years off and advised the Chilean Communist Party (PCCh)—the Latin American Communist party closest to Moscow—to seek change through participation in nonviolent leftist fronts.

The triumph of the Sandinistas over Nicaraguan President Anastasio Somoza in 1979, however, changed Moscow's thinking about the prospects for revolution in Latin America. A variety of reporting indicates that Moscow had not anticipated the Sandinista victory, but the event quickly focused Soviet attention on the region. In numerous public articles Soviet political theorists concluded that the Cuban model for political change—armed struggle and guerilla warfare—could be translated into a formula for creating political-military groups that could successfully challenge some incumbent regimes. Support for armed struggle in Latin America was a shift in tactics for the Soviets as well as a major change in Soviet thought. In fact, in the 1960s Havana's intransigent backing of armed struggle had produced a Soviet-Cuban rift.

Chile Is Targeted

Following the Sandinista victory, published Soviet and Cuban statements and actions in support of antigovernment insurgents made clear that Moscow and Havana were targeting several Latin American nations, including Guatemala, El Salvador, and Chile, for violent revolution. Chile was an obvious candidate because:

- Vulnerabilities in the Pinochet regime were tailor-made for Soviet exploitation. An economic downturn in 1983 spawned widespread discontent and an



Gen. Augusto Pinochet

anti-Pinochet opposition that has continued to grow. Partly, Pinochet has responded with repression aimed especially at the poorer classes. The discontent has been fanned by highly publicized acts allegedly carried out by Pinochet's security forces, such as the murder of several Communist leaders and the immolation of two young Chileans.

- Neither Moscow nor Havana had diplomatic or trade ties to Santiago, so they had little to lose. Moreover, as Soviet academic literature has made clear, the Kremlin interpreted the 1973 Pinochet victory as a "temporary defeat" for the Chilean revolution, and the opportunity to complete that revolution became a special goal.
- The demise of neighboring military regimes and the formation of democratic governments in several key South American countries, including Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay, have made Chile's dictatorial government an anachronism and have increased regional antipathy toward the regime. The violence with which Pinochet came to power and his continued reliance on repression have also earned him disapproval outside Latin America, making him an attractive target

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Differing Soviet and Cuban Perspectives

Although Moscow and Havana are working toward the same strategic goal in Chile—the establishment of a radical leftist government closely linked to both capitals—there have long been significant differences in the way Soviet and Cuban academic writings and public statements analyze the potential for revolution in Latin America and in the tactics they advocate to assist the formation of Communist regimes. Moscow has emphasized winning broad acceptance within society and creating genuine “class consciousness.”

[REDACTED]

Before the fall of Somoza, Soviet writers cautioned against the use of violence in support of a leftist revolution, arguing that such tactics often alienate significant segments of society—including elements of the industrial, agricultural, and middle classes. In turn this creates a reactionary backlash, which can lead to the destruction of the revolution and can discredit the USSR. Havana has been far more opportunistic than Moscow, more prone to the use of violence, and seemingly less concerned with ideological issues, traits evidenced by Cuban activities in support of revolution in South America during the 1960s. [REDACTED]

For a short time in the early 1980s, however, stimulated by the victory of the Sandinistas, Moscow and Havana both enthusiastically endorsed armed rebellion against several Latin American governments. The Soviets became convinced that, at least under the existing conditions, support to leftist groups such as the Sandinistas and a violent drive for power could be shortcuts to the ultimate achievement of Marxist regimes in the Western Hemisphere. But as the euphoria of the Sandinista victory wore off and Moscow was faced with the declining fortunes of insurgencies in Guatemala and El Salvador, the Soviets began to temper their enthusiasm for armed struggle with a renewed emphasis on the traditional tenets of Soviet revolutionary theory [REDACTED]

The View From Moscow. Moscow's analysis of why the Allende revolution failed reveals part of its strategy for a successful Communist takeover. According to Soviet academic interpretations, a leftist revolution should have taken hold in Chile during Allende's presidency and the country should have evolved into a pro-Soviet Marxist state. Moscow concluded that the Chilean Communist Party bears a large measure of responsibility for this failure. [REDACTED]

Moscow criticized the PCCh for not being prepared to dominate the revolution and defend its interests against the violent opposition of the extreme left and right. In order to achieve some support from the middle class, according to Soviet critics, the PCCh should have been prepared to politically counter the parties of the extreme left, especially the pro-Cuban Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR), as they forced Allende to adopt measures, such as a rapid nationalization of property, that aggravated an already deteriorating economic situation. The Soviets also criticized the PCCh for treating the armed forces as a monolithic institution hostile to a leftist revolution. According to an article in the international Soviet publication *Problems of Peace and Socialism*, the party should have recognized divisions, based on class differences, within the military and worked to turn them to the advantage of the revolution. [REDACTED]

Nevertheless, Moscow's initial infatuation with what it perceived as the ease of the Sandinista victory in Nicaragua has been reflected in a heightened awareness that revolutions can sometimes develop unexpectedly and in a greater willingness to work with non-Communist leftist parties. In the case of Chile, these new approaches have merged with the lessons learned from the failed Allende revolution to form the current strategy for a successful Communist takeover. Moscow now advocates a broad political-military front in Chile as the best means to oust the Pinochet regime. Moscow also has condoned violence as a legitimate means to overthrow Pinochet. [REDACTED]



[REDACTED]

The Soviets have warned the PCCh that ideological preparation of party members remains its most important task. This reflects Moscow's continuing conviction that, in order to create a sustainable regime, the PCCh must be disciplined, saturated with Marxist-Leninist theory, in control of the other revolutionary parties, and responsive to the specifics of the Chilean environment and population. [REDACTED]

The View From Havana. Cuban President Fidel Castro, on the other hand, has consistently been attracted to a revolutionary model that emphasizes initiative and military action and subordinates political training and the formulation of clear principles governing political leadership. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Cuba has a less orthodox and ideologically rigorous approach to revolution, and it considers violence the principal instrument of change in Latin America. Havana also seeks influence through less violent means, such as trade, medical aid, and educational assistance, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

On the surface, at least, Castro's activities in Chile are consistent with these comments. For example, the Cubans seem less concerned with outlining a long-term political program than with the successful transfer of power from Pinochet to a leftist government.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Castro is willing to spread his resources in support of several parties that make up the leftist opposition. As they have done with the Sandinistas, the leftist insurgents in El Salvador, and others, the Cubans have been trying to broker leftist unity in Chile as a means to maximize the resistance to the

incumbent government. Once Pinochet has been ousted, Castro apparently trusts that the Communists will emerge as the dominant political party.

[REDACTED]

Game Plan for Overthrowing Pinochet

On the basis of Soviet academic writings, [REDACTED] and the activities of the PCCh, we believe at present there is a consensus among the Soviets, Cubans, and the PCCh on general tactics for overthrowing Pinochet, although there is reliable evidence that some disagreement over specific issues remains. The tactics include:

- Carrying out activities designed to increase the party's popularity while maintaining increasing pressure on Pinochet.
- Joining a coalition with other leftist parties to consolidate the opposition.
- Holding mass meetings and strikes.
- Winning over or neutralizing as many elements within the armed forces as possible.
- Using terrorism to force Pinochet to respond with increasingly reactionary measures that will spur a backlash, create sympathy for the PCCh in the middle classes, and swell the ranks of the opposition.

[REDACTED]


[REDACTED] Moscow believes violent activity will create a polarized environment in which the PCCh will emerge as the group most acceptable to a majority of Chileans to succeed the Pinochet government. The attempted assassination of Pinochet by a band of well-drilled assailants who ambushed his guarded motorcade in September of 1986 was the most striking example yet of a commitment to violence. The attempt was clearly the work of the Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front but with some degree of coordination with the PCCh.

[REDACTED]

Moscow apparently expects that increased political instability will ultimately undermine Pinochet's support within the armed forces also by creating a growing distaste for their role in repressing popular dissent and defending an intransigent Pinochet. The Soviet critique of PCCh actions during the Allende



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The ambush of General Pinochet's motorcade on 7 September 1986 (drawing from an official Chilean publication). [REDACTED]



years makes clear Moscow's belief that members of the armed forces must be encouraged to respond to this deteriorating political environment as members of the dissatisfied middle or lower-middle classes, loyal to the nation of Chile, rather than as officers sworn to protect Pinochet. [REDACTED]




The discovery of over [REDACTED] of weapons stockpiled in northern Chile clearly indicates that the PCCh envisioned that at some point the opposition would shift from quick, hit-and-run operations designed to harass the Pinochet government to more broadly based military activity [REDACTED]





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*Some of the arms found in
1986 in caches of the Chilean
Communist Party and the
Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic
Front.* ■





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The Chilean Political Scene

Political Parties

All political parties became technically illegal in Chile when the military government came to power in 1973. Nevertheless, several dozen moderate parties and factions continued to function more or less openly. After the emergence of a mass opposition movement in 1983, the government became somewhat more tolerant of the activities of moderate opposition groups—although not of Marxist parties. The moderate parties have formed several alliances or coalitions in the past few years, as have the parties of the far left. Pinochet has joined the bandwagon by creating his own political party, the National Advance Party.

Coalition Groups

Popular Democratic Movement. Most far left parties belong to the Popular Democratic Movement, which was folded into the United Left Alliance in June 1987.

The National Accord. Eleven mainstream parties that signed a comprehensive series of moderate proposals for a transition to democratic government in August 1985 at the instigation of the Catholic Church's primate. Includes two conservative and two leftist parties along with the original members of the Alliance. Quiescent in recent months.

The Democratic Alliance. A broad grouping of seven parties from the moderate right to the center left founded in 1983 and dominated by the centrist Christian Democratic Party. Chairmanship rotates every six months among the parties.

Left

Right

Movement of the Revolutionary Left Pro-Castro radical leftist organization

Communist Party of Chile	Largest, most cohesive, and influential far left group in Chile
Socialist Party/Almeyda	Largest and best financed of the many factions of the Chilean Socialist Party
United Popular Action Movement	Christian-Marxist split from Christian Democratic Party; comprises several factions
Christian Left	Small but growing group of Christian socialist dissenters from Christian Democrats
Socialist Party/Mandujano	Disparate collection of democratic and Marxist socialists
Radical Party	Chile's oldest party; secular, more leftist alternative to Christian Democrats
Socialist Party/Nunez	Largest and most moderate socialist faction
Social Democratic Party	Moderate faction of pre-1973 Radical Party
Liberal Movement	Small, old-line liberal party

Christian Democratic Party Spearheads the democratic opposition movement to Pinochet; membership runs from center right to left


Republican Party Small rightwing party

Popular Socialist Union Rightwing faction split from pre-1973 Chilean Socialist Party


National Party Possibly largest rightwing party

National Renovation Party Established in early 1987 through fusion of two moderate right parties and one far right party


National Advance Party Pinochet's own political party





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For the last decade and a half the Soviets have broadcast extensively in Spanish to Chile over Radio Magallanes, which operates out of the Soviet Union. Moscow has provided a steady discourse on international and domestic Chilean events and has also developed feature programs aimed at special interest groups in Chile. For example, the "Voice of the Fatherland" is directed specifically at Chile's armed forces; other programs are geared to enlist the sympathies of women or university students. The MIR has not benefited from Moscow's propaganda efforts, but the Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front has. In September 1986 Radio Magallanes extolled membership in the Front by quoting a letter from an exiled Chilean youth who sought advice on whether to return to Chile and join the Front. Radio Magallanes encouraged the youth to do so. [REDACTED]

The Soviets also provide a propaganda outlet for the PCCh. In the immediate aftermath of the arms discovery in 1986, for example, the PCCh used the TASS office in Buenos Aires to publish a statement denouncing Pinochet's reprisals. [REDACTED]

In recent years both Havana and Managua have publicly condemned the Pinochet regime and extolled the leftist opposition. Moscow and its allies have consistently lambasted the Pinochet government in international and regional forums, including the United Nations and the Organization of American States. Year after year in the UN, the Soviets, Cubans, and East Europeans sponsor resolutions in the Social, Humanitarian, and Cultural Committee and the Human Rights Committee that condemn human rights abuses in Chile. [REDACTED]

Hemispheric Support System



The USSR and its allies have minimal representation in Santiago. There are two Soviets attached to a United Nations organization there, and, according to [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Of the Bloc states, only Romania has diplomatic relations with Chile. In the absence of any significant Communist presence in Chile, Moscow




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and its allies have used regional Communist parties and their own facilities in neighboring countries to maintain liaison with the Chilean opposition. [REDACTED]



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The Risks of Pursuing the Violent Overthrow of Pinochet

Risks in Chile. The political isolation of the PCCh that followed the discovery of the arms caches and the attempted assassination of Pinochet demonstrates the need for the PCCh and the other far left parties to walk a careful line between an escalation of violence that keeps the Pinochet regime off balance and actions that create a backlash and increase support—if not for Pinochet himself—for a gradual evolution toward a democratic nonleftist regime by the 1990s. Events during the April 1987 visit of Pope John Paul to Chile provided another example of this dilemma. At first, the Communist media condemned the Pope's visit as a CIA/Vatican plot to shore up Pinochet. When the violent demonstrations of the left provoked a negative popular response, both Moscow's Radio Magallanes and the PCCh quickly denied that the Communists had anything to do with them.


Soviet academic journals have acknowledged that arbitrary violence harmed the PCCh during the Allende period. In particular, the journals have

warned that if the moderate opposition and the armed forces remain united in their opposition to the left—a realistic prospect if they both feel threatened by violence—the PCCh will be unable to gain and maintain power in Chile.

Regional Risks. In the region's other nonsocialist countries, Moscow maintains support for Communist and other leftist groups but does so with a clear intent not to jeopardize relations with the national governments. Within the last two years Moscow has begun an unprecedented campaign to establish closer and more lucrative ties to the most significant political and economic powers in Latin America, notably Mexico, Argentina, and Brazil, while concurrently reducing support to local insurgents. Continued Soviet actions to dislodge Pinochet could undermine these initiatives, providing a clear example to the region's leaders of Moscow's capacity for subversive interference in Latin American countries.



Havana has been wrestling with such competing interests as well. In the last few years several Latin American states, such as Brazil and Peru, have increasingly accepted Cuba as a member of the Latin American community. Moreover, Cuba looks to states such as Argentina and Brazil for trade and financial credits to help its troubled economy. Castro's goal of overthrowing Pinochet could put Havana's new "moderate" reputation at risk.

At least through the end of 1986, Moscow and Havana apparently felt that international antipathy for Pinochet was strong enough that regional leaders would tolerate Soviet and Bloc support for subversive violence.





Reasserting Party Control Over Violence? Reports of dissension in the ranks of the PCCh and Manuel Rodriguez Front, as well as a recent brief lull in terrorist acts, suggest that the PCCh leadership—under advisement from Moscow—is attempting to reassert control over when and how acts of terror are perpetrated by party or Front members. In the current political climate in Chile the Communists find themselves caught between elements of the radical left, anxious to speed up the drive against Pinochet through a more liberal application of violence, and the democratic opposition, which is still frightened by the discovery of the arms caches, the assassination attempt, and the PCCh's recent refusal to cooperate with the voter registration drive supported by most members of the leftist coalition. [REDACTED]



The increased isolation of the party that followed the discovery of the cached arms and the attempted assassination of Pinochet almost certainly caused Moscow to conduct some form of damage assessment and to conclude that some terrorist acts or actions that would lead to violence, such as the caching of weapons, would be counterproductive and would alienate groups, such as the armed forces or the moderate left, whose support is necessary if the Communists are to gain and sustain power. The Soviets appear to have decided that the PCCh should reestablish internal party discipline and control over terror so as to bring the use of terror more into line with Moscow's views on the selective and purposeful application of violence. [REDACTED]

Possible Scenarios

Scenario One: Pinochet Stays After Term Ends. The high degree of popular antipathy among virtually all classes and social groups to the idea of Pinochet retaining power after 1989 suggests that he could only do so through fraudulent elections or other extralegal means. Such a turn of events would almost certainly cause an increased level of dissension and disruption in Chilean society. Moreover, in order to guarantee his tenure in the face of such resistance, Pinochet would probably prod the local police and armed forces to increase internal control and repression. This, in turn, would damage the reputation of the armed forces with the Chilean public—reducing their appeal

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as an alternative to Pinochet—and probably cause fissures within the ranks of the armed forces themselves. These events could easily bring about the kind of all-out insurrection envisioned by Moscow and Havana as the steppingstone to PCCh political control of Chile [REDACTED]

Moscow probably evaluates this as the most fertile environment for pushing its overall goals, especially if resistance to Pinochet's regime forces him to clamp down even harder. Increased repression would provide a justification for Moscow to remain visibly opposed to the Chilean President. Moreover, the situation could evolve in Chile as it did in Nicaragua, leaving the PCCh at the forefront of an opposition with support from various classes. In this case, Moscow would almost certainly maintain its level of support and, quite possibly, throw its weight behind an all-out PCCh effort by increasing its assistance—including the direct provision of arms. [REDACTED]

Havana would probably supply weapons to various leftist groups, including the pro-Cuban MIR. The Soviets, however, are anxious to guarantee the dominance of the PCCh from the start of the post-Pinochet era, and almost certainly would pressure Havana to suspend aid to competing leftists. Given the greater numbers and popularity of the PCCh, Castro might grudgingly comply with Moscow's desires. If the PCCh succeeded in seizing power, Moscow and Havana would, we believe, provide a steady stream of advice and probably advisers in order to steer the PCCh toward the establishment of a Marxist-Leninist state. In particular, the Soviets and Cubans would probably help set up internal political controls and aid in the establishment of a secret police that would begin harassment of those groups opposed to the new order. As is the case in Nicaragua, however, we believe Moscow would attempt to keep its own profile low in Chile to avoid provoking the United States. [REDACTED]

Scenario Two: Pinochet Leaves Office Peacefully.

Pinochet has expressed determination to remain in power indefinitely, but ultimately the military, led by the Army, could decide it has no recourse but to confront him and insist that he step aside. Most Chileans, including those in the armed forces, are

convinced that the best outcome for Chile would be one in which the military and the nonradical political party leaders reach an agreement on an orderly transition to civilian rule. If in fact such a peaceful transition is worked out and armed violence is minimized, Moscow and Havana would be faced with a dilemma over how to proceed. According to various Soviet journals, Moscow believes that, in such a situation, the PCCh could be swept aside or destroyed if it were unable to respond effectively to a quickly changing political environment and a drive toward a peaceful political transition. [REDACTED]

If, in Moscow's assessment, a majority of Chileans support the new government and the PCCh's prospects for taking over the government appear dim, we believe the Soviets would probably advise the PCCh to refrain from violent activities. This would almost certainly be Moscow's approach if the new government promised to legalize the PCCh. The Soviets would press the PCCh to assume the role of accredited opposition that Communist parties, like the one in Argentina, play in other countries in the region. This could lead in several years to state-to-state ties between Moscow and Santiago and might eventually lead to the Communists becoming part of the legally elected government in Chile. [REDACTED]

It appears unlikely, however, that the PCCh will be legalized any time soon. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] there is little support among the Chilean armed forces and the majority of civilians for this move and these sentiments will probably continue. In the wake of the attempted assassination in 1986, the moderate opposition has refused to collaborate with the radical left, including the PCCh. Nevertheless, Soviet advice and actions in other revolutionary situations in Latin America indicate that, unless Moscow concluded that a majority of Chileans (representing the various classes) were opposed to the new government, the Soviets would still advise the PCCh to refrain from violent opposition. Despite probable demoralization in party ranks, and almost certain resistance from Havana, we believe Moscow would advise the PCCh to make political legalization its goal for the time being. [REDACTED]



Scenario Three: Pinochet Is Assassinated. The assassination of Pinochet would probably spark a significant backlash against the violent left—the most likely sponsor of the assassins. Of all the scenarios, we believe that this one would be the most damaging from Moscow's point of view. Even if the PCCh might gain some credit—especially among students and others predisposed to forceful action—for ridding the country of the dictator, there would undoubtedly be aversion to the violence of the assassination. The parties of the radical left, including the PCCh, could lose a significant amount of support as other Chileans, notably members of the upper and middle classes, rallied to the defense of the successor government. In fact, the new government might find in the assassination an excuse for an all-out crackdown on these parties. Moscow's overt support for such violence would brand the Soviets as advocates of terrorism and expose the dark side of their aspirations in the Western Hemisphere. [REDACTED]

Conclusions

Whether the Soviets will continue to advocate the violent overthrow of Pinochet depends on their perception of how successful this policy is in strengthening the PCCh and whether it undermines their efforts to maintain good relations with other Latin American countries. If they believe Pinochet's intransigence and increased repression will set the scene for a mass rebellion and popular acceptance of violence, they undoubtedly will encourage the PCCh to use violence and probably will supply weapons and logistic support. If, on the other hand, Moscow concludes that the armed forces and opposition political parties are headed toward a nonviolent solution to Chile's political succession and that other regional states are becoming less tolerant of Soviet interference in Chilean affairs, we believe the Soviets will advocate that the PCCh assume a peaceful path to power. [REDACTED]

If Moscow forces the issue, the Cubans are likely to follow Moscow's lead, even if reluctantly, in determining their policy on support to the Chilean opposition, but some aspects of Havana's position may differ from Moscow's. Old controversies between Moscow and Havana concerning when and how to bring about revolutionary change in Latin America could be resurfacing. Moscow has already shown a desire to ingratiate itself with the governments of several Central American democracies where it had previously

supported antiregime insurgents. Castro apparently retains his long-held conviction that armed insurrection by a broad strata of leftist forces can bring about leftist change in Latin America in the short term. Moreover, Castro appears unabashed by the discovery of Cuban involvement with the Chilean left. [REDACTED]

The Chilean example suggests broader lessons about when the Soviets decide to support a revolutionary drive. Such a decision is apparently often largely based on an assessment of two factors: the risks to Soviet interests and the impact on local Communist parties. Frequently what is good for one is good for both. For example, in Peru Moscow has counseled the Communist Party to act as a loyal opposition to President Alan Garcia rather than provoke a leftist revolt. For Moscow, this serves the dual purpose of reassuring the Peruvian Government that the USSR is not trying to undermine it—thereby maintaining a degree of Soviet influence—while saving the Peruvian Communist Party from a premature and potentially disastrous challenge to established authority. [REDACTED]

In other cases, however, there is a dichotomy between these two factors that acts as a brake on Soviet support for a violent drive toward revolution. In Colombia, Moscow has only limited political and economic influence, but it is hesitant to publicly throw its weight behind any of the armed opposition groups. They are reluctant even though the Colombian Communist Party's armed wing, to which Moscow has clandestinely given direction and perhaps funds, has the potential to seriously challenge the established government. This hesitancy probably stems from Moscow's apparent belief that—in contrast to the situation in Chile—Soviet support to the Colombian opposition would be viewed in the region as unacceptable and would adversely affect Soviet relations with other South American states. [REDACTED]

In those countries, however, where Moscow believes that by underwriting violent tactics it can further its own fortunes and increase the popularity of the local Communists, it will push ahead in its efforts to support a Communist drive for political power. Chile clearly is such a country. [REDACTED]

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