



INTERAGENCY INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT
30 October 1983

PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT OF CUBAN AND SOVIET INVOLVEMENT IN GRENADA

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- C. Official Cuban Breakdown of Cuban Personnel in Grenada
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- F. Chronology of Cuban Statements and Actions in Grenada,
7 to 30 October 1983
- G. Chronology of Soviet Statements and Actions in Grenada,
7 September 1979 to 27 October 1983

[REDACTED]


[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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I. Key Judgments and Exploitation Considerations



[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] In view of Bishop's expressed concerns about a possible invasion, it is reasonable to believe that the captured arms stocks inventoried to date were intended to ensure internal security and to defend Grenada against attack -- particularly in view of apparent plans to expand the size of the Grenadian armed forces. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] Some of the arms may have been intended for use as a stockpile from which arms could be transshipped to revolutionary governments elsewhere in the eastern Caribbean. Similarly, some arms could have been prepositioned for contingency use by Cuban forces, [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

The use of identifiable Soviet arms to support guerrilla movements would be uncharacteristic. For example, insurgents in El Salvador are not supplied with Soviet-made weaponry. Moreover, we doubt that the weapons found in Grenada were stockpiled for use in an invasion of neighboring island states because Cuba and Grenada would be deterred by anticipated US responses.

[REDACTED]

If it turns out, however, that the quantities of weapons are considerably in excess of those enumerated in the bilateral military assistance agreements with the USSR and North Korea, then we must consider that some of the arms stocks in Grenada were intended for use elsewhere in the region. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Recent events in Grenada suggest several conclusions regarding our assessment of the situation in Central America, and especially in Nicaragua:

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
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-- Despite their domestic economic problems, the Soviets, Cubans, and other Soviet allies are prepared to make a substantial financial commitment to provide military equipment and training to defend their investments in client states such as Grenada and Nicaragua. In the wake of recent developments in Grenada, the commitment of additional military personnel, weapons, and equipment to Nicaragua and Cuba would not be unexpected, but the introduction of high performance jet aircraft to Nicaragua is considered unlikely. [REDACTED]

II. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

III. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

IV. Estimates of Cuban Personnel


On 28 October the Cuban Government announced the presence of 784 Cubans in Grenada, providing a detailed enumeration of their functions. (See TAB C.)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]



[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

V. Cuban Intentions**

Since Maurice Bishop and his followers overthrew the regime of Eric Gairy in March 1979, Grenada has served as a focal point for efforts by the Cubans to expand their influence in the eastern Caribbean. Havana had taken the lead in trying to make the island a showcase of Cuban-aided development policy, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]


[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

**For a chronology of Cuban statements and actions in Grenada from 7 to 30 October 1983 see TAB F. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]



Castro was personally close to Maurice Bishop and strongly supported his regime. Havana probably was aware of the frictions between Bishop and Coard before Bishop's trip to Eastern Europe, but seems to have expected that such differences could be smoothed over. The event which apparently precipitated Coard's power play was Bishop's rejection of Coard's proposal to assume the senior party post, with Bishop becoming the head of state. The Cubans would have preferred that Bishop remain in full control, but probably would have acquiesced to a power-sharing arrangement if circumstances so dictated. Havana, in fact, may have been planning to send a delegation to St. Georges to help negotiate a suitable compromise after Bishop was placed under house arrest, but the mission probably was aborted by the news of Bishop's execution.

Havana's public reaction to the news of Bishop's execution and their cautious treatment of the new government in subsequent days.

Castro almost certainly interpreted the US decision to deploy a naval task force to Grenada as a sign an invasion was seriously being contemplated, if not underway. He apparently responded by dispatching Colonel Tortola Comas to Grenada on Monday, 24 October, to organize the resistance.

A decision not to resist would also have unnerved the Sandinista regime which is depending on Havana to help defend it from external attack. In addition, a meek surrender would have badly damaged Castro's credibility as a world revolutionary leader by giving the appearance of knuckling under to US military pressure.

VI. Soviet Intentions*

The USSR apparently wanted to consolidate a Marxist regime in Grenada as a model and a source of influence over other east Caribbean countries. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] We believe Soviet interest in using the Point Salines airfield for naval reconnaissance was marginal at best. [REDACTED]

Moscow seems to have preferred a low profile in Grenada. The purpose of this would have been to deflect criticism and avoid alarming nearby countries over Soviet involvement, instead using the regionally more acceptable Cubans for a leading role. [REDACTED]

- Nonetheless, the Soviets were aware of the extreme economic difficulties into which Grenada was falling, and they might have feared that their own unwillingness to provide significant economic aid could weaken Grenada's orientation toward the USSR and Cuba.
- Both Moscow and Havana might have been concerned by Bishop's efforts to improve relations with the United States last summer, [REDACTED]

The events in Grenada, and the related expulsion of the Cuban Ambassador from Suriname, are likely to affect Soviet thinking about the Caribbean-Central American region in several ways:

- Moscow will intensify its efforts to build up Caribbean Communist and other far left parties by supplying funds and advice. The goal will remain a long-term hope of Communists' benefitting from economic problems, overpopulation, and other strains with continued Soviet advice to consolidate their own parties and build solid bases of public support.
- The USSR will continue and probably increase efforts militarily to harden Cuba against possible US attack.

*For a chronology of Soviet statements and actions in Grenada from 7 September 1979 to 27 October 1983 see TAB G. [REDACTED]

- Moscow will continue to enhance the ability of the Sandinistas to defend their regime, but it will seek to avoid a major public role by, for instance, not sending identifiable Soviet military personnel or shipping major weapons directly on Soviet ships.
- The Soviets will be more careful about an armed confrontation with the United States in the region as a result of the US's willingness to use force in Grenada. The Soviets still are not likely to authorize Cuban shipments to Nicaragua of high performance jet fighters, and they will reinforce their admonitions to Cuba against undertaking actions that might lead to a Cuban confrontation with the United States. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]