

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

OFFICIAL BUSINESS

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BY HAND TO

The Honorable Dean Rusk
The Secretary of State
Washington, D. C.

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File in 3

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE


22 July 1963

Dear Dean:

In response to your inquiry of yesterday, I am transmitting herewith a memorandum in which item 3 responds specifically to the question you directed to me. You can consider items 1 and 2 as gratuitous and representative of the Agency's interest in the problem, but which deal with subjects which are the responsibility of the Department of State.

I have noted and reported from time to time serious deficiencies in the internal security services of the Venezuelan government. It is because of this that the Agency expresses doubt concerning the VSS capability to protect Perez Jimenez. This lack of capability has been demonstrated on several occasions when appropriate Venezuelan government authorities have been warned by us in advance of impending acts of violence, have been unable to take appropriate protective measures, and, as a result, the forecasted acts of violence have taken place.

Yours very truly,



Attachment

The Honorable Dean Rusk
The Secretary of State
Washington, D. C.

STATE DEPT. DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW
 Retain classification Change/classify to
 Declassify with concurrence of CIA
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EO 12958, 25X
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22 July 1963

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Extradition of Perez Jimenez to Venezuela

1. Political Implications of Perez Jimenez' Return to Venezuela

His return at the present time, or at any time prior to the elections scheduled to be held in November, would tend to aggravate the already precarious relationships which exist between Betancourt and both the center and the right. Generally speaking, those who support Betancourt would tend to accept and defend Perez Jimenez' extradition, while all elements of the opposition, both of the left and right, would tend to attack the action. It is believed that the extradition would be exploited by propaganda from the left, and that political agitation from that direction would greatly increase.

2. Betancourt's Attitude Toward the Extradition.

Obviously, Betancourt cannot take a public or official position against the return of Perez Jimenez. He must certainly be aware of the additional political problems which Perez Jimenez' return would create. He has, however, stated repeatedly to the Embassy that he does not believe the return of Perez Jimenez would cause great difficulties. As recently as June 19th, Betancourt assured the Ambassador that he wanted Perez Jimenez back.

3. Can the Venezuelan Government Provide Adequate Protection for Perez Jimenez

The lack of coordination and known weaknesses of the Venezuelan Security Services, have not demonstrated an ability to protect the life of Perez Jimenez. It would certainly be difficult, if not impossible, to give him adequate protection in any normal prison situation. With regard to a trial, the feeling against Perez Jimenez from many directions, fanned by leftist propaganda and agitation, would be so intense that a fair trial would be highly unlikely. It should be borne in mind, of course, that if he is returned to Venezuela, Perez Jimenez will be tried for the crime of embezzlement, rather than for a political crime. It is also perhaps of some significance, that there is no death penalty in Venezuela.

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GROUP 1
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