

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

31 July 1963

DR

Dear Mr. Rusk:

Attached is a report [redacted] covering some points raised in the course of Mr. Nixon's recent luncheon with de Gaulle in Paris.

Mr. McCone asked that this report be brought to your personal attention.

Sincerely,

[redacted signature]

Executive Assistant

Attachment

The Honorable Dean Rusk  
The Secretary of State  
Washington 25, D. C.

STATE DEPT. DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW  
 Retain class'n  Change/classify to  
 Declassify  with concurrence of CTA  
EXEMPTED 12958, 25X  
FPC/HDR by [signature]  
Withdrawal No. 72  
Date: 3/12/96  
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31 JUL 1963

SUBJECT: Mr. Nixon's Conversation with de Gaulle on 30 July 1963

With regard to possible American help to France which could make testing unnecessary and allow France to adhere to the test ban, de Gaulle took the position:

- a. Such cooperation in the nuclear field was probably not feasible from a political standpoint in America and in light of American laws and necessary congressional action.
- b. It was now a bit late to consider offering France such a proposition.
- c. Even if information were provided, France would have to do its own testing (this with a grin).

On the matter of a possible NATO stockpile of a portion of participants nuclear capability, de Gaulle showed very little interest. He reiterated his theme of national control of France's deterrent.

Mr. Nixon pointed out to de Gaulle that there are many influential political figures in the United States that sympathize with de Gaulle's position (he mentioned Russell, Dirksen, Goldwater) and that some sharing of nuclear information could be worked out.

It is Mr. Nixon's opinion that although de Gaulle is a grand figure, set in his ideas and not readily influenced, his great sense of history leads him not to want to go down in the record as an obstructionist and, in this sense, he is susceptible to public opinion.

*de Gaulle*  
*for Nixon to de Gaulle*

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