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INTERAGENCY INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT
19 December 1983

GRENADA:

A FIRST LOOK AT MECHANISMS OF
CONTROL AND FOREIGN INVOLVEMENT

This Interagency Intelligence Assessment was requested by the President. It was prepared under the auspices of the Assistant National Intelligence Officer for Latin America. The Assessment was coordinated at the working level within the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and the intelligence organization of the Department of State. Also participating were the intelligence organizations of the Departments of the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Marine Corps. Information available as of 7 December 1983 was used in the preparation of this Assessment.

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SCOPE NOTE

This Assessment reflects the initial interagency exploitation of the documents recovered from Grenada after the invasion of 25 October 1983. The judgments noted here are preliminary and result in part from a continuing examination of some 3,500 folders--ranging in content from a single sheet of paper to a complete manual or box of photographs--that were catalogued before 30 November 1983. [REDACTED]

In addition to this material, at least a few hundred additional linear feet of documents await collation and analysis. This latter material includes notes and records retrieved from the residences of Maurice Bishop and Bernard Coard. In spite of discussions with US personnel in Grenada, we do not know how many--if any--documents have not yet been recovered and when more will be available for exploitation. [REDACTED]

Because the overwhelming majority of these documents were Grenadian and reflect Grenadian viewpoints, we would not expect to find direct documentation of Soviet or Cuban strategy toward, objectives in, or perceptions of Grenada. A fuller appreciation of the material surveyed in this Assessment as well as an examination of additional documents will be presented in a forthcoming Interagency Intelligence Memorandum. [REDACTED]

KEY JUDGMENTS

Following an all-source assessment of available intelligence on Grenada and an analysis of that part of the documents recovered from Grenada before 30 November 1983, we have come to the following conclusions:

- o The primary focus of almost all actors on the Grenadian scene--both foreign and domestic--was on consolidating the power of the New Jewel Movement and strengthening its Marxist-Leninist orientation. To achieve this end, a web of relations among Grenada, Cuba, and the Soviet Union evolved, characterized by:
 - Discreet associations that became more overt as the New Jewel Movement increased its internal control.
 - Close party-to-party relations among all three countries.
 - Implementation of many Soviet-Grenadian agreements through Cuba.
- o The New Jewel Movement constituted a very small but highly influential part of the Grenadian populace, dedicated to building a Marxist-Leninist society but divided by personal ambitions and conflicting views on how quickly to proceed with this task. By October 1983, Grenada had:
 - A self-described Marxist-Leninist political party--complete with Central Committee, Political Bureau, and Secretariat--representing the revolutionary elite.
 - An army and militia that in size and armament far outstripped those of its neighbors or of previous Grenadian governments; both institutions helped move Grenada in the direction of a militarized society and provided important vehicles for indoctrinating youth.
 - An internal security apparatus that dealt harshly with overt regime opponents and was sufficiently pervasive to intimidate potential challenges to the New Jewel Movement.
 - A highly developed propaganda machine that relied on the government-monopolized media and party-controlled entities throughout the government bureaucracy to disseminate the leadership's political message.
- o The captured documents underscore that the Bishop regime viewed Cuba as its principal foreign ally. Fidel Castro and Maurice Bishop had developed a close personal relationship.
- o While Castro almost certainly knew of the competition between Bishop and Bernard Coard, he probably was unaware of the degree to which Bishop had lost support within the leadership and of the Coard faction's growing drive for dominance. The killing of Bishop was clearly unforeseen in Havana.

- o The Cuban role in defending Grenada is still being examined. Thus far, we have not been able to confirm that armed Cubans defended other than their own positions or were involved in coordinating a defense with Grenadian forces. Most of the Cuban resistance came from the forty-odd military advisers and an unknown number of construction workers who were trained reservists in the Cuban military. It appears, however, that the majority of the construction workers had insufficient arms and ammunition and offered little resistance. [REDACTED]
- o The Soviet Union valued the New Jewel regime in Grenada as a symbol of declining US power and expanding Marxist influence in Latin America. Moscow initially kept the Grenadians publicly at arm's length, effectively masking the growing military relationship. The captured documents show that direct Soviet influence was brought to bear on party organization, ideological training, and management of the failing Grenadian economy. [REDACTED]
- o Both the documents and open sources show that Grenadian contacts with the USSR were handled primarily by Deputy Prime Minister Coard, who was the most ideologically committed and the most pro-Soviet member of the leadership. There is controversy within the Intelligence Community regarding the extent of Soviet control over events in Grenada. The documents give no indication that in July 1983 Coard discussed with Soviet officials the leadership conflicts in the New Jewel Movement. There is general agreement within the Intelligence Community that such discussions might have taken place; the Defense Intelligence Agency and some analysts in CIA believe that when Coard went to Moscow he informed the Soviets of his plans to challenge Bishop and petitioned the Soviets for advice and support. DIA further believes that Coard was instructed by Moscow to take action to assume leadership. However, no documentary evidence of any kind of collaboration as described above has been found as yet. [REDACTED]
- o Although the documents provide no evidence of a Soviet or Cuban request to use air and naval facilities on Grenada, we believe that the Cuban role in building the Point Salines airport indicated an expectation of using it for Cuban purposes, and the USSR probably also planned use of some facilities. The documents indicate that Grenadian officials envisaged the possibility of such use. [REDACTED]
- o The captured documents and other sources show that Grenadians had been:
 - Receiving training in Cuba and the USSR for both domestic and foreign intelligence work.
 - Conducting military training and political indoctrination of small groups of eastern Caribbean leftists.
 - Broadcasting Cuban- and Soviet-furnished propaganda over Radio Free Grenada.

- Disseminating newsletters to Caribbean journalists and media workers. [REDACTED]
- o Although few references in the captured documents support the judgment, other evidence indicates that both Havana and Moscow viewed Grenada as a springboard for:
 - Penetrating other countries in the area.
 - Distribution of propaganda and money to leftists in the region.
 - Military training of subversive groups. [REDACTED]
- o Captured documents reveal that Grenada had secret military agreements with Cuba, the Soviet Union, North Korea, East Germany, and Czechoslovakia. While the Grenadians may have believed these weapons were for their armed forces, we believe that the Soviets and their proxies probably intended to draw on the stores of weapons on Grenada to supply friendly countries in the region as opportunities or need might arise. [REDACTED]
- o The overall picture presented by the evidence is that by October 1983 the USSR and Cuba had made real progress toward turning Grenada into a center for further subversion of the region. [REDACTED]

DISCUSSION

INTERNAL CONTROL MECHANISMS

1. The primary focus of almost all actors on the Grenadian scene--both foreign and domestic--was on consolidating the power of the New Jewel Movement and strengthening its Marxist-Leninist orientation. Following the NJM's armed overthrow of the government of Eric Gairy on 13 March 1979, the new Grenadian leaders, headed by Maurice Bishop quickly set about establishing an institutional base to consolidate their power. In so doing they relied heavily on the Cuban political model in designing their own structures. They looked to Cuban advisers for guidance in constructing mechanisms of control and sought specialized training both at home and abroad for NJM members. The training was sought predominately from Cuba but also, as time passed, from the USSR and other Soviet-aligned countries. Thus, by October 1983, Grenada had:

- A self-described Marxist-Leninist political party--complete with Central Committee, Political Bureau, and Secretariat--representing the revolutionary elite.
- An army and militia that in size and armament far outstripped those of its island neighbors or of previous Grenadian governments; both institutions helped move Grenada in the direction of a militarized society and provided an important vehicle for indoctrinating youth.
- An internal security apparatus that dealt harshly with overt regime opponents and was sufficiently pervasive to intimidate potential challenges to the NJM.
- A highly developed propaganda machine that relied on the government-monopolized media and party-controlled entities throughout the government bureaucracy to disseminate the leadership's political message.
- An array of mass organizations designed to rally support for the regime in all sectors of the society. [REDACTED]

The Party

2. The NJM constituted a small but highly influential sector of the Grenadian populace, dedicated to building a Marxist-Leninist society but divided by personal ambitions and conflicting views on how quickly to proceed with this task.* As of July 1983, the NJM had a total membership of 310 members, according to one of the captured documents. Of these, only 77 were full party members, while 79 were candidate members and 154 were applicant members. The party's eight-member Political Bureau apparently was formed some three years before the NJM seized power, but the Central Committee with 15 or

* A fuller description of the internal dynamics of the NJM appears in annex A.

16 members, was regarded as the Movement's highest authority. It was in this body that the key decisions were made once the leadership crisis began to unfold in mid-1983. Subsidiary to the Central Committee were a number of entities such as the Workers Committee, the National Women's Organization, the National Youth Organization, and the parish coordinating bodies that were responsible for building support for the party among key groups at the grass-roots level. To ensure that party decisions were implemented and to monitor support for the regime, party cells or "support groups" were established in workplaces, Army units, educational institutions, and ministries. [REDACTED]

3. Reflecting the importance that NJM leaders gave to strengthening the party, efforts were made to arrange training for party members in Cuba, the USSR, and to a lesser extent in Eastern Europe. For example, the NJM signed an agreement with the Communist Party of Cuba in 1983 to send 30 Grenadians to Cuba on party business, including nine to be trained in propaganda-related subjects and five of high-school level slated to spend a year at the Cuban Communist Party's Nico Lopez School. The Cubans also agreed to send eight specialists to Grenada this year with skills related to party organization and ideological development. [REDACTED]

4. In June 1983 thirteen NJM members were selected to go to the USSR for political education, and in October we know that six Grenadians had begun a nine-month course at the International Leninist School in the USSR. The Grenadians also decided last June to send two party members to the Higher Party School in East Germany, and in April Grenadian leaders were seeking candidates to study in Bulgaria. Foreshadowing problems that were later to become increasingly apparent, a group of East German party organizers in Grenada complained early last year of the general disorganization they encountered in Grenada and the lack of ideological fervor among Grenadian party members. [REDACTED]

The Grenada Revolutionary Armed Forces

5. The NJM set out from the beginning to train a large--for the eastern Caribbean--professional army that would defend against any external threat and serve as the regime's main bulwark at home. To guarantee party leadership, Prime Minister Maurice Bishop assumed the portfolios for the Ministries of Defense and Interior. In January 1981 the government formed the Grenada Revolutionary Armed Forces (GRAF), composed of the People's Revolutionary Army (PRA), the People's Revolutionary Militia (PRM), the Grenada Police Service (GPS), and the Coast Guard, Prison Service, Fire Service, and Cadet Corps. General Hudson Austin, a boyhood friend of Bishop, was Commander of the Armed Forces and Commander of the Army. By October 1983 the PRA had grown to about 600 personnel who provided the officer corps and leadership cadre for the PRM when the entire armed force was mobilized. [REDACTED]

6. From the outset, the PRA enjoyed Cuban advisory support and training, with initial emphasis on military instruction of senior officers, which began only five weeks after the NJM came to power. Five "brigade commanders" received three weeks of intensive training in Cuba in June 1979. The objective was to develop a small but well-trained, well-equipped, and well-indoctrinated force that would form the nucleus of the Grenadian Army. [REDACTED]

7. According to captured documents, the USSR also provided specialist training and courses for selected high-ranking officers. Army Chief of Staff Einstein Louison attended a six-month course in the USSR, and Grenada's two Deputy Ministers of Defense, Liam James and Ewart Layne, attended shorter courses. All three Soviet-Grenadian military agreements called for Grenadian servicemen to be trained in the USSR in the use of the promised Soviet equipment. The treaty signed in July 1982 also stipulated that Soviet specialists would be sent to Grenada, but we cannot confirm that the Soviets ever complied. [REDACTED]

8. The PRA proved to be ineffective for a variety of reasons. Budgetary limitations and a chronic inability to retain trained personnel kept the professional cadre small and inexperienced. Most Grenadians were unwilling to accept the regimentation required for a military career and many did not agree with the Marxist-Leninist ideology propounded by the NJM. Ultimately, the PRA was split by the leadership crisis, with the majority of the force aligning with Deputy Prime Minister Bernard Coard. [REDACTED]

9. In August 1983, General Austin characterized the PRA as an ineffective combat force with severe discipline, morale, and training problems. He acknowledged that military norms and standards that would approximate international standards had not been established. Apparently the PRA was mainly engaged in enforcing NJM policy, with the concomitant effect of intimidating the population, and thus it became a force much disliked by Grenadians. [REDACTED]

10. The decision to create a People's Revolutionary Militia was announced soon after Bishop took power, but the PRM was initially given low priority as the regime concentrated on building the Army. The assassination attempt against Grenadian Government leaders in June 1980 seems to have spurred interest in the militia, however, and its mission began to crystalize:

- To assist the Army in defending the country.
- To perform neighborhood control duties.
- To serve as a vehicle for inculcating youth with the regime's revolutionary dogma.

Reflecting these goals, militia members typically were given two months of basic infantry training at army camps or other sites near militia members' residences or workplaces. This was followed by weekly two hour sessions in which political education classes were featured prominently. As popular enthusiasm for the New Jewel Movement began to dwindle, the regime sought to overcome resistance to militia recruitment by making such service a prerequisite for government employment. [REDACTED]

11. In line with the Bishop government's priorities, the Cubans were somewhat slow in focusing attention on the militia. The visit to Grenada in April 1982 by Cuban General Ochoa appears to have been a turning point in Cuba involvement. According to a captured document, Ochoa was concerned with the prospect of an eventual foreign-based attack on Grenada, and he promised to

send Cuban officers to assist in developing the militia. [REDACTED] reports that about two weeks later 300 Grenadian militia members, selected from units all over the island, were sent to Cuba for six months' training. [REDACTED]

12. A uniformed, but unsalaried, volunteer militia of some 2,500 men and women was eventually formed. The People's Revolutionary Militia was considered by the Coard faction to owe its main allegiance to Prime Minister Bishop, not to the NJM, a situation which effectively eliminated its already negligible combat capabilities. In October 1983, when the NJM leadership perceived that Grenada might be invaded, it called for the mobilization of the militia. Reportedly, only 100 men and no women responded to the callup. Presumably, the reported disarming of the militia by the Coard faction and the subsequent assassination of Bishop had caused this drastic loss of support. [REDACTED]

13. Developing an efficient internal security apparatus was the primary responsibility of the de facto Minister of Interior and Deputy Minister of Defense Liam James, a Coard faction member. To upgrade the regime's internal security capabilities, Cuban advisers were assigned to work with the heads of the Ministry's major subentities. The Grenada Police Service was not considered politically reliable and its reorientation was regarded as a key element in consolidating NJM power. Accordingly, responsibility for investigating, detaining, and interrogating regime opponents was given to a newly created Special Branch, which bypassed the police commissioner to report directly to senior Army officials and to the Cubans. Under Cuban direction, the Criminal Investigation Division of the police force took steps to place informants in every neighborhood. An active effort was also under way to indoctrinate police force members through regular political education classes. One Grenadian political prisoner released after the US intervention claims that the police had succeeded in discouraging dissident activity through the demonstration effect of dragging regime opponents into local police stations for late night questioning. [REDACTED]

14. The Ministry of Interior also sought Cuban and Soviet help in improving its intelligence and counterintelligence performance. Cuban assistance dates to at least 1981 [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] A captured document reveals that, in February 1982 Hudson Austin wrote to then Chairman of the KGB Yuriy Andropov requesting courses in intelligence and counterintelligence for four members of the Ministry of Interior. In what may have been a follow-up to Austin's request, [REDACTED]

THE CUBAN CONNECTION

The Nature of the Relationship

15. It is clear from reporting that by 1976 Havana had earmarked Grenada as a unique target of opportunity--one of the few places in the region where violent revolution by the radical left could succeed. The NJM rapidly became

the recipient of the largest share of support furnished by Havana to radical groups in the eastern Caribbean. While Cuba's long-term goals in supporting the NJM have never been spelled out either in public statements or in intelligence reporting, it is safe to assume that, once the immediate goal-- the NJM's seizure of power--had been achieved, the Castro regime expected to play a dual role: helping the NJM consolidate its grip on power by assisting in the replacement of all political, economic, and social institutions with revolutionary institutions subordinate to the NJM leadership; and using revolutionary Grenada as a steppingstone for the spread of Cuban influence throughout the region as well as in international forums. [REDACTED]

16. The main vehicle Cuba used to influence the NJM--both before and after the coup against Eric Gairy--was the party's America Department headed by Manuel Pineiro, the chief architect of Cuban subversion in Latin America. Fidel Castro apparently had developed a warm personal relationship with Bishop well before the coup and decided that prime responsibility for Cuba's relationship with the NJM should rest with the activist America Department rather than the bureaucratic Foreign Ministry. In addition to Castro's own direct contacts with the NJM leadership--principally Bishop--Cuba's liaison with the NJM was conducted mainly by the America Department, whose senior representative in Grenada was Ambassador Julian Torres Rizo. [REDACTED]

17. While there is no evidence of a direct Cuban role in the coup by the NJM on 13 March 1979, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The immediate public reaction by Havana was one of extreme caution to avoid military intervention in Grenada by the United States or the United Kingdom if a Cuban connection should become obvious. Even Bishop denied any connection to or dependence on Cuban aid. [REDACTED]

18. Cuba's overt caution masked a flurry of covert activity designed to secure Bishop's control. Arms and advisers were shipped to Grenada by a number of surreptitious means. Captured documents show that Grenada secretly received a wide variety of small arms, automatic weapons, and ammunition from Cuba during April 1979, while Bishop was publicly seeking Western support*. Bishop then announced his turn toward Cuba in early April, claiming an inability to attract aid from other quarters. This began the direct Cuban involvement in Grenadian affairs that continued until the US intervention. [REDACTED]

*Captured documents show that Grenada received the following arms from Cuba in April 1979: 3,400 Soviet and US rifles, 200 machineguns, 100 shoulder-fired rocket launchers, 100 pistols and revolvers, twelve 82-mm mortars, twelve 75-mm cannon, twelve 12.7-mm antiaircraft guns, over 3 million rounds of rifle ammunition, a half-million rounds for the machineguns, another 66,000 rounds for pistols, 4,000 rockets, 4,800 mortar shells, six hundred 75-mm shells, and 237,000 rounds for the antiaircraft guns. [REDACTED]

19. The key to the burgeoning relationship was the growing influence of Fidel Castro and Ambassador Torres Rizo over Maurice Bishop. [REDACTED]

20. Later in 1980, [REDACTED] said that Cuba had not assigned individual advisers to the various ministries in Grenada, but that Bishop routinely conferred with Torres Rizo before making decisions on government matters.* [REDACTED] reportedly added that individual ministries had little power and that even the smallest issues had to be discussed at meetings of the full cabinet; even then, decisions usually were not made until subsequent cabinet meetings after Bishop had talked privately with Torres Rizo. There were, however, no indications in the captured minutes of the NJM Central Committee and Political Bureau that the Cuban Ambassador was ever present. [REDACTED]

21. Castro almost certainly knew of the competition between Bishop and Deputy Prime Minister Coard. The scant intelligence available to date, however, suggests Castro may well have been unaware of the degree to which Bishop had lost support within the leadership and of Coard faction's growing drive for dominance. The killing of Bishop was clearly unforeseen in Havana. According to [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] concluded that Torres Rizo failed to detect what was going on because of his close relationship with Bishop, believing him to be firmly in power. [REDACTED]

22. This judgment is supported by observable Cuban behavior during the crisis which was sparked by the NJM Central Committee meeting on 12 October. According to captured documents, the Central Committee decided to inform Cuba and the USSR of Bishop's arrest, and the Ambassadors of the two countries were apparently in contact with the Central Committee the same day. A copy of a letter sent by Fidel Castro to the NJM Central Committee on 15 October shows that Havana promised not to intervene in what it described as an internal matter. [REDACTED]

*By the time of the American intervention, Cuban advisers had been assigned to a number of ministries. [REDACTED]

23. [REDACTED]

The Scope of Cuban Economic Assistance

24. Cuban economic-technical assistance to Grenada was concentrated in the fields of public health, fisheries, education, construction, sports, and transportation/communications. The first assistance to materialize was a team of medical personnel who arrived on 29 June 1979 for a one-year tour. This medical mission remained in Grenada until repatriated in November 1983. Its size fluctuated modestly, but it usually consisted of about a dozen doctors, dentists, and medical technicians. A few were based on Carriacou, the only Cubans in Grenada not stationed on the main island. [REDACTED]

25. A small Cuban fisheries advisory team was sent to Grenada in late 1979 or early 1980 but, [REDACTED] accomplished little. The team of seven advisers was quickly reduced to five by sickness; the first fishing boat donated by Cuba was temporarily lost by careless Grenadian students; and the Grenadians in the program suffered from a lack of motivation, preferring to prolong their training in order to continue to get free meals. Although several additional boats were delivered, the program appears to have had little economic impact. [REDACTED]

26. Educational assistance consisted of sending a Cuban literacy expert and a translator to Grenada and accepting Grenadian students in Cuban schools. As of late 1980, for example, 69 Grenadians were enrolled in Cuban educational institutions studying agriculture, dentistry, medicine, and engineering; this rose to a total of over 200 by October 1983. [REDACTED] social and cultural differences as well as a lack of qualified Grenadian candidates caused problems in taking advantage of the Cuban scholarships that were offered. [REDACTED]

27. Cuba reached an agreement with Grenada in November 1979 to build a new airport in the Point Salines area of southern Grenada and before the month was out a pilot team of 36 Cuban construction workers had arrived to begin the project. The following March, the Cuban merchant ship Playa Larga arrived in Grenada with heavy construction equipment and a contingent of 136 construction workers, and by November 1980 the total involved in building the airport had reached 300. The total was between 600 and 650 at the time of the US action in October 1983, when the airport was nearing completion. [REDACTED]

28. Cuban aid in the field of communications focused on upgrading Grenada's public broadcasting facilities. Havana provided a 75-kilowatt transmitter to greatly expand Radio Free Grenada's range (it had been using only a 1-kilowatt transmitter), built the edifice to house it, and put up a new 400-foot transmitting antenna. Cuba also provided continuing technical assistance and

program support as well as training for Grenadian radio and television technicians. [REDACTED]

29. Other forms of Cuban support included sports instructors (the first group of two arrived in July 1980), a six-man technical team that stayed briefly to install air conditioning equipment in St. Georges Hospital, a few agricultural experts, and a small group of a dozen or so involved in a variety of advisory positions. The official Cuban roster, announced by Castro on 28 October 1983, included: 636 construction workers; 17 medical personnel; 12 education workers; six agricultural specialists; six advisers from the transportation sector (this probably included the two Cuban pilots of a twin-engine executive aircraft that Castro gave Bishop); five fishing advisers; three basic industries experts; three cultural affairs personnel; three commercial advisers; one sports official; one adviser from Cuba's Central Planning Board; one communications technician; and six people from the State Committee for Economic Cooperation who apparently provided the overall management for the Cuban civilian assistance program in Grenada. [REDACTED]

Military Assistance

30. The first few Cuban military advisers arrived in Grenada in April 1979, shortly after Prime Minister Bishop asked for assistance. The numbers of military personnel apparently increased later that year. Captured Cuban documents refer to a "Military Mission," which was created by late 1981; sometime later, apparently in either late 1981 or early 1982, the two countries signed a secret military protocol. The agreement establishes the size of the mission, Military Unit Number (MUN) 5520, at 27 military personnel, with others assigned on a quarterly basis for special projects. Castro publicly claimed that 43 Cuban military personnel were on Grenada on 25 October 1983, but the available documents provide a range of 35 to 60 personnel on currently irreconcilable lists. [REDACTED]

31. The mission of the group was to provide training and assistance to the various branches of the PRA and PRM. The Cuban advisers would travel to the various PRA and militia camps to provide the training with the assistance of translators. The military mission was also involved in processing the training requests and arms that the Grenadians were to receive in accordance with the Soviet-Grenadian treaties. [REDACTED]

32. There was also a small group of seven to nine Cuban Ministry of Interior personnel assigned to Grenada. These individuals were advising various branches of the internal security apparatus. We know of no agreement or protocol establishing their responsibilities. [REDACTED]

33. The Cuban role in defending Grenada is still being examined. Thus far, we have not been able to confirm that Cubans were active in defending other than their own positions or in coordinating Grenadian defenses, nor does it appear that the Cuban military mission was under the direct tactical control of Havana or the Cuban embassy. [REDACTED]

34. Colonel Pedro Tortolo Comas commanded the military mission from 1981 until May 1983, when he was replaced by Colonel Rafael Mendes Rodrigues.

Tortolo returned on a "work visit" on 24 October; as the senior Cuban officer on Grenada during the intervention, he assumed command of Cuban military forces. These forces consisted of the forty-odd advisers previously mentioned and an unknown number of the construction workers who were trained reservists in the Cuban military. [REDACTED]

35. On the basis of interviews with those involved in the conflict, it appears that the Cuban defenders were active at the Point Salines airport, where a few advisers and most of the construction workers were assembled, and at adjacent facilities, where most of the military advisers were located. The regular Cuban soldiers fought well, were disciplined, and conducted orderly withdrawals. Most of the construction workers had some military training or belonged to the Cuban Territorial Militia. Some reportedly had practiced defending the airport and had constructed hasty defenses just before the invasion. However, most of them had insufficient arms and ammunition to defend their areas of responsibility, and as a result a large number offered little or no resistance. Most of the Cubans surrendered on the morning of 26 October. Colonel Tortolo and his group of 38 Cubans stopped fighting about the same time and reached the Soviet Embassy on the afternoon of 27 October to take refuge. [REDACTED]

THE SOVIET ROLE

The Nature of the Relationship

36. The Soviet Union seemed to value the New Jewel regime in Grenada as a symbol of declining US power and expanding Marxist influence in Latin America. Intelligence reports show that Moscow began to use Grenada--as it has other footholds in the Third World--for spreading Communist influence through propaganda and the distribution of money to leftist groups in the region. We believe that the island's location could have made military facilities there of future value to the USSR, and it might also have become important for intelligence gathering and for training and helping revolutionaries in the region. However, the Soviets appeared wary of becoming deeply involved with Bishop's regime, probably because of doubts about its durability and dedication to Communism as well as concern about potential US reactions. The overall picture presented by captured documents and other information is that by October 1983 the USSR had hardly begun to take advantage of Grenada's potential. [REDACTED]

37. While the Cubans covertly rushed to help Bishop after the 13 March 1979 coup, the Soviets--who must have known what the Cubans were doing, and perhaps even had a role in it--moved slowly. Moscow did not establish diplomatic relations until 7 September 1979, and did not open a resident embassy in Grenada until September 1982. This arm's-length treatment might have been intended to mask the military relationship that developed during 1980, but it seems more likely to indicate that the Soviets were content to let Cuba have the leading role in Grenada, at least initially. [REDACTED]

38. The documents include extensive materials on the history, structure, discipline, and other aspects of the Soviet Communist Party (CPSU) that were given to Grenadians. It seems to be shelf material, prepared in English for

general distribution to Third World countries without special adaptations for local conditions. Some of this material apparently was brought home by Grenadian students who attended Soviet party schools. Grenada was unable to send more than a handful of students because of a shortage of skilled people at home. The CPSU was advocating improved organization of the New Jewel Movement, tighter discipline, more effective ideological work, and general improvement in the Movement's grip on the island. [REDACTED]

39. Moscow tried to influence other eastern Caribbean countries from Grenada by providing equipment and advice for Radio Free Grenada to make propaganda broadcasts. [REDACTED] the Soviets and Cubans used Grenada for regional propaganda meetings and as a site for [REDACTED]. The information in this reporting, which predates the fall of Bishop, is not reflected in available documents. [REDACTED]

40. Both the documents and open sources show that Grenadian contacts with the USSR were handled primarily by Deputy Prime Minister Bernard Coard, who was the most ideologically committed and pro-Soviet member of the leadership. Bishop, Army Commander Hudson Austin, and lesser officials were also involved, but Bishop in particular had closer contacts with Cuba. The first major aid-seeking mission to Moscow of which we have any record was led by Coard in May and June 1980. He returned on other visits, including a visit in July 1983. [REDACTED]

41. [REDACTED] in late October 1983 that Coard was Soviet Ambassador Sazhenev's man and that he constantly advocated Soviet interests in his dealings with other Grenadian leaders. A report based on early document exploitation indicated that a Soviet codebook and other cryptographic material had been found in Coard's briefcase. This suggestion of a special link to Moscow cannot be confirmed because confusion in document collection makes it unclear whether the material belonged to Coard or whether the codebook indeed was of Soviet origin. [REDACTED]

42. According to the documents, Coard visited the USSR in July 1983 after the CPSU Central Committee agreed to receive five members of the Grenadian leadership "for rest and treatment," and Grenadian leaders named Coard, his wife, and three children. Clandestine reporting provides the following information [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] the Soviet Union had ordered the removal of Bishop as Prime Minister and his replacement by Coard. [REDACTED]

43. There is controversy within the Intelligence Community regarding the extent of Soviet control over events in Grenada.* The documents give no indication that in July 1983 Coard discussed with Soviet officials the leadership conflicts in the New Jewel Movement. There is general agreement within the Intelligence Community that such discussions might have taken place; the Defense Intelligence Agency and [REDACTED] believe that when Coard went to Moscow he informed the Soviets of his plans to challenge Bishop and petitioned the Soviets for advice and support. DIA further believes that Coard was instructed by Moscow to take action to assume leadership. DIA bases this judgment on its understanding of Soviet behavior in political crises in other Third World countries (such as Egypt in 1971, Afghanistan in 1974, and South Yemen in 1978 and 1980). However, no documentary evidence of any kind of collaboration as described above has been found as yet. [REDACTED]

Economic Assistance

44. The documents do not add substantially to what we already knew about the economic relationship. As elsewhere in the Third World, Moscow emerges as something less than a generous benefactor. The first known economic development of importance came from Coard's May and June 1980 visit. He was promised some \$1.1 million worth of agricultural equipment as a gift. The Soviets also agreed on a 10-year line of credit on terms that were renegotiated in December 1982 down from an unknown interest rate to 4 percent. Moscow provided aid piecemeal, drove hard commercial bargains, paid low prices for Grenada's basic export, nutmeg, and made few outright gifts. When Grenada asked on 6 September 1983 that delivery of truck spare parts be speeded up, for instance, the Soviets rebuffed it by saying the pertinent contract had required that bank guarantees be made within 30 days of the contract's signing--and they obviously had not been. [REDACTED]

45. The Soviet State Planning Committee (Gosplan) offered a cooperation agreement to the Grenadian Ministry of Planning, Finance, and Trade that apparently was intended to provide education and instruction on how to run a socialist economy. A draft of the agreement is among the captured documents. We know that a number of visits were exchanged, and Soviet economic officials visited Grenada in order to deliver lectures [REDACTED]

46. Grenada clearly had great hopes of extensive Soviet economic aid. A captured paper on preparations for Bishop's July 1982 visit to Moscow lists numerous projects for which help was to be sought. The Soviets responded, however, with only limited promises of definite aid and more expansive commitments to study proposals. As the Grenadian economy declined, St. Georges turned increasingly to Moscow for economic relief. Documents indicate that as early as 2 July 1982, Grenada, beset by "severe budetary limitations," asked the USSR to assume responsibility for feeding, clothing, and fueling the Grenadian armed forces, which the Soviets were already arming. When the

*The examination of additional documents--particularly those from Coard's house--should throw more light on this issue.

Grenadian Chief of Staff asked [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] By that time, according to other information, St. Georges was falling behind in government salaries and generally was in dire financial condition. [REDACTED]

47. Personal notes and other materials among the captured documents show that there was little if any expectation in Grenada by the summer of 1983 of being bailed out financially by the USSR. While not prepared to underwrite the Grenadian economy, the Soviets did deal with the country on economic terms somewhat softer than those usually accorded Third World countries. [REDACTED]

Military Assistance

48. The documents include previously secret agreements with the USSR to provide military aid to Grenada. The Soviets provided the aid free of charge as they do for Cuba. It is unclear whether the weapons were merely transshipped through Cuba, or were Soviet-supplied Cuban weapons that had been replaced by more modern items as a part of the upgrading of the Cuban armed forces under way in recent years. [REDACTED]

49. [REDACTED] Soviet military aid began with a program to train six Grenadians in the USSR shortly after diplomatic relations were established, but Moscow initially counted on Havana to provide both arms and basic military training to Grenada. Coard's publicly reported trip to the USSR and Eastern Europe in May and June 1980 to seek economic aid is shown by the documents to have included a secret search for military aid. His talks then presumably helped lay the groundwork for the signing in Havana on 27 October 1980 of a secret agreement for the USSR to provide 4.4 million rubles' (\$5.85 million) worth of military equipment. This agreement established the pattern for a 9 February 1981 protocol adding another 5 million rubles' (\$6.65 million) worth of military equipment to the first agreement and a 27 July 1982 agreement for 10 million rubles' (\$13.3 million) worth. [REDACTED]

50. To hide Moscow's connection, the agreements provided for the USSR to make deliveries to Cuba, which would arrange onward transportation. The 1980 and 1981 agreements provided for Soviet military training of Grenadians in the USSR, and the 1982 agreement mentioned the sending of Soviet specialists to the island--by which time the Soviet involvement with Grenada was becoming more open. There is no mention in the documents of establishing a Soviet Military mission there. [REDACTED]

51. In addition to military training, the USSR also provided intelligence and security training for a handful of Grenadians. As already noted (see paragraph 14), a letter from Army Commander Austin on 17 February 1982 to then KGB Chairman, Andropov asked Austin's "dear comrade" to train three Grenadians for one year in counterintelligence and one in intelligence. A source of undetermined reliability said that, as early as 1980, Grenada had arranged for six policemen to be trained in "secret operations" by the Soviets, and interviewed Grenadian officials said the five Grenadians had received training in 1983 in the USSR for overseas intelligence operations. [REDACTED]

52. There is no indication in the agreement that the USSR had requested military use of facilities on Grenada. During Bishop's July 1982 visit, the Soviets agreed to perform a preliminary survey to establish the suitability of Grenville as a deepwater port. This agreement prompted rumors that Moscow intended to establish a naval base there, but we have nothing to substantiate them. In fact, the survey seems to have caused the USSR to drop the port development idea because of a long reef and other geologic problems, but a captured document shows that the possibility of "a seaport project" was still under discussion in May 1983. [REDACTED]

53. Grenadian documents on the Point Salines airport show that the USSR had no role in its construction, although Grenada sought financial assistance from the Soviets. When Grenada was running out of money and worried about being able to finish the airport, Bishop turned to Libya to plead for \$5 million. His 26 September 1983 letter to Libya leader Qadhafi said Libya is "the last remaining hope for providing the necessary finance to complete the international airport." [REDACTED]

54. Grenadian officials envisaged the possibility of both Soviet and Cuban military use of Point Salines. In December 1981 the then Minister of Mobilization, Selwyn Strachan, announced to a Worker's Party of Jamaica congress that the airport would be used by Cuba to transport its forces to Africa and by the Soviets for military purposes. An agenda item of a New Jewel Movement meeting on 22 March 1983 said "the airport will be used for Cuban and Soviet military." A Movement member who had received CPSU training in Moscow wrote in his personal notebook, apparently in October 1983, that rumors were being spread that "the Party wanted Bishop to sign for the Airport to be a Military Base and We did do that." [REDACTED]

OTHER EXTERNAL ACTORS

The East Europeans

55. East Germany was the most heavily involved of the European countries, providing several kinds of aid and assistance to Grenada. The documents confirm that East Germans were active in party, trade union, and youth organization--of the 10 East Germans on the island on 25 October, six were engaged in agricultural assistance under the auspices of youth and party organizations. East Berlin also provided agricultural vehicles as well as equipment for security forces--uniforms, bedding, knapsacks, and pistols--and may have supplied other equipment, including gas masks. In addition, East Germany was involved in upgrading the island's telephone system; two of the remaining four East Germans in Grenada at the time of the invasion were involved in this effort. [REDACTED]

56. Bulgaria was a source of ideological and party training for a small number of Grenadians--most of it provided in Bulgaria rather than in Grenada--and was beginning to be involved in developing Grenadian animal husbandry. We do not know the activities of the three Bulgarians who were on the island on 25 October. Most Bulgarians who visited Grenada were agricultural and construction experts, although at least one was involved in propagandist work. [REDACTED]

57. Czechoslovakia served as a supplier of small arms--rifles, rocket--propelled grenades, and ammunition. Prague also was engaged in supporting hog raising in Grenada, and offered scholarships to eight Grenadians in science and construction in 1983-84. [REDACTED]

58. The available documents do not indicate the terms of the assistance provided to Grenada by the East Europeans. It is unlikely that any great portion of the aid was free, but much of the payment may have been by barter for bananas and nutmeg. [REDACTED]

The Asians

59. At the time of the intervention, North Korea had not established a significant presence in Grenada. However, P'yongyang's approach to St. Georges was consistent with its recent policy initiatives in Latin America--to take advantage of emerging leftist governments to expand its recognition and influence at the expense of Seoul. North Korea has vigorously courted Nicaragua, Guyana, Suriname, and former Prime Minister Manley of Jamaica to these ends. The available documents provide no evidence that P'yongyang was acting on behalf of either Moscow or Beijing; instead North Korea appears to have been pursuing its own goals. [REDACTED]

60. In October 1983, North Korea was about to undertake major economic and military assistance projects. On the economic side, P'yongyang had volunteered to help build a 15,000-seat stadium, a fruit-processing factory, two fishing boats, and an irrigation system under a five-year development program publicly announced during Prime Minister Bishop's trip to P'yongyang in April 1983. Under the terms of this agreement, North Korea was to provide technical advisers and some construction materials and equipment, while Grenada would provide the bulk of the labor and materials and pay the expenses of the technicians. The 15 North Koreans on the island on 25 October were probably conducting initial surveys on these economic projects. [REDACTED]

61. More important, Grenadian documents confirm that Bishop concluded a secret military assistance agreement during the same visit to P'yongyang. North Korea had promised to supply, at no charge, sufficient small arms, ammunition, and equipment to equip a force of about 1,000 men. This equipment, listed in the document at a value of \$12 million, was to include 1,000 rifles, 80 machine-guns, two coast guard patrol boats, 6,000 uniforms, large amounts of ammunition, and miscellaneous other gear. A reliable source reports that an elite Grenadian force was to be trained by the North Koreans, but there is no confirmation in the available documents. [REDACTED]

62. We believe that the military agreement had not yet been implemented. From Hudson Austin's report of his September 1983 visit to P'yongyang, it appears that the North Koreans were delaying their participation, perhaps out of concern for increased US attention and surveillance. North Korean assault rifles of Vietnam-war vintage have been recovered from Grenada; we are as yet unable to determine whether these weapons were used in Southeast Asia or came directly from North Korean stocks. [REDACTED]

63. According to a Grenadian document dated 13 April 1982, Grenadian and Vietnamese representatives met in Vietnam and agreed that the Vietnamese would provide Grenadians training in weapons, tactics, chemical warfare, propaganda, and engineering. The Grenadian delegation later asked the Soviets in Moscow to provide 40 airline tickets over a one year period to transport trainees to Vietnam. Other documents indicate that the Grenadians encountered problems arranging transportation for the trainees. Among the Grenadian documents we examined were Vietnamese aircraft recognition manual dated 1976 and several inches of pictures portraying Ho Chi Minh extolling his people during the Vietnam War. [REDACTED]

The Middle East

64. As the Grenadian economy continued to unravel in 1979 and 1980, the Bishop regime turned to several Arab states for assistance. Captured documents show Algeria, Iraq, and Syria each pledged a \$2 million grant toward the completion of the Point Salines airport. Bishop also found Libya to be a fertile ground for economic assistance. All four patrons courted Grenadian favor for their own interests. [REDACTED]

65. We believe Libya saw Grenada as a potential transit point for arms shipments to Latin America* and as a convenient but little-used base for recruiting and funding regional radicals for paramilitary training in Libya and for Libyan representatives to spread Qadhafi's social and political philosophies. After Bishop's visit to Tripoli in 1980, Libya established joint ventures in agriculture and fisheries. In 1981, Tripoli financed three British-built coastal patrol boats for Grenada and agreed to loans of about \$1.9 million to help defray the costs of constructing the Point Salines airport. [REDACTED]

66. Libya opened a People's Bureau (embassy) in St. Georges in early 1982 and Bishop's third visit to Tripoli, in June 1982, resulted in a further \$4 million loan toward airport construction. Although there is documentary evidence to suggest Grenadian irritation with the slow disbursement of Libyan funds, a captured document shows Bishop again requested financial aid--\$5 million--shortly before his death. [REDACTED]

67. Algeria was under the influence of more radical domestic elements at the time of its initial aid commitment to Grenada. To maintain Algeria's voice in Caribbean affairs, its standing in the Nonaligned Movement, and appease the dwindling but still-vocal radical element in his government, President Bendjedid released the second half of the \$2 million stipulated aid to Grenada for 1984 and granted an additional \$4 million in petroleum and commodity aid. Algeria has periodically provided buses, trucks and spare

*In June 1983 a Libyan merchant ship Kassantina visited St. Georges and transferred unidentified cargo to smaller ships in the harbor. This closely followed the incident in which Libyan transport aircraft bound for Nicaragua had been grounded in Brazil.

parts and to help support the airport project small amounts of wine, fertilizer, clothing, and commercial products for Grenada to sell. [REDACTED]

68. Iraq responded to Bishop's pleas for assistance in order to build support for hosting the Nonaligned Movement summit scheduled for Baghdad in 1982. In spring 1982, Baghdad's ambitions faded as the war with Iran grew hotter; Baghdad subsequently terminated its assistance to Grenada. [REDACTED]

69. Syria's bitter rivalry with Iraq probably fueled its initial interest in Grenada. At any rate, Syrian assistance to St. George's ended in 1981. [REDACTED]

MILITARY AGREEMENTS AND EQUIPMENT

70. Captured documents reveal that Grenada had secret military assistance agreements with at least five countries: Cuba, the Soviet Union and North Korea had set up major programs; East Germany and Czechoslovakia had provided small amounts of equipment. As previously mentioned (paragraph 18), Cuba provided a sizable amount of small arms and other equipment to Grenada immediately following the NJM assumption of power in April 1979. [REDACTED]

71. We believe the large numbers of weapons seized in Grenada were intended primarily for use by Grenadians in their own defense--first in anticipation of an invasion by counterrevolutionary pro-Gairy forces, later in reaction to US Navy exercises in the Caribbean. The NJM planned an expansion of its People's Revolutionary Armed Forces to 6,800 regular and militia personnel in response to its perception of the external threat. The Grenadians and their suppliers also were aware that if the island was attacked, there would be few if any opportunities for resupply. While the Grenadians may have believed all of these weapons were for their armed forces, we believe that the Soviets and their proxies probably intended to draw on the stores of weapons on Grenada to supply friendly countries in the region as opportunities or need might arise. [REDACTED]

72. As of mid-November 1983 more than 580 tons of military and military related items--and at least 58 vehicles and pieces of construction equipment--had been confiscated in Grenada. The overwhelming majority of the weapons were of Soviet or East European origin, with minor amounts from the United States, the United Kingdom, North Korea, and the People's Republic of China. The largest single concentration of weapons was at Frequente, which probably was the "central store room" referred to in many documents. There were six warehouses at that site: one each for arms and ammunition and four dedicated to quartermaster items, spare parts, and vehicles. Military arms have also been recovered from the Cuban construction camp, Fort Rupert, Fort Frederick, Richmond Hill, and many smaller caches. The lack of proper documentation by US personnel makes the exact location of weaponry at the time of its capture difficult if not impossible to determine. [REDACTED]

73. It appears that most of these weapons were under direct Grenadian Army control. Documents reviewed to date confirm that the "central store room" was the primary control point for arms, ammunition, quartermaster items, and some explosives. From this point, Grenadians controlled the distribution of

equipment to military regions, camps, individuals, internal security organizations--and even a few Cubans. The military regions also controlled the further issue of weapons to the subordinate units and individuals. [REDACTED]

74. It should be noted that it is standard military practice to have large stockpiles of weapons and ammunition. We believe that some of the weapons from the stockpile in Grenada, however, could be shipped to other countries in the region, but there is no known documentary support of this. [REDACTED]

GRENADA AS A BASE FOR SUBVERSION

Political Activities

75. There is no question that both Havana and Moscow viewed Grenada as a springboard for penetrating other countries in the area. At the time of the US intervention, however, little had been accomplished. Bishop understood and accepted the concept of revolutionary internationalism and the need to carry the fight to areas beyond national borders. In lauding the changes of government in Dominica and St. Lucia a few months after his own coup in Grenada, he told a Cuban news magazine in October 1979 "we think our revolution contributes to the acceleration of the process of decolonization in our area, where there are still enclaves under British, French, and--in the case of Puerto Rico--US domination, and that our revolution is part, together with the Sandinista triumph in Nicaragua, of the revolutionary advances in Latin America. The revolution in Grenada is ready to offer all the solidarity that is required by the people that struggle for their national liberation and against imperialism." [REDACTED]

76. The 1983 "Cooperation and Exchange Plan between the Communist Party of Cuba and the New Jewel Movement of Grenada"--one of the documents seized following the US intervention--clearly calls for Cuban-Grenadian cooperation in support of foreign revolutionaries as well as against US interests. The plan states: "The Cuban Communist Party and the New Jewel Movement of Grenada will exchange information of mutual interest, both in the field of development of the two revolutions and their experiences, as well as on the international situation and, fundamentally, that of the Caribbean in its struggle against imperialism, neocolonialism, racism, and Zionism. Likewise, they will exchange information on the liberation movements as well as coordinate actions and positions of mutual interest to be adopted at events, conferences, and other party activities of an international character, with special emphasis on the problems in the Caribbean." [REDACTED]

77. The 1983 work plan for the NJM's Propaganda Department, also captured by US forces, listed as one of its objectives to "deepen the internationalist spirit and socialist consciousness of the Grenadian masses." In dealing with international issues, the work plan called for the local media to "highlight activities of progressive and revolutionary parties in the region; . . . identify and promote all the revolutionary heroes of the region; . . . explain the birth and growth of progressive parties of the region" as well as to focus on "burning issues. . . peace, US aggression" and on the "history of Socialist countries." [REDACTED]

78. The bilateral cooperation plan's call for solidarity with the "International Revolutionary Movement" presumably resulted in the meeting of Caribbean leftist and Communist parties that, according to seized documents, was held in Grenada in mid-March 1983. Although no details are available on the discussions or results of the meeting, the following groups were listed as having attended: the Communist Party of Martinique, the Dominica Liberation Movement, the United People's Movement of St. Vincent, the Barbados Movement for National Liberation, the People's Popular Movement of Trinidad and Tobago, the February 18th Movement of Trinidad and Tobago, the Jamaican Worker's Party, the Working People's Alliance of Guyana, the People's Progressive Party (Communist) of Guyana, and the Worker's Revolutionary Movement of St. Lucia. Other captured documents mention a second meeting, held in August, that was attended by the NJM, the February 18th Movement of Trinidad and Tobago, and other unspecified participants. Cuba's contact with such groups through its mission in Grenada dates back at least to early 1980

[REDACTED]

79. A former member of the Grenadian Government's international relations committee told US officials during his interrogation that Grenada's foreign policy was coordinated with Soviet front organizations and that most of the program support he sought from abroad was arranged through contacts with the World Peace Council and the US-Grenadian Friendship Society. A memorandum from the Grenadian Embassy in Moscow in November 1982 stated that the World Peace Council expected its Grenadian affiliate to take the lead in mobilizing peace groups throughout the eastern Caribbean. Toward that end the Grenadian Minister Counselor in Moscow recommended that Grenada host a meeting of Caribbean Peace Movements in April 1983. The NJM's range of contacts with Soviet-aligned groups is reflected in a Grenadian Army officers notebook that contains addresses for such groups as Friendship House in Moscow, East Germany's Solidarity Committee, the Korean Committee for Asian-African Solidarity, and the Communist Party of Colombia.

[REDACTED]

80. The captured documents show that a "secret regional caucus" of "progressive parties" met in Managua in January 1983 to discuss how to influence the Socialist International (SI). The attendees were SI representatives from the Salvadoran National Revolutionary Movement (which belongs to the political arm of the guerrilla coalition), the Jamaican People's National Party, Grenada's NJM, and the Radical Party of Chile. Also present were representatives of the Cuban Communist Party and the Sandinistas organization in Nicaragua, neither of which is an SI member. The presence of non-SI members at this caucus was particularly embarrassing to West European socialist parties, according to [REDACTED] Guyana's Working People's Alliance and St. Lucia's Progressive Labor Party had recently gained observer status in the SI, and the NJM was assigned as the caucus liaison to them.

[REDACTED]

Intelligence Activities

81. Evidence available to date indicates that the thrust of Cuban intelligence activity in Grenada focused on developing a professional Grenadian intelligence service. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] other information confirms that one of these advisers oversaw the intelligence coverage of students at the US medical school. The school had long been viewed by NJM leaders as a likely center for US espionage activity, and the captured documents detail the measures employed by the Grenadians to monitor activity there. [REDACTED]

Unconventional Military Activities

82. Cuba's efforts to work in tandem with Grenada to strengthen revolutionary forces in the region is particularly evident in the case of Suriname. At Cuba's behest, Grenadian internal security chief Liam James made several trips to Suriname beginning in 1982 to advise Daysi Bouterse and other Surinamese officials on security matters. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Grenada's security relationship with Suriname dates to as early as 1980 when four Surinamese Army personnel received training in Grenada, apparently to enable them to establish an intelligence branch within the Surinamese Army. [REDACTED]

83. Beginning in 1979, the New Jewel Movement provided training to a few members of leftist groups in the English-speaking Caribbean. The training was conducted by the People's Revolutionary Army, described [REDACTED] as an ineffective combat force with severe discipline, morale, and training problems. [REDACTED]

84. The first group to receive training consisted of some 16 followers of George Odlum, the then Deputy Prime Minister of St. Lucia and a member of the leftwing Labor Party. [REDACTED]

85. [REDACTED]

Propaganda

86. Havana and Moscow also saw Grenada as a key site for dissemination of propaganda in the region. They both participated in the upgrading of Radio Free Grenada, and Havana provided scholarships in Cuban institutions for the Grenadians who were to operate and maintain the new station, which was inaugurated on 13 March 1982. Presumably to support Radio Free Grenada's newscasts, Havana inaugurated Prensa Latina press transmissions in English to the eastern Caribbean. For news costs and for broadcasts in the fields of sports, the sciences, and music and other cultural activities, the Cuban Radio and Television Institute provided Radio Free Grenada with programming as part of a cooperation and exchange agreement signed in March 1981. In late 1980, officials of the Grenadian Ministry of Information reportedly were successful in their efforts to have journalists in other Caribbean countries publish locally various articles supplied by Radio Free Grenada--a clear indication that the station's broadcasts were expected to have an impact far beyond Grenada's own territory. The extent of Cuban support for Radio Free Grenada suggests that Havana, in addition to using the station to consolidate Bishop's revolution, looked upon it as a Cuban propaganda surrogate in the eastern Caribbean, helping to counter powerful other international broadcasters that had established broadcasting stations in the region over the past decade.

87. Captured documents indicate that the Soviet-front International Organization of Journalists was planning to use Grenada as an important regional propaganda dissemination point. At an IOJ meeting in Angola in January and February 1983, the IOJ agreed to give Bishop's information chief, Don Rojas, \$4,000 to set up an IOJ Caribbean regional office in St. George's by March 1983, with an additional stipend of \$200 per month to subsidize the expenses of running the office. Rojas was also promised three four-year scholarships in journalism beginning in September 1983 at the University of Bucharest, Rumania; three five-year journalism scholarships beginning in September 1983 at the University of Moscow; and one or two places in a two-month course for senior journalists of developing countries in East Germany beginning in mid-April.

88. Once established, the IOJ regional office was to produce a monthly newsletter for and about Caribbean journalists and media workers. In July, Rojas, acting as IOJ regional secretary, was to tour Jamaica, Antigua, Dominica, St. Lucia, Barbados, St. Vincent, Trinidad and Tobago, and Suriname, speaking on the IOJ and its history, principles, achievements, and objectives. The IOJ was to cover all expenses for the tour. In August, the IOJ regional office was to conduct a two-week course in Grenada on the principles and practices of "democratic journalism." In September, similar one-week courses were to be conducted in Suriname and St. Vincent. The IOJ regional office was also to prepare monthly monitoring and analysis reports on the Caribbean media and send them to the IOJ Secretariat General in Prague for

inclusion in its world press computer data bank, and to the IOJ Commission for Studies and Documentation in Moscow. [REDACTED]

89. Beginning in August, the office was to solicit articles from "progressive" journalists throughout the region for publication in the IOJ's monthly journal, Democratic Journalist. The office was to begin preparations in December for the holding of the Second Conference of Caribbean Journalists and for Operation Truth, a team of West European journalists chosen by the IOJ to write stories on Grenada. Both the conference and Operation Truth were to coincide with the celebration of the fifth anniversary of the Bishop coup in March 1984. On his way to Angola, according to the captured documents, Rojas stopped in Cuba to meet with officials of Cuba's Casa de las Americas--a major source of Cuban propaganda--and coordinated plans for a future conference of intellectuals as well as for the receipt of Cuban propaganda materials in Grenada. [REDACTED]

ANNEX A

Internal Dynamics of the New Jewel Movement

Background to the Leadership Struggle

1. The factors that led to the disintegration of the New Jewel Movement are rooted in the history of the party and especially in the interplay between its two major leaders, Maurice Bishop and Bernard Coard. The rivalry between the two men preceded the movement's rise to power, and, while this dynamic had long been evident, the extent of their differences over policy questions, the intensity of Coard's personal ambitions, and the painstaking efforts he had taken to develop an independent power base--a party within a party--are only beginning to be fully understood in retrospect. [REDACTED]

2. The origins of the New Jewel Movement are embedded in the personal histories and ideological formation of a small group of young, mainly middle-class Grenadians politicized by foreign study during the turbulent late 1960s. Bishop and his childhood friend, Kenrick Radix, returned to Grenada in 1970 after obtaining their law degrees in the United Kingdom. Together they founded the Movement for Assemblies to the People in 1972 to try to rally popular support against the entrenched and increasingly heavyhanded regime of Eric Gairy. In March of the following year their party aligned with Unison Whiteman's Joint Endeavor for Welfare, Education, and Liberation (JEWEL) to form the New Jewel Movement, and the movement quickly began to attract a largely youth-and-labor based constituency. [REDACTED]

3. Meanwhile, the avowedly Marxist-Leninist Bernard Coard had mobilized his own political following, organized around the shadowy Organization for Revolutionary Education and Liberation (OREL). Although he and Bishop formed a loose alliance in 1973, OREL apparently did not formally merge with the New Jewel Movement until March 1978. By then Bishop--embittered by the Gairy regime's killing of his father, contemptuous of the democratic process as a result of being fraudulently deprived of electoral victory in 1976, and already having established a personal relationship with Fidel Castro--was increasingly amenable to radical solutions. [REDACTED]

4. After the New Jewel Movement took over, Coard as a committed Leninist recognized the importance of controlling the party machinery and worked assiduously to use it to develop his own power base. Through his connection with OREL he had already done important spadework by contributing to the ideological formation of young Grenadian militants. Building on the OREL experience, Coard took advantage of his role as party theoretician to continue to provide ideological instruction to party members and to Army personnel. Coard's post as head of the party's Organizing Committee, where he served until July 1982, gave him responsibility for party organization and enabled him to assign loyalists to strategic positions throughout the party, mass organizations, and government ministries. [REDACTED]

5. The most important group upon whom Coard had an impact was a clique of radical officers who had assumed senior positions in the Army. These officers, including most notably Liam James, Ewart Layne, and Leon Cornwall--

all of whom became Central Committee members--were to play key roles in the leadership crisis from July 1983 onward; first by calling for Bishop to share power with Coard, then by putting Bishop under house arrest when he reneged on the Joint Leadership agreement, and finally by assuming effective control after Bishop was assassinated. The captured documents make emphatically clear that these three men, each in his late twenties, shared Coard's preference for orthodox Communism, his determination to strengthen ties with the Soviet Union, and his desire to accelerate the pace of the revolution. A thoroughly unsavory and hardbitten group, the three had well-earned reputations for using violence against opponents and all have been accused of personally participating in the torture of detainees. [REDACTED]

6. The extent to which the Army radicals were subordinate to Coard as opposed to merely ideological soulmates with similar goals remains uncertain. Many of the officers were from humble backgrounds and a deep sense of class hatred and resentment of elitist privilege characterized their world view. Consequently, some officers--especially among the second echelon--were as critical of Coard for his bourgeois lifestyle as of Bishop. Direct evidence regarding communications between the Army radicals and Coard during the leadership crisis remains an important gap in our information base. The weight of available information now, however, points compellingly to a conclusion that by mid-July the Army radicals and Coard had established a symbiotic relationship and that this alliance held firm through the arrival of US troops. The fact that US forces found Coard and Liam James hiding out together after the invasion reinforces this judgment. [REDACTED]

The Power Struggle Intensifies

7. Coard's disillusionment with Bishop's leadership led him to resign from the party's Central Committee and Political Bureau in September 1982, but he held his ambitions in check until last summer. Bishop's trip to the United States in June 1983 appears to have had a catalytic effect on Coard. Two sources have reported that the decision to go to Washington exacerbated divisions within the party, and Coard took pains publicly to condemn the United States on the day that Bishop returned. There is no indication in the captured documents reviewed so far that Coard was concerned that Bishop's visit reflected an intention to moderate his policies in order to appease Washington. Instead, Coard seemed to fear that the trip and Bishop's performance would undercut Coard's own standing in the party. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Coard was particularly galled because Liam James was said to have been impressed by Bishop's skillful handling of the trip. [REDACTED] Coard may have begun to fear that his support in the officer corps was beginning to slip. [REDACTED]

8. Soon after Bishop returned from the United States, Castro reportedly sent word to the Grenadian leadership that he planned to attend the inauguration of the airfield at Point Salines in March 1984. Coard doubtless interpreted this as a major opportunity for Bishop to bolster his international prestige and enhance his domestic appeal. At this point Coard's frustration may have boiled over as he saw a man whom he viewed as complacent, undisciplined, and relatively untutored in Marxist-Leninist doctrine continue to prosper. Meanwhile his own ambitions must have been fed by his wife,

Phyllis, herself a Central Committee member and an outspoken Bishop critic. A Jamaican by birth, she announced soon after the New Jewel Movement took power that she had not "come to Grenada to be a deputy Prime Minister's wife."

9. Minutes of the Central Committee Plenary in July 1983 indicate that there was a receptive audience in the group for more radical solutions. One by one, Central Committee members expressed their concern that the revolution had reached a critical stage as a result of growing opposition from abroad and apathy at home. Especially noteworthy was the widespread conviction among party leaders that the revolution had not taken root, as reflected most specifically in the lack of public support for the mass organizations and the militia. There were also indications that the majority of Central Committee members had come to believe that Bishop--at least by himself--was not the man to carry the revolution forward.

10. It was becoming increasingly clear that Bishop, ever confident of his appeal to the Grenadian people and his international stature, had paid insufficient attention to the inner workings of the party. He thus found himself in a position of embodying the Grenadian revolution for most of those on the island who continued to sympathize with the New Jewel Movement, but at the same time commanding a dwindling base of support within the upper echelon of the party.

The Leadership Proposal

11. At an emergency session of the Central Committee on 26 August, a decision was made for the entire Central Committee to hold an extraordinary meeting in mid-September. Stating that the party was beginning to disintegrate, Liam James reaffirmed the need to strengthen internal party discipline "along Leninist lines" and urged an intensification of efforts to indoctrinate and mobilize the masses. To ensure full participation by Army hardliners, Leon Cornwall returned from his post in Cuba for this meeting and Ewart Layne cut short his military training course in the USSR. When the Central Committee convened on 14 September, James stated that the fundamental problem was Bishop's leadership. Arguing that organization and discipline, ideological clarity, and brilliance in tactics were needed to push the revolution forward, he proposed a model of joint leadership in which Bishop would remain Prime Minister and Commander in Chief but Coard would become the de facto party chief. Only longtime Bishop loyalist George Louison spoke against the proposal, and the vote carried 9 to 1, with three abstentions including Bishop and Army Commander Hudson Austin.

12. On 25 September a meeting of full party members was held to vote on the joint leadership proposal, and, when Bishop did not show up, a delegation was sent to request his presence. The full membership also voted nearly unanimously to accept the proposal and Bishop announced after prolonged debate his readiness to implement the decision. He and Coard embraced and the following day Bishop left on a trip to Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Cuba from which he did not return until 8 October. After Bishop's departure, Coard apparently began to play an increasingly assertive behind-the-scenes role.

13. While on the trip, Bishop--encouraged by George Lousion--decided that he would not accept the joint leadership concept, and Louison argued against the Central Committee decision in a talk to party members in Hungary. Word of Bishop's reversal filtered back to Grenada, and the Central Committee apparently decided to signal its displeasure by ensuring that Bishop received no formal reception upon arrival in Greanda. [REDACTED]

14. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Among the captured documents is a letter dated 15 October 1983 from Castro to the Central committee of the NJM in which the Cuban leader denies that Bishop "mentioned a single word" or "made the slightest allusion" to problems within the party during his trip. [REDACTED]

15. By 11 October the power struggle was threatening to spill over into the streets. To put Coard on the defensive, Bishop had spread the story that Coard and his wife had ordered his assassination. Individual militia units loyal to Bishop began to mobilize and demand weapons to defend the Prime Minister. Within the Army, Chief of Staff Einstein Louison was seeking to rally support for Bishop. By that point Army Commander Hudson Austin, whose ties to Bishop dated to their youth in the town of St. Paul, had succumbed to pressure from Army radicals and had been successfully neutralized--a development that reportedly deeply affected Bishop's morale. In addition, employees in at least one government ministry were threatening a shutdown, and labor leaders loyal to Bishop spoke of going on strike. [REDACTED]

Bishop's House Arrest

16. The Central Committee met on 12 October to confront Bishop. After discussing the escalating turmoil on the island and Bishop's failure to abide by the rules of democratic centralism, he was informed of the decision to place him under "indefinite" house arrest. James stated that the situation demands "Bolshevik staunchness," adding that "Communists without belly better hop the next plane." Echoing James, Ewart Layne insisted that at a minimum Bishop be expelled from the party and dismissed from every state position. The Central Committee decided to inform Cuba and the Soviet Union of Bishop's arrest, and the ambassadors of the two countries were apparently contacted the same day. [REDACTED]

17. In the wake of Bishop's arrest, a rump Central Committee continued to function and apparently remained the chief decisionmaking body. On 13 October, Coard is reported to have stated that he was receiving assistance from the head of the militia in disarming that situation. The next day Coard

loyalists sought to rally popular support but to little avail. When Minister of National Mobilization Strachan announced that Coard was the new Prime Minister he was apparently shouted down by the crowd, and his attempts to appeal to workers also fell on deaf ears. Moreover, a captured National Mobilization Ministry document indicates that local party organizers informed the Ministry soon after Bishop's arrest of strong grassroots sentiment against Coard. [REDACTED]

18. Throughout the period between Bishop's house arrest on 13 October and his death on 19 October--as well as earlier in the crisis--Havana appears to have been slow in anticipating developments and ineffectual in influencing the outcome. Nonetheless, a desire not to antagonize the Cubans, coupled with the obvious lack of popular support for the Coard-radical Army coalition, probably accounts for the new regime's last effort at a compromise with Bishop. On 18 October, James and Layne headed a delegation to offer a power-sharing arrangement that would have enabled Bishop to remain as Prime Minister in return for publicly admitting responsibility for the crisis. Bishop is said to have promised his answer the following morning. [REDACTED]

19. We have found little information to add at this point to press accounts of the killing of Bishop. Our reporting confirms that, when Bishop and a crowd of a few thousand Grenadians marched to Fort Rupert, the rump Central Committee, including Coard and the Army radicals, were at Fort Frederick and that it was this group that issued the orders to kill him. That there was a growing sense of vindictiveness toward Bishop among the ruling group by the time he was placed under house arrest is clear from the captured documents. For example, an entry dated 14 October in a notebook that belonged to Liam James states that, "Coard wants to kill Bishop." Reporting concerning the period after Bishop's demise remains sparse, but the fact that a letter from the Army's chief of logistics dated 23 October was addressed to Coard indicated that he continued to have a leadership role after the Revolutionary Military Council took control. [REDACTED]

ANNEX B

Weapons Captured in Grenada

1. The equipment listed here is the portion of the more than 580 tons of military stores captured on Grenada that was inventoried before to 29 November 1983. Weapon types are grouped to simplify this listing; most numbers have been rounded because the inventory is as yet incomplete.

Small arms - Rifles, machineguns, submachineguns
(mostly Warsaw Pact):

8,000 plus

Crew served weapons:

82-mm mortars	10
75-mm guns	8
12.7-mm air defense artillery pieces	6
23-mm ZU-23 air defense artillery pieces	12

Ammunition (rounds):

7.62-mm	5,516,600
57-mm rockets (RPG-7)	366
75-mm (Soviet and Chinese)	1,800
82-mm mortars	8,960

Miscellaneous:

BTR-60 armored personnel carriers	7
BRDM-2 armored reconnaissance vehicle	1