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CHINESE ATTITUDES TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION

The Soviet denunciation of the Russo-Japanese neutrality pact on 5 April served to intensify speculation in China regarding Soviet intentions in the Far East. Avowed Chinese policy toward the Soviet Union for many years has been one of friendly respect, but Chinese leaders differ as to the value to China of Soviet participation in the war against Japan. Liberals and Communists urge closer Sino-Soviet ties in the present crisis. Semi-official groups within China are taking steps to effect a rapprochement between the two countries. Chinese Government leaders, however, have shown few signs of giving up their long-held suspicions of Soviet designs on Manchuria, Sinkiang, and the Chinese Communist areas. Meanwhile, the USSR has recently been increasingly critical of the Kuomintang Government and more and more commendatory of the Chinese Communists.

Enthusiastic press and official comment on the Soviet move of 5 April concealed this basic cleavage among the various factions in Chinese political life. At one extreme, the *Yenan Emancipation Daily* (Communist) strove to justify the USSR's previous policy toward Japan, and called upon the Kuomintang Government to abandon its "erroneous policy" and improve relations between the Soviet Union and China. *Ta Kung Pao*, Chungking Independent newspaper, greeted the move as a "downpour on the Japanese leaky roof," and soberly suggested that the Government send a special envoy to Moscow "to discuss the Far Eastern program."

Kuomintang Government officials likewise hailed the Soviet action. Minister of Information Wang Shih-chieh and Wei Tao-ming, Ambassador to the United States, stressed the effect on the morale of the United Nations. Wang stated that "the moral and psychological effect of this decision of the Soviet Government, even apart from other measures that may be taken, will be tremendous. . . . From now on the path is cleared for Soviet Russia, China, and other United Nations to collaborate without even a formal barrier." Ambassador Wei called the Soviet decision "a most significant move that will greatly strengthen the cause for which we are fighting."

Actual political alignments in China regarding relations with the USSR closely parallel alignments on internal matters. Those elements seeking democratic reforms and Kuomintang-Communist rapprochement favor closer ties, while Chiang and the reactionary cliques controlling the Kuomintang have a deep distrust of the Soviet Union which is connected with their intractable attitude toward the Chinese Communists.

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Chiang, his Chief of Staff Ho Ying-chin, and the reactionary-nationalist Whampoa military clique have been implacable enemies of the Communists since the 1927 split in the Nationalist Party (Kuomintang) and subsequent Kuomintang campaigns to eradicate the Chinese Communists. Chiang's personal advisor on Russian affairs, Chu Hsin-ming, has been equally hostile to both the Chinese Communists and the Soviet Union. Education Minister Chu Chia-hua and the "CC" clique, led by the brothers Ch'en Kuo-fu and Ch'en Li-fu, Party Organization Minister, represent two powerful Kuomintang factions and are perhaps the most anti-foreign and anti-Soviet elements in the Party.

Other influential personalities and groups within the Kuomintang have a more moderate attitude toward the USSR than the "CC" and Whampoa cliques. Foreign Minister T. V. Soong was reported to be considering a treaty of amity with the Soviet Union and has been suggested as a special envoy to Moscow. Sun Fo, prominent liberal Kuomintang leader who holds a certain special immunity in speech and action as son of Sun Yet-sen, consistently advocates closer relations with the Soviet Union, and claims that a strong, united China is in the Soviet interest. He is president of the Sino-Soviet Cultural Association in Chungking, an organization dedicated to the furtherance of Sino-Soviet friendship through discussions, movies, and meetings commemorating important Soviet holidays. However, Sun's actual political influence in offsetting the present anti-foreign tendencies of the innermost Kuomintang cliques is severely limited by his lack of military strength and a personal following. The middle-of-the-road Political Science Group has not been particularly vocal with respect to the USSR, and may be expected to continue its general support of the dominant anti-Russian conservative group in the Kuomintang.

Outside the Kuomintang, the League of Democratic Parties, although largely preoccupied with internal reform, is concerned lest the Kuomintang's tactics with regard to Russia draw the two countries into actual conflict, and has expressed increasing interest in improving Sino-Soviet relations.

Finally the Chinese Communists, like the liberals, would welcome Soviet participation in the war against Japan. Formal relations between Moscow and Yen-an, the capital of Communist China, are non-existent; each has been careful not to embarrass the other by indicating an improper attachment; and even the Kuomintang officially states that the Communists are not under Russian control. Until recently the Soviet press, though represented by two Tass correspondents at Yen-an, has devoted very little space to the Chinese Communists. Now, increasingly numerous items in the Soviet press indicate Russian approbation of the Chinese Communist war effort and of their extensive political and economic reforms, as contrasted with conditions in Kuomintang China.

On their part, the Chinese Communists have shown considerable interest in Soviet Russia. Many of their leaders have studied in the USSR, and others are now being trained in the Russian language. Chinese Com-

munist newspapers feature Tass reports. They applauded both the signing of the neutrality pact with Japan in 1941, and its recent denunciation. The Russian position on such problems as Poland, Yugoslavia, and Germany and the exploits of the Russian Army are given prominence in Border Region newspapers.

Even those Chinese leaders who distrust Soviet intentions appear aware of a need for indicating their interest in closer friendship and understanding with the USSR. In a speech before the People's Political Council (PPC) in September 1944 Chiang Kai-shek himself, stressing the necessity for cooperation with the Soviet Union, stated that "the Government has readjusted the factors which are regarded as sufficient to cause obstruction, and the international relations between China and the Soviet Union, it is hoped, will become closer." Three days later the Council passed a resolution calling for the strengthening of Sino-Russian cooperation on the basis of a conviction that China and the Soviet Union, as the "pillars of peace" on the Asiatic mainland, cannot fully discharge this responsibility without complete understanding and close cooperation. The PPC decided to implement the resolution by requesting the Government to strengthen Sino-Russian cooperation in accordance with its fixed policy, and by conferring with the Government about the dispatch of a people's goodwill mission to the USSR. The Chinese News Service in the United States was instructed by the Government to emphasize the "good relations" existing between China and the USSR, and a research worker was hired to prepare articles for the Service on Sino-Soviet relations. The Chinese also claimed that the removal of Sheng Shih-tsai as Governor of Sinkiang was a gesture of friendliness toward the Soviet Union. Most recently, the semi-official People's Foreign Relations Association decided to send a goodwill mission to the USSR.

But despite these protestations of friendship, other moves indicated a basically unfriendly attitude toward the Soviet Union. The PPC goodwill mission was never sent. Kuomintang policies toward Northwest China and the Border Region are motivated in part by hostility toward the Soviet Union. The removal of Governor Sheng Shih-tsai, while presented as a move to appease the USSR, has not been followed by any change in the anti-Soviet policy in Sinkiang. Kuomintang elements continue to blame Soviet instigation for the recent uprising in the province which neutral observers contend was due to Chinese suppression of minority peoples there.

Meanwhile the Chinese Government has been faced with an apparent change in Soviet policy. Over a period of years, following the Japanese attack on China in 1937, the Soviet press was generally friendly to the Kuomintang Government, and the USSR, although a non-belligerent in the Pacific War, early took the lead in supplying equipment, technical advisors, and transportation facilities to aid the Chinese war effort. The Soviet Union continues to maintain formal recognition and a correct official relationship with China. However, the Soviet Union has increasingly indicated a belief that the presently-constituted Kuomintang Gov-

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ernment has made only a minimum contribution to the defeat of the Japanese, has failed to fulfill its promises of internal political and economic reforms and has adopted an untenable position in its refusal to permit a coalition government. The Russian press meanwhile has been expressing admiration for the partisan warfare carried on by the Chinese Communists against the Japanese, and for the effective manner in which the Communists have secured popular support in the regions they occupy. Commentators lately have also expressed support for the Communist position in its struggle with the Kuomintang.

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