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## WESTERN EUROPE

*French Resistance Criticism of Purge Policy*

Politically divergent sections of the Resistance have issued sharp criticisms of the slowness of the collaborationist purge conducted by the provisional government in Paris. Two weeks ago the committees of liberation in eleven southeastern departments issued a formal protest stressing the need for a much accelerated political, economic, and administrative purge. The statement suggested that the government owes its existence "to the victorious action of the Resistance movement and should base its policy on the will" of Resistance spokesmen.

The Parisian press has also devoted considerable space to the problem. Both the conservative *Combat* and the Communist-dominated *Front National* agree that a thorough purge is a preliminary condition to true liberation; they charge that "scandalous leniency" has been shown certain Vichy civil servants still in office, and assert that "our patriotic militia constitutes the only safeguard of our still youthful freedom." Other papers emphasize that only by eradicating every vestige of the Vichy regime can "republican legality" be achieved. The similarity in argument despite the political and geographic divergence of the sources indicates a general hostility toward all collaborationists and an impatience with the tempo of the purge.

Despite the report that 8,700 collaborationists are in custody in Paris alone, and despite the recent cleansing of the Foreign Office, the De Gaulle regime has followed a cautious policy in the prosecution of collaborationists. Whatever the advantages of this policy in allaying foreign and domestic fears of revolution, civil war, or dictatorship, it unavoidably appears suspect to active members of the Resistance. The addition of Resistance delegates to the Council of Ministers has not quieted widespread fears that the provisional government, so long in exile, may underestimate the unfavorable repercussions of a "soft" purge policy.

*Communist Cooperation in Southeastern France*

Political conditions in Provence show little of the factionalism which had been anticipated in view of Communist strength in the region. Gaullist authorities, by calling upon the Communists to share the responsibilities of office, have placed the extreme left in a position where it must either silence or satisfy the discontent and criticism which every departmental administration must face.

In Marseille the Communists have been willing to leave the leadership of the departmental committee of liberation in the hands of non-Communist leaders. Radical leaders have offered no objection to regularizing the status of the FFI, although this action reduces the independence of the Communist shock troops (FTP). In Nice law and

order have been re-established despite the confusion resulting at the time of liberation from the absence or death of many prominent Resistance leaders, and despite the friction caused late in August by the anti-Communist attitude of the FCNL-appointed prefect. This prefect has been replaced by a Communist or a Communist-sympathizer, irresponsible activity of FFI bands has diminished, and the liberation committee has become a purely advisory body. Throughout the department of Alpes-Maritimes Communist leaders are stressing the need for French unity rather than emphasizing class warfare or social change. In this region too, the FFI is being absorbed into the army and political prisoners are being held for trial in accordance with provisional government regulations.

#### *The Dutch Resistance*

As disclosed by Prince Bernhard, commander of the Dutch Forces of the Interior, all underground activities of the Dutch resistance have been placed under OD (*Ord edienst*, Service to Maintain Order), the RVV (*Raad van Vorzet*, Council of Resistance), and the KT (the exact title of which has not been reported but which is believed to be the important Communist underground organization). Preliminary reports indicate Allied forces operating in Holland have received effective help from the Dutch resistance.

The OD, one of the oldest Dutch underground movements, was originally founded to maintain order in case of a German withdrawal and is chiefly composed of ex-army men organized on a regional basis. Gestapo operations and the internment of all former army personnel ordered by the Germans in May 1943 have resulted in a large membership turn-over. The organization, however, continued to exist and to play an important role as the official agency through which the London Government maintained contacts and obtained information in the homeland. Other resistance groups protested this preferential position accorded the OD, and when the OD became too well known to the Gestapo to be effective, the Government began in late 1943 to deal with other underground formations. The OD then reorganized and relaxed the rules prohibiting its members from taking part in active resistance. Its primary aims of gathering intelligence, preventing wanton destruction by retreating Germans, and maintaining order were retained.

The RVV has become one of the largest Dutch underground groups, despite an initial lack of interest on the part of the London Government. It is reported to have been partially successful in unifying active resistance units varying from the extreme right to the extreme left in political orientation. The Communists have cooperated with the RVV, though they have maintained a separate organization.

#### *New Belgian Cabinet*

Prince Charles, the newly appointed Belgian Regent, has entrusted

former Prime Minister Pierlot with the formation of Belgium's first post-liberation cabinet. The new cabinet announced on 26 September has nineteen members, thirteen of whom have not held ministerial posts before. For the first time in Belgian history the Communist Party is represented in the cabinet.

In view of the fact that the Prime Ministry, the Vice-Presidency, and the two key Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Finance are held by members of the former government, the attitude of the new Pierlot ministry on most major issues is expected to be similar to that of the Government-in-exile. Since the portfolio of Economic Affairs is held by a member of the Liberal Party, one of Belgium's most conservative groups, no far reaching economic change, such as nationalization of vital industries, is likely to be introduced.

The inclusion of two Communists (as Minister of Public Health and Minister without Portfolio) may be explained by Pierlot's desire to form a government of "wide national concentration" representing all resistance factions. Communist sympathies have undoubtedly increased significantly in Belgium, and members of other political parties are said to have favored inclusion of Communists in the cabinet in order to minimize their opposition. Several strikes of a political nature reportedly ended upon the appointment of the Communist ministers. However, the posts allotted to the Communists do not carry great influence in the administration of the country.

The new government is expected to stay in power until the return of the King from imprisonment in Germany or until new elections can be held. Although twenty representatives and twelve senators considered collaborationists will presumably be excluded from Parliament, the ministry will have to work with a legislative assembly which largely represents political alignments as of 1939. Among the most pressing problems facing the new government are those of food and fuel supplies, economic rehabilitation, and punishment of traitors. The constitutional changes planned by Belgian political leaders during the occupation cannot be undertaken while the country is under the reign of a Regent.

#### *Salazar Seeks To Avoid Break With Japan*

A reliable report from Portugal indicates that Premier Salazar, despite rumors to the contrary, continues to be very reluctant to sever relations with Japan and intends to keep the Japanese Government informed in advance of any change in the present policy. Under the pressure of Allied demands, Salazar is reported to have declared to the Japanese Minister, Morito Morishima, the Portuguese sovereignty and Portuguese administration of Timor must be restored. Morishima is said to have replied that his Government intends to do everything possible to relieve the situation and would consent to withdraw some of its troops from the island but is obliged to continue the occupation for the present.

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### *Modification of Swedish Neutrality*

The deterioration of the German military effort has caused the Swedish Government to modify its policy of strict neutrality by closing Baltic and Bothnian ports to foreign shipping, abolishing transit privileges for German civilians, and releasing interned American airmen.

In reply to press demands that the government take some action against Germany to stop the deportation of Norwegians and Danes to German concentration camps, the Swedish government has suspended transit privileges for German civilians in Sweden. Following the recent abrogation of German freight privileges this measure appears virtually to have ended all German transit in the country.

The Swedish action in barring all foreign shipping from Swedish territorial waters in the Gulf of Bothnia and the Baltic as far as the extreme southwestern tip of Sweden has drastically reduced Swedish-German trade. Such German shipping as remains must be carried on through Goteborg and other west coast ports, a route where the ships may encounter Allied submarine attack and mines. Swedish authorities are prepared for the inevitable repercussions of this action on their own economy, such as the unemployment of several thousand seamen, reduced mining operations, and the loss of substantial fuel imports.

The recent decision of the Swedish Government to release immediately 300 interned American airmen whose planes were forced down in Swedish territory does not represent a basic change in policy. During the past year Allied airmen had been evacuated in accordance with the number of interned Germans released. The present decision has been based on the assumption that, as a result of the fighting in northern Finland, several hundred Germans will be forced across the Swedish frontier. The latter are to be given the choice of returning to Germany or being interned.

## CENTRAL EUROPE

### *New Polish Crisis*

The ouster of General Kazimierz Sosnkowski as commander in chief of the armed forces controlled by the Polish Government-in-exile, and the surrender of Polish guerrilla forces in Warsaw, have further intensified the rifts and recriminations between the Government-in-exile and the Polish Committee in Lublin. The dismissal of Sosnkowski, effected after a long series of internecine quarrels among Polish officials in London, appears to have been precipitated by strong pressure from the British Government. The British reportedly believe that the prestige of the Western Allies, who recognize the Government-in-exile, and of the Government itself could be preserved if the Poles would agree to territorial "adjustments" and would remove certain personalities who were particularly distasteful to the Soviets.

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Violent Soviet and PCNL reactions to the appointment of General Bor (Tadeusz Komorowski) as Sosnkowski's successor, however, give little hope for an amicable solution to the conflict. The Chairman of the Polish Committee, Edward Osobka-Morawski, followed the announcement with a hotly-worded statement describing Bor as a criminal and ordering his arrest and trial on charges of ordering a premature uprising in Warsaw. Morawski insisted that Bor has not been in Warsaw. The Government-in-exile, astonished by the intensity of this attack, countered with charges that Morawski and General Rola-Zymierski, commander of the Polish forces fighting with the Soviets, have hampered efforts to aid the patriots in Warsaw and that Zymierski is planning to establish a militarist regime in Poland.

Bor's appointment is interpreted as a victory of the so-called "underground orientation" in the Polish Cabinet over Premier Mikolajczyk, who proposed the abolition of the post of commander in chief. The Socialists in the Cabinet have been pressing for a government reorganization to conform with the composition of the "legitimate" Polish underground, which is controlled by a mixture of right-wing Socialists, military followers of the pre-war regime, and rabid nationalists. These Socialists apparently believe that the Communists (Polish Workers Party) will be forced to admit their failure to gain political control and will agree to build the new Polish regime on the "Badoglio" rather than the "Tito" pattern.

Indications are, however, that the Polish Communists, rather than bargain with the "legitimate" leadership, have elected to try to increase their support by reactivating the old political parties under a new "reliable" leadership. Two old organizations, the Socialist and the Peasant Parties, and a new Democratic Party are reported recently to have selected members of the Polish Committee as leaders. This move apparently has the two-fold aim of demonstrating that the members of the Lublin Committee are not Communists and that all "democratic" parties are free to function in liberated Poland.

#### *Moscow Free Germany Committee*

Germany's recent strategic and political disasters have given new stimuli to the activities of the Free Germany Committee in Moscow. A recent appeal by fifteen divisional commanders of Army Group South, captured by Soviet forces in the Balkans, goes beyond the customary request to the German army to surrender and calls for the elimination of Hitler and his regime by force of arms. Refuting Nazi counter-propaganda that "helpless" German officers have been coerced into making their statements, the appeal begins with the words: "Now that we are prisoners of war we may voice our thoughts freely." Nazi propaganda had also charged that the names of dead Generals were used to sign such appeals broadcast from Moscow to the Reichswehr. To give substance to this accusation, the Nazis "posthumously" decorated General Lindemann, co-author of an August appeal, for "bravery in action."

The prominent German officers who have been writing anti-Nazi articles for the Soviet press or issuing appeals to the German Army to surrender have not been charged with war guilt by the USSR despite previous support of the Nazi regime. A well-informed Allied observer has offered the following analysis of the Soviet definition of war criminal. The Soviets do not recognize any international law of war in this matter, but instead, he believes, are guided by political expediency and national self-interest. Conspicuous association with the formulation of German war policies appears to be an important Soviet criterion for guilt, but each case is considered and judged individually rather than categorically.

#### *The Effect of Germany's Military Reverses on the Home Front*

The deteriorating German military position has imposed significant new strains on German home morale and the price control system. The disorderly retreat of German forces to the West Wall and the return of German civilians from the occupied countries have necessitated energetic assurances from Nazi propagandists to counter defeatism. While admitting that "men fell victim to a panic," Nazi spokesmen have assiduously assured the people that none of the "real" fighting troops were involved and that the German army is still powerful. Efforts are being made to discount soldiers' stories in advance of their return. The extent of the disorder is minimized by assailing the misconduct of "stragglers." A general campaign now is under way against the so-called *Etappe* — the soft-living soldier and civilian elements in the rear areas, who invent stories to cover up their flight or panic.

Germany's current military fortunes appear to have weakened government inflation controls and the people's will to obey regulations. Numerous items in the German press testify to the increased boldness with which the German public seeks to escape threatening inflation. The majority of the German people apparently long ago lost confidence in the future value of the Reichsmark, but encountered difficulty making protective purchases of real value. The people therefore sought to hoard currency in the hope that they might be able at a later date to profit from a relaxation of price controls and in order to protect themselves against a breakdown of the banking system. Between 15 August and 15 September, largely because of hoarding, the Government was forced to increase the currency in circulation by some 3 billion RM to a total of 40 billion RM. This total is in striking contrast to the figure of 30 billion RM for last year and 8 billion RM before the war. The increase occurred despite the fact that civilian incomes and private purchases have been reduced by the mobilization of more civilians into the army or war plants.

## THE BALKANS

*Rumanian Government Reluctance to Punish Collaborationists*

The Rumanian Government continues to take only limited action against war criminals and persons associated with former fascist regimes in Rumania. While several prominent members of Antonescu's entourage and other anti-democrats have been taken into custody, the portfolios of National Economy and Finance are still held by General Potopeanu, whom a Soviet commission previously listed as a war criminal. The failure to arrest all of the compromised politicians is attributed in part to the reluctance of cabinet members to punish former colleagues and to the small number of experienced Rumanian administrators who have not been associated with anti-democratic governments. Further delay in apprehending other compromised persons may induce the Soviets to complete the task themselves, some sources in Bucharest believe, though the Soviets are expected to confine their attention to actual war criminals and collaborationists.

## THE FAR EAST

*Puppet Philippine Government Declares War*

The proclamation of martial law in the Philippines on 22 September and the announcement on 23 September that the puppet Philippine government had declared war on the United States and Great Britain clearly discredited previous propaganda about the "independent Philippines" by turning over full control of the Islands to the Japanese. The declaration of war also appears to be the final action indicting the puppet officials in Filipino eyes as collaborationists and responsible in considerable measure for the consequences of war against the Allies.

The Japanese, who for several months have been pointing out to the Philippine people the "menace" of American attack, have recently intensified the campaign to brand the Americans as "terror raiders" and "enemies of the Republic." They also reminded puppet government officials as well as the Filipino people that the Japan-Philippine Treaty of Alliance of 14 October 1943 required, according to the Japanese view, the active military cooperation of the puppet state with Japan.

Immediately following heavy American raids on Manila on 20 and 21 September, the puppet government proclaimed the existence throughout the Philippines of a state of martial law. With the proclamation, the puppet government became simply an auxiliary of the Japanese military machine in the Islands. The commissioners of the nine Philippine military districts were designated as Military Governors with broad general powers and wide latitude in punishing opponents of the New Order. Puppet President Laurel warned against the dangers of "momentary invasion" and called for cooperation of all the people of the Islands.

On the following day, the puppet Philippine government and the Japanese Army Command in the Islands simultaneously announced President Laurel's declaration of war against the United States and Great Britain. The fact that the puppet president personally declared war was actually a violation of the puppet Constitution, which requires that the National Assembly approve such a measure by a two-thirds vote. Nonetheless Japanese and puppet propagandists labored to convince the Filipinos of the legality of the declaration by attempting to demonstrate that Laurel's emergency powers for dealing with domestic affairs included the power to declare war.

That the Japanese forced this decision on the puppet government appears fairly certain. Japanese propaganda notwithstanding, a great many, probably most, of the Filipinos remain loyal to the United States. However, pro-Japanese some members of the government may be, it is doubtful that many of them would voluntarily have incurred the wrath of the people by such an act. Throughout the occupation period the Japanese have experienced extreme difficulty in combatting popular pro-American sentiment. Even with the declaration of war, the Japanese were forced to have Lieutenant-General Homma, former Japanese commander in chief in the Philippines, broadcast a warning that the Japanese will not continue to tolerate "Filipinos misguided by pro-American feelings."

#### *Allied PW Against the Japanese*

The Japanese have been subjected to Allied psychological warfare and proved not completely invulnerable, although as yet only minor results have been achieved. A report on psychological warfare activities between 13 and 23 July in the battle for Myitkyina indicates that few surrenders resulted from leaflet drops and public address system appeals. However, public address broadcasts may have contributed to low morale causing the Japanese to withdraw from certain positions to which they had held determinedly for three weeks. Natives came over to the American lines as a direct result of the public address appeals and were able to give invaluable information. Finally, the broadcasts acted as a morale-builder for American troops.

When the Myitkyina campaign was progressing most slowly, the commander of the Myitkyina Task Force asked the Assam Psychological Warfare Team to drop large numbers of surrender leaflets over the city. The Team prepared two types of leaflets: preparational leaflets, designed to reduce morale by giving information of Japanese defeats, announcing the good treatment of Japanese prisoners, and instilling doubts as to the value of death on the battlefield as opposed to life for a "New Japan"; and also a direct surrender appeal, to be used as a pass when coming over to the Allied lines. Approximately 125,000 leaflets, including instruction sheets for American and Chinese troops making the capture and material in native languages, were dropped in the course of two months. No voluntary surrenders resulted from the leaflets, and their effect on the

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general morale of the troops is unassessable. Interrogations of prisoners of war captured in other areas indicated that while many of the leaflets were read and ridiculed, at other times small groups of soldiers would seriously discuss the leaflets, and a number of prisoners were able to recite the text verbatim.

Later a public address system was installed for experimental broadcasts to the Japanese troops. The equipment was first set up about 150 yards north of the front line. In the early morning and evening the public address system broadcast short 30-minute programs of American and Japanese music, news of Japan and the progress of the war, and finally the surrender appeal. The first two broadcasts were limited to news and music. In the third broadcast, the American commanding officer and a Chinese officer gave detailed instructions for surrender. The main themes of the appeal were: Japanese defeat is inevitable. American forces are advancing in the Pacific. Japan's shipping has been destroyed to the point where she cannot supply her troops fighting on far fronts. Japanese soldiers in Burma now receive no reinforcements or supplies, no Japanese airplanes have come to aid them, and the struggle is futile. The militarists are responsible for the war. They must bear the responsibility for its failure. Dying on the battlefield is not dying for the Emperor; it is dying a useless death for the militarists. On the other hand, a new Japan will rise from this war, a Japan freed from the clutches of the militarists.

After ten days of broadcasting, one Japanese soldier surrendered. On the third day, the Americans were able to move forward a quarter mile, for the first time in three weeks. The intelligence officer, stating that until this day the Japanese had held doggedly to their positions, believed that the broadcasts may have contributed to the low morale which made them withdraw. On the following two nights, about forty natives made their way to the American lines. The broadcasts had proved to the natives that despite Japanese propaganda there were American as well as Chinese troops in the area, and they decided to surrender. Increasing numbers came over thereafter, and invaluable information has been obtained from these refugees.