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25 April 1950

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MEMORANDUM FOR: SPECIAL ASSISTANT, INTELLIGENCE, DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OF STATE
ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
DIRECTOR OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE
DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE, HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE, ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR INTELLIGENCE, THE JOINT STAFF
DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

SUBJECT: Meeting of JIGSAW Committee

Should not have been included. See April memo.

1. The sixth meeting of the JIGSAW Committee will be held on Tuesday, 2 May 1950, at 1430 hours in Room 117, Central Building.
2. The attached report of the Sub-committee will be discussed at the meeting and, if approved by the Committee, will be forwarded to the Intelligence Advisory Committee.
3. Minutes of the fifth JIGSAW Committee meeting held on 31 March 1950 are also attached hereto.
4. It is requested that the names of those attending be reported by telephone to the office of the Chairman, JIGSAW Committee (Code 14), extension 2817) by 1600 hours on 1 May. Since full representation is desired, it is requested that if neither the regular representative nor his alternate is able to attend, a substitute be designated.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE:

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THEODORE BARBITT
Chairman
JIGSAW Committee

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OAD/ORE:TB:fd
Distribution:

- Each addressee
- DCI
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- ~~COAFF~~
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APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: DEC 2001

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JIGSAW's Recommended Priority Program

25 April 1950

The priority program recommended below is the result of careful and detailed consideration by the JIGSAW Committee. In the first stage of its consideration, the Committee examined the very broad field of international Communism, seeking some method for concentrating attention on the important parts of that field. A report by JIGSAW's Subcommittee suggested that the study of international Communism could be divided into four major fields of investigation: the principles of Communism, international communist organizations and activities, national communist parties, and Communism as an instrumentality of Soviet foreign policy. Further consideration by JIGSAW led to the conclusion that the most urgent intelligence requirements (of those not being met under existing programs or operations of the intelligence agencies) are to be found in the second, third and fourth of these fields of investigation. The next step was the examination of those projects within these fields which the representatives of the intelligence agencies suggested for consideration by the JIGSAW Committee.

More than one hundred projects were suggested to JIGSAW, and the priority program was established on certain standards

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and criteria. First, it was decided to restrict the priority program to a small number of projects, each of which was regarded as meeting a definite and urgent need. Second, in view of the numerous requirements of this government and the many-sided aspect of international Communism itself, an effort was made to include a variety of different types of projects. The program, therefore, contains area studies, organizational and type studies, biographical studies and others. Wherever possible, when a series of studies was proposed to JIGSAW, only one of the series was accepted for the priority program. Thus, the members of JIGSAW strongly feel that it is necessary to make a detailed analysis of communist intentions and capabilities in the strategic industries of the world. Since all strategic industries cannot be studied at once, it was decided to begin this series of studies by an examination of communist activities in the international maritime industry. In similar fashion, the examination of communist capabilities for sabotage and related activities in key areas is initiated with a study of communist capabilities for such damage in France and Italy.

Finally, JIGSAW attempted to take into account the various types of facilities available within the American Government for the execution of its priority program in the near future

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and to use as many of these as possible. Thus, for example, it will be noted that agencies expected to participate in the execution of the priority program will be the Biographic Division of the State Department, the External Research Staff of the State Department, the Office of Special Operations of the Central Intelligence Agency, and other member agencies of the JIGSAW Committee.

In presenting this priority program, the JIGSAW Committee has not attempted to rate the individual projects as to importance or with reference to the order in which they should be undertaken by the intelligence agencies. The JIGSAW Committee believes that each of these projects is essential to the logical development of an intelligence program in the field of international Communism.

Recommended Priority Program

- a. Communist capabilities and intentions for sabotage of important facilities in French and Italian areas vital to the United States' effort in the event of war or other emergencies.
- b. Communist organizational potentials and capabilities in the international maritime industry.
- c. The mechanism of international Communism for control of, communication with, and financing of, the national Communist parties. (An explorative summary).
- d. Communist operations and organizations among scientific workers outside the Soviet Union.

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- e. The impact of the Yugoslav and other defections on the cohesiveness of the world communist movement.
- f. The pattern of clandestine communist activities, of both legal and illegal parties, relating to:
 - (1) Insurrection and preparation of insurrection;
 - (2) Communist penetration of armed and security forces;
 - (3) Partisan and resistance operations;
 - (4) Espionage;
 - (5) Intra-party communications methods in these fields;
 - (6) Intra-party financing in these fields.
- g. Basic communist strategy in the present period, as revealed in communist tactics in Southeast Asia.
- h. Present types, methods of selection, changing characteristics in the leadership of the Communist parties in Southeast Asia.
- i. (Exploratory summary) Communist related activities of Soviet embassies, and other overt agencies abroad, with particular reference to (1) espionage; (2) political activities; and (3) subversive activities.
- j. Comparative study of Communist methods for penetration of governments and assumption of power, as revealed in the Russian, Chinese, Czechoslovak and other experiences. (This is recommended only if it can be undertaken by External Research.)

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Highlights of the JIGSAW Meeting of 31 March 1950

1. The Committee agreed in principle to use a recording device instead of a stenographer for recording the minutes. The Committee voted for a continuance of verbatim minutes and accepted the Chairman's suggestion that for experimental purposes, a brief account of the meeting's highlights by the Secretary, accompany the report.
2. The Chairman announced that the project card file of national intelligence on Communism will be processed through the facilities of the Office of Collection and Dissemination, CIA. Abstracts of the projects can thus be made readily available to analysts.
3. The Chairman announced that, for the present, the FBI has withdrawn from JIGSAW, but expressed hope that the Bureau will reconsider this action.
4. The Committee considered two submissions of the Sub-Committee: (1) recommendations for a "Priority Program" of national intelligence on Communism and (2) suggestions for projects on "Aspects of International Communism". There was a discussion of additional projects such as the extension of project "a" to Germany, interests in special projects expressed by agency representatives for later allocation, capabilities of External Research for collaboration, and problems of collection for projects such as an examination of the WFTU. The Chairman of the Sub-Committee explained the Sub-Committee's trend of thought in arriving at the list of priorities.
5. The Committee voted to accept the report of the Sub-Committee.
6. The Secretary distributed a memorandum from the Sub-Committee to the Committee concerning the possible establishment of an interdepartmental periodical estimate of international Communism for consideration by the JIGSAW members. It will be discussed at a later meeting.
7. It was agreed that the Chairman would forward the final JIGSAW report to the IAC upon completion and acceptance by the Committee, so that provisions may be made to execute the program by providing the necessary manpower and to determine allocations to the member agencies.

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INTERDEPARTMENTAL "JIGSAW" COMMITTEE

Minutes of Meeting
Held in Room 117, Central Building
On 31 March 1950, at 1430

Mr. Theodore Babbitt, Presiding

* * * * *

P R E S E N T

Mr. Louis Nemzer.....Department of State
Mr. Bernard Morris.....Department of State
Mr. H.R. Penniman.....Department of State
Lt. Col. E.B. Nichols.....Department of the Army
Major R.E. Boynton.....Department of the Army
Mr. W. Abbott.....Department of the Navy
Col. D.N. Wackwitz.....Department of the Air Force
Mr. Stefan Possony.....Department of the Air Force
Mr. C.A. Rolander, Jr.....Atomic Energy Commission
Capt. H.P. Wright, Jr., USN.....Joint Chiefs of Staff



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INTERDEPARTMENTAL "JIGSAW" COMMITTEE

Minutes of Meeting

(Verbatim)

BABBITT: One very practical detail that I should like to take up immediately is that of the decorations on the table. This is the intake end of a wire recording device which had already been mounted here. It is quite a job to mount it. It need not be switched on. Miss Sudmeier is here and we can go on as we have. But I should like to put up to the Committee the possibility that we use the wire recording device in the future, simply as a device to assist our personnel side of our office. Miss Sudmeier is going to be absent for some time in the future and the question of a replacement would be greatly eased if there would be no objection on the part of the members of this Committee to using the wire recorder. It works the same way -- the remarks are taken down and transcribed and a verbatim report will be circulated.

MORRIS: I would like to take the opportunity of raising the question of whether we want verbatim reports or edited reports. I think on at least one occasion an edited report might have served a useful purpose.

NEUMER: At the risk of causing a split in my department, I disagree. It seems to me that the incident that occurred would have occurred anyway.

NICHOLS: I think we in the Army would prefer to get an edited report. Of course with the concurrence of those attending the conference after it has been edited.

BABBITT: Naturally it would be circulated for the acceptance of the minutes. By an 'edited report' did you mean a report taken from the verbatim report?

MORRIS: The usual secretarial notes.

BABBITT: Would you rather have a verbatim transcription that is edited

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and boiled down? I think Mr. Morris is talking about simply secretarial notes.

WACKWITZ: Personally, I think the edited report that has been reduced somewhat is generally more purposeful. It saves wading through a lot of unnecessary material.

BABBITT: Somebody has got to do that!

NEEMER: Would it be possible to ask the Secretary of the Committee to give us a one page summary of the results of the meeting, with the other available for the others of us who would like to have the verbatim report in our files?

BABBITT: If we are going to have a verbatim report anyway, I think that could be done. I gather that the consensus is in favor of at least having a verbatim transcription handy for reference purposes, in spite of the incident that has been alluded to. I think it is a pretty good idea to have a verbatim transcription available for reference.

Does anyone object violently to the presence of these gadgets on the table?

WACKWITZ: Not at all.

WRIGHT: Why would there be any objection?

BABBITT: I know some people around town who object for psychological reasons. Something akin to 'mike fright'.

NEEMER: In connection with this problem, I think we might address ourselves to the matter of the utilization of this machinery in the future. I would be perfectly willing to have this used in the future.

BABBITT: I gather there is no great objection on anybody's part to the use of the wire recording device.

PENNIMAN: It would still be desirable if you had a brief summary in addition to it.

BABBITT: We will try to work it out.

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NEZZER: Perhaps not a summary, but a statement of decisions reached at the meeting. If there were only two or three decisions, that could be done in a few lines.

BABBITT: That is what I meant by secretarial notes. That is, a general outline of the discussion and a record of the decisions reached.

NEZZER: I am not sure you need an outline of the discussion, from that point of view -- but that, after our discussion we have arrived at certain specific decisions, that these assignments were given to a particular sub-committee, and that this person was asked to do these things.

It could be done. "The Committee considered this point and that point and came to the following decisions". That need not be more than a page.

BABBITT: Let's get the opinions on the desirability of having a full transcription of the notes available, no matter what form the circulated version took -- whether it be a short one page summary based on the transcription, or the secretarial notes. How many favor the existence of a full verbatim transcript of each meeting?

(Majority raised hands)

BABBITT: How many would prefer to have an abridgment circulated?

(Possory and Wackwitz raised hands)

PENNIMAN: Would it be possible to circulate an abridgment and the full transcript? I just raise that as a possibility.

BABBITT: I think if we circulate the whole thing each time, which is quite an operation, that maybe that would be enough. We will continue to make the full transcription. For experimental purposes we will draw up a brief account, secretarial minutes, of this meeting.

I have two brief announcements before we can take up the report. I have spoken to the Assistant Director of our Office of Collection and Dissemination, (who also runs the Reference Center and the CIA Library in

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connection with it) about setting up a readily accessible central file of the projects which have been requested to be sent in to the Secretary. That is the description of the projects. I am told that it will be very easy, through a mechanism known as Telefax, I think, to reproduce and file in IBI machines the abstracts of the projects up to 250 words. They need not go up to 250 words, but the machinery will take up to that number. This could be done very easily for future filing with the Secretary if the Committee members would see to it that accompanying the project (if it is in existence, or if it is not) they would file an abstract for a full description of the project, which would then be typed on the Telefax cards, coded and recorded. The ultimate objective being that if any analyst in any agency thereafter starts to work on a project having to do with international Communism, he can apply to the CIA Library for a loan of all projects on that particular phase which he is about to undertake. I know this Telefax operation slightly, from the outside, and I know that it works very well. Naturally you will not get out any more than you put in; but if everybody puts in everything they have, we will eventually be able to push a button and get out these abstracts of all projects bearing on the subject. As the coding mechanism usually works you get rather more than you need on the one thing, but you cover the whole field adequately. It will also give you the location of the paper of which you have the abstract, and the various copies. For instance, you might find that there are two copies in G-2, and one in OIR and one in CIA. I am going to pursue that further, to see the coding operation, to see if we can come up with something which will be of practical value to the JIGSAW operation.

I think I should also mention the absence of the FBI representatives this time, and to tell you that the Direction (CIA) received a letter from the Direction of the FBI mentioning some remarks of mine at the last meeting and stating that in view of those remarks the FBI desired to withdraw from

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the JIGSAW Committee. That letter has been answered, with a request for reconsideration, which is still unanswered. So I cannot tell you whether the FBI will finally and formally withdraw from the JIGSAW Committee or not. I most certainly hope they do not, because they are in possession of information which should be of great value in the study of international Communism if it could be made available to the other members of the Committee. However, that matter is not decided yet.

You have before you two reports. One was circulated last week and contains a list of first priority projects. The subject is "Recommendations for Priority Program".

The other one, a much more bulky document, which has just been distributed, is on the subject of "Suggestions for Projects on Aspects of International Communism". This is a more lengthy document and for that reason I think it should not be discussed in any detail today.

What we intend to do (if the Committee approves) with both of these documents, if they are approved, is to forward them to the IAC with a report which is yet to be written requesting full support from the agencies involved in the production of, in the first place, the priority projects, and within the framework of the larger list of projects.

The larger list, in spite of its size, is admittedly far from complete. You will recall the four fields of investigation which we have discussed before. I noticed, on page 2, that there is only one paragraph on field number I. "Principles of Communism"; and field number III. "Activities of National and Regional Communist Organizations"; has not been completed; and field number IV. "Communism as an Instrument of Soviet Foreign Policy", is only sketched out. But that, when completed, will be forwarded to the IAC, not as a list of projects, but as background and a framework against which the most important and priority programs of this Committee are to be viewed. We shall hope to get the opinion of the agencies on the validity of the priorities

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in the priority program, and with that their approval of allocations for the production.

Obviously, the Sub-Committee's report for the Priority Program is before you for discussion and possible amendment in the way of additions, subtractions, or in any other way. Is there any discussion? Mr. Nemzer, as chairman of the Sub-Committee, would you like to lead off?

NEMZER: There might be a number of things pointed out with reference to the Priority Program. You will note that the Committee has not rated these projects, for a number of reasons. First, because it is felt that a group of agencies rather than one agency should address itself to the problem of doing these projects, and therefore several projects could be done at the same time. In looking over the projects, you will see, I think, quite readily that we have in a sense picked on a number of projects which could be done by different departments. Thus, for example, project 'h'. ("Present types, methods of selection, changing characteristics in the leadership of the Communist parties in Southeast Asia") is obviously a project to be done primarily by biographical intelligence organizations of the government. Project 'f', ("The pattern of clandestine Communist activities of both legal and illegal parties", etc.) is obviously a project to be done principally by SO. We have designated project 'j', as one which obviously should be at least partly done by External Research -- if not wholly. There are a number of other projects which are of special interest to member departments of the Committee.

Another point that I would like to make in this connection is that this Priority Program, as we have it here, should not be thought of as the only aspect of the program for immediate work in JIGSAW's program. That is to say, this is, in a sense, the first batch of reports that ought to be done in the near future; but almost all of them make sense only if connected with another series of reports that should be done soon afterwards.

Thus, for example, take project 'b' ("Communist organizational potentials and capabilities in the international maritime industry".) It is quite clear

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that in terms of the situation that exists in the world today, particularly in the Western World, but to some extent in other parts of the world -- let's say in Australia and to some extent the South Pacific -- an understanding of the Government of Communist potentials and capabilities in the maritime industry is an important requirement. But that ought not to be thought of as isolated from related projects which fit together. There are five or six major strategic industries which I think all of us agree ought to be studied at one time or another if the requirements of the American government are to be reached.

The same thing can be said about a number of others. Project 'g' (which refers to Communist strategy as revealed in Communist tactics in Southeast Asia) although obviously of great importance at this time in view of the events in the South Pacific, is really only the first of a series that ought to be done with reference to Communist strategy and tactics. There are a number of others that will come to mind immediately as you look at the report.

BABBITT: Yes. I should say that that project 'b', on the international maritime industry, would be connected with any other studies of the WFTU, other industries affected by the WFTU, or any other Communist dominated labor organization.

██████████ By reference to the fuller report, page 4, this particular one, as an example, may be seen in the context of these others you suggest. It is down here as Number 14. ("Communist potentials and capabilities in the maritime industry.") There are a number of others under the same general sub-topic. Number 13 through 21 is the group. The same thing holds for the others. That is the general principle that Mr. Nemzer is talking about.

BABBITT: Within that framework, is there any discussion, any additions, or suggested deletions from the priority list?

NICHOLS: I am a little confused at this particular stage. In the short list we have 'Communist capabilities and intentions for sabotage of important facilities' in just two countries -- France and Italy. I think it should be made apparent that the Army is interested in these capabilities and intentions

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in any specific area in which we might be called upon to use our military forces. What I want reassurance on is that this would not restrict our field of interest.

BABBITT: Not in the slightest.

NEMZER: On the contrary. That is just the point I was trying to make. As you are now saying, this suggestion of 'a' makes sense only if we keep in mind that that must be done with others.

NICHOLS: I want that in the record.

NEMZER: I feel strongly about that. This is the top part of the iceberg -- the projects that we feel should be seen now, and should be done immediately. But the iceberg can not be handled unless we do all of the other projects that fit in immediately with this.

NICHOLS: I have no other comment.

BABBITT: We have to start somewhere. Is this as good a place as any, shall we say, to start?

NICHOLS: From our standpoint, that is the best place. We are primarily interested in item 'a' on the short list. We just do not want to be restricted at a later time by having a comment made to the effect that 'you should have said that a long time ago'.

PENNIMAN: It seems to me it would be useful if a paragraph statement of Nemzer's and Price's statements are outlined and put in.

BABBITT: It will be taken care of in far more than one paragraph, I hope. If this report is accepted as a Priority Program, as I said, it will go forward to the IAC with a rather lengthy report as another attachment. The JIGSAW report, which you requested me to do at the last meeting, and which I have not done, for reasons quite beyond my control (bacteriological of nature) -- and consequently I think we could very well forward the whole thing in one batch. That is, this report as an attachment, and as a point of focus of the background progress report of JIGSAW up to now, leading up to this, and requesting the support of the agencies on a priority basis. It will be far more than one paragraph of additional information. I propose to circulate the draft of that

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report to the members of the Committee at a later meeting, to ask their approval of it before it is finalized and dispatched to the IAC. I hope that will be very soon.

NEEMER: Mr. Chairman, before the report to the IAC is finished, circulated and approved, it might be useful to continue along parallel lines and get all of the information needed for actual allocation of these priority jobs. That is to say, at the same time that the report is being drafted, it is my suggestion, and the suggestion of most of the members of the Sub-Committee, I think, that that list be sent to each of the departments with a request for some indication of that department's plans in this general connection. Let's say, for example, that this is sent to State. I am sure that my department will answer by indicating that we plan, within the foreseeable future, to do project 'b', and several others, and we would be interested in having portions of those reports allocated to State. If similar answers are received from each of the member departments, JIGSAW can then immediately proceed to allocating those jobs, and in fact in the report to the IAC indicate those allocations as part of our report, so that a whole step will be taken at the same time.

BABBITT: I wanted to ask the members of the Committee at this meeting to signify officially if possible, but probably tentatively only, which projects they thought their agencies and departments would be interested in producing. I think there are very few which would be completely within the field of responsibility of only one department. But in using the term allocation, it would be understood that that department would have general charge, but might call upon some other department for assistance in various phases of the work. But I would be very glad to have some indications, on the basis of this list, of the interest, shall we say, of the member agencies.

So far as SO is concerned, I think that 'f' and 'i' fall within our field of interest. So pending an approval from headquarters, I should say that we would definitely be interested in 'f' and 'i'. As a matter of fact, we are working on 'f' already.

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BABBITT: All six subheadings of 'f'?

█ Yes. We might call on other departments for assistance.

BABBITT: That would be done through the normal procedure.

NEMZER: Do you feel that probably 'c' could be at least partly done, or done with the cooperation of SO?

█ On 'c', as you know, we have put out one interim study on the subject, and we feel that more could be done, that it could be carried a little further, perhaps by State or ORE. But if it is felt that we can contribute some more on the subject, we shall be glad to assist.

NEMZER: There may be a number of them that would have to be done by a task force from several departments. The one that Colonel Nichols showed interest in, and in fact suggested, ('a'), could only be done by all of the facilities available and certainly all of the departments cooperating.

BABBITT: When you say 'by all of the departments cooperation', I quite agree. It seems to me that the best machinery we have for that is the ORE, CIA coordinating mechanism, isn't it? I am putting that out as a question. Would it be easier to put that down, for instance, as an ORE project? We would not try to do the whole thing inside the office. Or would it be better to assign it, for instance, to G-2?

NICHOLS: It would seem to me that that particular one, 'a', can be contributed to by every agency almost in an equal amount, and that every agency has an almost equal interest in it.

NEMZER: Not all writing on the same thing, but subsections of a report of this type.

NICHOLS: The point I am getting at is that everyone has an equal interest, and therefore how can you assign a primary interest?

NEMZER: You might have a task force, dividing the actual work, with various departments taking primary responsibility for sections.

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NICHOLS: With a chairman over the whole thing.

NEEZER: It may be that that is the kind of a job that is worth exploring from the point of view of procedures as well as substantive value. There are a number of different ways of doing it.

BABBITT: That is what I wanted to bring up. I simply suggested the CIA machinery as the one with which I am most familiar. Normally, if that were an internally generated ORE project, a meeting would be called to discuss the outline and to allocate production responsibility for various sections of it.

NEEZER: My suggestion on a project of this type would be that we have to explore the whole business rather thoroughly. For example, titles are not really sufficient in some cases to actually let you know what is behind the request. In a case like this it seems to me that the first thing a Sub-Committee would do would be to find out from the Army, (who suggested it in the first place) what they had in mind in detail, and get other information from other departments as to what they think ought to be done, and as the project shapes up you may find that one particular organization is better than another in attacking the kind of problem that you now see.

PENNINGMAN: Does not this suggest that there is a continuing value in continuing the Sub-Committee, for that purpose among others -- at least on the exploratory level?

BABBITT: Yes, I think there is. We might also add, informally at least, to the Sub-Committee (again from the ORE point of view) one of the project people from the Publications Division, who are the ones familiar with the machinery, and working out the terms of reference. That could be done on an entirely informal basis.

PENNINGMAN: I raise this question also, to take it down to one that hits directly at me, 'j', where it states "This is recommended only if it can be undertaken by External Research". There are two or three things which we would need if we were to undertake it. First of all, this would mean there had been some kind of general outline agreed upon so that everybody here gets hit as

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much as they can in getting any research done out in the universities, so that on whatever countries we study we will have approximately the same kind of information about each of those countries, so that at some point there can be a comparative study made. Individual analysis on the countries, which is at least partly historical, is not worth a great deal unless we can see it in a pattern, so that it can be projected into other countries which have not as yet been penetrated or have not as yet had the Communists assume power. So that the External Research staff ought to have that kind of information -- an outline that we could talk to people about. Secondly, and this applied to another problem which is really quite separate and which you may not wish to discuss at this point, but for the actual comparative study it would probably mean that somebody ought to be paid to do it. It is possible, perhaps, without payment to get some of the other jobs done. We have people doing one, or likely to start it, so we can get some done 'for free'; but when it comes time for the comparative study of the methods, it means that somebody has to get this material that has been done by others and then go through and to the job of analyzing the various countries in order to make the comparative statement. At this point I suggest that we may have to go out and hire somebody to do that -- maybe a three months job for the summer, or something of that sort. But at the moment I don't see how we can easily escape having that done. But otherwise, with those two things in mind, I think that it would be quite possible that the External Research Staff can do a great deal on it. We already have the Duchacek study on Czechoslovakia. We have a little volume which we have not yet had a chance to get out, partially because we cannot figure out where you send seven copies of something that thick, without causing trouble. How do you go about having everybody more or less dissatisfied equally? In any case, there is one on Hungary. There are others underway. As a matter of fact, there is one underway on almost all of the satellite countries. So I don't think there will be too much problem in placing something, or in picking

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up something already in progress. The final job is going to require more work, and it may even be that we would have to ask some of those who have already done the study to add on in order to meet some of the requirements that might come up around the table.

NEZZER: I think it should be stressed in that connection that the pay-off on that project, Howard, (Penniman), must be the comparative study and the pattern that emerges. We can have a library full of books on each of these revolutions and not actually have great benefit to the government, unless the culminating study, the comparative aspects, and the pattern, and the lessons to be learned from all of these are brought together in this final job, for which you have responsibility. It makes no sense at all to launch into this unless we can assure you that you will get support for that last job.

PENNIMAN: The others have a certain historical value, but to be useful it needs this final pattern thing.

BABBITT: As far as the matter of funds goes, I am reasonably sure that between CIA and State we can find them.

NEZZER: As far as the interests of State are concerned: State is planning studies that relate to or include 'b', 'd', 'e' and 'g'. That is to say, OIR is considering such studies and is interested in them. I have discussed with the Biographical Division of State the possibility of doing 'h'. They are very much interested, although we have no commitment as yet.

BABBITT: Mr. [redacted] did you say you were working on 'c'?

[redacted] No, we are not. We did a report two years ago. We are not doing anything on the subject. Naturally, we would assist and help out anybody who needs our help.

NEZZER: State will be interested in 'c' I think, but that would again require a number of agencies working together. State does have a very definite interest in 'c'.

BABBITT: The scope of that is tremendous -- "The mechanism of international

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Communism for control, communication with, and financing of, the national Communist parties."

NEZZER: You notice that we hastened to add: "An explorative summary".

BABBITT: I did note that.

██████████ Has AEC any particular interest in 'd'?

ROLINDER: I would think so. It is hard to know how AEC would perhaps develop that information. There is no question that they might be interested in it.

PENNIMAN: This is, of course, one of the areas in which it would be extremely useful to have the FBI working to assist.

BABBITT: Yes, it certainly would. I think possibly OSI might be able to contribute something (on 'd'), and certainly they would be interested. That is the Office of Scientific Intelligence in CIA.

NEZZER: State is of course primarily interested in certain Communist public organizations, world federations of scientific workers, on which we have done some work and are definitely interested, and on which we may report in the near future. Obviously a considerable portion of the work which would have to be done for it could not be done by State. There again we could contribute to a common plot.

PENNIMAN: There again it looks like OSO might have interest in some part of it.

██████████ I should think so. I feel that whoever tackles this job will find out that there is a great deal of investigative work to be done, and that could be charged out to SO in connection with the preparation of the study.

BABBITT: That brings up the matter of collection. Even on these priority projects, I am quite sure that a great deal of further information will have to be collected by all of the agencies. But it seems to me that at least at this stage it is not advisable to contemplate any extraordinary collection measures. I do think however, as Mr. Nezzar suggested before the meeting, the advisability

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of getting together representatives of our collection agencies for a talk -- possibly attending a meeting of JIGSAW. But at least to have them here to make sure that they understand the full scope and the importance of collection requests which they may receive on these or similar projects. I am quite sure that many of them in the field put a fairly low priority on the type of request which we consider extremely valuable, on which we need information, and information which we need very badly before we can go on on any of these things. To take for example the one you mentioned, Mr. Nemzer, the WFTU, the personnel, the officers of that organization -- what their relations are with Moscow; how those relations are maintained; the entire connecting links between the headquarters of the WFTU and Moscow. It should not be too difficult to get that information, and yet it is very sketchy. We know very little about it indeed. The reports we do have on it are very slow coming in, are most behind the times, simply because a low priority has been put on somewhere along the collection line.

██████████ In this connection, I feel that perhaps some sort of machinery could be developed within JIGSAW for the exploration and possibly the solution of such immediate procurement problems -- another sub-committee, perhaps, that would take up the situation of coverage of the WFTU, which I agree with Mr. Nemzer, and you Mr. Chairman, is quite the burning problem at the moment. I think the JIGSAW Committee could make a contribution toward the coverage of this problem both in overt and clandestine information if it developed some sort of sub-committee or organism which would tell the various collection agencies what is needed, what kind of priority should be attached, and what type of information should be developed.

BABBITT: Is not the principle along the latter lines, that we present them with our requirements for information, and would point out the importance of it.

NEMZER: That would include, of course, a canvas of the situation. For

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example, as I pointed out, there are certain overt materials that are not reaching the government. It is a perfectly scandalous situation, it seems to me. There are materials being sold in bookstands around in various parts of the world that we cannot get hold of. And of course, there is a great deal of material that should be gotten that is of a clandestine nature which is extremely important. Some of us feel that the WFTU is in some respects the most important Communist instrumentality outside of the Soviet Union today. It exists in Western Europe and therefore we ought to be able to get at it in some fashion, and we are not doing that. JIGSAW might first note the problem, show some ways of getting at the problem, and become in a sense a source of pressure on our collection agencies for getting that problem solved in an adequate fashion in the future. [REDACTED] and I thought that perhaps the first thing that might be done by a sub-committee of JIGSAW would be to find what materials, and what types of materials, are reaching our government dealing with the WFTU, and note the gaps in the coverage, and then in perhaps a meeting with the collection agency representatives -- either at a JIGSAW or a sub-committee meeting, or in some other way -- point these out and point out the necessity for filling these gaps at the earliest possible moment.

BABBITT: Need we not include the WFTU on the high priority project list if we are going to put all of this pressure on it? I rather think we should.

WENZER: It is connected in a very real sense with 'b', as Mr. Babbitt pointed out.

BABBITT: Yes, but is is not in evidence on the listing.

POSSONY: Should we be considering whether we should include the so-called army in Eastern Germany as a high priority project?

[REDACTED] As a procurement?

POSSONY: As a procurement.

BABBITT: Yes, possibly. The whole problem of the information from the Soviet zone of Germany is one that is all too familiar to all of us, I am quite sure -- the difficulties we have had.

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██████████ I am not sure whether that is part of the JIGSAW work.

BABBITT: It certainly has to do with the Soviet Union.

██████████ It is a borderline case.

NICHOLS: It seems to me it is like military order of battle.

POSSONY: It is the military, or quasi-military.

NICHOLS: Are you talking about the overt police or the clandestine organization?

POSSONY: The overt organization.

NICHOLS: That seems to me to be a military order of battle. We are not getting into the method of deploying armies, and the navy in this are we?

BABBITT: Well, it is a quasi-military force.

WACHSITZ: Used in direct implementation of Communist strategy.

POSSONY: And not used in the conventional way of strategy.

BABBITT: In the broadest sense, there is practically no problem facing us anywhere today that cannot be related back to international Communism. After all, the whole basis of everything is the US-USSR tension, the cold war, or whatever you want to call it, and everything we do has to be hooked into that framework, of which a not inconsiderable part is the international Communist movement.

NEMZER: It seems to me our orientation might be along these lines: That the men of the Kremlin have a group of major instrumentalities. One might include the Soviet armies. Another major instrumentality might be Soviet economic power. A third might be the Soviet government and its instrumentality in such areas as the satellite states. A fourth one might be what we call the world Communist movement, as an instrumentality of the Kremlin -- not including the Kremlin, but as an instrumentality of it. And we presumably are addressing ourselves to that instrumentality -- the world Communist movement.

NICHOLS: The East German police are different then.....

NEMZER: In Italy, that is one of the sub-units of the Communist Party, as we understand it.

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NICHOLS: And there is nothing covert about the East German Army.

POSSONY: Another thing, on page 6, "Pattern of clandestine Communist activities, of legal or illegal parties, relating to: a. insurrection and preparation for insurrection." That would be in Eastern Germany or Western Germany?

NICHOLS: It is not insurrection in West Germany.

POSSONY: If it does not invade West Germany.

NICHOLS: If Eastern Germany invades -- then it is no problem for us, and then you have war and this paper would be out of the window.

██████ I think we are mixing up investigation and research. Naturally the problem of para-military forces in Western Germany is in the subject of investigation, but whether we want to include it in our research program is an entirely different proposition.

NEMZER: If you were to indicate you wanted a study made of Communist capabilities and intentions in Western Germany including any clandestine military groups that might be used in Western Germany through the Communist organization, that would, it seems to me, be a plausible addition; but if we are dealing with what amounts to the Soviet armed forces as such, no matter how important that is (and it is vitally important), it really does not come within our scope of work.

POSSONY: The first alternative, I think, is the correct one.

NICHOLS: I cannot visualize the East German Army infiltrating the Western zone.

BABBITT: That would be certainly covered under 'f' somewhat.

POSSONY: That is correct, yes -- 'f (1)', and maybe 'f (3)'.

BABBITT: What about the WFTU?

MORRIS: I would be disinclined to make the WFTU a priority job for a couple of reasons. One, because there have been a number of reports written on the WFTU that are available. The other reason is that in studying the international maritime industry, it is in a sense a study of one part of the

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WFTU, as in some of the other projects, and we can go on from there. I do believe that the WFTU is a very good trial run for a collection job for JIGSAW.

BABBITT: You would like to treat the WFTU from the collection side at the present time?

NEZZER: At the present time. And see it as a job to be done in the near future, beyond 'b' -- as one of the several jobs that should follow 'b'. One of the points that most of the members of the Sub-Committee have been stressing is the desire not to overload this priority list. If we can possibly do it to keep it down to a minimum number.

BABBITT: I quite agree with that. I think if it is shorter and more clearly defined there is a greater chance that we will have success with the IAC -- success in the attempt to get manpower behind the JIGSAW projects.

There are a number of projects where we have to do a considerable amount of collection, and if you feel that the WFTU is one of the most 'burning problems' at this time, then I would say it ought to be in somehow.

NEZZER: We wonder whether that would be, in a sense, another project, another task undertaken by JIGSAW -- at the same time working on the priority program, rather than part of it.

BABBITT: Is not that a contradiction in terms?

NEZZER: Not necessarily. Because JIGSAW is going to have a whole series of tasks in many fields as we work along. This is only one of the jobs we are going to be doing.

BABBITT: Yes. I think we would like to say that any list of priorities here would limit the demands on all of us to those particular ones, but of course we cannot.

NEZZER: I am speaking of the work of JIGSAW. JIGSAW will not always address itself to the problems of priority and allocation. There are many other problems involved in the whole area of international Communism -- problems of collection, and duplication of effort. These other problems have

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also to be considered by JIGSAW as a part of its normal work, and in a sense this is moving us closer to the day when we can attack those problems -- the first of those problems outside the program area.

Do you think there is a possibility of shaping point 'b' in a similar fashion as point 'f' and making the maritime project one of the sub-projects of the WFTU?

NEMZER: That becomes a huge project.

There is no question about it, but I think there is a contradiction if we say the WFTU is so important and then on the other hand don't put it on the priority list.

I don't feel that way, because we are all keenly aware of the information covered, and we would occupy the position that it is not possible at the moment to start a project on the WFTU, but we have to wait until we get more information, and the problem on the WFTU is now collection.

PENNIMAN: It is true, is it not, that as far as general information is concerned, you have to get down to something awfully concrete about the WFTU, and you first have this collection problem that you speak of to get out of the way.

NEMZER: I should say that the problem of not having too many jobs enters here. If we wanted to include a WFTU job, we ought to consider then, taking on 'b'. As between the WFTU and 'b', at this point, I would be strongly in favor of doing the maritime industry first.

The maritime industry job would be one of the class two jobs, while the WFTU would be a pioneering kind of job like 'c' and 'e'.

NEMZER: As Mr. Penniman said, there is a lot of information on the WFTU.

BABBITT: May I suggest we leave the WFTU off the priority list and that Mr. Metz explore the collection situation, with the help of any of the members, with a view to presenting to JIGSAW a report on that specific collection situation -- what agencies are in a position to collect the type of information

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that we want.

██████ Yes, I can.

BABBITT: Better start the other way -- draw up a set of requirements to be coordinated with the other agencies with a view to putting pressure on whatever collection agency seemed to indicate being able to get that information on a high priority basis for JIGSAW.

██████ I hope I can draw on the assistance of Mr. Nemzer, who is most interested in this subject.

BABBITT: We are all interested! In regard to 'j', because of the note, I would like to make this statement for the record, that it is my understanding that 'j' can be undertaken by External Research.

PENNIMAN: That is right. To this extent we can be sure of it. We can get some studies on individual countries, because we already have some, and we can expand those. In some cases where it is decided by the Sub-Committee, or by JIGSAW, or whoever is responsible for that decision, it might be desirable to go out and actually place a project with Professor Joe Blow, or something which might involve some money, but primarily the need for money probably will be at the comparative level at the end. With that in mind, sure, External Research can do it.

BABBITT: Those are practical details. But it can be done by External Research. There is one other point on which I am not quite clear. Colonel Nichols, did you indicate a burning desire to undertake project 'a'?

NICHOLS: I am afraid not. I will have to make a few remarks, and repeat some of those I made at the last Committee meeting. That is, that at the present time, we cannot commit any additional personnel, or any personnel, to the formation and completion of a project under our terms of reference. Now, however, if this proposition is made to the IAC, and the IAC determines that the Army will supervise this particular project, then the Army will have to make available the additional personnel and funds to complete it. At the present time there is

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no personnel and no funds to complete work on a project of this nature.

BABBITT: Of course that is why we are going through the machinery of the IAC -- in order to get support on as sufficiently high level as possible.

NICHOLS: That was my understanding of it, but Mr. Namzer opened this with a suggestion that this Committee allocate these projects now.

NAMZER: No -- to gather the information on allocation. In other words, if at our next meeting some of us come back and say we can commit our agency to undertake a particular project then an allocation would follow automatically. In those cases where agencies cannot take upon themselves the task of doing certain jobs, and the problem of allocation remains, it seems to me that that is a problem largely for JIGSAW recommending to the IAC.

NICHOLS: As far as the Army is concerned, I am afraid that will have to be the procedure that is used, because I think that all of you are aware of the cut we have taken in the budget, as have all three departments in the Defense establishment. Our personnel has been cut to the bone, and we are performing, at the present time, just current intelligence. We have no personnel to put on a long range project such as this. Do I understand it what when you write this report to the IAC it will explain exactly what I am driving at, and you will get that point across?

BABBITT: You will have a crack at the draft.

NICHOLS: We just don't have the capability of producing, even through we realize the value of it.

BABBITT: That, I am sure, is unfortunately true of all of the members of this Committee, in various degrees.

NICHOLS: Is that true of the Navy?

ABBOTT: I think even more so in the case of Navy, which is so much smaller than you are.

BABBITT: The Air Force is perhaps slightly more fortunate?

POSSONY: Considerably smaller!

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MORRIS: Let's give it to ORE.

BABBITT: We can take on some of the work, but I could not set a deadline on which we would complete it.

POSSONY: May I raise a question which just came up. I don't think that it is completely necessary to have a lot of money for External Research in Washington. I think the main trouble in Washington to some extent is to get more or less security clearance.

BABBITT: I am afraid JIGSAW will have very little influence on the people who give clearances.

POSSONY: There are many universities in town who had clearances before. As an example, I directed the study on collection of Soviet treatises. Finally we finished one volume, and now the State Department says they are going to help us a little.

BABBITT: I am not familiar with that.

PENNIMAN: You should come in through the External Research Staff.

POSSONY: Is that CIA?

BABBITT: No, it is a joint setup.

PENNIMAN: We just don't spend money now, because you can get this very good cooperation that you talk about from the universities and the university faculties. There are occasions however, if you say Professor 'X' is the key man for this kind of a study where it becomes necessary to pull him off of either his teaching job for a period of two or three months, or to pull him off of a research project which he is on, and after all you have to have people who will complete the project and the problem is to get them to finish doing it. If you pull them off of something like that then you may need some assistance. This cost something and sometimes runs into big money. It is done in State and in CIA under the NIS program, or through our own program. The assistance ranges from \$300, to where you hire four or five graduate

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assistants to help you, to \$4,000. I think that is the largest project we have out.

NICHOLS: With regard to the matter I thought you were discussing -- clearances -- it was my opinion that 'j', the one you were talking about, would not involve access to any classified material, and that that would be gathered from overt sources.

POSSONY: You can make external research at the universities on the basis of classified documents.

PENNIMAN: On the particular study involved here much of the material is not material which has any classification.

POSSONY: We run into trouble on the 'Secret'. We have never tried anything beyond 'Secret'.

PENNIMAN: I think it is usually simpler to depend on the agency when it goes beyond that. You run into questions of bringing people in if they are not in town.

WACKWITZ: Getting back to the priorities a minute. On 'f', 'The pattern of clandestine Communist activities of both legal and illegal parties', that is, of course, just a general bit of research that would apply I presume to most any area or country, and I am wondering if we could not suggest Western Germany as a forerunner on that particular section.

██████████ This project is conceived of as a type study more than an area study. In this study we want to develop the patterns, the methods and techniques. It is not contemplated so much to investigate the clandestine activities of the KPD in Western Germany, the communication service and what not. It is contemplated to work out the general method and techniques, the organizational patterns that might apply to any area so that the area man who has to deal let's say with Western Germany is better equipped to understand and evaluate what goes on in Western Germany or in South Korea, or in Latin America.

WACKWITZ: Getting back to 'g', 'Basic Communist strategy in the present period, as revealed in Communist tactics in Southeast Asia' -- I am getting

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back to Dr. Possony's suggestion with reference to the East German military forces that would presumably be used subversively to create insurrection. If Southeast Asia was important enough to put in there, certainly Germany is the other big target in the world in addition to Southeast Asia right now. Let's put it this way -- it has more people guessing.

BABBITT: I think we have a great deal more information on the activities in Western Germany, which is far from satisfactory, but the problem of Southeast Asia pretty well boils down to a lack of -- I won't say only a lack of information but a lack of work and study having been done on that area, and certainly in that respect Germany is far better covered, has been far better covered.

NICHOLS: On the other hand, if we are going to make a type study, it would seem to me that France perhaps would be a much better example to use, because all six of these things exist in France, which supposedly is a free country, whereas West Germany is occupied, which would necessarily give you a definite setup of conditions.

BABBITT: In that sense Germany is not typical; nor would the Communist pattern in Germany be typical.

[REDACTED] 'g' is not so much a type study.

NEHAZER: No. 'f' is a type study. 'g' is an area study, and we hope the first of several.

[REDACTED] Let me put it this way, in concrete terms. We will stress clandestine Communication methods or covert military organizations. We will draw on the information available, whether from Eastern Germany or Western Germany, or from Bolivia, and whenever possible will append area studies. For instance, the communication system between East and West Germany. The clandestine system is pretty well documented through the work of the Army. We will be able to draw on that information. To a certain extent your requirement will be covered.

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POSSONY: In other words, there are.....in Western Germany, and it would be interesting to find out what they are.

█ That is a problem of investigation and not so much of research.

BABBITT: That is under the control of the theater commander, who is not represented on this Committee.

█ So far as 'g' is concerned, I think it was the consensus of the Sub-Committee that information on Southeast Asia was needed for the formulation of policy and for the evaluation of problems regarding security.

BABBITT: There is going to be a real collection problem there.

WACKWITZ: Generally speaking, this whole program here probably stems from a certain vacuum that exists, otherwise we would not be here today, so obviously the collection problem is something that has to be studied with relation to this program. It is something new, something different, and I am just trying to think of our Air collection system there as it applies to this, and I cannot see that much would be forthcoming, irrespective of what directives we sent out. We might glean a little bit. It is something that has to be tailored to the job.

BABBITT: Yes. The Air Force collection, I should think, would have really very little scope of action in most of these.

WACKWITZ: SO and the FBI are, of course, geared more along that line. One of the things that might come out of this is an expansion of the Special Operations activity, if the priority is placed high enough.

BABBITT: There is no question about that, but that we hope to get reorientated all round the board.

Colonel Wackwitz, do you take it that you would prefer to have some study concerning Western Germany on the priority list? Do you consider that that would be a higher priority than the Southeast regional study?

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WACKWITZ: Not necessarily. I am trying to get this frame of reference of our task straightened out in my own mind. I can see that a lot of these answers certainly would go a long way toward answering any questions which we might have had. I don't think it would be absolutely essential to place it on the priority list.

POSSONY: I think it is more important than number 'c'. I have no argument against the study, but I think it is more important to find out what they may do in the next year or so in Germany. I think that study of the strategy is quite useful.

[REDACTED] Of course, 'c' is of particular importance in view of the fact that the whole mechanism is controlled by the USSR and we would like to find out how.

PENNILLIAN: To some extent there is validity to Dr. Possony's comment. That is, it is true that we know, or everyone assumes -- we may be wrong, but one must assume there is control, and the fact of the control being known the other questions here in a sense become subsidiary questions which would be desirable to know if we could find out; but in terms of what the American policy is likely to be, I find it a little hard to believe that it is as important to know of the actual findings, and so on, as it is to know, for example take either Western Germany or France -- the basic strategy in those two areas.

NEMZER: I think there is a basic misunderstanding here of what this list is supposed to be. This is not a list of the questions that are most important for American policy at this moment. This an effort to examine the field of international Communism, and in the various corners of that field beginning exploration and being making vital studies. These projects don't compete with each other to any great extent. They are supposed to cover different areas for different reasons. I think 'c' is an obvious one from the point of view of the work of this Committee. If we are going to examine and study

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international Communism we certainly should make sure that more and more is known about how international Communism works. Certainly all of us could think of many important problems that ought to be answered now for an American policy, but I am not sure that those problems are necessarily the job of this particular Committee. Our job is international Communism, as one of the instrumentalities of the Kremlin. It does not seem to me to be profitable to try to mark these various projects in terms of priority of, let us say, the President. We will get different answers from different people. We are not here to give many answers to many important questions that you may think of. We are only here to work in the broad area of international Communism, and we are here to suggest different projects for different aspects of that area which need to be worked on.

PENNINGMAN: This gives a different meaning to the word 'priority'.

NEMZER: These are, in our eyes, sample priority jobs in order that we may move along in several fields at the same time.

POSSONY: Do you mean to say that this is purely academic?

NEMZER: This is an effort to realize international Communism as an instrumentality of the Kremlin. There are many facets to it, and we are trying to touch the essential problems and certain aspects of it. The reason I suggested we do not attack the WFTU problem at the same time we are doing the international maritime problem was not because I don't think the WFTU was not important, but it seems to me it was part of that same corner of international Communism, and we ought to suggest the most important ones in that corner now.

POSSONY: That is priority according to importance.

BABBITT: Yes, but the fact that is important and has been picked, I say 'b' rather than the whole of the WFTU, does not interfere with any of the others. It does not block it off in any way.

POSSONY: I understand that.

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BABBITT: At the same time, Mr. Nemzer, the list has been given to the Committee for consideration, and if the Committee should consider that 'c', for instance, is not under any pressure of sufficient importance, and that something else is --

NEMZER: That is true, but not in terms of selecting contrasting projects that would be done in different areas in the whole field by perhaps different people. If the same agency is working on three at the same time, obviously all three are not going to be done. If there are different corners of international Communism that ought to be explored, we might work out two or three different projects, which must not be contrasted in terms of importance. Now, if there is a project which is important of itself, regardless of what other projects you have here, then by all means we certainly should explore the necessity of doing it. But there is no need, it seems to me, to contrast the importance of any new one with any we might have here that was put on for a different reason entirely.

██████████ While the Sub-Committee worked this list out, they voted on individual topics, on the matter of importance as the individual members considered them.

NEMZER: There is no reason why a new suggestion might not be made. That is why we are having a meeting now. It is entirely proper to do it.

POSSONY: 'g' and 'h' both refer to Southeast Asia.

NEMZER: That is right.

POSSONY: If we have two projects on Southeast Asia, we might as well have one on Germany.

██████████ They were put together because they were complementary. The total was a composite. I think that if the Air Force feels there should be one on Eastern Germany, that that is a different proposition. Let them propose a definite project on Western Germany and then we can take it up. There is a second point in there -- possibly connected with this.. This is just a suggestion, but as

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I understood the suggestion earlier that the Air Force might have facilities which could be used, but these projects didn't represent pieces of work on which they could be used, and therefore would be used on something else. Let's get that something else.

NEUZER: By all means.

POSSONY: I don't know that that was quite the meaning. I think our collection effort is channeled to Air problems and it is very difficult to turn it over into that.

WACKWITZ: The whole thing is geared up right now. No so long ago we were more or less directed, as Army was, to get out of the political field in various parts of the world, and to confine our reporting specifically to Air matters. This particular type of research is digging down beneath the surface where you have got to have people who have a type of training that at least most of our field representatives don't possess. That does not say that we don't come across some information that would be beneficial. That is what I meant.

As to the other thing, the field of Western Germany -- if they feel it is necessary, could they state it for us, as a project?

POSSONY: It is very simple. In 'g', have it read 'in Southeast Asia and Germany'. Add "Germany".

BABBITT: It is two different studies.

POSSONY: The same techniques.

You don't want it connected with 'a'?

POSSONY: That would be all right except that that is exclusively sabotage.

WACKWITZ: This happens to be on a thesis we have been trying to examine. In other words, we are not expecting them to be so crude as to just go to war, but, how can they extend their power further without taking that step.

POSSONY: A secret war.

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██████████ Would not it be better to state a project to hit the bull's eye on that particular project?

██████████ Using the same wording as in 'g'.

██████████ Can you state it more precisely?

WACKWITZ: We are thinking about the same thing that Mr. Nemzer said: Within the instrumentality of the world Communist apparatus, how could the Soviets best utilize their resources in order to better their position in Western Germany.

BABBITT: Would you improve on the wording of 'g'?

POSSONY: That states it.

NEMZER: Mr. Chairman, if the Air Force feels strongly enough, it seems to me we might well simply make an additional project, put it on the list, add it and call it, 'Basic Communist strategy in the present world, as revealed by Communist tactics in Western Germany'.

NICHOLS: I would like to not concur in that particular suggestion. Western Germany is occupied by the United States. We have a representative, a High Commissioner from the State Department; we have the rest of the area under the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and a commander-in-chief, and if we get involved in that you can see that we will get involved in a lot of internal talk and dissension within our forces. The responsibility for Western Germany is the responsibility of the High Commissioner and the commander-in-chief. All of the collection effort being spent in Western Germany, and which will be spent in Western Germany, is for the benefit of the occupation of Western Germany and not for the benefit of us who sit here.

BABBITT: I disagree with you on that, as far as the Office of the High Commissioner is concerned. I don't know about the military. Mr. Skutes' intelligence group is very definitely accepting requirements and suggestions from us, and working on them. It is sub-divided into ---

PENNIMAN: Strategic and political.

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NICHOLS: Well, then the project should be assigned to them and not to us.

NEMZER: I don't agree with you on that.

PENNIMAN: The question of who was to do the evaluations came up, in an odd way, and it got put down in a hurry that the evaluation was not to be done except for some strictly internal political stuff; but in so far as it related to the outside, no.

BABBITT: I think that is a proper project for us to undertake.

NICHOLS: I will not vote, because I have not changed my mind.

NEMZER: It seems to me that this is a nomination for this list. That is my own feeling. It is worthy of consideration. I feel it is an addition that goes beyond some of our own considerations. There are many important problems that we have not put in. I do think it can be put in, if the Committee feels that way. Certainly we have sections at State that work on Germany all of the time. In fact, we have turned out a report on this area very recently. But I do think it might be worthwhile putting to a vote whether the full Committee wanted it added to a list of priorities.

BABBITT: Would you like to discuss it further?

WACKWITZ: I might say one thing in connection with this problem. I am aware of statements that have been made by rather responsible individuals (probably some of you have heard this) that Germany is eventually going to the East or to the West, but it is going to get together. I have heard that statement made by people like Souririne in Paris; Marshall Montgomery made it when he addressed the National War College last year; and a few others have made that statement -- people who have some reason to make it. So it seems to me it is a rather important point in the future development of Communist strategy.

BABBITT: Is it fundamentally Communist strategy, or is that Soviet foreign strategy which is susceptible of being implemented by means other than the Communist Party?

WACKWITZ: I don't know. But I don't see how they could do it except within the instrumentality of the Communist Party if they are to gain any success.

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That would mean that most of the study would have to be dedicated to the illegal work of the Communist Party in Germany, because we are pretty well informed on what the KPD, the overt organization, is doing.

NEUMER: I disagree very strongly, if it means that this is being done in the SED. It seems to me that everything is being done with the utilization of the other and the SED is a complete instrumentality. That is principally what we are talking about -- the use of this kind of machinery for doing something in the German problem.

BABBITT: That is not the way I understand the submission, which was 'Basic Communist strategy in the present world, as revealed by Communist tactics in Western Germany'.

POSSONY: I used the word 'Germany', without breaking it down. I don't know the answer. That is one of the problems that came up and we do want it answered.

BABBITT: You did not limit it to Western Germany? Then the proposal has been made by the Air Force to include this further item on 'Basic Communist strategy in the present period, as revealed in Communist tactics in Germany'. Those in favor of the inclusion --

MORRIS: May I ask the Air Force representatives if they desire this kind of a study because they believe there is nothing in Washington, that no job in Washington has attempted to come up with any of the answers? I believe that precisely this kind of a job is being done over in the State Department. I think there is a short job coming out very soon -- practically that kind of a study.

WACKENITZ: That, again, may be so. We don't know, but your mentioning it --

POSSONY: That would only bear out the fact that it ought to be on the list, that the work has been done, and that everybody ought to be happy.

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BABBITT: All of those in favor of including this new item on the program will please raise their hands.

(Following raised hands: Wackwitz, Possony)

PENNIMAN: Are you interested in my vote, or am I an advisor?

BABBITT: I believe you are not a member of the Committee, but your status is the status of a consultant invited to present your views.

As a point of order, need the Secretary vote on that?

BABBITT: The Secretary is a member. If I thought it would be a frequent procedure I would probably have to see whether we were voting by units or by individuals.

Gentlemen, I should like to sum up. I believe that we are ready for a formal vote at least on the acceptance of the report of the Sub-Committee on 'Recommendations for a Priority Program'. Is there any further discussion on that question?

PENNIMAN: It seems to me in view of the discussion here this afternoon about the question of why this was done and why that was done, that it would be extremely useful to include a series, a criterion so that you forestall these questions as this goes forward. It may forestall a series of questions. I think this might well be included. I don't state this as any objection, but I think it would help.

BABBITT: Yes, I agree with that. I think they should be included. That is, the basis on which the priority program was made up should be included in the report which goes forward to the IAC. That will be done and will be submitted as a part of the report before it does up.

On the question of the acceptance of the program as submitted by the Sub-Committee, is it approved? Do you accept the report as the recommendation of the JIGSAW Committee to be forwarded to the IAC? Please signify by raising hands.

(Following raised hands: All members of the Committee)

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The report is accepted. I have already outlined the procedure for the future. A full report on the progress of JIGSAW to date, together with the 'Recommendations for Priority Program', and a request for support of this program on the part of the IAC agencies will be forwarded as soon as possible.

I have not had a tentative acceptance of allocation for some of the projects listed in the Priority Program.

NEIZER: I think we should say 'indication of interest', because none of us can make even tentative commitments.

BABBITT: I accept that. That is much better -- an indication of interest in the various projects. I note, however, that there has been none on 'c' or 'd'.

NEIZER: An indication of interest in 'c' and 'a' was expressed by the Army.

█ The fact that we have not mentioned ORE does not mean that ORE is not interested in many of these projects.

BABBITT: We are interested in all of them.

█ This is particularly apropos of the remark about 'c' and 'a'.

BABBITT: I have an indication of interest by OIR in 'b', in 'c'.

NEIZER: There is a joint interest in 'c' by SO and State.

BABBITT: For 'd': OSI, AEC, and OIR.

WACKWITZ: Air has an interest in 'd'.

NEIZER: That is to say, an interest in production, not an interest in having it done by others.

BABBITT: Yes.

█ In addition to State interest, ORE has considerable interest in 'e' too.

BABBITT: OIR and ORE for 'e'; 'f' is for SO; 'g', OIR; 'h', OIR.

NEIZER: Call it State, because it would be done largely by our Division of Biographic Intelligence.

BABBITT: We will say State for 'h'; 'i', SO; 'j', External Research Staff. I think before the outline goes out that it should be committed to the full Committee.

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NEMZER: It seems to me it might be well worth considering that kind of procedure for every one of these projects. In so far as it becomes a JIGSAW project all members have a right to look at the original plan for it.

BABBITT: That was certainly in my mind. I visualize all of these projects being approved by this Committee.

██████████ Would you say that 'e' is within the JIGSAW field, or is it strictly a State proposition so far?

NEMZER: I can say that State has embarked on it -- I hope. I have 17 or 18 people working on it at this time.

BABBITT: If that is to be included on this list and will eventually come out as a JIGSAW approved project (not that State has to get approval from the JIGSAW Committee to put on a project) -- but if it is to be a JIGSAW approved project, I think its outline should be submitted to the Committee.

NEMZER: I should be very glad to submit it. I might say that we are hoping to do a portion of 'b' -- the portion we are interested in -- some time in the near future, and I should be very glad, before completing plans on that, to submit it to the JIGSAW. But there will be a number of us interested in 'b'.

BABBITT: I think any submissions should be made through the Sub-Committee. Do you agree with that?

NEMZER: Fine. The suggestion then would be that the Sub-Committee would make a somewhat more intensive examination of the project and then present its recommendations for review, if necessary, to the full Committee.

BABBITT: I was thinking of the Sub-Committee's mechanism for obtaining additional views of directly interested agencies, other than those of the originator.

NEMZER: In that case, it might then be an order for the Sub-Committee, or the members of the Sub-Committee to receive the plans for the Tito project that State is now embarking on, comment on it and not wait for a full meeting of JIGSAW.

BABBITT: Yes, I think so. It would be circulated before the meeting, and discussed before the meeting. Does that seem too ponderous?

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NEMZER: Except in terms of the time element. I hesitate to make any statement, but we have assigned a deadline that if everything goes right again might bring us pretty close to the end of the project before JIGSAW meets again.

RABBITT: Obviously the full treatment cannot be afforded that project, if that is the case.

NEMZER: The first point you made could be done -- we could immediately contact the members of the Sub-Committee and get their reactions to the plans now underway.

RABBITT: I wish you would do that. On this paper that was just circulated,* in view of the lateness of the hour I think it rather impractical to start the discussion on it.

NEMZER: I wonder if perhaps we might either change or add to the wording in paragraph 1. I don't think that Mr. London meant it in quite the fashion it might be interpreted. The Sub-Committee didn't actually come 'to a conclusion'. The Committee is suggesting for consideration this type of periodical estimate.

RABBITT: There appears to be a need for it.

NEMZER: Well, 'conclusion' bothers me a little bit. Nevertheless, interpret it as such and we will agree.

RABBITT: The proposal here, of the Sub-Committee is for discussion at a future meeting -- probably the next meeting of the JIGSAW Committee. If there is no objection, I should like to call another meeting possibly in two weeks, I don't think we are limited by anything I know of to meeting only once a month, and I should like to get going as soon as possible on the report to the IAC. We might, at that time consider the idea of a JIGSAW publication.

NEMZER: As the Chairman, are you thinking of instructing the Secretary to send the Priority Program officially to the various departments and ask them for statements on allocations and proposals and plans so that that can be enter-

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*Memo for Committee members by the Secretary, concerning recommendations for the establishment of interdepartmental periodical estimates of world Communism, of 29 March 1950.

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tained, or are you thinking of that being done through the members of this Committee?

BABBITT: I think it should go out officially.

NEMZER: I believe that way. I think that would be best.

BABBITT: If there is no further business to come before the meeting, we will adjourn.

(The meeting adjourned at 1645)

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