

SOVIET DEFENSE POLICY
1962-72

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
28 April 1972

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

SOVIET DEFENSE POLICY
1962-72

I. BASIC OBJECTIVES AND TRENDS

The objectives underlying Soviet military policies can be described today in much the same way as a decade ago: preserving the security of the homeland; maintaining hegemony over Eastern Europe; and fostering an image of strength in support of a strong foreign policy aimed at expanding Soviet influence.

The military policies that support these objectives, however, have shifted markedly. The impulsive policies of Khrushchev, who downgraded the importance of conventional forces and tried to buy a strategic nuclear deterrent cheaply, gave way in the mid-Sixties to more functional concepts of military power under Brezhnev and Kosygin. Soviet military policy was also influenced by fundamental changes in the way the USSR viewed its own power in relation to the other major countries of the world, by its estimate of the external threat, and by the impact of new technology on Soviet weaponry--and on the capabilities of potential enemies.


Trends in Military Policies

In broadest outline, the major trends in Soviet military policies over the past decade have been these:

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Comparison of US Expenditures With Dollar Valuations of USSR Expenditures for Defense, 1963-1972



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- Expansion and improvement of strategic offensive and defensive forces to the point that the Soviets now regard themselves as having achieved rough strategic parity with the US.
- Continued maintenance of strong ground, air, and missile forces opposite NATO, but with increasing confidence that NATO does not pose an imminent military threat.
- Growing concern over the possibility of armed conflict with China, and a consequent strengthening of military forces along the border since the mid-Sixties.
- Development of missile-equipped naval forces increasingly able to operate in distant areas, both to counter Western naval forces and to show the flag.


Trends in Military Spending

These policies led to a gradual increase in military spending. Total Soviet expenditures for military purposes grew from an estimated 18 billion rubles (58 billion dollars) in 1963 to about 22 billion rubles (72 billion dollars) in 1971, an increase of about 22 percent.* The graph opposite shows the trend in Soviet military spending and compares it to US expenditures over the years.

The year-to-year changes in Soviet military expenditures have been shaped mainly by the Soviet drive to catch up with the US in strategic arms. Much of the rapid growth between 1966 and 1970 resulted from increases in outlays for strategic attack and defense programs, and particularly for military research and development. A decline in strategic attack expenditures--reflecting a leveling

* The ruble figures are estimates of what the USSR pays for its military forces and programs. The dollar figures are estimates of what the Soviet forces and programs would cost if purchased and operated in the US.

Comparison of US Expenditures With Dollar Valuations
of USSR Expenditures for Military RDT&E*, 1963-1971



*Includes all atomic energy R&D.

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off in ICBM deployment--was primarily responsible for the low growth rate of about 1 percent in 1971. Soviet defense expenditures for 1972 are expected to reach about 22.5 billion rubles (74 billion dollars), about 2 1/2 percent more than in 1971.

Since 1967, the most dynamic element in Soviet defense spending has been military research and development. It has climbed sharply and in 1971 accounted for over 15 percent of the total dollar valuation of the Soviet defense effort. Historically the US has outspent the Soviets in this area, but since 1969 this relationship has been reversed as a result of continued growth of the Soviet effort while US spending on military R&D declined. (See Graph)

Trends in Military Manpower

Soviet military manpower has increased substantially over the past decade, moving from a total of about 3 million in 1962 to over 3.9 million this year. The increase resulted largely from the growth of ground forces to reinforce the border opposite China, and from the expansion of strategic forces.

US military manpower has shown a markedly different trend and is now about 1 1/2 million men below the Soviet total. Manpower for strategic forces has declined steadily, while general purpose forces peaked during the height of the Vietnam War and then declined. (Table 4 of the Annex compares US and Soviet military manpower trends.)

II. STRATEGIC FORCES

In the aftermath of the Cuban missile crisis and the failure of Khrushchev's effort to improve the USSR's strategic position at one stroke, Soviet leaders saw the building of a significant deterrent force as their most pressing military requirement. It was evident to them that their small force of ICBMs, heavy bombers, and missile submarines was being grossly outnumbered by US missile and bomber deployment programs, and that their strategic defenses were becoming outmoded. Their response was


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Operational US and USSR ICBM Launchers




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The chart shows the estimated number of Soviet operational ICBM launchers as of early 1972. The completion of all known standard silos has provided the Soviets with a total of 1,407 operational launchers at their ICBM complexes. Because of the uncertainty surrounding the purpose and construction timing of the new silo program, it is not reflected in the chart. The chart also excludes the 120 ICBM launchers at Fervomaysk and Derazhnya, which are believed to be intended for use against targets in Western Europe.

Operational US and USSR SLBM Launchers



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to undertake a massive effort to redress this growing imbalance by deploying large, survivable strategic attack forces and improving their strategic defenses.

Intercontinental Attack Forces

At the end of 1962, the Soviet intercontinental attack forces was composed of some 200 heavy bombers, 54 soft ICBM launchers, and less than a hundred short-range submarine-launched ballistic missiles. The only expansion under way was in the ICBM force, and that was moving slowly. The US, in contrast, had a bomber fleet of over 600 B-52s, 175 Atlas and Titan ICBMs, and 9 Polaris missile submarines carrying 16 missiles each. Moreover, the Minuteman ICBM was on the verge of large-scale deployment, and Polaris submarine production was continuing.

Several new Soviet weapons systems were already in research and development at that time, and the decision was made to embark on a sustained high-priority deployment effort centering on three of them: the large, high-yield SS-9 ICBM; the relatively small SS-11 ICBM; and the 16-tube Y class ballistic missile submarine. Bombers were retained as part of the force mix, but there was to be no effort to match the US bomber fleet numerically.

In the decade to follow, the Soviets worked a dramatic improvement in their strategic posture relative to the US. US deployment programs leveled off in the mid and late Sixties, and the Soviets began to catch up. The graphs opposite illustrate this trend for the ICBM and missile submarine forces.

ICBM Force Developments. By the end of 1968, the Soviets had reached virtual parity with the US in numbers of operational ICBMs, most of them now in hardened silos, and by the time SALT began in late 1969 they were moving well ahead. In the fall of 1970, there was a major switch in the ICBM deployment program. Construction of additional standard silos was abruptly halted, and a few groups of silos were even abandoned before they were finished. Instead, the Soviets introduced two new types of silos designed

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for increased hardness, one probably intended for a large new missile and the other for a variant of the small SS-11. Over the next several months the Soviets began construction on 91 of the new-type silos, but in the summer of 1971 they stopped adding more and have not done so since.

Missile Submarines. The Y-class submarine construction program came later than the ICBM programs, but was well under way by 1968. Production reached a rate of 8 units a year in 1970. Since then, production has begun shifting from the standard Y class to a modified version which will carry a larger missile but will have 12 rather than 16 launch tubes. If production continues at current rates, the operational Y-class fleet would equal the US fleet of 41 modern ballistic missile submarines in 1974. Because of the reduced number of launch tubes in the new version, however, it would be another year before the Soviets caught up in total modern submarine missile launchers.

R&D Programs. While pursuing these deployment programs, the Soviets have continued to develop new offensive weaponry. There is evidence, for example, that preliminary tests of a new ICBM larger than the SS-9 began in late 1971, and other new missile projects appear to be in the offing. In addition, a 3,000-mile missile for the submarine force has been tested extensively, and it will soon be at sea on the new version of the Y-class submarine.

One significant feature of Soviet missile development so far has been the absence of any flight test programs for multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicles (MIRVs). The large new ICBM is a good candidate to be the first Soviet missile with MIRVs, but in this area the Soviets lag considerably behind the US, whose Minuteman III and Poseidon MIRV systems are already operational. Thus, while catching up with the US in total numbers of missile launchers, the Soviets have begun to fall behind again in another important measure of strategic attack capability--the number of separate targets that each side could attack. The US now has a commanding lead in this respect, and that lead is likely to grow at least through the mid-1970s.

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Expenditures for Strategic Attack. In dollar terms, the Soviets have spent about the same amount on intercontinental attack forces in the 1963-71 period as the United States. The Soviets, however, have also maintained a substantial effort on peripheral attack forces which have no exact counterpart in the US, and when these expenditures are included overall Soviet expenditures on strategic attack for the 1963-71 period were about one-third more. Since US spending for intercontinental attack forces peaked before 1963, while Soviet spending did not reach its peak until 1969, these comparisons understate the long-term US effort to some extent. (The graphic opposite page 7 shows the trends in US and Soviet expenditures for strategic attack.)

Strategic Defense


Defense of the homeland from strategic attack has historically had a high priority in Soviet military planning, claiming a much higher share of resources than do strategic defenses in the US budget. In 1962, PVO Strany, the Soviet strategic defense organization, could already boast that it was numerically the largest air defense organization in the world, having some 7,500 SAM launchers and 4,500 interceptor aircraft. Moreover, construction had begun on ABM defenses around Moscow.

But the massive Soviet investments in missiles, aircraft, and radars were being undermined by changing US offensive capabilities. New US weapons and tactics--low-altitude penetration of bombers carrying long-range standoff weapons, and penetration aids and MIRVs on ballistic missiles--posed problems not satisfactorily solved to this day. The story of PVO Strany during the past decade is one of a vigorous but imperfect effort to upgrade its forces to counter the fast-paced changes in the US offense.

Air Defense Improvements. Unlike the US, the Soviets have added steadily to their air-defense weaponry in recent years. Since 1964 they have introduced five new types of fighter-interceptors, and production is continuing on two of them. The air-defense missile force has also continued to expand

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Comparison of US Expenditures With Dollar Valuations of USSR Expenditures
for Strategic Attack and Strategic Defense, 1963-1971



*All US spending is for intercontinental systems

Note: These comparisons exclude the cost of nuclear warheads and bombs

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and improve. Deployment programs are still in progress for the long-range SA-5 system and the SA-3 system designed for low-altitude defense. New radars, communications systems, and hardened control facilities have also been added. These improvements have plugged many gaps in Soviet air defenses, but they have not closed off the threat of low-altitude penetration by attacking bombers.

ABM Developments. The decision to begin deploying ABMs around Moscow in 1962 gave the Soviets an early start, but it saddled them with a system based on technology that was soon to be overtaken by offensive innovations. The dish-type radar used for target tracking, for example, is capable of engaging only a few targets at a time. The Soviets apparently soon recognized that the system could be overcome by multiple warheads and penetration aids, and between 1964 and 1967 they abandoned half of the ABM sites begun around Moscow.

In 1967, the Soviets began experimenting with new types of ABM radars capable of handling many targets simultaneously, and a year later, work started on a prototype for a completely new ABM system using this kind of radar. The new system is cheaper than the cumbersome Moscow system and could be deployed in much shorter time (construction of the sites at Moscow took about 7 years). The range of this system appears to be considerably less than that of the Moscow system, and it could be used for local defense of key target areas or possibly ICBM fields. Meanwhile, new ABM missiles have been undergoing tests since late 1970.

So far, none of the new ABM equipment has been put into operational use. Satellite photography has not revealed any evidence of operational ABM deployment in the Soviet Union beyond the Moscow area.

Expenditures for Strategic Defense. Soviet expenditures for deploying and operating their strategic defenses, as valued in dollars, have been nearly three times those of the US during the past decade. (The graph opposite shows the trends for both countries.) This difference is accounted for largely by the USSR's larger commitment to air defense--a reflection of the fact that the Soviets are confronted by a much

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larger bomber threat than is the US. The total expenditures of the two countries on deployment of ABM systems have been about same. In the ABM field, of course, expenditures on R&D in both countries have greatly exceeded the deployment and operating expenses incurred so far, but it has not been possible to make meaningful comparisons of ABM R&D spending.

Soviet Strategic Concepts and Perceptions

The way the Soviets have developed, deployed, and operated their strategic forces says several things about how they view the utility of these forces:

- They consider these forces primarily as a deterrent. The major effort has been on programs which assure the ability of these forces to absorb a US strike and still be able to return a devastating blow.
- They nevertheless plan for the possibility that deterrence might fail. They give high priority to strategic defenses, and they apparently target their strategic attack forces primarily against military-related installations rather than population and industry per se. In their doctrine, the preferred use of strategic attack forces is to pre-empt--that is, to launch an all-out strike against the enemy's forces when the enemy clearly is about to launch his own nuclear attack. A "launch-on-warning" strategy has also been advocated by some Soviet military writers, but others have warned of the risks involved.
- They do not contemplate launching a sudden, bolt-from-the-blue, first strike on the US, nor do they expect one on themselves. They have not acquired forces with the necessary combination of accuracy, yield, and numbers to be effective in this role, and there is abundant evidence that they do not maintain their strategic forces in a state of constant alert. (One of the enduring tenets of their

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doctrine is that any general war would be preceded by an extended buildup of tensions that would allow time for preparation.)

Soviet strategic doctrine also appears to reject the feasibility of graduated nuclear warfare. In their writings and statements on the subject, Soviet strategists are consistently skeptical that it is possible for two nuclear powers to exercise restraint once nuclear weapons have been employed.

The Soviet leadership has probably concluded that for the foreseeable future neither the US nor the USSR will be capable of acquiring a strategic superiority sufficient to ensure success in confrontation or a victory other than a Pyrrhic one in a nuclear war. Nevertheless, there are those in Moscow who believe that the US is striving to obtain some relative advantage in terms of political-military leverage and actual warfighting capabilities. The US doctrine of "strategic sufficiency" and emphasis on MIRV programs have been interpreted in some Soviet quarters as pointing in this direction. There are also voices calling for the USSR to strive for a measure of advantage.

There is probably no unanimous view in the Kremlin, however, as to how the strategic relationship should be measured. One senior member of the Soviet SALT delegation complained that some Soviet military men still tend to think as though they are counting "rifles and cannons" and pay too little attention to qualitative factors in looking at the strategic equation. At the same time, there is evidence that the Soviets perform sophisticated war-gaming analysis in much the same way as the US does. Whatever the measures, it is clear that the Soviets attach great importance to maintaining a position of "strategic equality" with the US and having it recognized by the US and other nations.

Soviet Motives at SALT

The Soviet decision to enter SALT in mid-1968 was induced not only by the evolution of a rough numerical parity between the two opposing strategic

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arsenals, but also by a number of interrelated economic and political considerations. As SALT has progressed over the first seven rounds, Soviet interest in an arms limitation agreement has come into sharper focus.

One of Moscow's primary interests has been to stabilize the US-Soviet strategic relationship and to gain US recognition of the principle of "equal security with no military advantage for either side." Although the strategic forces of the two sides are asymmetrical, the Soviets apparently believe them to be comparable in terms of overall capabilities, and undoubtedly appreciate that this acknowledgement at SALT would buttress their claim for a role in world affairs equivalent to that of the United States.

Moscow's decision to enter SALT also reflected its desire to limit certain aspects of US-Soviet competition through negotiation. The negotiating record has indicated, however, that the Soviets did not enter SALT with the intent of ending strategic competition between the two countries. Rather, they have attempted to narrow the focus of this competition and limit it chiefly to the qualitative area of research and development. They have also insisted that force modernization be allowed to continue, at least under the terms of an interim agreement.

In spite of the Soviet buildup in strategic forces over the past decade the share of GNP allocated to defense fell to about 6 percent in 1971. This declining military burden indicates that purely economic considerations have not forced the Soviets to seek a SALT agreement. The Soviets may, nevertheless, hope to realize some savings in terms of high-quality physical and human resources--assets that are needed to modernize the civilian economy and boost productivity.

III. GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES

Forces Opposite NATO

The structure and posture of Soviet and Warsaw Pact theater forces at the time of the 1962 Cuban

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missile crisis reflected Soviet doctrine which had evolved in the late Fifties and early Sixties. This doctrine was based on the belief that any war between NATO and the Warsaw Pact would immediately escalate to nuclear war.

In the Pact strategy for nuclear war in Europe, the mission of the ground forces was to exploit massive nuclear strikes delivered throughout the depth of the theater by advancing rapidly across Western Europe. Ground and tactical air forces were equipped to provide greater mobility and concentrated, short term combat power. The ground forces were entirely mechanized and provided with massive numbers of tanks. The number of tactical aircraft was reduced, and equipment modernization programs emphasized air defense and tactical nuclear delivery capabilities. This focus on nuclear warfare resulted in a decline in conventional firepower.

By 1968, the Soviet view of war in Europe had undergone a significant change. In response to the NATO flexible response strategy, Pact planners have come to believe that the initial period of a war with NATO could be fought without the use of nuclear weapons. They still cling to the view that an unsuccessful NATO conventional offensive--or a breakthrough by a Warsaw Pact counteroffensive--would compel NATO to resort to tactical nuclear weapons. The Soviets see the conventional phase, therefore, as only a prelude to nuclear war. The Soviets believe moreover, that NATO does not intend to restrict a European conflict to the use of tactical nuclear weapons only and that a limited nuclear response on the part of the Pact would only offer the West the opportunity to deliver a massive and decisive strategic nuclear strike.

Soviet acceptance of a possible nonnuclear phase of hostilities has led to some changes in force structure. Division artillery, for example, has been increased by about 50 percent since 1967. Pact tactical aircraft, however, continue to be characterized by relatively small payloads, despite some improvements in current Soviet fighters.

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For this reason the Soviets plan to use medium bombers for large-scale conventional bombing in the initial phase of a war with NATO. At the same time, the Soviets have continued to develop their tactical nuclear capabilities, increasing their tactical nuclear missile forces by about one-third.

Aside from these changes in combat support, Soviet theater force organization has not diverged significantly from the pattern established in the early Sixties. This organization emphasizes the shock power, mobility, and protection against nuclear effects of the tank, and is intended for a relatively short, fast moving offensive. The Soviets hope to conduct a conventional offensive using essentially the same tactics as for nuclear war.

Forces Opposite China

Deteriorating Soviet-Chinese relations have been responsible for significant changes in Soviet theater forces during the past decade. Since 1965 the Soviets have tripled their ground forces opposite China, and the buildup is continuing. There are now some 37 to 42 Soviet divisions and 370,000 men deployed in the border area. About 11 of these divisions are at or near combat strength.

The pattern of the ongoing buildup suggests that the Soviets intend eventually to have 42 to 48 divisions and close to 1,100 aircraft opposite China. At full strength, this force would have about 780,000 troops. Such a force probably would enable the Soviets to seize and hold indefinitely the most important peripheral regions of China such as Manchuria, Inner Mongolia, or large parts of Sinkiang.

It is clear that the Soviets are preparing for the possibility of tactical nuclear warfare against Chinese forces. Almost every division along the border has nuclear-capable tactical rockets, and there are four brigades equipped with 160-mile-range tactical ballistic missiles. In addition, the Soviets have deployed the 500-mile Scaleboard and

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300-mile Shaddock mobile missile systems with ground forces in the area. Ultimately the Soviet forces along the border will probably have about the same proportion of tactical nuclear weapons as the forces opposite NATO.

Some Soviet strategic missiles and bombers are almost certainly targeted against China also.

Naval Forces


The requirement for anticarrier forces was the major influence on the development of the Soviet general purpose naval forces from the mid-Fifties through the mid-Sixties. Subsequently the emphasis broadened to include improvement of antisubmarine capabilities and expansion of out-of-area operations.

Anticarrier Forces. The Soviets decided to counter Western carrier forces primarily with anti-ship cruise missiles, rather than building their own carriers. By 1962 the Soviet Navy already had a large force of missile-armed medium bombers and had begun deploying cruise missile submarines. During the early and mid-Sixties the cruise missile submarine force was built up rapidly, and the naval air forces received new types of missiles and aircraft. Long-range cruise missiles also were fitted on a number of new major surface combatants.

Antisubmarine Warfare. During the last half of the Sixties the Soviets deployed a variety of new systems with improved ASW capabilities, while continuing to strengthen the anticarrier forces as well. The new weapons systems included helicopter carriers, long-range ASW aircraft, and two new classes of nuclear-powered submarines.

Despite these efforts, the Soviet Navy has made little progress in ASW. It has not solved the problem of initial detection of submarines, either through use of ASW forces or by an ocean surveillance system. As a result, current Soviet ASW forces do not pose a serious threat to the US ballistic missile submarine force. Furthermore, this same deficiency leaves Soviet naval surface forces vulnerable to Western attack submarines.

US and USSR Naval Operations



*Excludes hydrographic, space support, SSB/SSBN and special submarine operations

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

Out-of-Area Operations. Concurrently with the ASW programs, the Soviet Navy undertook a major effort to operate its forces in distant waters. In the early Sixties the Navy rarely ventured outside its coastal waters, even during major exercises. As late as 1965, Soviet surface combatants, attack submarines, and naval auxiliaries spent only about 6,000 ship-days on out-of-area operations. During the last half of the Sixties, however, Soviet naval operations expanded rapidly. The graph opposite shows this trend and compares it with US naval operations.

The 1962-71 period also saw an expansion of Soviet naval activity into new operating areas. The Soviet Mediterranean Squadron, for example, was first established in 1964 and grew into a major force in 1967. Soviet naval forces established a presence in the Indian Ocean in 1968, began a series of deployments to the Caribbean in 1969, and in 1970 began what has become a small continuous presence off of West Africa.

Naval air operations have expanded also. In 1965, the naval air forces received new reconnaissance aircraft and began to conduct long-range missions over the open ocean. In 1968, a Soviet naval air squadron was established in Egypt, and in 1970 naval reconnaissance aircraft began to make brief visits to Cuba.

Shipbuilding. During the 1962-1971 period, the Soviets built more major naval ships than the US, but their ships were generally smaller. In contrast to US practice, the Soviets have shown a preference for relatively small multi-purpose ships, with an emphasis on speed and firepower at the expense of range, endurance, and sustained combat capability. The only major area in which they have surpassed the US is in numbers of attack submarines, as shown in the following table:

**Comparison of US Expenditures With Dollar Valuations
of USSR Expenditures for General Purpose Forces, 1963-1971**



Note: These comparisons exclude the cost of nuclear warheads and bombs.

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Number and Tonnage of Major Naval Ships
Commissioned, 1962-1971

	Number		Thousand Tons	
	US	USSR	US	USSR
Major Surface Combatants	83	92	564	291
Attack Submarines	42	117	154	428
Major Amphibious Ships	<u>45</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>634</u>	<u>38</u>
TOTAL	170	220	1,352	757

The Soviet Navy does not have a major mission of projecting forces ashore, as does the US Navy, nor is it as concerned with protecting extended sea lines of communications. As a result, the Soviet Navy has been able to concentrate its main efforts on systems designed to attack and destroy other naval forces.

Expenditures for General Purpose Forces

Soviet spending on general purpose forces has grown slowly during the past decade but has remained well below US expenditures in this category. (The graphs opposite illustrate this trend.) Before the US made large-scale commitment in Vietnam, US expenditures for general purposes forces averaged about 15 percent above the dollar valuation of counterpart Soviet spending. During the height of the Vietnam conflict--1965-69--US spending was about 65 percent higher. Since then US expenditures in this category have dropped sharply, and in 1971 they were less than 10 percent above the Soviet total.

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TABLE 1
SOVIET INTERCONTINENTAL ATTACK FORCES

	End 1962	End 1968	1 April 1972
<u>ICBM Launchers</u>			
SS-6	4	--	--
SS-7	50	197	190
SS-8	--	23	19
SS-9	--	168	288
SS-11			
At ICBM Complexes	--	580	850
At MR/IRBM Complexes**	--	--	120
SS-13	--	--	60
Total	54*	968*	1,527*
<u>Ballistic Missile Submarines</u> (Launch tubes in parenthesis)			
G class**	23 (69)	22 (66)	22 (70)
H class	9 (27)	9 (27)	9 (30)
Y class	--	4 (64)	25-27 (400-432)
Total	32 (96)*	35 (157)*	56-58 (500-532)
<u>Heavy Bombers</u>			
Bear	100	110	110
Bison	100	90	85
Total	200	200	195

* These totals are for operational ICBMs and ballistic missile submarines, and they do not include others under construction at the times indicated. At the end of 1968, for example, some 330 additional ICBM silos (60 of them for the SS-9) were under construction and 13 additional 16-tube Y class submarines were under construction or fitting out. As of 1 April 1972, there were 91 new-type ICBM silos under construction and 15 Y class submarines under construction or fitting out.

**These probably are intended primarily for attack against targets in Europe and Asia.

CURRENT US INTERCONTINENTAL ATTACK FORCES

<u>ICBM Launchers</u>	
Minuteman	1,000
Titan	54
	<u>1,054</u>
<u>Ballistic Missile Submarines</u>	
Polaris/Poseidon	41 (656 launch tubes)
<u>Strategic Bombers</u>	
B-52	450
FB-111	74
	<u>524</u>

~~TOP SECRET~~

TABLE 2
SOVIET STRATEGIC DEFENSE FORCES

<u>AIR DEFENSES</u>	<u>End</u> <u>1962</u>	<u>End</u> <u>1968</u>	<u>April</u> <u>1972</u>
<u>Interceptor Aircraft</u>			
Subsonic	3,325	1,575	885
Supersonic	<u>1,260</u>	<u>1,775</u>	<u>2,230</u>
	4,585	3,350	3,115
<u>Surface-to-Air Missile Launchers</u>			
SA-1 (at Moscow only)	3,276	3,276	3,276
SA-2	4,020	4,500	4,380
SA-3	220	480	988
SA-5	--	360	1,332
	<u>7,516</u>	<u>8,616</u>	<u>9,976</u>
<u>ABM DEFENSES</u>			
Engagement Radars (Moscow)	--	3	8
Launchers (Moscow)	--	24	64
Hen House Ballistic Missile			
Early Warning Radars	--	2	6
Regional ABM Radars (Moscow)	--	1	2

CURRENT US STRATEGIC DEFENSE FORCES

AIR DEFENSES

<u>Interceptor Aircraft</u>	
F-101, F-102, F-106 (including Air National Guard)	593
<u>Surface-to-Air Missile Launchers</u>	
BOMARC	84
Nike Hercules (including Army National Guard)	<u>755</u>
	839

ABM DEFENSES

Ballistic Missile Early Warning Radars (BMEWS)	3
Over-the-Horizon Radars	9
SLBM Warning System Sites	8
Satellite Early Warning Systems	2 satellites 2 ground stations

~~TOP SECRET~~TABLE 3
SOVIET NAVAL GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES

	<u>End</u> <u>1962</u>	<u>End</u> <u>1968</u>	<u>April</u> <u>1972</u>	<u>Current</u> <u>US</u> <u>Totals</u>
<u>Major Surface Forces</u>				
Aircraft carriers	-	-	-	17
Helicopter carriers	-	1	2	9
Cruisers - CL and CLG	14	12	15	28 frigates
Cruisers - CLGM (1)	1	8	11	68
Destroyers	107	81	82	122
Escorts	79	104	112	68
	201	206	222	244
<u>Submarine Forces</u>				
Cruise Missile - nuclear	5	35	40	-
- diesel	11	26	28	-
Total Cruise Missile	16	61	68	-
Torpedo Attack - nuclear	8	18	28	56
- diesel	253	234	182	38
Total Torpedo Attack	261	252	210	94
	277	313	278	94
<u>Naval Air Forces</u>				
Missile carriers	265	270	275	See
Reconnaissance/bomber	165	355	360	footnote
Patrol/ASW aircraft	80	85	135	(2)
ASW helicopters	110	175	235	
	620	885	1,005	2,500

(1) These ships--the Kynda and Kresta classes--are commonly identified as light cruisers because of their surface-to-surface missiles, but they are about the same size as a US guided missile frigate. They are less than half the size of a US light cruiser.

(2) The US Navy's air arm cannot be compared meaningfully to Soviet Naval Aviation because of the major differences in missions and equipment. The Soviets, for example, have no naval fighter aircraft, while the US has no long-range missile carriers comparable to the Soviet types.

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TABLE 4
USSR AND US MILITARY MANPOWER

	1962		1968		1972	
	USSR	US	USSR	US	USSR	US
Strategic Attack	174,000	263,000	325,000	169,000	363,000	150,000
Strategic Defense	415,000	149,000	459,000	102,000	529,000	52,000
Ground Forces*	1,219,000	860,000	1,485,000	975,000	1,562,000	580,000
Tactical Air Forces	223,000	155,000	240,000	345,000	259,000	215,000
Navy	340,000	405,000	369,000	460,000	385,000	340,000
Command & Control	548,000	924,000	673,000	1,460,000	694,000	1,018,000
Research & Development	45,000	54,000	53,000	42,000	53,000	35,000
Military Security Forces	225,000	-	225,000	-	225,000	-
Total Active Military Manpower	3,061,000	2,810,000	3,704,000	3,550,000	3,931,000	2,340,000

* Includes Soviet Naval Infantry and US Marines.

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