

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Memorandum

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Supplement
to

THE CRISIS
USSR/CUBA

Information as of 1600
6 November 1962

PREPARED FOR THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL.


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~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
6 November 1962

CUBAN AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM



Further analysis [REDACTED] confirms that SAM sites are Soviet-manned and off-limits to Cubans except for guard and support functions. There has been no indication that the large numbers of Cubans required to man the system [REDACTED] had received training [REDACTED] either in the USSR or in Cuba. Finally, the SAM system in Cuba is a late version of the system and has only been previously noted to have been manned and controlled by Russians.

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The conclusions that can be drawn from the above are:

(1) SAM sites under Soviet operational control could successfully shield Cuba from reconnaissance by U-2s [REDACTED]

(2) [REDACTED]

(3) [REDACTED]

(4) While Cubans can be trained in several months to take over some functions of the air defense system, a minimum of 12-18 months would be required before the more complex elements of the system, such as the SAMs, could be manned and maintained by them.

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SOVIET EFFORTS TO EVADE UN VERIFICATION

Soviet statements and actions during the past several days strongly suggest that the USSR is making a major effort to load the missiles aboard Soviet ships and remove them from Cuba as quickly as possible before any UN verification and inspection machinery can be organized and put into effect.

The Soviets have indicated that "all offensive weapons" will have been shipped out by 12 November. Khrushchev may then announce to the world that he has carried out his end of the bargain and call upon President Kennedy to respond by formally guaranteeing that the US and other Western Hemisphere countries will not attack Cuba. Such a Soviet announcement, possibly accompanied by the publication of photographs purportedly establishing "proof" of the USSR's performance, would be calculated to undercut US insistence on UN on-site inspection and verification in Cuba and to leave the US with no alternative but to accept Moscow's "good faith" in fulfilling Khrushchev's pledges. The Soviets would also hope by these moves to be in a position to charge the US with "bad faith" if the President should decline to give formal non-invasion assurances on the ground that Khrushchev had reneged on UN verification. Moscow would almost certainly contend that only the opposition of the "sovereign and independent" government of Cuba prevented implementation of UN inspection in Cuba. The USSR's repudiation of earlier assertions that the IL-28's would be removed along with the missiles may reflect serious difficulties in Mikoyan's talks with Castro. Unlike the missiles, which were under exclusive Soviet control, the IL-28's may have been transferred to the Cubans under military assistance agreements. It thus remains to be seen whether the USSR will risk jeopardizing its whole relationship with Castro by applying sufficient pressure to force him to consent to the removal of the bombers. Castro, in any event, is in a good position to demand heavy compensation in the form of economic assistance and, possibly, more specific Soviet commitments to protect the Cuban regime in all contingencies. (An elaboration of this evidence is contained in Annex I)

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SOVIET SHIPS ON HAND FOR MISSILE REMOVAL

Kuznetsov's statement that nine Soviet dry-cargo ships are loading in Cuban ports and will shortly depart for the USSR with the offensive missiles appears to be generally accurate. The ships designated by Kuznetsov have the capacity to carry on their decks 49 MRBMs with transporters and, therefore, can carry the 33 MRBMs positively identified in Cuba or the 48 MRBMs which might have been delivered by the USSR to arm the six MRBM sites identified in October. These ships also have the capacity to carry in their hold virtually all of the associated equipment for the MRBM complexes. All of these ships have been in port long enough to load missiles and transporters and to depart Cuba by 7 November. The ships in question are shown in the following table (a more detailed resumé is contained in ANNEX II):

<u>Port</u>	<u>Ships</u>	<u>Time in Port</u>	<u>Missile with Transporter Capacity</u>
<u>Casilda</u>	Leninskiy Komsomol	Since 3 Nov	10
	Fizik Kurchatov	Since 3 Nov	10
<u>Havana</u>	Labinsk	Since 24 Oct	2
<u>La Isabela</u>	Alapaevsk	Since 25 Oct	2
<u>Mariel</u>	Bratsk	Since 3 Nov	2-4
	Dvinogorsk	Since 2 Nov	2-4
	Ivan Polzunov	Since 4-5 Nov	4
	Metallurg Anasov	Since 29 Oct	10
	Volgoles	Since 5 Nov	7


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ANNEX I

1. Soviet UN delegate Morozov told UN Secretariat officials on 5 November that dismantling of the missile sites will be completed and that all offensive weapons will have been shipped out of Cuba by 12 November. He said some Soviet ships are already in Cuban ports and that the others required to complete the removal will arrive this week. He argued that, in view of this schedule, there is no reason for continuing the Red Cross inspection system (which still has not been organized) beyond 15 November.

2. About half of the missile transporters and launching equipment previously identified at the MRBM sites now have appeared in Cuban ports. Preliminary analysis of 5 November photography shows that 9 of the 11 MRBM missile transporters at the port of Mariel have been loaded on the decks of Soviet ships in the harbor, and one of the ships is apparently leaving port. The USSR thus appears to be shipping missiles from Cuba without waiting for ships capable of carrying them below deck.

3. When this process of removal has been completed, Khrushchev may well announce to the world that he has carried out his commitments to President Kennedy. He will then call on the President to respond by issuing a formal declaration guaranteeing Cuba against invasion by the US and other Western Hemisphere countries. The Soviet leaders would undoubtedly hope that these moves will effectively undercut US insistence on UN on-site inspection of the missile sites and weapons being removed by Soviet ships. They may believe that such a Soviet announcement, possibly accompanied by the publication of photographs purportedly establishing "proof" of Soviet performance, will deprive the issue of inspection and verification of its force and immediacy and that the US will then have no choice but to accept Soviet "good faith" in having made good on Khrushchev's commitments. The Soviet leaders probably would also believe these moves would put them in a strong position to charge the US with "bad faith" if the President should decline to give formal assurances against an invasion of Cuba on the ground that Khrushchev had failed to carry out his pledge to accept UN verification. Moscow's reply to this probably would be that the USSR had every intention of allowing full UN verification but that the adamant opposition of the "sovereign and independent" government of Cuba made it impossible to put these arrangements into operation.

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4. In a further effort to "document" the USSR's good faith in implementing its pledges, Moscow may make public the alternative plan which Kuznetsov presented to Mr. McCloy on 4 November, under which the Soviets would provide the US with photographs of dismantled missile sites, give the US the Soviet schedule for moving the missiles to Cuban ports, together with shipping schedules, and allow US ships to come alongside Soviet ships in such a way as to enable US inspectors to see and count the missiles. If the present New York negotiations fail to produce agreement on inspection and verification procedures, Moscow would claim that US insistence on full UN on-site verification in Cuba was only a device for delaying a settlement and evading implementation of the President's offer of assurances against an invasion of Cuba.

5. It is not clear at this point whether there is collusion between the USSR and Cuba in rejecting full UN verification or whether the Soviets are simply taking advantage of Castro's opposition to avoid creating a precedent which would pose serious problems for the USSR in the future, particularly on questions of disarmament and nuclear test ban controls. It seems clear, however, that in view of President Kennedy's demand for UN verification, Khrushchev felt he had no choice but to accept this in his backdown letter of 28 October. The Soviet Foreign Ministry instructed the Soviet ambassador in Cuba on 31 October to inform U Thant, who was in Havana at that time for talks with Castro, that the UN would be permitted "to look at whatever they want to...in Cuba." U Thant's military adviser, Brigadier Rikhye, later confirmed to US officials in New York that the Soviets had told the UN party that, as far as the USSR was concerned, the UN could inspect the missile sites and all incoming shipments.

6. While the Soviet leaders thus apparently felt obliged at the height of the crisis to agree to UN verification in Cuba, they later came to believe that after Khrushchev's 28 October letter removed the immediate danger of US military action they could safely maneuver to extricate themselves from Khrushchev's embarrassing commitment by hiding behind Castro's opposition to any UN presence in Cuba.

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7. A similar ambiguity surrounds the motives and pressures underlying the shift in the USSR's position on removing the IL-28's from Cuba. Prior to his arrival in Havana, Mikoyan assured Ambassador Stevenson and Mr. McCloy on 1 November that the IL-28's would be included in the list of offensive weapons to be withdrawn in an estimated 10 to 15 days. According to Brigadier Rikhye, Soviet representatives in Havana told U Thant's party "many times" that they were determined to remove all the equipment which President Kennedy regarded as offensive, including the IL-28's.

8. On 5 November, however, Kuznetsov professed surprise that the US regards these bombers as offensive weapons. He contended they are basically obsolete in view of their low ceiling and speed, that they are good for only "coastal defense," and that they cannot be used in combat over enemy territory. He gave a negative reply to a direct question whether the USSR would include the IL-28's in the weapons to be removed from Cuba.

9. In view of the very marginal strategic value to the USSR of deploying these bombers in Cuba, we believe this shift in the Soviet position may well be evidence of the serious difficulties Mikoyan is encountering in his talks with the Cuban leaders. Castro has made it clear that he was not consulted on Khrushchev's decision to withdraw the missiles and that, in any event, they were never under Cuban control. The IL-28's, however, may be an entirely different matter in that they may have been actually transferred to Cuban control under the terms of military assistance agreements. If this is the true state of affairs, it remains to be seen whether the USSR will risk jeopardizing its whole relationship with Castro by applying sufficient pressure to force him to consent to the removal of the bombers. Castro, in any event, is in a good position to use this question in demanding heavy compensation in the form of economic assistance and, possibly, further and more specific Soviet commitments to protect the Cuban regime in all contingencies.

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ANNEX II

1. The Labinsk which Kuznetsov indicated would depart Cuba on the 6th of November should be able to do so. She is known to have been in Mariel on 1 November and to have returned to Havana on 5 November. She probably took on a load at Mariel and returned to Havana to take on fuel and bunkers prior to her departure for the USSR.

2. Photographic intelligence taken on the afternoon of 5 November shows the Bratsk leaving the port with three missiles on deck. This may mean that she is now en route the USSR. Or, as in the case of the Labinsk, the Bratsk may be proceeding to Havana to take on bunkers prior to her final departure.

3. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Photography [REDACTED] shows the Dvinogorsk offshore from the main piers at Mariel. Her hatches were still open, although most of the loading apparently was completed. She carried no missiles on deck.

4. The Metallurg Anasov, which is also in the port of Mariel, on 5 November had on her decks 6 missiles and transporters, with an additional two in the process of being loaded. This combined with the deck cargo on the Bratsk accounts for the 11 missiles and transporters sighted earlier at the Mariel docks.

5. The two ships known to be at the port of Casilda, the Fizik Kurchatov and the Leninsky Komsomol, have adequate capacity to carry 20 missiles with transporters on their decks. This is more than adequate to carry the 12 missiles and transporters observed earlier near Casilda. One of the two ships was shown in photography of 5 November to have two missiles already loaded on deck.

6. The small amounts of observed IRBM equipment could probably also be carried on these ships.