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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

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THE WEEK IN BRIEF

PART I

OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST

SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS IN THE LIGHT OF PEIPING'S TENTH ANNIVERSARY Page 1

Developments in connection with Khrushchev's visit to Peiping for the tenth anniversary of the Chinese regime suggest that differences in views on foreign policy tactics and ideological matters remain as irritants in the Sino-Soviet relationship. The Chinese have publicly hailed Khrushchev's visit to the United States and his disarmament proposals. However, they apparently have reservations about the long-term effects of the USSR's present posture toward the United States. The Chinese also strongly reaffirm Peiping's position that the commune will be China's basic social unit after "entering Communism," despite the Soviet statement that the commune is "impossible" in the future Communist society. Present Chinese propaganda acknowledging dependence on the Sino-Soviet alliance, however, reflects Peiping's desire to avoid a showdown with Moscow.



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PART I

OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST

SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS IN THE LIGHT OF PEIPING'S TENTH ANNIVERSARY

Developments in connection with Khrushchev's visit to Peiping for the tenth anniversary celebration of the Chinese regime suggest that differences in views on foreign policy tactics, methods of "socialist construction," and ideological matters remain as irritants in the Sino-Soviet relationship. Mao and Khrushchev, who held several days of well-publicized talks during the visit, failed to issue the customary joint communiqué. It seems probable that their views differed so much that compromise language could not be agreed upon.

While Peiping is apparently willing to publicly endorse Khrushchev's visit to the US and his disarmament proposals, its foreign and domestic policies apparently require it to maintain that the threat of American "aggression" remains. In contrast to Soviet statements, Foreign Minister Chen Yi--in a special article written for *Izvestia* for the Chinese anniversary--complained that "so far" the United States has not "repudiated its policy of aggression and war," as witnessed by its "continuation" of the cold war, continued construction of foreign military bases, "active" rearmament of Japan, and "continuing occupation of Taiwan."

Khrushchev completely dissociated the USSR from this line in his statement on leaving Peiping, declaring that "Communists of the Soviet Union consider it our sacred duty and primary task" to end the cold war and guarantee the "triumph of the cause of peace."

The Chinese leaders apparently view their policy toward the United States as requiring tactics significantly different from those now being pursued by Khrushchev. That American hostility to the Peiping regime must be met with "tension" rather than a display of "weakness" is a cardinal principle of the Chinese leaders, who have said that the



United States will not change its policy toward China "of its own accord." In his *Izvestia* article, Chen Yi reaffirmed the central theme of Peiping's tactics: "The people of the world still have to wage long-term struggles again and again against

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American imperialism in order to achieve the relaxation of international tension."

The Chinese are apprehensive that friendlier US-USSR relations will prove detrimental to their interests, which are opposed to the maintenance of the status quo in the Far East. On the Taiwan and Laotian issues, the Chinese have directed their principal invective against the United States as the "aggressor," apparently in the belief that consistent opposition to American policy will eventually lead to a reduction of American influence in the area. This line probably is also useful in Peiping's domestic program, as the Chinese have stated that "face to face with the American aggressor, the Chinese people are forced to intensify their work and build economically backward China into an advanced, industrialized, and socialist power."

Khrushchev's failure during the celebrations in Peiping to support publicly the Chinese on the specific issue of Taiwan reflects his desire to avoid issues which run counter to his posture of peaceful coexistence with the United States. This silence, however, does not imply repudiation of Moscow's commitment in September 1958 that any attack on Communist China would be regarded as an attack on the USSR.

The Chinese leaders apparently felt the need at a major regime celebration to reaffirm their long-term objectives toward the offshore islands and Taiwan. Peiping, however, has shown no disposition to develop the "liberate Taiwan" theme into a major

propaganda campaign for the present. Present Chinese statements speak of "liberating" Taiwan "in one way or another," but imply no sense of urgency.

Despite the difference in Sino-Soviet views, Chinese statements during Khrushchev's visit suggest that the Chinese are aware of their dependence on the USSR and do not wish to push present differences to the point of impairing the alliance. An editorial in People's Daily on 3 October stated that the Chinese people regard the steady strengthening of their unity with the USSR, "their great ally," as an important guarantee of the "prosperity and strength of their country as well as their sacred international duty."

Central committee Secretary General Teng Hsiao-ping, in an anniversary article for Pravda, revived Mao's own formulation on the leadership position of the Soviet Communist party as well as the Soviet Government. Teng stated that "the unity of the socialist camp headed by the Soviet Union, and the unity of the international Communist movement with the Communist party of the Soviet Union at its center, form the core of even more extensive international unity."

Khrushchev's failure to endorse the communes and economic policies connected with Peiping's "leap forward" shows that the two leaders were unable to find a formula to bridge their differences and that these issues will continue to harass Sino-Soviet relations. Soviet propagandists are still attacking the commune concept, and one writer has recently

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stated that the commune is "impossible" in the future Communist society.

The Chinese leaders, however, appear deeply committed to the concept and, in the face of Soviet and domestic opposition, are insisting on the "superiority" of the communes over the former cooperatives. Government chairman Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping have recently stated that the commune will be the best form of social organization for the future "gradual transition to the Communist society."

As in previous Sino-Soviet ideological differences over the past 10 years, the Chinese are again indicating their determination to manipulate ideology for domestic purposes

and in order to increase their prestige as a "creative" Marxist party. Liu Shao-chi stated in his anniversary article for the October issue of the bloc's theoretical journal, Problems of Peace and Socialism, that although "revolution and construction in China have features peculiar to this country," it is also "possible that some of these important special features may reappear in some other countries." Liu concluded, "In this sense, Chinese experience is to a certain degree of international significance."

Liu avoided saying that the communes and the "leap forward" policy were what he had in mind, but he apparently felt that his readers could easily draw their own conclusions.

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