

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

[Redacted]

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(When Filled In)

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

FILE

COUNTRY UAR/INDIA/CHINA

REPORT NO. [Redacted]

SUBJECT PRIME MINISTER NEHRU'S MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT JAMAL ABD-AL-NASIR

DATE DISTR. 4 DECEMBER 1962

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

DATE OF INFO.

PLACE & DATE ACQ.

APPRAISAL

REFERENCES [Redacted]

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE [Redacted]

1. [Redacted] COMMENT. RATAN KUMAR NEHRU, SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE INDIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY, AND ASOKE KUMAR SEN, INDIAN MINISTER OF LAW LEFT CAIRO ON 30 NOVEMBER AFTER DELIVERING A MESSAGE FROM NEHRU TO NASIR ABOUT INDIA'S DISPUTE WITH CHINA.) THE INDIANS MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

2. PRIME MINISTER NEHRU WAS CONCERNED ABOUT ANY UAR PRESS STATEMENTS FAVORABLE TO THE CHINESE, WHICH THE CHINESE HAVE NOW REPLAYED. NEHRU WAS ALSO CONCERNED ABOUT ARTICLES UNFAVORABLE TO HIMSELF IN THE CAIRO PRESS. [Redacted] COMMENT. UAR INFORMATION MEDIA HAVE STRONGLY FAVORED INDIAN SIDE OF CASE.)

3. THE UAR AND OTHER NON ALIGNED COUNTRIES WITH NO IMMEDIATE

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THREAT FROM CHINA WERE ASKED TO DENOUNCE CHINESE AGGRESSION.

4. NEHRU DID NOT DECLARE WAR ON CHINA BECAUSE HE FEARED INVOCATION OF THE MUTUAL DEFENSE CLAUSE IN THE SINO-SOVIET TREATY.

5. NEHRU VIEWED THE BANDARANAIKE PROPOSAL FOR A SIX POWER CONFERENCE OF MEDIATORS (PORT GBLD WILL FWD) MOST OF THE COUNTRIES ASKED TO PARTICIPATE WERE UNDER DIRECT THREAT FROM THE CHINESE.

6. NEHRU WAS AWARE OF A SECRET BURMESE-CHINESE AGREEMENT WHEREBY BURMA HAD AGREED TO REFUSE TO COOPERATE WITH ANY COUNTRY WHICH TOOK AN UNFRIENDLY POSITION TOWARD CHINA.

7. NEHRU FELT THAT INDONESIAN PRESIDENT SUKARNO WANTED FOR INTERNAL REASONS TO STRENGTHEN THE POSITION OF THE CHINESE AS OPPOSED TO THAT OF THE INDIANS.

8. NEHRU FELT THAT ALL INDIA'S NEIGHBORS WERE AFRAID TO RAISE THEIR VOICES AGAINST CHINA. SECRETARY GENERAL NEHRU MENTIONED AFGHANISTAN IN PARTICULAR.

9. NEHRU WAS AWARE THAT YUGOSLAV PRESIDENT TITO COULD NOT TAKE AN OPEN MAJOR STEP TO HELP INDIA AS TITO DID NOT WISH TO EMBARRASS THE SOVIET UNION.

10. NEHRU WAS AWARE THAT HE HAD BEEN UNABLE TO ROUSE PUBLIC OPINION IN INDIA AS NASIR DID AT SUEZ. COMMENT:
 THAT NASIR SAID THIS POINT WAS PART OF SECRETARY GENERAL NEHRU'S PRESENTATION. IT SOUNDS MORE LIKE A NASIR ELABORATION.)

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11. THE ENVOYS EXPLAINED THE MILITARY POSITION AND FRONTIER CLAIMS ON A MAP. THEY MADE THE POINT THAT THE CHINESE GOAL WAS TO GAIN A STRATEGIC JUMPING OFF POINT FOR SUBSEQUENT OPERATIONS AGAINST INDIA.

12.

[REDACTED] COMMENT: NASIR'S PRIVATE REACTION WAS THAT NEHRU WAS WAS FRIENDLY. [REDACTED] FOOLISH AND NAIVE EVER TO HAVE DEPENDED ON THE SOVIETS FOR PROTECTION. NASIR'S STATED REACTION WAS THAT HE WOULD "DO HIS BEST" TO BRING PRESSURE TO BEAR FOR A SETTLEMENT.) [REDACTED] COMMENT: THE INDIAN REQUEST WAS NOT FOR MILITARY AID BUT FOR INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT. NASIR [REDACTED] THOUGHT INDIA HAD MADE TOO MANY ENEMIES AND THAT THEREFORE IT WOULD BE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO ROUSE SUPPORT AMONG THE NON ALIGNED COUNTRIES.)

13.

END OF MESSAGE

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