


[Redacted]

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: JUN 2002

10 April 1964
[Signature]



EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Findings of the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) Observer Team to Panama Concerning Panamanian Charges of Aggression against the United States

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
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1. [Redacted] April 1964, the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) Observer Team to Panama has completed the first draft of its report to the ICJ on its findings as to Panamanian charges of aggression by the United States under Articles 3, 5, and 20 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. If the ICJ accepts this report, it will be made public by the end of April 1964.

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2. [Redacted] The Team believes that the student march on 9 January 1964 was carefully prepared and did not have the characteristics of a spontaneous student movement. There is reason to believe that the Panamanian authorities, including the Minister of Foreign Affairs, was informed beforehand of the students intent to demonstrate. The Team finds that mob violence began in Panama City prior to the student return from Balboa High School.

3. The Team received no evidence of any attempts by the Government of Panama (GOP) to assuage, entreat, or otherwise control the mobs in spite of repeated attempts by Canal Zone authorities to have the GOP call out the National Guard. The Team believes that if the National Guard had taken charge early on 9 January or soon thereafter, violence would probably not have taken place. On the contrary, the Team finds that Panamanians were allowed to use press and radio without restriction to inflame the situation and to misinform the public. Panama City broadcasts were cited as perhaps a major factor contributing to excitement in Colon where the National Guard remained disarmed during the most difficult days.

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Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification~~

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4. The Team found, however, that there was no indication that any Canal Zone authority tried to persuade Americans to behave quietly at the Balboa High School. It also found that the Zone Police used riot control batons "too aggressively." But the firing of bullets and tear gas was the only means by which the limited number of Zone Police could attempt to control massive crowds. The Team found that some Zone Police fired revolvers into, rather than over, crowds bent upon destruction. When the United States Army took over, it called upon both Panamanians and Americans to return to their homes. The Commanding General, USARSOUTHCOM, made request through appropriate Panamanian authorities to have fire directed against the Canal Zone stopped. Failing this, after a two-hour wait, and when Panamanian fire from a variety of arms grew in volume and effectiveness, the Commanding General ordered selective firing against identified snipers by United States marksmen.

5. Conclusions on the charges


a. As to United States violation of life, liberty and security of persons: The Team was "unable to reach a decision" that any such right had been violated. United States forces acted to prevent injury to persons and property from unlawful violence. While the Team had grave doubts that the force used against Panamanians was not in excess of that absolutely necessary, it recognized that temper and violence of Panamanians was such that there was little doubt that real threats to life and property existed and had to be met with strong measures. In short, Panamanian violence justified measures adopted by Canal Zone authorities.

b. As to United States violation of the right of assembly: The Team was unable to conclude that there was a violation of this right. Panamanian mobs did not constitute peaceful assembly, but posed violent, immediate hazards to life and property. The Team qualified this by stating that Canal Zone authorities could have handled the situation with greater foresight, that Panamanian students should have been better protected, and that United States students and adults should have been more firmly handled. However, the Team strongly condemns Panamanian authorities for failure to curb and control Panamanians.

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C. As to United States violation of the right of freedom of movement and residence: The Team was unable to conclude that there was a violation of this right.



Richard Helms
Deputy Director for Plans

CSDB-3/660,532

Orig.: The Director of Central Intelligence

Special Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

Thomas C. Mann
Assistant Secretary of Inter-American Affairs,
Department of State

The Director of Intelligence and Research,
Department of State

The Honorable Cyrus R. Vance
Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Honorable Stephen Ailes
Secretary of the Army


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The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director for Intelligence
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