

2 April 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: NSC Meeting

1. I briefed the NSC on the following items as per the attached briefing notes:

- a. Soviet Space and Missile Developments
- b. Sino-Soviet Dispute
- c. South Vietnam
- d. Brazil

2. I then asked Col. King to brief in further detail on developments in Brazil which he did, utilizing the teleconference report of 1500Z, April 2nd, between Secretary Ball and Ambassador Gordon. A copy of this telecon is in the file.

3. With respect to the Soviet VENUS shot, I called the President's particular attention to the security breach which appeared on March 31st in the NEW YORK TIMES' Finney article entitled "Soviet Fails in Two VENUS Probes", and a parallel article using practically the same text which appeared in the Washington Post. I stated that USIB were considering recommendations on an investigation and I would present such recommendations to the President. The President responded that I should go forward with any investigations I felt appropriate and he would approve any actions I desired to take.

NOTE: In a later conversation with Bundy and Alexis Johnson, they explained that both of them, together with Spurgeon Keeny, had considered releasing the substance of the Finney article but after talking with Dr. Wheelon had decided against doing so. All three were very much surprised that the article appeared in the paper and disclaimed any responsibility.

ACTION: Depending upon USIB's decision, I should instigate a USIB investigation or an FBI investigation. In the event of the latter, the subject should be discussed with the President. Also I agreed informally to review the USIB decision with Mr. Bundy prior to proceeding.

4. Secretary Rusk stated that Amb. Bohlen was meeting with de Gaulle today to discuss South Vietnam.

ACTION: We should be on the alert for Bohlen's report.

5. Rusk stated that it was his and the Department's opinion that CIA was in no way overstating the depth of the Sino-Soviet split, indicating that the Department was studying carefully any evidence of actions by one party of the controversy against the other. He said no physical actions were discernible as yet but Rusk raised the question of the possibility of the abrogation of the Soviet-ChiCom Mutual Defense Treaty.

ACTION: We should continue to study this problem in depth and confer from time to time with State. I should be kept informed for personal discussions with Rusk.

6. Rusk then brought up the question of the UAR relationship. He said that the Department believed that no benefits had as yet been derived from our attempts to reach an understanding with Nasser. Nasser had failed in his commitments in the Yemen; there were now more troops in the Yemen than ever before and furthermore he had taken overt action against Aden. Furthermore Nasser had stimulated Libya's efforts against the U.S. and British bases and was continuing to agitate this issue. Additionally Nasser had been uncooperative in our numerous efforts to bring the Middle East arms race under control. Rusk said he raised this question with, and informed the Consul, that U.S. policies towards the UAR and Nasser were under penetrating study by the Department.

ACTION: DDI should give this matter continuing consideration and should discuss the subject with appropriate people in the Department and also with me.

7. Rusk then reported on Panama, stating that status quo remained, that there was a possibility that today or tomorrow there would be a break which would permit us to move to the conference table. There was no change in our position.

NOTE: In a previous conversation with the President and others, it appeared that the Panamanians were moving away from their intransigent position and they themselves were creating a more favorable climate. In this conversation, which took place on April 1st, the President asked me personally if I thought we were acting correctly on this Panama issue. I replied that I felt his position was defensible and would not recommend any changes.

JAM/mfb