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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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SUBJECT

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1.

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- BUNDY-SMITH
- BATOR
- BOWDLER
- BOWMAN
- CHASE
- COOPER
- HAYNES
- JESSUP
- JOHNSON
- KEENEY
- KLEIN
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2. THE ~~OVER-ALL~~ SITUATION IN BURMA TODAY IS AN UNSETTLED AND UNHAPPY ONE FOR THE PEOPLE OF BURMA. IN CONTRAST TO THE DAYS WHEN U NU WAS PREMIER OF BURMA AND HIS GOVERNMENT WAS NOT CAPABLE OF MAKING ITS PRESENCE WIDELY FELT, THE REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT OF THE UNION OF BURMA (RGUB) PERVADES EVERY FACET OF LIFE IN BURMA TODAY. THE POWER CENTER IS THE ARMY, LED BY NE WIN, AND NE WIN IS THE RGUB. ALTHOUGH THE BURMA ARMY HAS A REPUTATION OF BEING THE GROUP THAT BROUGHT INDEPENDENCE TO THE PEOPLE OF BURMA, AS NE WIN'S INSTRUMENT THE ARMY HAS BECOME THE ORGANIZATION WHICH HAS ESTABLISHED ITSELF AS A NEW CLASS, ACTING AS THE VANGUARD OF THE BURMESE WAY TO SOCIALISM, REGULATING THE DAY-TO-DAY LIFE OF ALL STRATA OF BURMESE SOCIETY.

3. NE WIN'S POWER STEMS FROM BURMA ARMY SUPPORT, AND IT IS PRINCIPALLY WITH THAT SUPPORT THAT HE STAYS IN POWER, ALTHOUGH HE DOES ENJOY A PERSONALITY AS A FIGHTER FOR BURMESE INDEPENDENCE. CONVERSELY, THE ARMY IS DEPENDENT ON NE WIN (ITS LEADER AND OBJECT OF ITS LOYALTY) FOR ITS UNITY AND COHESIVENESS. NE WIN IS AS ESSENTIAL TO THE ARMY AS THE ARMY IS TO HIM.

4. GIVEN THE SUPREME POSITION OF NE WIN AND HIS ARMY IN BURMA TODAY, IT IS NECESSARY TO ASSESS THE PROBABLE EFFECTS ON THE ARMY OF ITS POLICE STATE ACTION IN ARRESTING ALMOST 300 BUDDHIST MONKS AND SECOND-LEVEL POLITICAL PARTY LEADERS

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BETWEEN 27 AND 30 APRIL 1965. THE MONKS AND THE GOVERNMENT HAVE BEEN ON A COLLISION COURSE FOR SEVERAL MONTHS. THE BUDDHISTS HAVE BEEN DETERMINED TO MAINTAIN WHAT THEY CONSIDER A RIGHTFULLY INDEPENDENT POSITION IN RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS IN BURMA, BUT THE RGUB HAS HAD AN EQUALLY STRONG DETERMINATION TO FORCE THE MONKS TO PURIFY THEMSELVES, CONFINE THEIR ACTIVITIES TO RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS, AND TO LEAVE POLITICS ALONE. THE ROLE OF THE ARRESTED POLITICIANS IN THE RECENT MONK AGITATION IS NOT COMPLETELY CLEAR, BUT A SENIOR BURMESE [] OFFICIAL HAS SAID THAT THE RGUB HAS EVIDENCE THAT SOME ~~EX~~ POLITICIANS, MOSTLY ~~(AFPFL)~~ **ANTI-FASCIST PEOPLE'S LEAGUE** IN THE MANDALAY AREA, WERE COLLABORATING WITH MANDALAY MONKS IN THEIR ~~ANTI~~ GOVERNMENT ACTIVITIES. WHAT THE MONK LEADERS WERE UP TO WAS CLEAR AND WELL PUBLICIZED. THEY OPENLY CHALLENGED NE WIN, CALLED HIM A COMMUNIST MILITARY DOG, AND DISPUTED THE RIGHT OF HIS GOVERNMENT TO REGULATE A MAJOR RELIGIOUS ORDER OF THIS COUNTRY. IN ADDITION, THE MONKS HIT THE RGUB AT ITS MOST VULNERABLE POINT WHEN THEY OPENLY QUESTIONED THE RGUB'S ABILITY TO OPERATE AN EFFICIENT ECONOMIC SYSTEM IN BURMA. NE WIN'S SWIFT CRACK-DOWN ON THE BUDDHISTS WAS PROBABLY PARTLY BECAUSE HE REALIZES ECONOMIC PROBLEMS ARE THE MOST SERIOUS ISSUES HE FACES TODAY.

5. THE RGUB MUST BE GIVEN CREDIT FOR REALIZING IT HAD A TIGER BY THE TAIL AND THAT WHATEVER STEPS WERE TO BE TAKEN AGAINST THE BUDDHISTS HAD TO BE CAREFULLY WEIGHED, ELSE THERE

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COULD BE A BACKFIRE. CERTAINLY THE LESSON OF ARMY PERSONNEL FIRING UPON BUDDHIST MONKS IN HUE, SOUTH VIETNAM, IN MAY 1963, WAS NOT IGNORED. THE RGUB HAS BEEN WISE ENOUGH TO SIDESTEP SEVERAL OCCASIONS WHEN SERIOUS CONFRONTATION APPEARED LIKELY, PUBLICLY IMPLORING THE ELDER BUDDHIST LEADERS TO THROW OUT THE FALSE (POLITICAL) MONKS. THE MANDALAY MONKS WERE ASKING FOR TROUBLE AND PROBABLY EXPECTED THEY WOULD EVENTUALLY GAIN POPULAR SUPPORT. SOME OF THEM OPENLY BOYCOTTED THE GOVERNMENT SPONSORED ALL-SANGHA CONFERENCE IN MARCH AND SUBSEQUENTLY THEY ATTACKED POLITICAL SYMBOLS OF THE RGUB, PEOPLES STORES AND THE OFFICES AND HOMES OF BURMESE SOCIALIST PROGRAM PARTY OFFICIALS. THESE PUBLIC ANTI-RGUB ACTIVITIES BY THE MONKS INCREASED IN FREQUENCY IN APRIL AND GOT ONE THING THE MONKS WANTED: THAT ARMY FORCES WOULD BE CALLED OUT TO ASSIST THE POLICE TO MAINTAIN ORDER. THERE WERE MONKS WHO HOPED THAT SOME MILITARY WOULD FIRE INTO A CROWD OF CLERGYMEN, BUT FORTUANATELY FOR ALL, INCLUDING THE GOVERNMENT WHO FEARED JUST SUCH AN UGLY INCIDENT, THIS DID NOT HAPPEN. WITH THE MIDNIGHT ARRESTS OF APPROXIMATELY 150 MONK LEADERS, THE GOVERNMENT PUT AT LEAST A TEMPORARY LID ON THEIR ACTIVITIES. THE BUDDHIST MONKS MUST NOW REGROUP, BUT THE SWIFT RGUB ACTION WILL BE A DETERRENT. IF THE MONKS FAIL TO RESUME THEIR AGITATION WITHIN A FEW WEEKS, THEIR DISSIDENCE AS A SIGNIFICANT FORCE MAY BE FINISHED.

6. THE ARMY CAN PROBABLY FEEL IT WAS WELL JUSTIFIED IN

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TAKING THE ACTION IT DID, ALTHOUGH CERTAINLY THE EFFECT IT COULD HAVE ON THE PUBLIC IMAGE OF THE ARMY WAS WEIGHED CAREFULLY BY THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL IN ARRESTING THE MONKS.

THE ARMY MOVED AGAINST A RELIGIOUS GROUP WHICH GENERALLY HAS A CLOSE BOND WITH BOTH PEASANT AND WORKER IN MUCH OF BURMA.

NOW THAT THE DEED IS DONE, NE WIN HIMSELF MUST EVALUATE WHAT EFFECT THIS ACTION WILL HAVE ON HIS OWN PERSONAL POPULARITY, PARTICULARLY WITHIN THE ENLISTED RANKS OF THE ARMY: THE COMMON SOLDIER OF THE ARMY HAS BEEN LONG SAID TO HAVE GREAT ADMIRATION AND LOYALTY FOR THE GENERAL, BUT THE AVERAGE SOLDIER ALSO COMES FROM PEASANT STOCK AND HAS ~~BEEN~~ TAUGHT TO RESPECT THE MONKS.

7. NEVERTHELESS, NE WIN HAS MADE IT CLEAR THIS TIME, AS HE HAS DONE BEFORE, THAT HE WILL NOT GIVE QUARTER TO THOSE WHO STAND IN THE WAY OF ACCOMPLISHING HIS REVOLUTION. WHETHER THE BUDDHIST ISSUE WILL CAUSE A SCHISM WITHIN HIS OWN REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL/^(RC) BEARS CLOSE WATCHING. IT APPEARS THAT THERE HAS ALREADY BEEN SOME DIFFERENCE OF VIEWS ON HOW TO HANDLE THE MONKS. [REDACTED] INDICATE GENERAL LUN TIN, COMMANDER OF THE NORTHWEST COMMAND WITH HEADQUARTERS IN MANDALAY, RESISTED USING THE HEAVY HAND. LUN TIN, A MEMBER OF THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL, IS BELIEVED TO BE UNDER DETENTION IN RANGOON. SOME MEMBERS OF THE RC MAY BE TEMPORARILY UPSET AT LUN TIN'S MISFORTUNE, BUT IT IS REASONABLE TO ASSUME THAT THESE DISAGREEMENTS WILL BE TEMPORARY AND THE DIFFERENCES SWALLOWED. ALL MEMBERS OF THE RC OWE THEIR EXISTENCE IN POWER

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TO NE WIN, AND ALTHOUGH OFFICERS SUCH AS BRIGADIER SAN YU AND COLONEL THAN SEIN ARE DEVOUT BUDDHISTS, THEY FIRMLY BELIEVE ARMY RULE UNDER NE WIN IS WHAT BURMA NEEDS.

8. AT THE LOWER LEVELS IN THE MILITARY, AMONG JUNIOR OFFICERS AND ENLISTED MEN, IT WOULD SEEM THAT THE JAILING OF MONKS COULD HAVE AN ADVERSE EFFECT ON THE MORALE OF THE ARMY. NE WIN IS SUPPOSED TO BE THE FRIEND OF ALL THE PEOPLE IN BURMA, NOT A POLICE OFFICER, FOR HE HAS EMPHASIZED THE ARMY MUST BE THE FRIEND OF THE WORKER AND PEASANT. IN THE DAY OF U NU, THE BUDDHIST CLERGY WIELDED SIGNIFICANT INFLUENCE IN GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS, BUT UNDER THE RGUB THERE IS A DIFFERENCE IN THE STATUS OF MONKS. THE RGUB EXPECTS THEM TO SUPPORT, NOT LEAD, THE REVOLUTION. THE RGUB MADE IT CLEAR IN AUGUST 1964 THAT THE BUDDHISTS MUST CONFINE THEMSELVES TO RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS, BUT REALIZING THEY COULD NOT SUCCEED BY MEETING THE GOVERNMENT HEAD ON, THE BUDDHISTS SOUGHT A NEW COURSE DESIGNED TO ENLIST THE SYMPATHY AND SUPPORT OF PEOPLE AND CONCEIVABLY SOME MEMBERS OF THE MILITARY. THE MONKS OBVIOUSLY STIRRED UP WIDESPREAD INTEREST AMONG THE PEOPLE BECAUSE THEY WERE WILLING OPENLY TO CRITICIZE THE RGUB. HOWEVER, THE LACK SO FAR OF ANY OVERT POPULAR REACTION TO THE ARRESTS OF MONKS APPEARS TO MEAN THAT THE MONKS HAVE FAILED TO WIN THE POPULAR SUPPORT AND SYMPATHY NECESSARY TO RESTORE THEIR PAST POSITION OF INFLUENCE OR EVEN TO KEEP IT FROM ERODING FURTHER.

9. AT THIS TIME INFORMATION IS LACKING WHICH WOULD INDICATE

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THE SENIOR MILITARY OFFICERS, INCLUDING MORE CONSERVATIVE MEMBERS OF THE RC, FEEL DEEPLY ENOUGH ABOUT THE POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF THE BUDDHISTS' ARRESTS TO CONSIDER SERIOUSLY CHALLENGING NE WIN'S DECISION. WERE THERE ATTEMPTS OUTSIDE OF RANGOON, FOR EXAMPLE IN MANDALAY, BY REBEL MILITARY OFFICERS TO SET UP A POINT OF CHALLENGE TO NE WIN, IT IS BELIEVED NE WIN CAN AND WILL MOVE SWIFTLY TO PUT DOWN A COUNTERREVOLUTION. IN RANGOON, HE CAN RELY UPON THE LOYALTY OF VICE CHIEF OF STAFF SAN YU, WHO HAS OVER-ALL COMMAND OF TROOPS, AND UPON COLONEL TIN U, COMMANDER OF CENTRAL COMMAND, WHOSE HEADQUARTERS AND TROOPS, INCLUDING THOSE OF THE RANGOON GARRISON, ARE NEARBY.

10. IN THE SPRING OF 1964, THE INTERNAL CRITICS OF THIS GOVERNMENT AND WESTERN OBSERVERS BELIEVED THE COURSE OF NE WIN'S REVOLUTION WAS DIRECTED STRAIGHT FOR AN ERRATIC, BUT PRAGMATIC, BRAND OF COMMUNISM. THE GOVERNMENT WAS, AND STILL IS, HEAVILY PERMEATED BY "FORMER" COMMUNISTS AND COMMUNIST SYMPATHIZERS, THE MAJORITY OF WHOM ARE PRO-SOVIET AND WHO EXERT CONSIDERABLE INFLUENCE IN MATTERS OF INTERNAL POLICY AND ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT. MANY OF THESE "FORMER" COMMUNISTS HAVE BEEN GIVEN OFFICIAL AND IMPORTANT APPOINTMENTS IN MOST MINISTRIES AND DEPARTMENTS, AS WELL AS IN THE GOVERNMENT'S BURMA SOCIALIST PROGRAM PARTY. THE GOVERNMENT'S REVOLUTIONARY PROGRAM IS HEAVILY DOSED WITH MARXIST LEFTISM AND THE DETERMINATION WITH WHICH NE WIN AND HIS ADVISERS HAVE ATTEMPTED TO SPEED THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THEIR SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC REVOLUTION MAY PUT THEM

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IN THE DEPTHS OF ECONOMIC CHAOS BEFORE THEY REACH THE MILLENNIUM ENVISAGED IN THE BURMESE WAY TO SOCIALISM PHILOSOPHY. EVEN SOVIET DIPLOMATIC OFFICIALS IN RANGOON HAVE SAID NE WIN WAS PUSHING HIS REVOLUTION TOO FAST. MANY ASPECTS OF ~~SOCIOECONOMIC~~ LIFE IN BURMA HAVE BECOME SEVERELY DISTURBED BY THE RGUB, WITH A RESULTANT EFFECT ON SOCIAL PATTERNS OF LONG STANDING. THE FARMER, WHO MAKES UP THE BULK OF THE POPULATION AND BY NATURE IS INDEPENDENT, HAS BEEN UNHAPPY WHEN TOLD TO GROW MORE RICE IN ADDITION TO OTHER CROPS. HIS PURPOSE IN LIFE, HE HAS HEARD, IS TO WORK HARDER FOR THE BURMESE WAY TO SOCIALISM. (RICE EXPORTS, A PRIME SOURCE OF FOREIGN EXCHANGE, ARE REPORTED TO BE DWINDLING). INDUSTRIES AND BUSINESSES HAVE BEEN NATIONALIZED BY THE RGUB. INCLUDED IN THIS RIGID PUBLIC CONTROL WERE SMALL STORES AND SHOPS, WHICH THE RGUB HAS RUN WITH RED TAPE AND INEFFICIENCY. SHELVES ARE NEVER FULL, SOMETIMES BARE, AND FOR THE FIRST TIME PEOPLE QUEUE UP TO GET LITTLE OR NOTHING. HOUSEHOLDERS SPEND HOURS SEARCHING FOR DAY-TO-DAY NECESSITIES. FOR THE WORKER OR EVEN THE GOVERNMENT CIVIL SERVANT, THE OLD INSTITUTION OF PETTY CORRUPTION IS NOW CONSIDERED ECONOMIC SABOTAGE. HOWEVER, THE FACTORY WORKER OR COMMON LABORER FINDS THINGS IN SOME WAYS BETTER UNDER THE RGUB BECAUSE GOVERNMENT WAGE BOARDS SPEAK AND ACT IN THE WORKERS' BEHALF. ALTHOUGH THERE ARE WORKERS WHO BELIEVE THEIR RIGHTS HAVE BEEN IMPROVED BY THIS GOVERNMENT, THEY HAVE GIVEN ONLY PASSIVE SUPPORT TO THE RGUB. NOW THE

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EMPHASIS IS SHIFTED. A YEAR AGO, THE RGUB PROMISED TO ESTABLISH WORKERS' COUNCILS TO INSURE FAIR TREATMENT OF WORKERS. HOWEVER, ON 1 MAY 1965 NE WIN SAID THAT WORKERS' COUNCILS HAD NOT BEEN ORGANIZED BECAUSE WORKERS HAD FAILED TO ACHIEVED UNITY.

HE CRITICIZED THEIR APATHY AND SAID THAT THE SUCCESS OF THE REVOLUTION DEPENDED ON THE WORKERS UNDERSTANDING FULLY THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES TO INCREASE NATIONAL PRODUCTION. HE SAID THAT IF THE WORKERS WERE TO HAVE THE RIGHTS TO WHICH THEY WERE ENTITLED AND WANTED A BETTER STANDARD OF LIVING, IT WAS THE WORKERS' RESPONSIBILITY TO INCREASE PRODUCTION. IN EFFECT, THE ATTITUDE OF NOT GIVING A FULL DAY'S WORK TO THE GOVERNMENT WOULD NO LONGER ^{BE} COUNTENANCED.

11. THERE IS DISCONTENT AMONG OTHER GROUPS IN BURMA BESIDE THE MONKS AND THE PEASANT FARMERS. THE ~~EX~~-POLITICIANS, (THOSE STILL OUT OF JAIL), THE ETHNIC INSURGENTS (THE CHINS, SHANS, KARENS AND KACHINS), AND THE WHITE AND RED FLAG COMMUNISTS ARE BECOMING MORE ACTIVE IN THEIR OPPOSITION TO THE RGUB. THE CAUSE OF THE WHITE FLAGS SEEMS TO HAVE SOME APPEAL IN THE COUNTRYSIDE. AMONG THE DISSIDENT ELEMENTS IN BURMA, THE COMMUNISTS COULD PROBABLY CLAIM MORE COORDINATED LEADERSHIP ABILITY AND MAY BE ABLE TO DRAW TO THEM CERTAIN NON-COMMUNIST ~~EX~~-POLITICIANS WHO LACK WITHIN THEMSELVES EITHER THE COHESION OR LEADERSHIP TO ORGANIZE SUCCESSFULLY ON THEIR OWN AGAINST THE RGUB. FURTHERMORE, IT IS CONCEIVABLE THAT NON-COMMUNIST ELEMENTS, INCLUDING ETHNIC INSURGENTS, MIGHT INDIVIDUALLY AND SEPARATELY ENGAGE IN SUFFICIENT ANTI-RGUB ACTIVITY/^{TO} CONTRIVE NE WIN

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TEMPORARILY INTO COOPERATION WITH THE BURMESE COMMUNIST PARTY. THIS IS NOT PROBABLE BUT IS POSSIBLE. BUT AS LONG AS EACH OF THESE GROUPS APPEARSTO GO ITS SEPARATE WAY OR HAS NO EFFECTIVE LEADERSHIP, IT IS DOUBTFUL THAT THERE WILL BE A COORDINATED MASS REVOLUTION AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT. IT IS TRUE THAT BEYOND THE LIMITS OF CENTRAL BURMA, THE RGUB HAS PHYSICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL OF ONLY MAJOR CITIES AND TOWNS. A MAP OF BURMESE ETHNIC INSURGENCY AREAS SHOWS THAT MUCH OF THE COUNTRY IS NOT RESPONSIVE TO THE AIMS OF NE WIN'S REVOLUTION; RATHER THERE IS CLEAR OPPOSITION AND DISSATISFACTION. MOST GOVERNMENT EFFORTS TO SUPPRESS ETHNIC INSURGENCY **HAVE** BEEN OF A MILITARY NATURE, AND THERE HAVE BEEN FEW INSTANCES OF THE GOVERNEMENT'S ATTEMPTING TO INITIATE POLITICAL/ECONOMIC PROGRAMS TO TRY TO WIN COOPERATION OF THE INSURGENTS.

12. UNIVERSITY STUDENTS ARE QUIET POLITICALLY, PRIMARILY BECAUSE STUDENT ORGANIZATIONS ON CAMPUS ARE PROSCRIBED; HOWEVER, THE 7 JULY 1962 MASSACRE OF RANGOON UNIVERSITY STUDENTS BY NE WIN'S ARMY HAS NOT BEEN FORGOTTEN. THE GOVERNMENT IS WATCHING CLOSELY FOR SIGNS OF WHETHER STUDENTS, WHO BASICALLY COMPLAIN OF GOVERNMENT PROSCRIBED CURRICULA AND REPORTEDLY ARE MEETING CLANDESTINELY IN SMALL GROUPS, MAY JOIN THE PHONGYI AGITATION AS A MEANS TO DEMONSTRATE AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT.

13. AMONG ALL OF THESE DISSATISFIED ELEMENTS, INCLUDING THE PEASANT, NONE OF THEM HAS WITHIN ITS RANKS AN OUTSTANDING PERSON WHO COULD LEAD THEM IN AN **ANTI** GOVERNMENT MOVE. AMONG FORMER ARMY

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OFFICERS, THERE IS PROBABLY ONLY ONE, ~~EX~~ BRIGADIER AUNG GYI, WHO HAS SUFFICIENT PERSONAL APPEAL TO ACT AS A COORDINATOR OF AN ANTI-GOVERNMENT MOVEMENT. A SECOND, BUT NOT REALLY A COMPETITOR, IS BO YANNAING, A FORMER MEMBER OF THE "THIRTY COMMANDS", WHO IS KNOWN FOR HIS BRILLIANT RECORD IN WORLD WAR II WITH THE BURMA INDEPENDENCE ARMY. BY HIS OWN ADMISSION, HE IS NOT A POLITICIAN OR ONE WHO ASPIRES TO POLITICAL LEADERSHIP, BUT HE IS WILLING TO GO UNDERGROUND TO LEAD A MILITARY MOVEMENT AGAINST NE WIN.

~~EX~~ THAT AUNG GYI, ALONG WITH EX-COLONEL KYI MAUNG AND POSSIBLY EX-VICE CHIEF OF STAFF FOR AIR TOMMY CLIFT, WOULD GO UNDERGROUND TO ORGANIZE AN ANTI-RGUB MOVEMENT. HOWEVER, IT IS NOT BELIEVED THAT EITHER AUNG GYI OR BO YANNAING COULD, WITHOUT SUBSTANTIAL EXTERNAL SUPPORT, ACHIEVE SUCCESS IN ENGINEERING A CHANGE IN GOVERNMENT WITH THE USE OF ~~IRREGULAR MILITARY~~ FORCES. THE EXCEPTION WOULD BE IF BO YANNAING OR OTHERS WERE ABOUT TO ASSASSINATE NE WIN AT AN UNEXPECTED MOMENT. BO YANNAING WOULD PROBABLY ATTEMPT SUCH ACTION IF HE THOUGHT HE HAD A CHANCE, BECAUSE HE IS KNOWN TO HAVE SERIOUSLY CONTEMPLATED ASSASSINATION OF THE GENERAL IN LATE 1963.

14. THERE IS UNREALITY IN THE PLANS OF BOTH AUNG GYI AND BO YANNAING TO TAKE TO THE JUNGLE. DESPITE THE SUPPRESSION OF THE BUDDHISTS AND THE TARNISH IT MAY GIVE TO THE ARMY IN THE MINDS OF SOME BURMESE, THE CAUSES OF AUNG GYI AND BO YANNAING AT THE MOMENT SEEM HOPELESS; IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT FOR EITHER OF THEM TO INFLICT GENERAL DEFEAT ON THE BURMESE ARMY. NE WIN REMAINS FIRMLY IN CONTROL AND ANY ACTION UNDERTAKEN BY ~~EX~~ LEADERS SUCH AS AUNG GYI CANNOT BRING

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ANYTHING BUT TROUBLE TO BURMA AND ITS PEOPLE. IF EITHER AUNG GYI OR BOUYANNAING GETS AN INSURGENT MOVEMENT UNDER WAY, HIS ACTIVITY WILL PROVIDE THE EXCUSE THE COMMUNIST CHINESE CAN USE TO PRESS THEIR DEMANDS, IF THEY WISH, ON NE WIN FOR COMMUNISTS TO BE INCLUDED IN THE RGUB. IF THE COMMUNIST CHINESE DID THIS, OR NE WIN REFUSED THEIR PROPOSAL, THE COMMUNIST CHINESE CAN BE EXPECTED TO ATTEMPT SOME SORT OF ACTION TO PRESERVE THEIR INTERESTS IN BURMA.

15. FOR THE SHORT RUN, EVEN THOUGH THE PHONGYIS SUFFERED A SET BACK WHEN THE PRINCIPAL LEADERS IN MANDALAY WERE JAILED, IT IS BELIEVED THAT THEY WILL ATTEMPT A COMEBACK. THIS WILL NOT BE IN THE SENSE OF SEEKING WIDESPREAD POPULAR SUPPORT IN BURMA FOR THEIR ~~ANTI~~ GOVERNMENT MOVEMENT, BUT WILL PROBABLY TAKE THE FORM OF UNCOORDINATED MOVES IN DESPERATION. [REDACTED]

HAVE INDICATED CERTAIN YOUNG MONKS WERE WILLING TO ENGAGE IN SELF-IMMOLATION, BUT IT IS MORE REASONABLE TO PREDICT THAT THE MONKS WILL ATTEMPT TO BAIT THE ARMY, USING THE "VIETNAM METHOD." AS AN RGUB [REDACTED] OFFICIAL RECENTLY STATED, "THE MONKS WANT CORPSES." IF THIS ASSUMPTION IS CORRECT, THE THING TO FEAR IN THE NEAR FUTURE IS AN INCIDENT, FOR EXAMPLE IN MANDALAY, WHERE THE MONKS DELIBERATELY PROVOKE RGUB ARMY UNITS ON PATROL TO FIRE AT THE YELLOW ROBES. IF SUCH HAPPENS, THIS WILL CREATE VERY SERIOUS PROBLEMS FOR NE WIN AND THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL.

16. FOR THE LONG RUN, NE WIN MUST FACE SQUARELY THE SERIOUS DISLOCATION THAT THE GOVERNMENT'S ECONOMIC PROGRAM HAS BROUGHT TO BURMA. NE WIN HAS PUT TOGETHER A PATCHWORK OF COMMUNIST AND SOCIALIST

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ECONOMIC THEORIES WHICH HE BELIEVES WILL WORK IN BURMA. WHETHER THEY WILL IS SERIOUSLY OPEN TO QUESTION, BECAUSE WHAT NE WIN NEEDS MOST IS TIME IF HIS ECONOMIC POLICIES ARE TO BE CONSOLIDATED AND WORKED OUT SUCCESSFULLY. MALDISTRIBUTION OF DAILY NECESSITIES, INCLUDING RICE, HAS CAUSED DISCONTENT, IRRITATION AND DISSATISFACTION, AMONG ALL STRATA OF LIFE IN BURMA, AND THERE IS NO INDICATION THAT THESE ECONOMIC PROBLEMS WILL BE SOLVED QUICKLY. WHAT IS CLEAR IS THAT THEY ARE KNOWN TO EVERY CITIZEN IN BURMA AND THESE PROBLEMS CANNOT BE LOCKED UP IN THE MIDDLE OF THE NIGHT LIKE REBELLIOUS BUDDHIST MONKS AND SCHEMING ~~EX~~ POLITICIANS. THEY ARE THE MOST SERIOUS CHALLENGE THAT THE RGUB FACES NOW. FOR THE MOMENT, NE WIN APPEARS TO HAVE SUCCESSFULLY ENDED A TEMPORARY CRISIS CREATED BY THE MONKS WHO DID NOT GET WIDESPREAD POPULAR SUPPORT OR REACTION TO THEIR CAMPAIGN. HOWEVER WITH THE MONSOON COMING, IN JULY, AUGUST AND SEPTEMBER, IT WILL BE EVEN MORE DIFFICULT FOR THIS GOVERNMENT TO INSURE THE ADEQUATE DISTRIBUTION OF COMMODITIES.

17. AS LONG AS NE WIN REMAINS IN POWER, THERE APPEARS TO BE A MORE THAN EVEN CHANCE THAT THE RGUB WILL BE ABLE THROUGH RIGID POLICE STATE ACTIONS TO BUY MORE TIME IN WHICH TO EFFECT A MEASURE OF SUCCESS IN THE KEY MATTER OF ECONOMIC DISTRIBUTION. MOST CRITICS OF THE RGUB, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE MILITANT MONKS, APPEAR TO RETAIN RESIDUAL FAITH IN NE WIN AS A MAN. THE HOPE OF SUCH PEOPLE IS THAT HE IS NOT A COMMUNIST BY DESIGN, AND THAT ONCE HIS REVOLUTION HAS SOME SUCCESSES AT WHICH TO POINT, AND A RESULTING UPSURGE OF PUBLIC CONFIDENCE BECOMES EVIDENT, NE WIN WILL BECOME MORE BENIGN, PRISONERS

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WILL BE RELEASED FROM JAIL AND A REGIME MORE COMPATIBLE WITH TRADITIONAL BURMESE WAYS WILL EMERGE. THIS HOPE DOES NOT APPEAR TO APPLY TO ANY OTHER OF THE RGUB LEADERS. NE WIN'S SUDDEN REMOVAL, THROUGH ASSASSINATION, ILLNESS OR RESIGNATION, WOULD QUICKLY THROW BURMA INTO A CHAOTIC SITUATION IN WHICH CONFIDENCE IN THE RGUB WOULD COLLAPSE, AND A POWER STRUGGLE WOULD ENSUE. THUS THE HOPE OF CONTINUED STABILITY AND EVENTUAL ECONOMIC PROGRESS IN BURMA RESTS SQUARELY WITH NE WIN AND HIS CONTINUED WILLINGNESS AND ABILITY TO LEAD THE RGUB.

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END OF MESSAGE

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