

~~U. S. SECRET~~

1179

To: The Minister

4 September 1944

From: George E. Brewer, Jr.

I am returning the four documents which you handed me on Friday: telegram 1555 of August 5; 336 of August 17; and 21810 of August 11; and also copy of letter from Apollo to X/US.

I am also enclosing with these documents the draft of the cable which you asked me to make. I have shown it to Tikander because I wanted to be certain that it did not conflict with any of his ideas. He has indicated that it does not. I hope it may be of some use to you in phrasing your reply, and I would be delighted to confer with you if you feel that this is necessary.

I have received a further letter from my Headquarters in London in reply to my letter of August 15 (copy enclosed), the first two sentences of which read as follows:

"Your letter of August 15th which replied at length to the cable which we forwarded you from 109 contained exactly the sort of statement which we wished to have in order to support the representations which we intend to make to 109 during his visit here. We quite agree that the present status of our mission does not permit large-handed operations at this time."

If you would care to see the whole letter I will be very glad to have a copy struck for you.

George Brewer.

APPROVED FOR RELEASE  
DATE: JUL 2002

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M

To: The Minister

4 September 1944

From: G. E. B. Jr.

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I received this morning the following cable from my Headquarters in London:

"Joseph KLOMAN, chief instructor for OSS in Washington two years covering X2, SI, SO, OG, now with MO, attached SHAEF, chief training PWD, considered by us as valuable assistant to you /grp ind/ over all Westfield plans and training.

"He worked with LETHBRIDGE whom you know before coming to OSS.

"Cover, transportation, and release can be arranged here. HASKELL approves. Please wire your reaction."

I propose to answer it as follows:

"KLOMAN welcome addition. Assume his cover is not repeat not State Department. Please confirm.

"Have him briefed very carefully by X Section. Hasten his arrival."

This man has nothing whatever to do with Mr. Stahl but would be extremely useful in instructing and briefing any agents whom we may send to the field. I assume my Headquarters in London have arranged a cover job for him not directly connected with the Legation, but I wish to query them on this point.

I am holding up my reply until I hear from you that it has your approval.

George Brewer-

~~U. S. SECRET~~

011698

HTJ

To: The Minister

28 August 1944

From: George E. Brewer, Jr.

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The enclosed cablegram refers to my letter, a copy of which I sent you about ten days ago.

I will cable Col. Haskell with regard to Mr. Stahl when you decide whether or not you feel you can provide him a cover job in the Special Reporting Section.

George Brewer -

011698

Copy for the Minister

13

T E L E G R A M

From: London

August 23, 1944

22323 (32)

August 24, 1944

From: Haskell & Herman

To: 444

Rest assured our full agreement. Your letter was deliberately evoked. Follow original directive until further notice. (Nr. 32 to 444 from Joseph Haskell and Herman). We still suggest Stahl as assistant unless cover absolutely cannot be arranged. Letter follows.

011698

To: The Minister ✓

23 August 1944

From: George E. Brewer, Jr.

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Dear Mr. Minister,

I have just received the following cable from London with regard to Mr. Stahl, about whom we conversed the other day.

Mr. Stahl is 33 years old and was the world traveling supervisor for the Staley Corn Products Company from 1935 to 1941. He was the principal administrative officer in the Department of Agriculture in 1942. In 1943 he was in South America in the Liaison Intelligence Division, O.E.W., State Department. Later he was Chief of the Central European Desk, O.S.S., in Washington, and since June, 1944, he has acted as Assistant to the Chief of the German Desk in London.

I hope that you will find it possible to afford Legation cover for Mr. Stahl in the Special Reporting Section. As you know, I feel somewhat embarrassed in making this request because of your great generosity to me in other matters of this sort in the past, and I think I can assure you, positively, that this will be the last request of this kind that I shall be forced to make. I will let my superiors in London know your decision whenever you let me know what it is.

Most sincerely yours,

George Brewer -

011698

London

August 16, 1944

336 (17)

August 17, 1944

17 Top Secret 687 from 908 re your 15. Approval in principle Grieg project received today from 154. Will discuss further with 154 on his arrival. Meanwhile urge you consider seriously 109's message of 4 August to Minister and do everything possible to pave way for Grieg approval. This project part of general plan evolved in London for introduction of agents into Germany during period of collapse. View shortness time consider it advisable Odin stay Sweden until collapse period and accompany his men southwards. Odin will be briefed with SHAEF objectives. OWI project one of genuine usefulness and should provide satisfactory cover. Assure you we have full confidence in Odin and have no intention of violating existing agreement.

011698

U. S. ~~SECRET~~

To: X/US, (Copies to Col. Haskell and DS/US)

From: APOLLO

15 August 1944

Dear X/US,

As suggested in my cable No. 808 to X/US, 109's two cables have raised complicated issues, and they will have to be dealt with at some length and in considerable detail.

I am still proceeding on the principle that I am to report directly to you (via DS/US) on all German matters, and not directly to 109; although you and/or Col. Haskell forwarded me a recent cable from 109 without comment (except for para 5 which concerned X/US/1).

Before getting into the meat of 109's cable, I want to point out that there appears to be a serious misconception in his mind, and possibly in Col. Haskell's mind too, of our capacity to recruit and train W/T operators. My report of June 16th, quoted an earlier letter asking you if you were interested in getting a W/T operator into Germany, and it stated, "There are possibilities that we might make connections which would eventually lead to a feasible plan to do that." Later in the report the comment was made that "It looks now as though we might need Palladium's services to train and instruct possible W/T operators for work in Germany, as has been done in the case of Denmark."

As Headquarters London knew, the Danes in question were refugees with varying experience in Morse. They were interrogated and tested by Palladium, and on the basis of his recommendation, some of them were sent to the UK for complete training. The Germans I referred to are also refugees. Two of them have had a certain degree of wireless experience, and my thought was that if they proved satisfactory to you, from the security point of view, and if they were reasonably proficient in Morse, Palladium could polish them up and instruct them in W/T technique, the use of skeds, etc., right here on the spot.

We discussed this together when I was in London last month. Washington, not knowing the background, evidently has interpreted these comments far too optimistically, and evidently believes that we have a much wider field for recruitment than is the case. If we had any such possibilities for recruiting and training as they believed, it must have been obvious that I would have devoted more than six lines in a 50-page report to this subject. I think you, or Col. Haskell, ought to make this clear at once to 109, by cable, because his order that two teams be infiltrated into Germany at once, and three teams be placed in training, simply cannot be complied with. There are not ten men available. We shall be lucky, indeed, if we get four satisfactory

011698

recruits, and I can give no positive guarantee that even these will have the necessary qualities for under cover life in Germany or would be willing to go.

Specifically, there are two Germans, already known to 6206, whom we may be able to recruit. They are German deserters, who claimed on arrival to be Polish nationals, and who stated that they would be willing to return to Germany. X has already had a report from 6206 about these two men, and it is my belief that he felt the security risk in using them was a pretty severe one. Neither of the two men is trained in SO work, or in intelligence, although both, if their story is to be believed, have experience of living illegally in Germany. In addition to these men, 687 informs me that there are one or two Poles who may be available, who have some knowledge of Morse. Whether they could possibly live under cover in Germany, or if the Polish authorities here will release them to us, is not known at the moment. However, inquiries are now being made by 687 and we should know in a few days. He tells me that it is also possible that there may be one or two Dutch citizens who might also be recruited for this purpose. However, this would have to be done with the consent of the Dutch intelligence people, and it is by no means certain that we can get their services, although we are now endeavoring to find out all we can about them and to line them up as possible recruits. There may be one or possibly two more Germans among the refugees who could be considered, but we have absolutely no security check on any of them. That is about the field.

As to the larger issues raised by 109's cables: they seem to apply almost wholly to the German Section and I am assuming that no radical alteration is desired in the activities either of the Danish or of the Norwegian Sections.

With regard to the work of the German Section, I thoroughly appreciate the necessity for urgent action, in view of the rapidly developing military situation on the continent. However, we must be absolutely realistic as to what we are to do; how we are to do it, and when we are to do it.

The first point is that we here must know exactly what we are shooting at. Until the receipt of the cables I thought I had a pretty clear idea of what was wanted from this Mission by London, and since my return four weeks ago, I have been working along the lines which we discussed in London, and, as you know from my routine reports, we have made pretty good progress. I judge, however, from 109's cables, that the whole program for work inside Germany is now to be given much greater emphasis, and is to be carried

out on a much more ambitious scale than had been planned. The difficulty at the moment is that I am not at all clear as to what the nature and scope of these operations is to be. I gave you my opinion for what it was worth when I was in London, that the quickest dividends were going to be forthcoming in the field of intelligence, rather than in the field of sabotage, and for that reason my work here, and that of the SI branch, was being carried out in the closest possible collaboration. The SOE German Section here shared these views, and they, and we, and the SI Branch have tended to pool all our resources and information for a common effort. I still think this is the most effective way which we can work from Stockholm, and I still believe that the total amount of actual sabotage which could be carried on inside Germany, based from Sweden, will prove to be nothing but a drop in the bucket.

Can you give me some clearer picture as to what the general program is so that we can fit our work more intelligently into its pattern? I am listing in later paragraphs in this letter all our present resources and plans so that you can be in a position to estimate the degree of assistance which you can reasonably expect from Stockholm.

Once the picture of major strategy is clear, the next step is for us to analyze the exact contribution which we in Westfield can make. As I see it - Washington, London, and Stockholm (and presumably other outpost missions similar to Stockholm) are all part of one organized team. Each has certain facilities and capabilities and each has certain limitations in respect to the action it can take. Based on these facilities and limitations, each has certain logical responsibilities with regard to the overall German Mission.

It seems to me that we must all be quite clear about these points, too, if we are to coordinate our efforts successfully for work inside Germany.

The two cables imply that there is a strategic plan for SO operations in Germany. Naturally, I know enough about SO work to know what the general nature of these plans must be, but here in Stockholm we have no specific knowledge of any of its details. For instance, the demand that two teams of W/T operators be infiltrated into Germany at once, gives no clue as to what part of Germany they will be operating in, or whether or not they are to link up with an existing organization inside Germany, or whether they are to attach themselves to an expedition or an organization which will be sent out from the UK, or one of the other advanced operating bases. It is obvious, that there must be some plan of this sort because two wireless operators working by themselves, neither of whom is required, by the telegram, to be trained in SI or SO techniques, would obviously not be able to serve any purpose.

The greatest practical difficulty which confronts Westfield with regard to its German operations, at the moment, is that we have no going underground organization of our own within Germany, nor any connection with whatever underground organization that Special Force Headquarters in London has already established.

I rather gathered from my conversations with the X Sections in London, that neither X/US nor X have any effective organized cells within Germany with which we could make contact by couriers from Sweden, or to whom we could send W/T agents. I also gathered that they had a few "safe addresses" and "letter boxes" which could be used once they were convinced of the security of the courier routes which Westfield is currently working on.

From any operational point of view, courier routes should be kept entirely separate from the underground organization itself. The job of the courier is just that, and nothing more, - to deliver messages from one place to another. It is the job of the organizer himself to supply "safe addresses" and "letter boxes." We have lined up courier routes which can take messages and supplies, and probably "bodies" from Stockholm to various German ports. I say this advisedly, because the courier routes have not yet been tested, but from current reports of my agents, they are ready to function just as soon as we are ready to give them a job to perform. The fact of the matter is that we do not have anyone at the other end to receive the messages as we have in the case of the Norwegian and the Danish Sections.

In the case of such countries as Norway and Denmark, France and the Low Countries, where from our point of view we have a friendly population, trained organizers were despatched from the UK by air or boat to carry out the work of organizing cells, securing "safe houses", etc., and establishing communications via W/T with Headquarters. In the case of these countries there were plenty of potential recruits in the UK to receive this training and to be despatched in time to the field.

The case of Germany has been very different, and the job has had to be approached in a somewhat different manner. However, we cannot get around the fact that there must be trained organizers introduced into Germany. Here in Sweden we have a very limited field for recruitment, indeed, and absolutely no training facilities at all. I think we may all just as well face the fact frankly that we are probably not going to find any German nationals here who will meet the bill. There must be many times the number of prisoners-of-war in the UK and in the USA from which such recruits might be drawn, than there are in Sweden. Here there are a very small number of German deserters and refugees, most of whom are highly untrustworthy, and almost none of whom are subject

to any security check. They have all been considered either by SI, the Labor representative (who is just getting to work), or by 6206, and very few of them could even be considered for the job.

I think the most fruitful field for recruitment lies in Denmark, rather than in Sweden. I have talked this matter over with 7404 who believes that it might be feasible to set up, through MINT, a small recruiting organization in Denmark. There, there is both a German minority and native Danes with good German connections who could conceivably live under cover inside Germany. If such an organization were approved by you at Headquarters, I would suggest that you have direct communications with them by W/T on the recruiting program. Once they were established and had made contacts at the various north German ports, we could probably supply them with material, maintain communications with them, and issue any instructions desired by Headquarters by written message. If you in London can despatch organizers to the field by air or boat, we should be able to maintain the same sort of communications with them. We will try our best to recruit such organizers here in Sweden, and also more remotely in Norway. There is some possibility that the latter country may yield one or two recruits for eventual despatch to Germany. Frankly, I am not very hopeful about this matter so far as Sweden is concerned.

I gather SI has one or two contacts in Germany, but quite understandably, they do not want to imperil these contacts by turning over whatever "safe houses" they may have to us as termini for our courier routes. I quite understand this and I approve of their security in this matter.

I have dealt so far with the limitations with which we are confronted here in the matter of recruitment. So far as training is concerned, we have no facilities at all, with the possible exception of Palladium, whom I mentioned previously, who could be used to brush up men who are already familiar with the Morse code, but quite obviously, has neither the facilities nor the time to train raw recruits.

So far as transport is concerned it is obvious that we cannot introduce agents into Germany by air lift. There are two methods open to us. The first of these is by ships leaving Swedish or Norwegian ports; the second is by underground channels through Denmark.

At present we are working at top speed to secure boat routes which ply directly from Swedish ports to north German ports. We have been rather fortunate in the last two weeks, and apart from the case of "Skipper", we have discovered two other possible routes, one of which looks very promising, indeed.

In the case of the Norwegian ports we have established an organization in Gothenburg which in turn has made contact in Kristiansand, Norway. Through our Norwegian channels we have direct communication with the chief organizer of the boat routes in Kristiansand, by overland courier service. At present writing I feel free to tell you that I have good hopes that we can arrange for courier service from Norwegian ports directly to the north German ports, and that I believe these routes can be used not only for the transmission of messages, but also to carry "bodies."

Obviously, a direct line from a Swedish to a German port is preferable to the Norwegian or Danish routes, because in the latter two cases, three frontiers have to be crossed illegally, two of which are under enemy control.

In the matter of communications and supplies from Stockholm to anyone whom we may be able to infiltrate into Germany, the service is bound to be both irregular and slow. We are not set up here to handle direct W/T communications with Germany, nor is it the policy of London to permit us to do so. I should reckon that it would take between five and six weeks for us to send a message from Stockholm to any of the north German ports and receive an answer back.

Apart from the limitations I have already mentioned, it must be borne in mind that we are operating from Stockholm under diplomatic cover. In other words, we are engaging in wholly illegal activities within a neutral country which maintains a very active and efficient counter-espionage department. A blow-up of any proportions would have serious repercussions in the State Department, without whose help we cannot function at all. You will realize that this forces us to use the greatest possible care in our security, which in turn imposes delays of many kinds on our actions.

I may add in passing that we have not yet received permission from the State Department for the use of their pouch service for our illegal activities.

The possibilities of increasing our officer personnel in Stockholm, which was suggested in 109's long cable, is severely limited by the question of cover. Almost the only cover we can use today is that which can be afforded by the State Department. Naturally, I cannot speak for the Minister, but I firmly believe that we have almost reached the limit. The Legation is already heavily loaded with OSS personnel, and further requests for an increase in the present numbers will, in my view, almost certainly meet with resistance, the reason for which I can well understand.

I hope that this account will give you a clearer picture than you may have had, of the basic limitations to

the scope of action which we can expect to carry on from this base.

I now want to give you a very quick resumé on the positive side of the picture:

1. Through 6206's organization we have direct channels for distributing limited quantities of black propaganda inside Germany. We know that these channels are effective because we have had positive proof that at least a certain portion of the material sent through them has actually been delivered. These channels are entirely open to us for our use at any time we wish to make use of them.
2. 6206 has also succeeded in recruiting a Dane who is expected to depart for Hamburg just as soon as London can furnish us with the necessary forged documents. If this agent is successful in his Mission, he will organize "letter boxes" and "safe addresses" not only in Hamburg, but in other north German ports, to which, eventually, our courier routes (Westfield's) will lead, so that we may establish and maintain communications.
3. If Major is successful in his operation, we will have established a direct intelligence channel from Berlin to Stockholm, with really secure and swift communications by mail. We will also have established a general "letter box" to which any other contacts we may have in Germany may deliver their messages for direct transmission to Stockholm, and from which they can receive direct communications sent them from Stockholm.
4. We have lined up the various boat routes which I have already mentioned for courier service.
5. Apart from Germany proper, we have established routes into Norway and Denmark for the dissemination of black propaganda, which have already been proven, and which have already performed excellently in this respect.

If you in London can recruit and train organizers and W/T operators for the field, and are prepared to drop these men, not directly in Germany, but to reception committees in Norway and in Denmark, the chances that we could arrange from here for their further transport into Germany seems pretty fair. I am making this suggestion because we seem to have facilities for transport, and you certainly have the greater resources for recruiting and training.

U. S. ~~SECRET~~

-8-

It also seems to me London's duty to establish the overall operational policy for Germany and to prepare the operational plans. That does not seem to me, frankly, to be the job of this Mission. If it is, then the operational headquarters of the German Section should logically be in Stockholm and not in London. We will also have to count on London to supply us with forged papers, clothing, equipment, and propaganda material, and for security checks (insofar as they are required) of anyone whom we may be able to recruit here.

At the risk of being repetitious, I feel that the greatest need, at the moment, is the introduction of three or four completely trained organizers into Germany. There are no training schools here, and the only place in which they can be trained is in the UK. I presume that you have trained personnel there. If there is any way in which we can assist you in getting those people into Germany, either via Norway or via Denmark, or even at a pinch, via Sweden, we are prepared to help. But we cannot produce the trained agents here. In concluding, I should like to emphasize the importance of Westfield's close integration with the SI Branch and with the SOE. The resources of any one of these three is quite limited; the combined resources of all three are many times greater.

I hope you will let me have your views of this general analysis as promptly as possible, and I hope equally that this rather long account may prove to be of some value to you in your future planning.

Sincerely yours,

London

August 10, 1944

21810

August 11

Following is a Washington cable received from 109:

1. Westfield mission according to its report has facilities for training and recruiting WT operators and agents in Sweden for infiltration into Germany.

2. The time has come that this mission must perform and utilize (message nr. 10 to 444 from Joseph Haskell and Herman) its long period of preparation.

3. Two teams should be infiltrated into Germany at once and three more placed in training to follow as opportunities permit.

4. We understand there is close collaboration with SI, therefore the teams should be joint SO/SI missions. SO people will be engaged in the first instance primarily in reconnaissance. Action against targets should be timed with military movements only.

5. Despite your tentative objections suggest despatching ~~xxxx~~ Szahl rpt STagl at once, to organize recruiting and expedite operations. 109's recent message to Minister should help arrange cover quickly. Wire immediately arrangements made.

011698

Secret

Aug. 9

The Minister

Unless Sweden should change its policy of strict neutrality, the proposal is impractical and even potentially dangerous.

On the other hand, the Swedish government is cognizant of U.S. operations from here and has even been helpful when the question was merely one of gaining intelligence.

I am inclined to think that Sweden will opportunistically adopt a policy of benevolent neutrality in our favor and that the government would be disposed to turn a blind eye towards the proposed operations.

My recommendation is, since I understand Mr. Boheman knows about "Ty", that you sound Mr. Boheman out. You have had very frank, informal and off-the-record talks with him. Certainly he would not misunderstand. He is realistic.

Curt

011698

Washington

August 4, 1944

1555

August 5

This is message number 7.

109 for 155 info 105.

Please deliver the following message from me to Herschel Johnson personally:

Para 1. I have been deeply grateful for all your help. Now that the war has progressed to the point where it is apparent we should abandon the passive phase of our activities in your area and initiate affirmative action, I should like to submit to you for your advice and assistance the following matters which have been fully discussed with the State Department here.

Para 2. When the French phase has ended, a new problem will face us. We shall no longer have friendly forces behind enemy lines to assist us. It will be necessary to concentrate on basic SO operations with small patrols executing assaults from concealment, wrecking industrial plants and making audacious raids.

Para 3. We believe we shall be faced with an enemy driven underground. There will be no lack of sources on which they can draw: young and sincere Nazis, the vested interests of the Nazi régime, the losers in the Sudetenland and similar

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1555 continued

areas, deposed officials, young army officers.

Para 4. The Nazis are expert in underground activities. In their origins they came up from the underground and they have had to deal with all kinds of underground movements. They have been preparing for underground activities since the beginning: they have placed prospective leaders in innocent civil service or police positions; they have won over physicians and scientists to their side (many of whom may aid in hiding Nazis in hospitals, asylums, etc.) they will send little known potential leaders to asylum elsewhere to be ready when needed. We shall need all our vigilance and skill to combat them. We must identify their adherents, locate their supply dumps and secure intelligence as to their plans and activities.

Para 5. Our SO activities will have to be done by men we select for the work. We cannot rely on native help. To be effective, units must converge on Germany from our bases in neutral countries as well as from our elements located with the armies. We should contemplate using Sweden as a springboard for activities in Germany and Norway and would not conduct SO activities in Sweden itself.

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1555 continued

Para 6. We should not be integrated with SOE for SO work, since staff officers of one country cannot properly control armed units of another. These activities must be controlled in the field. However, the closest collaboration with SOE is contemplated.

Para 7. Against this background I should be grateful for suggestions from you concerning the possibilities of making your area a base (as a springboard) for the subversive and intelligence phases of our activities in Norway and Germany both directly and through Denmark. I should like you to consider before submitting your recommendations the penetration of Germany by intelligence and sabotage units, and the establishment from your area of communications with OSS units in the field. I particularly want your opinion as to how likely it is that there will be an efficient functioning underground possibly controlled from Sweden (at least in part) with "stay-behind agents," and a tightly knit organization which we can combat in EE with well trained personnel. There must be well known Anti-Nazis in Sweden who would be glad to aid in dealing with Nazi agents. We must look to our Swedish representative not only for the work he has been doing

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1555 continued

with you in intelligence, but for a forward operational job as well.

Para 8. Some of the questions that should be considered are: A) Can you help 155 to obtain and give to us a list of possible Germans who will assume leadership in underground resistance? B) Can affirmative action from there be initiated among French and other liberated labour groups in Germany?

Para 9. These questions are merely suggestive. I leave to you the formulation of other questions and answers that will come from thinking along these lines. In answering these queries it should be understood that OSS Sweden would largely be responsible for initiating and carrying through effective operations. We here would give it trained men to meet any plan you are prepared to support; we will advance funds and furnish OSS Sweden with supplies and leaders as the need arises.

Para 10. I am trying to prepare for the changed situation that will exist if we succeed in a major breakthrough to German lines in the next 60 days. I know you have thought about these problems. I should like the benefit of your thinking and the aid of your effective cooperation in devising and carrying through ways of meeting the new problems that will arise with invasion of Germany itself.

Para 11. While it is necessary to implement this quickly, I wanted to do nothing without first advising you of the situation and the necessity of immediate action.

011098