


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
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

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(b)(3)

6 November 1958



SOVIET MOVES IN GENEVA TALKS




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this statement foreshadows greater flexibility in the negotiations than it had earlier believed to be the case.

As late as 27 October, Soviet actions and statements suggested that Moscow intended to withhold further tests at least during the initial phase of the Geneva talks.



The continuation of Soviet testing after the opening of the Geneva conference probably reflects Soviet concern that suspension now might be interpreted as acceptance of the US-UK one-year test moratorium which, in Moscow's view, would dangerously restrict Soviet freedom of action. The Soviet delegation at Geneva can be expected to stand firm on its proposal for a permanent unconditional ban. The Soviet leaders probably hope they can bring further pressure on the Western position by warning that the USSR will halt its tests only after the United States and Britain agree to this proposal.

Foreign Minister Zorin implied that Moscow would resume testing only if the Geneva talks failed to produce agreement on a permanent and unconditional test cessation.

The decision to continue testing may have resulted from a last-minute reappraisal of the Western position in the light of Secretary Dulles' statement of 28 October that the US-UK proposal "involves really a two-year suspension." Moscow may have judged that

However, on 30 October, Moscow shifted to a harder line, asserting in an official statement that it would continue testing "as long as the governments of the United States and Great Britain continue to wreck agreement. . . ." The Russians may calculate that this reversion to a harder line, including further testing, would be the most effective way of forestalling Western moves toward the Soviet position, which could seriously embarrass Moscow.



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