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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

20 November 1958

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PART II

NOTES AND COMMENTS

SOVIET TACTICS IN GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS

Test Cessation

Both Geneva conferences remain deadlocked over agenda issues. At the ninth meeting of the conference on a nuclear test cessation agreement, Soviet representative Tsarapkin introduced a second revision of his draft agenda. Essentially the same as the draft presented on 11 November, the new proposal calls for agreement by the delegations to prepare two documents, one a treaty to stop tests and the other a "protocol" on a control system. The Soviet delegation has evaded the question of the precise relationship between these documents.

The USSR's insistence that an agreement on test cessation and the provisions of a control system be embodied in separate documents reflects Moscow's principal aims in the Geneva talks. First, the USSR apparently believes this approach will facilitate its efforts to sharpen the contrast between its demand for a permanent and unconditional cessation and the Western proposals for a conditional suspension stressing the necessity of prior agreement on a control system. Moscow is maneuvering to place itself in the strongest possible position so that in the event of a breakoff, it can charge that Western insistence on the priority of the control issue is an artificial device to evade an agreement to end testing.

The Soviet demand for two separate documents also is intended as a safeguard against any unexpected Western concessions which would seriously embarrass the Soviet leaders. Moscow has shown considerable

caution on the nuclear test issue since the United States and Britain proposed a conditional one-year suspension last August. The Soviet leaders recognized this proposal as a major challenge to their whole strategy.

The refusal of the Soviet delegate to discuss controls until a basic agreement on a permanent cessation of tests has been reached is a reversion to the position taken by Moscow prior to its agreement last May to attend the Geneva talks on test detection which held that negotiations on the control of any aspect of disarmament could come only after agreements have been concluded in principle.

The USSR's performance in Geneva to date suggests that its fundamental aim there, as at last year's London subcommittee talks, is to force a clear-cut showdown with the West on the issue of an unconditional test ban separate from all other aspects of disarmament. The Soviet attack continues to be aimed at what Moscow considers the most vulnerable points of the Western position--making a test cessation conditional on the implementation of other measures such as a control system, limitation and reduction of production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes, and reduction of conventional armed forces.

The Soviet news agency TASS on 15 November carried the full text of the original five-part Soviet draft agreement calling for cessation of tests, with only vague language on a control system. Despite this violation of the agreement to keep the talks secret, Moscow

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has not indicated any desire to break off negotiations.

Surprise Attack

The Soviet delegation at the talks on measures to prevent surprise attack continues its efforts to focus debate on broad political issues. In the 17 November meeting Kuznetsov reasserted Soviet objections to the Western working paper, again charging the West with intentions of using any inspection system for intelligence gathering.

Kuznetsov reiterated past Soviet charges against United States SAC bomber flights in the direction of frontiers of other states. He introduced a draft proposal recommending that the participating governments prohibit flights of aircraft carrying nuclear weapons over the territories of other countries and over open seas. The draft declares this practice increases the danger of surprise attack.

Both on 17 and 18 November the Communist delegation insisted that any joint communiqué include a reference to the Soviet proposal. Kuznetsov threatened that if no agreement were reached, each side would have to publish its own version. Both sides have made concessions on the communiqué but this wrangling may develop into an almost daily problem.

It seems likely that after the subject of aircraft flights is exhausted, the Communists will give similar treatment to other standard Soviet proposals, such as elimination of foreign bases, banning of nuclear tests, and reduction of armed forces. Thus, Moscow has begun its battle to present proposals of a political nature to blur the focus of the talks, thereby avoiding serious discussion and conclusions on the practical aspects of an inspection system.

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