


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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

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GENEVA TALKS

In further moves to establish a record which will place on the West the onus for any failure to reach agreements, Soviet bloc delegates in both Geneva conferences have introduced formal "declarations" summarizing bloc proposals and

criticizing Western positions. These declarations, one of which has already been published, are further efforts to place the bloc in the strongest possible position in the final stage of the talks and may foreshadow proposals to raise the talks to

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PART I

OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST

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the foreign minister level. In his 2 December interview with Premier Khrushchev, Senator Humphrey gained the impression that Moscow is willing to make some concessions in order to reach some kind of agreement for nuclear test cessation. However, the Soviet leader gave the impression he does not anticipate agreement on measures to prevent surprise attack.

Nuclear Test Cessation Talks

On 29 November the Soviet delegate introduced a declaration stressing the "merits" of the Soviet position and accusing the West of evading an agreement by insisting on detailed discussion of a control system. After listing four major points in the Western position which "cast doubt on the successful completion" of the talks, the Soviet declaration stated that the USSR would not object to the inclusion of "basic provisions on control" in a treaty on the cessation of tests. This ostensible concession was intended to remove a weak point in the Soviet position--the vague relationship between the Soviet-proposed treaty and a protocol on controls.

On 1 December the Soviet delegate clarified the declaration, stating that although he would prefer to have the treaty and control provisions embodied in two separate documents, he was prepared to accede to Western insistence on one document. The Soviet delegate objected to the article in the American draft agreement requiring the parties to pledge prompt and full cooperation with a nuclear weapons test control organization on the grounds that the American concept would create

not under control of the three nuclear powers.

On 3 December the Soviet delegate retreated from the recommendations made by the experts at Geneva last summer for a world-wide inspection system, alleging that the technical talks at that time did not examine the question of whether an "entire" system was needed. He is now insisting that any control organization be limited to the three nuclear powers, with decisions based on unanimous agreement. This, in effect, would provide Moscow with a veto over all actions of the organization.

It is apparent from his further comments that the Soviet delegate is particularly interested in his government's veto power over decisions involving inspection of any suspected violation. He insisted that inspection be performed by ad hoc groups formed only after receipt of evidence from which the organization "decides" there is a "strong suspicion" of a nuclear explosion. He then contended that a system confined to the territorial possessions of the three nuclear powers and to the oceans would be adequate at present, since this would cover 80 percent of the territory of the world, and "100 percent of that of the nuclear powers."

The agreement to embody all commitments in one document is a concession in form only and does not alter the basic Soviet position that an agreed draft of a permanent and unconditional test cessation agreement with only the briefest reference to controls must precede discussion of the details of the control system.

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Surprise-Attack Talks

On 28 November the Soviet delegate introduced a declaration which spelled out bloc proposals linking "concrete measures" to reduce the danger of surprise attack with specific disarmament measures. The Czech delegate followed with a draft agreement along the same lines. Both documents restated with minor variations long-standing Soviet proposals for ground control posts and aerial photography to be accompanied by such "concrete" disarmament measures as reduction of foreign forces in Europe by one third and denuclearization of both parts of Germany.

For the first time, Moscow set forth its views on the number and general location of control posts at railroad junctions, major ports, and highways. According to the declaration, 28 control posts should be located on the territories of members of the Warsaw Treaty, including six in the USSR, and 54 posts in NATO and Baghdad

Pact countries, including six in the United States. These totals were said to be based on the density of population and communications networks.

In addition to Moscow's standard proposal for aerial photography in a zone 500 miles on either side of the demarcation line in Europe, the Geneva declaration for the first time extended aerial inspection to Greece, Turkey, Iran, Japan, and Okinawa. Aerial inspection zones in the Soviet Far East and the western United States were made conditional on the establishment of both ground control posts and aerial photography zones in Europe and the Middle East.

This omnibus plan linking inspection systems with specific disarmament steps is designed to sharpen the contrast between the bloc's demand for "practical" measures to prevent surprise attack with Western insistence on a careful technical study of the problem, avoiding political issues posed by the Soviet disarmament proposals.

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