


~~SECRET~~

//

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

11 December 1958

(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(S)



SOVIET TACTICS AT GENEVA

Test-Control Talks

The Soviet delegation to the nuclear test cessation talks at Geneva continued its efforts this week to create the impression of substantial progress toward agreement. At formal sessions on 6 and 8 De-

ember, the Soviet team approved two draft articles which would prohibit nuclear-weapons tests and establish a control organization with which "each of the parties (would agree) to cooperate promptly and fully." On 9 December the Soviet delegation introduced a lengthy

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

11 December 1958

detailed text of "basic provisions" for a control system in an effort to undercut Western charges that the USSR refuses to negotiate details of an effective system. The plan, designed to appear comprehensive in scope, fails to include the basic guarantees for a fool-proof system set forth previously by the West.

The plan calls for a "control organization" to be established by the "founder states" --the US, the UK, and the USSR. The organization would include a "control commission," a "technical system," ground posts, control posts at sea, and aircraft. The commission would direct all elements of the organization to ensure: continuous and effective observations over possible sites of nuclear explosions, carrying out of regular flights over the high seas, processing of data, and organization and carrying out of on-the-site inspections of suspected violations. It would review all cases of suspected violation and adopt decisions on the existence or nonexistence of "sufficient grounds" for sending out inspection teams.

The USSR insists that all substantive decisions of the control "commission" be subject to veto by any of the three "founder states" in the commission and that disputes be referred to the UN Security Council. The plan fails to meet Western requirements on other major issues. It does not provide for a truly international organization, requiring instead that all personnel at the control posts, except for one or two senior officials, be nationals of the country in which the post is located. Soviet delegate Tsarapkin contended

that his proposals were based on the report of the Geneva technical talks last summer or, in some cases, on the views expressed by the Soviet expert at those talks. Tsarapkin also alleged that these "basic draft provisions" were sufficient and that all other details should be covered in agreements drafted by the organization itself.

Tsarapkin's insistence that the Soviet control plan is derived from the Geneva technical report will probably be used by Soviet propaganda as a basis for charges that a Western rejection is another retreat from previous positions and agreements. While the USSR may be willing to compromise on such points as the make-up, privileges, and immunities of control post personnel, and on communication facilities for the control organ, it is unlikely to drop its insistence on unanimity on all important questions.

In a press conference on 9 December, Tsarapkin firmly rejected majority voting, stating that Moscow "cannot accept an automatic two-to-one majority against it." He claimed that a country suspected of conducting tests would be obliged by world public opinion to let inspectors into its territory. However, he did tell the Western delegates that it should be possible to find a compromise defining which questions require unanimity and which need only a simple majority.

Surprise-Attack Talks

The Soviet delegate to the surprise-attack talks continues to repeat previous

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

11 December 1958

criticisms of the Western technical approach to the problem while privately indicating his readiness to conclude the talks before Christmas on a mutually acceptable basis. Soviet press and radio comment is very pessimistic as to the outcome of the negotiations. Moscow radio has broadcast charges of "sterile discussions," which it attributes to the Western

"negative" attitude toward "constructive" Soviet proposals. Moscow is probably satisfied that its omnibus proposals on inspection and disarmament in the declaration of 28 November, made public on 7 December, contrast favorably with the West's insistence on a careful, technical study of the problem.

* * *

~~SECRET~~