

## CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)

## NUCLEAR TEST BAN NEGOTIATIONS

At last week's sessions of the nuclear test ban conference in Geneva, Soviet delegate Tsarapkin made no effort to compromise outstanding differences on key features of the control system or on the research program to improve detection techniques. On 13 April he stated that the whole question of a research program was a "sensitive political" question and the consequences would be serious if the US proceeded unilaterally without Soviet agreement. He declared that both the number of nuclear explosions and their purpose must be agreed to by the USSR.

Tsarapkin specifically objected to the inclusion of artificially muffled explosions in a research program and stated that the USSR could not agree to such experiments on the grounds that they were intended to devise means of evading controls. On the moratorium on underground tests during the research program, he repeated the

Soviet position that the three powers should not automatically be free to resume underground testing when the moratorium expired.

Tsarapkin also clarified the Soviet position as to when on-site inspections could be initiated. On 15 April he explained that inspections in the USSR could not begin until all control posts were installed in the territories of the three powers and in areas where other nuclear explosions might occur. Under the Soviet installation schedule, this would mean no inspections in the USSR could be made until after four years. He charged that Western attempts to show that there were previous inconsistencies in the Soviet position stemmed from a desire to create a propaganda situation in which the West could conveniently break off negotiations.

In his initial comment on the complete draft treaty

APPROVED FOR RELEASE  
DATE: JUL 2002~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

introduced by the Western powers on 18 April, Tsarapkin said that the USSR would study the draft but regretted that it did not take account of Soviet proposals on certain important issues.

The generally negative attitude of the Soviet delegation was also reflected in Khrushchev's remarks to Walter Lippmann in their interview on 10 April. According to Lippmann, Khrushchev cited three reasons why he had no great hopes for a test ban agreement. In the first place, Khrushchev claimed that Western opposition to an agreement was shown by the proposals for 20 on-site inspections in the USSR, since he had been led to believe, presumably by Macmillan, that the West would be satisfied with three "symbolic" inspections.

Secondly, Khrushchev said that since the French were testing, they were unlikely to sign an agreement and would conduct tests for the US. When Lippmann mentioned possible Chinese Communist testing for the USSR, Khrushchev said while Peiping was moving in a direction where it could hold tests, this was not yet the case. He added that, when that time came, there will be a "new problem" and that the USSR would like all states to sign an agreement.

Khrushchev said his third reason was that the USSR could never accept a neutral administrator for the control system

and would insist on its proposal for a tripartite administrative council.

A member of the Soviet delegation stated that these two questions and the issue of artificially muffled explosions in the research program were the only important points of difference. He claimed that on all other issues the two sides were not far apart. Tsarapkin took the familiar line that the USSR deeply desired a treaty and that negotiations must continue in Geneva until a treaty is concluded.

The US delegation noted that the Soviet delegation appeared not to be under any pressure of time schedules and appeared willing to wait without making any concessions.

~~SECRET~~