[redacted]

Directorate of Intelligence

[redacted] Secret

[redacted]

A 10-Year Projection of Possible Events of Nuclear Proliferation Concern [redacted]

A Reference Aid

28

Secret
[redacted]
May 1983
Copy 167

Directorate of
Intelligence

Secret [redacted]

A 10-Year Projection of Possible Events of Nuclear Proliferation Concern [redacted]

A Reference Aid

[redacted]

Secret [redacted]
May 1983

A 10-Year Projection of Possible Events of Nuclear Proliferation Concern [redacted]

Introduction

Information available as of 21 December 1982 was used in this report.

Nuclear proliferation involves capability and intent; that is, the ability to construct a nuclear explosive and the motivation to do so. Capability largely comprises physical facilities and know-how. Intent is mainly a political question and involves a country's own balancing of factors affecting its security, prestige, and other interests.

The proliferation equation is affected by a variety of events, both political and technical. Relevant political events include leadership changes or emergence of new governments, establishment of cooperation among governments, and negotiation of contractual arrangements or agreements between governments. Relevant technical events include such occurrences as startup or acquisition of new facilities.

This paper is intended to give a concise overview of possible future events that could bear on nuclear proliferation. It is intended as a reference aid for nonproliferation policymakers to help prepare them to deal with such events, should they occur.

The main thrust of this paper is to project an integrated chronology of possible political and technical events over the next 10 years. The paper is organized by geographic regions and, within regions, by major countries of proliferation concern. Both supplier nations and countries viewed as potential proliferators are considered. A chronology of possible events is projected for each country and for key international nuclear organizations. This chronology is preceded by a pictogram that summarizes the near-term nuclear capabilities of countries of major proliferation concern.

The technical events are heavily concentrated on the startup of two types of sensitive fuel-cycle facilities: reprocessing and enrichment plants. Fast breeder reactors also are included, to the extent plans for such reactors can be anticipated. Other reactors are included only where they would have particular proliferation significance. Likewise, other fuel-cycle facilities are mentioned (for example, fuel fabrication plants) if they will materially aid a country in reaching nuclear independence.

For ease of reference, events concerning sensitive facilities—enrichment and reprocessing plants—are also presented chronologically in a separate appendix, grouped by type of facility and by geographic area.

This paper is an update of an earlier research paper published in July 1979. [redacted]

Pages: V. - 4

Exemptions: (b)(1), (b)(3)

[redacted]

North Korea has sought assistance [redacted] to build a nuclear power plant. Although these efforts have failed for financial and political reasons, we expect North Korea to continue to pursue its aim of acquiring a nuclear power reactor during the 1980s. We have no basis for believing that the North Koreans have either the facilities or materials necessary to develop and test nuclear weapons [redacted]

[redacted]

North Korea. North Korea has a small nuclear research program that includes the use of a 4-MW modified IRT-type research reactor supplied by the Soviets. This reactor was constructed during the 1960s at the Yongbyon nuclear research center [redacted]

Pages: 6-23

Exemptions: (b)(1), (b)(3)