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Talking Points for the DDI

28 January 1986

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Qadhafi's Vulnerabilities

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The US Government has a number of options available to apply additional pressure on Qadhafi.

[Redacted]

Qadhafi's most significant pressure point is the involvement of the Libyan military in unpopular foreign adventures.

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-- In our view, a campaign to increase pressure on Libyan forces in Chad is a viable option.

[Redacted] Libyan officers were admantly opposed to Libya's 1983 intervention and availble information indicates that Chad is still an unpopular assignment for Libyan officers.

-- Another option is highlighting Libyan military assistance to Iran. Public warnings that the US reserves the right to prevent Libyan officers from travelling to Iran if we believe it is in support of terrorism, supplemented in appropriate circumstances by political, military, [Redacted]

[Redacted] probably would neighten discontent in military circles. Qadhafi's sending military advisors to Iran has been opposed [Redacted]

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[Redacted] because of its war with a fellow Arab state, Iraq.

A more energetic and sustained media campaign by Washington emphasizing that Qadhafi--and not the Libyan people--is the target of recent US political, military, and economic measures would undermine Qadhafi's efforts to generate US sentiment to shore up his domestic position.

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-- Qadhafi and his principal deputy, Abd al-Salam Jallud, went out of their way to personally refute the remarks

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made by the President during his news conference asserting that US measures were not aimed at the Libyan people.

- Qadhafi has followed up by initiating a determined domestic campaign to convince Libyans that the US is trying to take away their independence.
- Increased US focus on Qadhafi personally would demonstrate US conviction that Qadhafi himself is responsible for Libyan lawlessness, putting the lie to his persistent claims that the Libyan people alone determine Tripoli's terrorist policies.

A program by Washington to publicly warn Third World governments of the dangers of receiving Libyan delegations would raise the political cost to Tripoli of its diplomatic and subversive activity. Such a program would highlight the fact that such delegations often include Libyan intelligence and terrorist operatives and are used to develop contacts with local dissidents.

- Issuing a travel advisory for countries where large Libyan delegations visit probably would embarrass Qadhafi and may prompt the host government to limit their contact with the Libyans.
- Additional measures the US could take to make it more difficult for Libyans to travel to Third World areas include singling out the groups or individuals the Libyans meet with and publicly questioning their political affiliations.