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
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
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
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
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The Turkish National Security Council has recommended tough action against Kurdish separatists.



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Turkey: New Measures for Dealing With Kurdish-Inspired Violence in the Southeast

The Turkish National Security Council (NSC) on 28 June recommended a series of measures designed to quell violence in southeastern Turkey. The situation there has apparently deteriorated in recent weeks as Kurdish separatists have stepped up their activities, and disputes between rival Kurdish forces have apparently spilled over into Turkey from Iraq.

According to the Turkish press, the measures call for the closing of all separatist societies and associations and the shutting down of their press organs. Additionally, tribes identified as engaging in "divisive" activities would be encircled by a cordon of security forces, and persons who have in the past participated in these activities would be banned from the area. To prevent clashes along the border, the NSC recommended the formation of an "air control security cordon" and the positioning of mountain commando units in the area. Turkish security forces would take control of what the separatists consider "liberated zones." Poor people would be relocated to "better" locations under government administration.

The NSC's recommendations follow several weeks of heightened concern on the part of the Turkish Government and military over violence in southeast Turkey. They may be derived from a plan reportedly submitted to Prime Minister Ecevit by the General Staff in mid-June. This plan, among other things, called for systematic house-to-house searches by the Turkish military, a military "show of force" in the southeast, and the construction of a network of roads to aid the movement of Turkish troops.

Turkish efforts to deal with the Kurdish separatist problem date back to the 1920s. Publicly, the government has often simply ignored the problem. But in June Prime Minister Ecevit, the Minister of the Interior, and

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the military Chief of Staff all made separate visits to the area, and the Turkish press has broken its virtual taboo against discussing Kurdish difficulties.

Most of the blame for the present difficulties is placed by both the press and the government on foreigners and foreign intelligence services--including both the CIA and the KGB. In speaking of "divisive" elements, however, the NSC made it obvious that the government is aware that Kurdish separatists inside Turkey contribute significantly to the problem.

Ecevit has apparently not yet accepted the recommendations. Repressive measures of this sort run counter to the personal beliefs of Ecevit, who desires to portray himself as a defender of human rights. He may, however, find it politically easier to adopt repressive policies to discourage violence in the remote southeast--where other than ethnic Turks are involved and the trouble can be blamed at least partially on foreigners--than to take similar measures against urban violence.

In any case, this would not be the first time he has authorized the use of force in Kurdish areas. In late April, during the rioting that followed the assassination of the mayor of Malatya, he decreed that regular troops could be employed to put down the violence. Subsequently, Turkish troops have several times been used to cordon off areas where particularly severe problems have existed.

The actual implementation of at least some of the recommendations may prove difficult if not impossible. Turkish security forces in the southeast have been considerably strengthened in both numbers and equipment during the past year, but the area is large, the terrain is difficult, and the roads are poor. Extending effective security control over the entire Kurdish area, including recaptured "liberated zones," might require more troops and money than Ankara is willing to commit. Ecevit will, however, be under heavy pressure from his security and military forces, as well as from his political opposition, to take whatever measures are necessary.

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