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APPROVED FOR RELEASE
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9 May 1968

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
9 May 1968

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

The Situation in Czechoslovakia
(As of 5:00 P.M. EDT)

1. The movement of Soviet troops toward Czechoslovakia is unconfirmed. Nevertheless, we believe Moscow may make some show of force designed to intimidate anti-Soviet elements in Prague. Rumors and unconfirmed reports of troop movements in Poland continued to be received and some have already become public and presumably have reached Prague. Neither Prague nor Moscow however, has directly commented on the current situation.

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2. As of 1545 hours, [redacted]

[redacted] no significant deployments of Soviet ground forces in East Europe or within the western USSR. [redacted]

[redacted]

We would expect to see all of these things if the Soviets seriously intended to intervene.

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
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
3. Some probably circumstantial information has become available.

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4. In Czechoslovakia, there is no evidence of

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(S) any unusual military activity.



There is no indication that any Czechoslovak units have been placed on an alert status.

5. Restrictions on the travel of journalists and

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs diplomats in Warsaw have fed rumors that Soviet troops

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(S) are passing through Poland toward Czechoslovakia.




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leaving Warsaw during the afternoon of 9 May. At the same time, the Polish press has continued to express its "anxiety and concern" over the work of Czechoslovak "reactionary antisocialist forces supported from the outside," aimed at "dividing Czechoslovakia from the brotherly socialist countries."



These
are areas where Soviet troops are stationed or where they might pass through Poland if they were heading West.

7. The Soviets probably hope that they can make their point in Prague by the mere show of readiness to intervene. The Soviets are not likely to make more than a display of force without a call for help from some segment of the Czechoslovakian Communist party. Overtly at least, they have done little to set the stage for an actual intervention, such as an announcement of maneuvers under the Warsaw Pact. There has been a loosening up of Soviet press and radio coverage on

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Czechoslovakia, but so far this gives no good guidance on their intentions. They have today greatly increased their broadcast hours in Czech^{and}oslovakia~~nt~~, but the content of the broadcasts has not been exceptional thus far.

8. A Czechoslovak broadcast on 9 May indicates that informed circles in Prague are feeling pressure. The commentator pleaded with "foreign listeners" to allow Czechoslovakia to build its new society, and added that "the future depends on how freely we make our decisions at home, how tolerant our allies will be.... But for God's sake let us not have even an implication of a repetition of the tragic history of the reckoning of Yugoslavia or perhaps even that of Budapest of 1956.... We would like to commemorate our 50th anniversary (as a republic)...not as a safe pawn or dominated by a foreign secret police....For this reason I want very much my words to travel beyond the frontiers of our country." The tenor of this broadcast, which was beamed about 3:00 P.M. EDT suggests that up to then no Soviet troops had crossed the border.

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