

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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COUNTRY ITALY

REPORT NO. TDCS -3/55

SUBJECT SEGNI'S VIEWS ON THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC (DC) PARTY SITUATION ON THE EVE OF THE DC NATIONAL COUNCIL

DATE DISTR. 26 JULY

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

DATE OF INFO. 23 JULY 1963

REFERENCES TDCS-3/554,538

PLACE & DATE ACQ.

APPRAISAL SEGNI'S VIEWS ARE PROBABLY ACCURATELY REPORTED

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENTS IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE

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FOLLOWING REPORT WAS PREPARED BY

AN ITALIAN

WHO KNEW HIS REMARKS WOULD REACH AMERICAN OFFICIALS.

1. ON THE EVE OF THE DC NATIONAL COUNCIL MEETING SCHEDULED TO BEGIN 29 JULY SEGNI HAD NOT CHANGED THE OPINION HE HAS HELD SINCE THE FAILURE OF NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE ITALIAN SOCIALIST PARTY (PSI) THAT ALDO MORO'S POSITION AS DC PARTY SECRETARY IS INDEED PRECARIOUS BUT NOT FATALY THREATENED. SEGNI IS DOING ALL HE CAN TO SHORE UP MORO'S POSITION. SEGNI'S PERSONAL RELATIONSHIP WITH MORO IS FAIRLY

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GROUP 1
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GOOD DESPITE SOME HARSH EXCHANGES BETWEEN THEM DURING THE FINAL FEW DAYS OF MORO'S ATTEMPT TO FORM A GOVERNMENT.

2. SEGNI BELIEVES THAT ON THE WHOLE MORO IS STILL THE BEST CHOICE FOR PARTY SECRETARY EVEN IF HE IS NOTICEABLY LACKING IN FIGHTING SPIRIT AND COURAGE. SEGNI HOWEVER CONTINUES TO HAVE A VERY LOW OPINION OF AMINTORE FANFANI, DESCRIBING HIM AS THE CANDIDATE OF THE COMMUNISTS FOR THE PREMIERSHIP. SEGNI BELIEVES THAT MORO FORTUNATELY IS AWARE OF THE SITUATION AND THAT IN HIS STRUGGLE WITH FANFANI, MORO CAN RELY ON THE SUPPORT OF THE "DOROTEI" WITH WHOM, ACCORDING TO SEGNI, MORO REMAINS ON GOOD TERMS. IF THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN MORO AND FANFANI WERE TO DEVELOP INTO AN OPEN FIGHT, WHICH HE THINKS UNLIKELY, SEGNI FEELS THAT MORO IS SURE TO HAVE THE MAJORITY OF THE DC PARTY WITH HIM. THIS MAJORITY WOULD BE FORMED OF MORO'S OWN "MOROTEI," THE "DOROTEI," ALL FACTIONS TO THE "DOROTEI" RIGHT, THE "BASE" AND THE "RINNOVAMENTO" GROUPS. THE LATTER TWO GROUPS ARE NOT UNANIMOUS IN THEIR SUPPORT OF MORO BUT THEY WILL NOT FOLLOW FANFANI IN ANY STEP THAT MIGHT FURTHER THREATEN THE UNITY OF THE PARTY.

3. ACTUALLY THE POSSIBILITY OF AN OPEN CLASH BETWEEN MORO AND FANFANI IS NOT GREAT. THE PROBLEM WILL NOT BE FACED AT THE NATIONAL COUNCIL MEETING. MORO WILL RETREAT AS TACTFULLY AS HE CAN UNDER ATTACK BUT FANFANI WILL NOT PUSH THINGS TOO FAR. AFTER HE OBTAINS WHAT HE THINKS ARE A FEW CONCESSIONS, FANFANI WILL LET THINGS STAND

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UNTIL THE DC CONGRESS, BUT HE WILL USE THE INTERVENING TIME TO PREPARE HIS GROUND FOR THE NEXT PUSH. MORO, MEANWHILE, IS ACCORDING TO SEGNI UNHAPPY WITH HIS PRESENT POSITION AND IF HE COULD DO SO GRACEFULLY WOULD RETIRE FROM THE SECRETARYSHIP.

4. SEGNI IS LARGELY IN AGREEMENT WITH THE "DOROTEI" WHO IN TURN ARE WORKING AS A GROUP AGAINST FANFANI. AT THE MOMENT SEGNI IS EXERTING HIS INFLUENCE PARTICULARLY THROUGH TREASURY MINISTER EMILIO COLOMBO WHO IN TURN WILL KEEP THE "DOROTEI" BEHIND MORO AT THE NATIONAL COUNCIL MEETING.

5. WHATEVER HAPPENS AT THE MEETING OR DURING THE NEXT SEVERAL MONTHS, THERE CAN BE NO DOUBT THAT SEGNI WILL EXERT HIMSELF TO THE UTMOST TO PREVENT THE RETURN OF FANFANI AS PREMIER. RATHER THAN DESIGNATE HIM, SEGNI HAS UNEQUIVOCALLY STATED THAT HE WOULD DISSOLVE PARLIAMENT AND CALL FOR NEW ELECTIONS. IN ANY STRUGGLE WITH FANFANI, SEGNI FEELS HE HAS CERTAIN ADVANTAGES. HE FIRST OF ALL IS NOT REQUIRED CONSTITUTIONALLY UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES TO NOMINATE ANY PERSON IN PARTICULAR. SECONDLY HE IS COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE ARMED FORCES, AND WITH THIS POWER HE IS DETERMINED TO SHOW A STRONG FRONT IN THE FACE OF ANY DISTURBANCES THE ITALIAN COMMUNIST PARTY (PCI) MIGHT MOUNT TO FORCE HIM TO ACCEPT FANFANI. COMMENT: THIS POINT OBVIOUSLY REFERS TO SEGNI'S CONVICTION THAT FANFANI IS THE PREFERRED CANDIDATE OF THE PCI FOR THE PREMIERSHIP. THIS IS A POLITICAL

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JUDGEMENT OF THE PRESIDENT BASED ON HIS INTERPRETATION OF THE SITUATION. GIVEN HIS POSITION, WHETHER ONE ACCEPTS OR REJECTS HIS JUDGEMENT, IT WILL HAVE A SIGNIFICANT INFLUENCE ON THE POLITICAL SITUATION.)

6. DESPITE THE FOREGOING, SEGNI SHOULD NOT BE LOOKED UPON AS HOLDING COMPLETELY NEGATIVE CONVICTIONS, IN FACT SEGNI WOULD WELCOME A MORO GOVERNMENT EVEN THOUGH, NOW THAT PSI SECRETARY PIETRO NENNI HAS IN SEGNI'S OPINION LOST CONTROL OF THE PSI, AN ACCEPTABLE CENTER LEFT IS HARD TO CONCEIVE. (SUB-SOURCE COMMENT: WITHOUT SAYING SO EXACTLY, SEGNI CLEARLY LONGS FOR A RETURN TO THE CENTER GOVERNMENT WITH A WORKING AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE LIBERAL PARTY (PLI) AND THE DEMOCRATIC SOCIALIST PARTY (PSDI).)

7. TO FURTHER EXPLAIN SEGNI'S ATTITUDE TOWARD FANFANI, SEGNI IS CONVINCED THAT FANFANI IS NOT ABOVE WORKING WITH THE PCI IN HIS FIGHT AGAINST MORO. IN FACT, SEGNI IS SURE THAT FANFANI HAS BEEN ENCOURAGING THE PCI TO PUT ADDED PRESSURE ON THE PSI AND THE REPUBLICAN PARTY (PRI) IN ORDER TO MAKE MORE TROUBLE FOR MORO AND THE "DOROTEI." SEGNI NOTES THAT FANFANI SHARES THE VIEWS OF FANFANI'S FRIEND AND ADVISOR, MAYOR GIORGIO LA PIRA OF FLORENCE, WHO IS NOW GOING AROUND SAYING THAT THE TIME HAS COME TO HAVE THE COURAGE TO TALK WITH THE COMMUNISTS. FANFANI, HOWEVER, WILL NOT CARRY HIS DOUBLE DEALING WITH THE PCI TO THE EXTENT WHERE HE WOULD HAVE TO BREAK WITH THE DC.

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8. ALL OF THE FOREGOING RAISES THE SPECTRE OF A POPULAR FRONT WHICH SEGNI FEELS IS A VERY REAL PROBLEM BUT THE DISSENSION WITHIN THE DC WILL PROBABLY STOP SHORT OF FORCING THAT SITUATION ON THE COUNTRY. SEGNI REALIZES THAT TO A GREAT EXTENT HE IS NOW THE TRUE KEY TO THE DC SITUATION. NOT EVEN THE "DOROTEI" HAVE SO CRUCIAL A ROLE. IN THE LAST ANALYSIS, THE POSSIBILITY IS ALWAYS IN SEGNI'S HANDS TO PREVENT THE FORMATION OF A GOVERNMENT RELYING FOR ITS MAJORITY ON PCI SUPPORT. THE "DOROTEI", HOWEVER, STILL HAVE A MAJOR ROLE TO PLAY AFTER THAT OF THE PRESIDENT. THE "DOROTEI" WILL SUPPORT MORO IN HIS STRUGGLE AGAINST FANFANI AND IN THE END FORCE THROUGH A SERIES OF COMPROMISES GRANTING FANFANI A FEW OF HIS POINTS BUT NOT MATERIALLY ADDING TO HIS STRENGTH. IN THIS WAY FANFANI WILL HAVE TO DESIST. HIS ESTEEM IN THE EYES OF THE OTHER FACTIONS WILL ALSO NOT HAVE BEEN ENHANCED. HE WILL THEN START PREPARING HIS GROUP FOR THE NEXT MAJOR BATTLE AFTER THE PSI CONGRESS.

9. FIELD DISSEM STATE CINCSOUTH (PERSONAL).

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