

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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COUNTRY WEST GERMANY REPORT NO. [] (b) (1)
 SUBJECT FOREIGN POLICY AIMS OF STRAUSS, DATE DISTR. 20 NOVEMBER 1961 (b) (3)
 SCHROEDER, AND SOME FDP LEADERS (S)
 PRECEDENCE PRIORITY
 DATE OF INFO. FALL 1961 REFERENCES IN []
 PLACE & DATE ACQ. APPRAISAL [] FIELD REPORT NO. []

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1. DECISIVE POWER COULD BE HELD IN THE NEW CABINET BY AN ALLIANCE OF STRAUSS, SCHROEDER, AND THE FDP "YOUNG TURKS." THE LATTER GROUP INCLUDES A VERY STRONG FACTION WITHIN THE FDP, DOES NOT INCLUDE MENDE, BUT DOES INCLUDE ALL THE FDP CABINET MEMBERS EXCEPT TREASURY MINISTER LENZ. ALTHOUGH THIS GROUP IS PREPARED TO ENCOURAGE THE RIVALRY BETWEEN STRAUSS AND SCHROEDER IN ORDER TO ENHANCE ITS OWN IMPORTANCE, IT IS WILLING TO OFFER SOME POLITICAL SUPPORT FOR STRAUSS, SHORT OF SUPPORTING HIM FOR THE CHANCELLORSHIP, AND THE VIEWS OF THIS GROUP ARE CLOSE TO THE VIEWS BOTH OF STRAUSS AND OF SCHROEDER.

2. "NEW REALISM" IS THE SLOGAN CHARACTERIZING STRAUSS, SCHROEDER, AND THE YOUNG TURKS. ALL AGREE THAT WEST GERMANY'S POSITION IN NATO MUST BE FURTHER STRENGTHENED, WITH WEST GERMANY BECOMING THE KEY EUROPEAN NATION IN THE ALLIANCE. THIS CONDITION IS CONSIDERED THE MOST IMPORTANT ONE IN A POLICY BASED ON "ENLIGHTENED NATIONAL INTERESTS." TO THIS END, THE GERMAN CONNECTION WITH THE WEST, PARTICULARLY WITH THE U. S., SHOULD BECOME CLOSER, SO THAT THE WEST WILL BE WILLING TO MAKE MORE CONCESSIONS TO WEST GERMANY. WITH THIS IN MIND, SCHROEDER AND STRAUSS ARE WILLING TO MINIMIZE BERLIN'S IMPORTANCE, SO THAT THE SOVIETS CANNOT USE THIS LEVER TO UNHINGE NATO OR TO FORCE CONCESSIONS FROM THE WEST LIKELY TO LIMIT WEST GERMANY'S POWER. EFFORTS SHOULD NOT NOW BE MADE TO REDUCE TENSIONS, SINCE THIS WOULD DETRACT FROM WEST GERMANY'S IMPORTANCE IN THE MAIN BATTLE LINE. ONCE WEST GERMANY'S MILITARY BUILDUP HAS REACHED A SATURATION POINT, TENSIONS CAN SAFELY BE

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REDUCED WITHOUT LIMITING WEST GERMAN POWER.

3. SCHROEDER, STRAUSS AND THE YOUNG TURKS AGREE THAT WEST GERMANY SHOULD HAVE THE RIGHT TO MAKE DECISIONS ABOUT ATOMIC WARHEADS BUT DISAGREE ON THE WAY TO ACHIEVE THIS RIGHT. STRAUSS THINKS THAT UNLESS THE U.S. AGREES TO SHARE ATOMIC WEAPONS AND THE RIGHT TO USE THEM WITH THE EUROPEANS, THE GERMANS AND FRENCH SHOULD COOPERATE TO PRODUCE ATOMIC WEAPONS OF THEIR OWN. SCHROEDER THINKS THE THREE WESTERN POWERS SHOULD BE PLAYED AGAINST EACH OTHER AND THAT THE GERMANS SHOULD RETRACT THEIR PLEDGE NOT TO PRODUCE ABC WEAPONS. A GERMAN ATOMIC DETERRENT COULD IMPRESS SOVIETS MORE THAN THE U.S. DETERRENT CAN SINCE NEITHER THE SOVIETS NOR THE EUROPEANS BELIEVE THE AMERICANS WOULD REALLY USE THEIR BOMBS. IF FACED WITH A GERMAN ATOMIC CAPABILITY, THE SOVIETS WOULD BE PREPARED TO MAKE MAJOR CONCESSIONS IN NEGOTIATIONS WITH WEST GERMANY. OTHERWISE, ANY CONCESSIONS THE SOVIETS MADE WOULD BE MADE TO THE WESTERN POWERS WITHOUT PRIMARY ATTENTION TO THE INTERESTS OF WEST GERMANY. SINCE WEST GERMANY COULD NOT IN ANY CASE PRODUCE MANY ATOMIC WEAPONS, THE WESTERN POWERS WOULD HAVE NOTHING TO FEAR. ON THE OTHER HAND, A STRONG MODERN ARMY SHOULD BE FORMED THAT COULD STOP ANY SOVIET CONVENTIONAL ATTACK. SCHROEDER, STRAUSS AND THE YOUNG TURKS AGREE THAT IF THE GERMANS COULD USE ATOMIC WEAPONS, THE SOVIETS MIGHT BE MORE GENUINELY INTERESTED IN AN ATOMIC BAN.

4. FOR THE TIME BEING SCHROEDER, STRAUSS AND THE YOUNG TURKS AGREE TO OPPOSE ALL PROPOSALS FOR REGIONAL DISARMAMENT OR ANY LIMITATIONS ON

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GERMAN ARMAMENTS. INSTEAD, THE WEST IS TO BE OFFERED A SUBSTANTIAL GERMAN CONTRIBUTION FOR DEFENSE, INCLUDING A SHARE IN THE COSTS OF CONTINGENCY MEASURES. IN THIS WAY, STRAUSS EXPLAINED TO THE FDP, THE THREE WESTERN POWERS CAN BE PREVENTED FROM LOOKING FOR POLITICAL OR OTHER CONCESSIONS TO REDUCE THEIR COSTLY ENGAGEMENT. "INCREASED GERMAN INTEGRATION INTO THE NATO COMMAND STRUCTURE," ACCORDING TO STRAUSS, MEANS THERE WILL BE BUNDESWEHR OFFICERS IN HIGHER JOBS IN ACCORDANCE WITH BONN'S DEFENSE CONTRIBUTION, E.G., COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, CENTRAL EUROPE, WHO, IN STRAUSS' OPINION, SHOULD SHARE IN DECISIONS ABOUT ATOMIC WEAPONS.

5. SCHROEDER, STRAUSS AND THE YOUNG TURKS DO NOT SUPPORT EUROPEAN INTEGRATION IN ITS ORIGINAL SENSE. "L'EUROPE DES PATRIES" IS SUPPORTED BY ALL THREE, INSOFAR AS THIS DOES NOT REDUCE WEST GERMANY'S SOVEREIGNTY. THEIR REASON IS THAT WITH COMPLETE EUROPEAN INTEGRATION IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE TO PURSUE "NATIONAL AMBITIONS AND RIGHTFUL CLAIMS," SINCE THE OTHER MEMBERS WOULD ALWAYS OBJECT. THEY SUPPORT THE INCLUSION OF THE UNITED KINGDOM IN EEC MAINLY AS THE BALANCING FACTOR AGAINST THE FRENCH. FURTHERMORE, THE U.K. WOULD NEVER AGREE TO ANYTHING CURTAILING NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTIES. WEST GERMANY WOULD ALMOST AUTOMATICALLY BECOME FIRST AMONG EQUALS IN EUROPE, ONCE DE GAULLE WAS GONE.

6. STRAUSS AND SCHROEDER AGREE THAT THERE CAN NOT AND SHOULD NOT BE REUNIFICATION BASED ON CONFEDERATION. INSTEAD, EAST GERMANY SHOULD BE INCORPORATED INTO WEST GERMANY. STRAUSS ENVISIONS LIBERATION WHEN EAST

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GERMANY IS NO LONGER A GREAT ASSET TO THE SOVIETS AND WEST GERMANY IS STRONG ENOUGH NOT TO BE OVERRUN WITHOUT SOME EFFORT. HE BELIEVES A REVOLT IN EAST GERMANY COULD BE USED AS A PRETEXT TO HELP ENSLAVED PEOPLE. SCHROEDER BELIEVES THE SOVIETS WILL EVENTUALLY BE PREPARED TO GIVE UP EAST GERMANY IF THIS WILL SPARE THEM CONTINUOUS CONFRONTATION WITH THE U.S. IN EUROPE. A STRONG GERMANY WHICH WOULD BE NO REAL THREAT TO THE SOVIET UNION BUT WOULD GUARANTEE THE STATUS QUO IN EASTERN EUROPE WOULD ALSO BE ADVANTAGEOUS TO THE USSR.

7. THE YOUNG TURKS BELIEVE REUNIFICATION SHOULD CREATE A GERMAN REICH, NOT JUST AN ENLARGED WEST GERMANY. THEY AGREE THAT NECESSARY STRENGTH MUST FIRST BE BUILT UP. WHEN THIS IS ACHIEVED, HOWEVER, NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE SOVIETS SHOULD BE UNDERTAKEN WITH AN OFFER TO DISSOLVE NATO IN EXCHANGE FOR REUNIFICATION. THEY BELIEVE RELATIONS WITH THE SATELLITES SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED IN ORDER TO OVERCOME THESE COUNTRIES' OPPOSITION TO REUNIFICATION, AND THAT LARGE-SCALE ECONOMIC PROGRAMS SHOULD BE INITIATED IN THE FORM OF AN EASTERN EUROPEAN DEVELOPMENT PLAN.

8. THE WESTERN POWERS CANNOT BE RELIED ON TO HELP ESTABLISH A UNITED GERMANY IN ANY FORM BECAUSE THE WESTERN POWERS ARE NOT SUFFICIENTLY INTERESTED UNLESS A UNITED GERMANY WOULD IMPROVE THEIR OWN POSITIONS. PROPOSALS FOR A UNITED GERMANY WHICH WOULD STRENGTHEN THE WESTERN POSITION ARE UNACCEPTABLE TO THE SOVIET UNION.

9. DIFFERENCES EXIST CONCERNING THE TIMETABLE AND STEPS TO BE TAKEN

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PRIOR TO REUNIFICATION. SCHROEDER THINKS REUNIFICATION IS IN THE DISTANT FUTURE AND THAT, IN THE MEANTIME, THE SOVIETS SHOULD BE CONVINCED THEY WOULD FARE BETTER IF THEY LIBERALIZED THE EAST GERMAN REGIME. CERTAIN ECONOMIC CONCESSIONS COULD BE MADE IN EXCHANGE FOR LIBERALIZATION. CONSIDERATION COULD EVEN BE GIVEN TO RECOGNIZING A LIBERALIZED EAST GERMAN GOVERNMENT. STRAUSS DOUBTS THAT LIBERALIZATION HAS ANY VALUE AND BELIEVES IT WOULD REMOVE THE POSSIBILITIES OF REVOLT IN EAST GERMANY. HE DOES NOT RULE OUT DE FACTO RECOGNITION, IF THIS WILL CONTRIBUTE TO THE MILITARY BUILDUP IN WEST GERMANY. THE YOUNG TURKS TAKE A SHORTER VIEW AND WANT TO INCREASE CONTACTS WITH EAST GERMANY BECAUSE THEY FEEL THAT WEST GERMANY CAN MORE EFFECTIVELY UNDERMINE EAST GERMANY THAN VICE VERSA.

10. STRAUSS, SCHROEDER AND THE YOUNG TURKS AGREE THAT WEST GERMANY SHOULD NO LONGER PAY FOR THE RIGHT TO BE ACCEPTED IN WESTERN COUNCILS. FROM NOW ON, THERE WILL BE NO MORE PLEADING BUT RATHER DEMANDS FOR RIGHTS BASED ON CONTRIBUTION AND POTENTIAL. CONCESSIONS AND SACRIFICES WILL ONLY BE MADE IF THEY IMPROVE WEST GERMANY'S POSITION AND STRENGTH.

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