

*W. Brennan*  
*V Bundy* 9

17 September 1963

SUBJECT: Views of Police Official Duong Van Hieu

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1. Police strongman Duong Van Hieu, whose secret police (Special Police Branch and Special Action Section) responsible with Colonel Tung forces for mass arrests Buddhists and students past weeks, told [redacted] that statement not true his office provided "hard evidence" which recent Times of Vietnam article claims available to GVN concerning CAS coup plotting. Hieu statement was tongue in cheek type with emphasis on term hard evidence.

2. In further conversation re Times of Vietnam allegations it evident Hieu convinced U.S. press personnel in Vietnam are CAS officers and that CAS has many covert operatives (not known to GVN) in State, USOM, USIS and among American businessmen in Vietnam. It also evident Hieu believes CAS, directing above elements and similar elements other countries, is responsible for local and international groundswell anti-GVN sentiment. When asked specifically whether he believed all this, however, Hieu shrugged shoulders and said he only discussing prevalent rumors which perhaps now supported to some extent by articles appearing in American press. Asked specifically which American press articles meant, Hieu made vague references Daily Mirror and Herald Tribune.

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3. Hieu asked [redacted] to comment on Times articles, especially alleged rumor that CAS spent 50 million dollars on coup plot. [redacted] replied that coup plot rumor, like rest of "Times" series of attacks against CAS, premeditated combination of lies and fabrication which reflect both the intention and integrity of the person who wrote them. [redacted] asked whether Hieu, being an intelligent man, felt it logical that Americans would spend hundreds of millions building up the GVN from nothing, then plot to tear it down again. Hieu said it does not seem logical.

4. Hieu again made reference to para 2 "rumors" and said with apparent bitterness that GVN has serious problem with Vietnamese intellectuals and educated professional class. Hieu contrasted American Doctor Dooley, whom he really admired, with unnamed Vietnamese doctors who go abroad for further education and research then elect to stay there and dabble in political intrigues from afar. Hieu added that those doctors who do return to Vietnam refuse to work in the provinces where they are desperately needed, and seek instead to secure a political position within the GVN. When this is denied them, Hieu added, they become part of the politically dissatisfied, and seek foreign sympathy here or in places like Paris and Washington. Hieu stated further that the Vietnamese intellectual, once educated, isolates himself from the Vietnamese people and serves no useful function, electing instead to involve himself in political intrigues

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
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in Saigon, Paris and Washington. Hieu did not bring his point into further focus, apparently satisfied to leave it as a general condemnation of such individuals as sources of political information or materiel for political action.

5. Later in the conversation Hieu returned to the above subject, this time to inject the idea that dissatisfied political elements are sometimes communist controlled. Hieu said he had broken up a Viet Cong operation through the arrest of a university professor who, during the "recent difficulty" had used his position to agitate against the GVN. Hieu found, he said, that the professor had been recruited by the Viet Cong several years ago as a "sleeper". His instructions had been to avoid political activity, push the instruction of democratic principles and processes, build a student following and wait for further instructions. When the "recent difficulty" started, Hieu said, the professor was recontacted by the Viet Cong and given instructions to agitate against the GVN, which he allegedly did, and was arrested. Hieu said sleepers such as this are emerging during this crisis.

6. Hieu's attitude throughout the conversation was one of solid support to the regime and its current course of action. He seems convinced that CAS is up to no good in Vietnam and is responsible for the current diplomatic friction between the U.S. Government and the GVN.

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