

~~TOP SECRET~~

Mr George Bundy²

SC-11180

Cuba

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Memorandum



THE CUBAN SITUATION

16 December 1962


APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: DEC 2002

EO 12958 6.1(c)>25Yrs

PREPARED FOR THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL.


FURTHER DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION
CONTAINED HEREIN IS NOT AUTHORIZED.

JFK LIBRARY
MANDATORY REVIEW
CASE # NLK- 02-30C
DOCUMENT# 52



~~TOP SECRET~~

~~This document contains classified information affecting the national security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, US Code Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798. The law prohibits its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized persons, as well as its use in any manner prejudicial to the safety or interest of the United States or for the benefit of any foreign government to the detriment of the United States.~~



EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(C)

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

EO 12958
3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(S)

[REDACTED]
16 December 1962

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

MEMORANDUM: The Cuban Situation

The Continuing Soviet Military Presence in Cuba:

1. Since the withdrawal of the Soviet strategic missiles and the IL-28s, we have not noted any significant reduction in the number of Soviet military personnel in Cuba. We estimate that some 16,000 remain.
2. Recent photography of the four Soviet armored group encampments reveals continuing activity and no signs of preparation for withdrawal. Construction of barracks at the encampment near Artemisa was continuing as recently as 12 December. An estimated 6,000 Soviet troops are stationed at the four camps.
3. The 24 Soviet-controlled SAM sites remain operational and buildings are being constructed at some of the sites. An estimated 4,000 Soviet personnel man the SAM sites. There is no operational reason why these weapons could not be used against US reconnaissance aircraft at any time.
4. Three coastal defense cruise missile sites appear operational. They are manned by an estimated 1,000 Soviet military personnel. A fourth such site was abandoned last month, but the equipment has probably not been removed from Cuba. Photography indicates that it was apparently delivered to the Campo Florido installation, ten miles east of Havana, where cruise missile equipment has been noted previously.
5. The 39 MIG-21Cs known to be in Cuba are almost certainly operated solely by Soviet pilots. At least some of them are equipped with air-to-air missiles. In addition, Soviet personnel dominate the air defense system, including the early warning radar network.
6. Eleven of the 12 KOMAR-class missile-equipped patrol boats have been sighted in recent photography

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(S)

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(S)

and appear still active. These boats are probably operated by mixed Soviet-Cuban crews.

7.

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(S)

8. There are no reliable indications of any planned reduction in the Soviet military presence nor of Soviet intent to turn over their sophisticated equipment to the Cubans.

Cuban-Soviet Relations:

9. Indications of the nature and extent of future Soviet economic support for the Castro regime may emerge from the discussions now underway in Moscow between Soviet leaders and veteran Cuban Communist Carlos Rafael Rodriguez. Rodriguez, who accompanied the Cuban trade mission to Moscow early this month, told the press in Moscow on 12 December that his talks will "cover wider problems" than trade. After commenting on Soviet long-term credits granted Cuba in the past, he said that now Cuba's duty is to "steadily reduce the need for credits." These comments seem to reflect both a continuing Cuban effort to squeeze as much as possible from the Soviets and possible Cuban concern that Moscow may now be becoming more tight-fisted in its aid policies.

10. A clandestine source who was in contact with personnel of the Soviet embassy in Havana early this month reports that Rodriguez is seeking a ten year, \$40 million loan from Moscow, a new agreement on consumer goods imports, and a higher price for Cuban sugar sold to the bloc. The special premium price Moscow had agreed nearly two years ago to pay for Cuban sugar has now been exceeded by the world market price.

-2-

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(S)

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~ []

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(S)

The Internal Cuban Situation:

11. The stresses of the recent crisis period on the Cuban leadership could well lead to high-level changes in the near future. Fidel Castro's own role, however, still appears dominant and there is no information that his position is being challenged by any other Cuban leader.

12. There is still no evidence to support reports from untested clandestine sources that Che Guevara left Cuba on 8 December for a year's "leave of absence" for health reasons and that President Dorticos has been granted three months leave. Guevara's most recent public appearance was on 7 December when he delivered the latest of a series of particularly aggressive pronouncements. Guevara, in his 28 November interview for the London Daily Worker came closer than any Cuban leader has yet to publicly criticizing the Soviet missile withdrawal. He also reiterated his hatred of the US and stated in strong terms the important role of Cuba in providing the example for Latin America's "anti-imperialist revolution." He listed a number of other Latin American countries which he called ripe for revolution and where guerrillas "are already in the field."

13. Student agitation for the removal of the veteran Communist rector of Havana University, Juan Marinello, could be the beginning of a new drive against "old" Communists who have not adapted to Castro's leadership. Marinello is accused by the students of having supported the Soviet position, not Cuba's, during the recent crisis period. The University students are widely regarded as among Castro's most vigorous supporters.

14. Public statements by Cuban leaders suggest that the Cuban political machine modeled after bloc Communist parties may be formally organized early in the year, perhaps next month, at a First National Congress of the United Party of the Socialist Revolution. Preparations for the party congress have been underway for some months in what regime officials describe as "the election of the best revolutionaries by their comrades at every work center throughout the country." This suggests that the new party is to be built on a completely new base and that former political organizations such as the old Communist party and Castro's 26 of July Movement are not to be incorporated en toto. Guevara has stated that the initial membership of the party will be between 60,000 and 80,000 militants.

~~TOP SECRET~~ []

~~TOP SECRET~~ []

Summary of Reports From a Cuban Military Officer:

15. During the past week we have received a number of reports from a Cuban military officer who has had first-hand information on a number of aspects of the Cuban military situation. Some of his information is new, much of it tends to confirm information previously received from other sources in less detail, and most of it appears true. The source appears reliable on subjects relating to Cuban military activities; his information on Soviet military activities in Cuba is generally secondhand and not as reliable.

16. The officer had first-hand knowledge of military construction activities in many parts of the island. He provides detailed information on the construction of military storage facilities in caves in various parts of Cuba and especially on three specific caves on which he is most knowledgeable. He strongly doubts that Soviet missiles are being concealed in Cuban caves, although he grants that this would be technically possible in a few of them. He reports that the items stored in caves include rifles, machineguns, ammunition, emergency rations, explosives, and gasoline. Refugee and other clandestine sources have previously reported on the utilization of caves for military purposes, but this source has provided the most detailed and useful information yet received on this subject. The general belief is that these storage sites are intended to be used by guerrilla forces in the event the island is invaded.

17. The source offers information on the Soviet missile buildup in Cuba, but on this subject he appears to rely largely on secondary sources. He doubts that all the strategic missiles have been withdrawn from Cuba, but bases this on having learned of more missiles coming into Cuba during the buildup period than he has heard of departing the island. In describing the various concentrations of Soviet military personnel in Cuba he repeatedly states that he does not know the precise numbers or functions of the personnel in these places since no Cubans have been permitted in the sites.

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(S)

18. The source states that on or about 29 November

[] THIS IS THE FIRST
information indicating that these installations might be

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
(S)

~~TOP SECRET~~ []

~~TOP SECRET~~ []

turned over to the Cubans. The source also stated, as his personal opinion, that the SAM sites in Cuba would probably be turned over to the Cubans eventually and that Soviet forces throughout the island would gradually be reduced as the Cubans became capable of handling the equipment. He stated that the MIG-21s have not been turned over to Cuban control and, in fact, that Cuban pilots have not been permitted to fly the planes. This tends to confirm information from other sources, although the source's added comment implying that the MIG-21s might be sent back to the USSR if the "US puts pressure on" cannot be evaluated.

18. The source describes at length the numbers and functions of Chinese Communist military personnel in Cuba, confirming our earlier impressions that the Chinese Communists are playing a very minor role in the military picture in Cuba. He states, in fact, that "it is to be emphasized that in the military domain, the show is exclusively Cuban-Soviet." The Chinese Communist military personnel consist of only 20 to 25 men assigned to the Chinese Communist embassy who advise the armed forces ministry on the operation of the weapons sent by Peiping to Cuba and, in addition, about five Chinese Communist pilot instructors at the San Antonio de los Banos airbase. He does not know the quantities of Chinese weapons in Cuba, but says they include bazookas, land mines, and possibly 37mm antiaircraft guns.

19. The source's report on Castro's plans with respect to the US Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay and on Cuban military activity in the base area is consistent with information from other sources on this issue. The gist of his report is that the regime continues to regard legal action--specifically "through the United Nations"--as the only way in which it might fulfill its aspiration of winning control of the base territory.

~~TOP SECRET~~ []

~~TOP SECRET~~

20. The source describes several events which lead him to conclude that the Cubans have been very careful to avoid any incident near the base that might provide the US with a provocation justifying an attack on Cuba. He states that the Cuban military buildup in the base area is extensive and in depth, but defensive in nature. This is generally confirmed by other sources, including extensive photographic reconnaissance of the area around the base.

21. The source's general comments on the Cuban-Soviet alliance are admittedly based on his own opinion; nevertheless it is apparent that it is the opinion of an intelligent and perceptive individual. He described the alliance as an "unholy" one, with each side attempting to use the other for its own ends and each constantly maneuvering to gain advantages over the other. He says Castro is trying to squeeze the Soviet Union for every bit of economic support possible and "the USSR knows this and Castro knows it does." He says the USSR is trying to make Castro expendable; "Castro knows this and the USSR knows he knows it." In general, he feels Castro remains in a strong personal position in the regime and Soviet efforts to control him or weaken his position, the source implies, have not been successful.

~~TOP SECRET~~