




21 August 1953

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs
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Office of Current Intelligence

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY



SUMMARY

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SOVIET UNION

1. Possible implications of the Soviet atomic tests (page 3).

FAR EAST

2. [redacted]



SOVIET UNION

1. Possible implications of the Soviet atomic tests:

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[redacted]

The degree to which the Soviet test of 12 August, involving both fission and thermonuclear reactions, enhances the USSR's war potential cannot be determined at this time.

The wording of the Kremlin's communique of 20 August suggests a continuation of Moscow's present moderate foreign policy. The statement that "there exist no reasons for alarm" implies that the Kremlin is not considering a sabre-rattling campaign. Instead, the Soviet leaders are likely to continue their arguments that other nations should meet the USSR halfway in its efforts to settle outstanding disputes. The Soviet Union will also utilize its newly demonstrated capabilities to dispel any impression, at home or abroad, that peace overtures reflect Soviet weakness.

The Kremlin is likely to make new propaganda proposals at the UN on disarmament and may hope that its progress in thermonuclear development will enhance its efforts to draw the support of other countries away from the US on this and other international questions.

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FAR EAST

2. [redacted]

[redacted]