


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15 August 1953

US OFFICIALS ONLY




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
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SUMMARY

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GENERAL

1. USSR apparently maneuvering to participate in postarmistice conference:

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[redacted] a postarmistice political conference should include all main

groups, countries and viewpoints interested in the general issues, but

[redacted] in its prearmistice proposal for the prisoner of war commission the Soviet Union had suggested a group of 11 nations, including itself.

[redacted] the General Assembly should decide on the nations to take part in the conference.

Comment: On 31 July Soviet UN delegate Tsarapkin expressed a preference for a conference limited to the "two sides" in the dispute, presumably without Soviet participation, and argued that the General Assembly had no responsibility under the armistice agreement to name the participants.

[redacted] shift in approach may be in response to strong sentiment among UN members, including Britain and France, in favor of inviting the USSR as well as India to participate in a broad conference. The US favors a conference with the General Assembly designating representatives from among the 16 UN nations which fought in Korea with the Communists deciding on their own representation, which could include the USSR.

The Kremlin may now see an opportunity for gaining indirect recognition of Communist China by a UN recommendation for Peiping's participation in the conference. The Kremlin probably also wishes to avoid having a Soviet bid for participation rejected and accordingly may be waiting for a coalescence of Western sentiment before taking a firm position on the membership question.

FAR EAST

EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)>25Yrs 2. Amami Islands' return reversing anti-American trend in Japan:

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[redacted]

The return of the Amami Islands to Japan on 8 August may have reversed the tide of anti-Americanism which had been gathering momentum during the past six months, [redacted]

[redacted] It is also the first American postoccupation action to have a significantly favorable effect on the generally leftist Japanese intelligentsia and publicists.

Comment: The return of the islands removes a major source of friction between the United States and Japan. The Japanese press contrasted their return with the Soviet Union's failure to recognize Japan's historic rights to the Habomai and Shikotan islands north of Japan. The press also acknowledged that American retention of the remaining Ryukyu and the Bonin islands was necessary for Japanese security.

SOUTHEAST ASIA

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3. Rumors in Indonesia of widespread arrests to take place on 16 August:

[redacted]

Rumors are current in high Indonesian army circles that the new defense minister plans to arrest the leaders of the Masjumi, Socialist, and other opposition parties, as

well as high army officers, on the eve of Indonesia's independence day, 17 August, [redacted] The arrests would be based on charges of collaboration with the Darul Islam.

[redacted] these rumors reflect the general uneasiness prevailing since the installation of Indonesia's Communist-influenced cabinet.

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
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Comment: One objective of the new government is the removal of strongly anti-Communist officers from the army high command. There have been no reports to indicate that this would be accomplished by widespread arrests.

The circulation of such rumors, however, will bring added support to those favoring a coup d'etat. Regular armed forces units of considerable strength have moved into Djakarta, ostensibly for independence day celebrations.

SOUTH ASIA

4. Pakistani army remains calm over Kashmir crisis:



Pakistani army headquarters near Kashmir is maintaining an attitude of complete calm with regard to the recent developments in Indian-held Kashmir, [redacted]

[redacted] The Pakistani army is not contemplating cancellation of leaves and does not plan to move additional troops into the area.

[redacted] the New Delhi cabinet is prepared for the possibility of war and that the army is ready. The next move, [redacted] is up to Pakistan, which India will name as aggressor if the Kashmir cease-fire line is violated.

Comment: Pakistan, as in previous crises, is apparently taking all possible precautions to avoid a conflict.

NEAR EAST - AFRICA

5. Comment on threat to depose the Moroccan sultan:

[redacted] the sultan of Morocco probably will not be deposed. It is anticipated

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that despite conflicting rumors the resident general and the sultan will reach a compromise, the exact nature of which may not be made public. An acceptable compromise must enable the French to claim that the sultan has accepted their demands and yet not alienate the sultan's following.

[redacted] Premier Laniel, Foreign Minister Bidault, and Resident General Guillaume are confident they can use the current situation to force the sultan to accept the French reform program. The French authorities are also in a position to bring sufficient pressure on El Glaoui, the sultan's chief opponent, to prevent him from upsetting the status quo.

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While the possibility of clashes between rival factions exists, it is not probable that large-scale disturbances will occur since the 56,000 French security forces are capable of maintaining order. Basic tensions will not be alleviated, however, and El Glaoui and his supporters will continue to be a source of trouble.

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