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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Routing and Record Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM:

CHIEF, Western Hemisphere Division

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE AS SANITIZED

9 March

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
		REC'D	FWD'D		
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CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE AS SANITIZED
2003

9 March 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief of Administration, DD/P

SUBJECT : Delegation of Authority

REFERENCES : (a) CSI 22-1
(b) CSN 22-1
(c) Memo to Addressee from Undersigned,
Dated 24 December 1953, Subject as
above.

1. In accordance with References (a) and (b), []
[] Chief of Administration for Project
PBSUCCESS, is authorized to issue travel orders for
personnel performing travel in connection with this
Project.
2. Quadruplicate specimen signature cards of the
above named individual are attached.
3. All delegations of authority included in Refer-
ence (c) are hereby reaffirmed.

J. C. KING
CWH

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9 March 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR: DCI
SUBJECT: PESUCCESS and OAS Conference
REFERENCES: LINC 944 (IN 25002)
[] 589 (IN 24927)

In compliance with instructions received by telephone from Mr. Earman, the following comments are submitted. Lettering coincides with that of the Lincoln cable, paragraph by paragraph.

A. We agree that the Guatemalans will continue to present any available proof concerning intervention. They may not, however, present any additional data at the Conference unless given an additional opportunity. It would appear that further alleged factual disclosures regarding intervention, if made subsequent to the termination of the Conference, might have a lesser impact than if delivered with the Conference forum as a sounding board.

B. We agree that the U.S. has publicly branded Guatemala and that failure to follow through at this time with further evidence to support our allegations may, to some extent, suggest weakness of position. Presumably, however, the U.S. delegation has had an opportunity to consider the views of the Latin American delegates at Caracas and believes that the course of action determined upon by the Secretary represents the most promising one. A battle of recrimination indulged in by the U.S., even though it should strengthen our case against Guatemala, might very possibly lessen U.S. prestige and alienate Hemispheric support.

C. Reaffirmation and extension of the principles subscribed to at Bogota and Rio are desirable. Postponement of certain operational

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activity as recommended by the Secretary of State would increase the probability of obtaining Latin American support in principle and later concerted action through OAS. These considerations outweigh recognized temporary disadvantages.

D. The course recommended by the Secretary does not exclude a continuation of the covert effort, but does partially curtail that effort in recognition of the importance of engaging in concerted rather than unilateral action. It was never intended that the U.S. delegation to Caracas would provide merely a supporting effort to PBSUCCESS. It was expected that the Conference might present the U.S. with an opportunity to obtain hemispheric support in dealing with the Guatemalan problem. This might in turn obviate the need for ultimate unilateral action as contemplated under PBSUCCESS. In view of recent known security compromises in the field, PBSUCCESS currently may not meet the criteria for a covert operation. The Secretary's recommendation, therefore, as stated in the second sentence of paragraph 3 of [] 588, that KUBARK take no irrevocable action until he has had an opportunity to review the whole situation is, in our opinion, completely justified.

E. The question is not one of whether we should present our case or not. Both courses of action contemplate this. The difference is one of timing and of possible concerted rather than unilateral action.

F. We do not agree with the implied concept that, since many aspects of the operation are already blown, further aggressive extension of semi-covert activities along the present PBSUCCESS pattern is necessarily advisable.

G. Modification of operational method to meet changing conditions

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does not imply abandonment of the objective. Psychological and political warfare may be continued effectively and securely.

H. We agree that time may be running out for the type of PM operation presently contemplated. In the light, however, of our experience to date, which forecasts the inordinate degree to which the hand of the U.S. may be disclosed, we wholly subscribe to the Secretary's desire to review our future course of action before proceeding. Consequently we believe that no irrevocable commitments should be made until such review has been completed.

Regarding H 2, A, B and C the Lincoln recommendation does not differ substantially from that of the Secretary save in the matter of timing. We believe that the decision as to timing must rest with those who are on the scene at Caracas and can assess the situation and determine the best course to pursue to achieve success.

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