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EYES ONLY

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE AS SANITIZED

8 March 1954

2003

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: PBSUCCESS; Points for Consideration concerning Informant "X".

1. On the basis of "X"'s first contact, it would seem that the possibilities of "provocation" are not as great as the possibilities that he is on the level. He has not made any requests either concerning himself or for specific action to be taken. He has already given some very interesting information on a volunteer basis and has promised additional quantities, for the stated reason that he is now convinced that the situation has become so very serious that he must take this action.
2. In view of these facts, which are all that are known at present, it would appear reasonable to treat him more as a source than as a potential defector. The Bureau SOP on this should be checked however since a decision will have to be taken within the next 48 hours as regards informing the Bureau.
3. Source will be granted further opportunities for discreet contact and we will be informed in greater detail of what he has to say. Meanwhile we should be carefully studying the opportunities which this contact offers and preparing lines of inquiry as well as lines of FW playback. In the latter connection, there is the possibility that an associate of "X"'s could serve as an unwitting channel for playback to the military. This associate is a man of some stature and reputation with his own military and it might be desirable, after further study, for some linguistically qualified army officer to cultivate his acquaintance.
4. The more significant items of information and viewpoint passed on included the following:
 - a. The time is close at hand when the Communists will be in a position to take over control completely. At present they exercise substantial control over the two top figures "A" and "T" and seem for the moment content to exercise their power behind the scenes using the others as front men for them.

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b. The principal significant point of disaffection is the army which is quite well aware of the threat to itself but which so far has not found the time right for any movement. The influence of "A" upon the army is very large and, but for his presence on the scene, the army might have had the courage to move.

c. It is the view of "X" that any movement from the outside would be fiercely resented by all of the people inside and would serve as a unifying and consolidating influence upon them. Although the army is militarily weak because of the shortage of arms, equipment, ammunition, etc., "X" predicts that any move from the outside would fail.

d. It is the view of "X" that although "A" and "T" may not themselves be Communists and probably are not, they are the willing and extremely effective tools of the Communists and that "A" at least is so inspired by his conviction that he will be the liberator of his country that any efforts to wean him away from his present course of action are doomed to certain failure. The persons having the greatest possible influence upon him have tried and failed and any additional approaches are doomed to equal failure.

5. There are three features of the situation in discussion which might add up to a suggestion of provocation and which in any case should be followed with close attention in all future dealings with "X". The first was a suggestion that our only policy in dealing with the country in question in which we had made a mistake was our policy of withholding arms from the army -- since this weakens the only force capable of resisting communism. The second was a flat statement to the effect that the disappearance of "A" from the scene at the present time or during the near future would cause a collapse of the Communist position and would render a clean-up of the situation possible. The third derives from "X"'s own background and connections, which are of the sort that would tend to qualify him in the eyes of the opposition as a person most likely to be believed and credited by U. S. officials. (It can be equally argued that it is because of this very background and experience that "X" has had the courage to make the approach on his own and has caused him to feel as strongly as he claims to feel against the "nefarious" nature of what is going on.)

(Handwritten notes by Whiting: /s/ HAROLD S. WHITING

Additional points: "X" volunteered a statement that the so-called "pilot" is a communist fabrication. "X" expressed the view that the Communists are purposely keeping alive the

United Fruit Co. issue alive -- it could have been amicably settled many years ago but the Communists insist on keeping the issue alive so as to use it as a means of keeping things stirred up.

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