

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
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DISPATCH NO. HUI-A-182

~~SECRET/RYBAT~~
CLASSIFICATION

TO []

DATE MAR 8 1954

FROM LINCOLN

SUBJECT { GENERAL KUGOWN
SPECIFIC Material for Transmittal to Frances R. HEGARTY

1. Attached please find English language and Spanish language notes for transmittal to Frances R. HEGARTY. The English language notes are to be destroyed by HEGARTY after reading and the Spanish language material is to be recovered from HEGARTY's contacts after they have studied it and made use of it.
2. It is requested that you study Part II of the English language notes and submit your comments and suggestions on the matter discussed therein. You will see that we are levying requirements in the fields of political reporting and political action on HEGARTY. This requirement, we believe, applies to you in even greater measure. We would appreciate henceforth if you could keep as fully abreast as possible of the political reporting done by the Embassy and of the opinions on the local political situation which are held (even though they may not be reflected in dispatches) by the man or men whom you consider to be the most competent in the Embassy. In addition, to this review of Embassy views, we are vitally interested in your own appraisal of the Honduran political situation as it affects the support (or lack of support) that CALLIGERIS may reasonably expect. You are generally familiar with the considerable demands on Honduran tolerance and "closing one eye" that our operations will soon be making. It is most important that you advise us on whatever lines of action we need to undertake in order to secure that support.
3. It is also requested that you obtain LUGTON's views on this subject. LUGTON is not to go out of his way or to take away time from his other duties to assist on this matter, but merely to furnish you with whatever ideas and observations he may have.
4. Please send us your first political report, however brief, by the next pouch. Any leads or guide lines you can give us will be most helpful. Feel free to be as independent in your judgment as you consider necessary.

JCD/JTN/eaf
8 March 1954
Distribution

JEROME C. DUNBAR

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CLASSIFICATION

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March 8, 1954

English Language Notes

PART I

1. Attached herewith you will find an editorial for the publication entitled "Time to Think." As usual, the most useful place for the editorial would be in the center two columns of the front page.

2. It is recommended that an article be run beginning in column one, page one, describing Communist plans for the infiltration of the army and for the creation of a purely Communist-controlled paramilitary force that would outclass the army and eventually render it useless and ready for dispersal. This subject has been alluded to quite effectively in previous issues. It would now be appropriate for someone on the staff, with sufficient military knowledge, to document this Communist plan and to write up a series of purported moves which the Communists might be presumed to make in progressing toward their objective of superior paramilitary force. This article would be continued on page two.

3. Another article, in columns two and three at the bottom of page one, might be entitled something like "A Better Future." It would discuss the basic ability and integrity of some army officer and would make the point that they could do better, both morally and professionally, than they are doing at present.

4. On column four of page one, it is recommended that there be placed an article which says substantially that Arbenz plans to go along with the Communists on everything they propose and finally resign himself altogether to their domination over the military. Again this subject has been partially covered in previous issues. Now it should be written up in the form of alleged leaks from the National Palace. This article to be continued on page three. Thus, again, we would have the evils of Communism and the evils of Arbenz facing each other on two opposite pages.

5. Again, it is recommended that there be a feature article on the weakness of another garrison.

6. It would be useful this week to exhume once more the story of the murder of Colonel Arana.

PART II

1. The problem of public opinion in your immediate area is becoming increasingly important for our work. As our plans are progressing, we are going to need not only a friendly political climate, but a political climate that is affirmatively with us.

2. What we basically need is that the issue of national security should become paramount in the forthcoming electoral campaign. Ideally, General Carias should wage his campaign on the basis that he and he alone is able to save the nation from the grave dangers that it faces from its Communist neighbor. This would involve, among other things, a series of detailed exposes by General Carias and his political lieutenants of the Communist danger in Guatemala and of Guatemalan infiltration into your area. It would involve further the assertion by General Carias and his political lieutenants that domestic and foreign problems were inescapably linked, so that there can be no hope of solving the Communist problem at home without having made some dent on the Communist problem in Guatemala. Thus, General Carias should campaign on a platform of firm, active anti-Communism in both domestic and foreign policies. He should constantly accuse his opponent of undermining the domestic tranquility and of being an agent of foreign inspired subversion. He should make it quite clear that his opponent is not a true Honduran, but actually a Guatemalan, a Guatemalan Communist at that.

3. You can see the relevance of the above to our task. If the electoral campaign is couched in these terms, then the forces friendly to us must, in order to be consistent, support our interests and our people. That way they would be showing the courage of their convictions.

4. This type of political climate cannot be prepared overnight. What we should begin doing, very soon, is to make an impact on the local press and radio and to induce the press and radio to give significant attention to the matter of national security. The press and radio should, in effect, call on the candidates in the forthcoming election to make the defense of the nation their primary concern.

5. There must be a way that your friends on the publication staff can inject this issue into the local press and radio. Please discuss it with them most carefully and point out to them that, as the weeks go by, they will more and more need an effective backstopping in Honduran public opinion. They should not attempt to seek this backstopping through articles in their own publication--- to discuss the Honduran situation in their publication might well be fatal, because it could easily be resented as the unwarranted interference by guests in the internal affairs of the host country. Instead, the publication staff must secure this favorably political climate through its clandestine and personal contacts with the local moulders of public opinion. In talking to the publication staff, make very sure you emphasize this distinction, namely that they are to target their paper only at their own country and that they are to influence Honduran opinion only through third parties.

6. Please report as soon as possible your own estimate of the feasibility of this approach and the reactions thereto of the publication personnel with whom you discuss it.

Hemos hablado de la necesidad de que el ejército se redima y rescate su honor deslustrado, no por lágrimas sino por acción determinada y decisión. La rectificación del error es una necesidad humana. Sin embargo, acude al pasado y toma medidas basadas en el pasado. Esta semana vamos a considerar qué medidas debe tomar el ejército con vistas al porvenir. El oficial inteligente que estudia el porvenir debe ver dos grandes peligros: el peligro de los comunistas y el peligro de las fuerzas de la democracia. El oficial de hoy no ha cumplido con su deber a las fuerzas democráticas ni ha podido cumplir con su deber a los comunistas, porque no se le permiten. El oficial percetivo debe ver que actualmente hay una carrera entre estas dos fuerzas, una carrera donde los comunistas esperan aplastarlo antes de que las fuerzas democráticas puedan exigir su retribución justa por sus fechorías, si no se reforma.

La intención de los comunistas respecto al ejército matematéico en el porvenir está tan clara y sencilla que sin duda muchos prefieren pasarla por alto. Cuando los comunistas, según sus planes, tengan el control completo, suprimirán enteramente el cuerpo actual de oficiales, con excepción de unos cuantos alquilones patéticos tan débiles y tan desreciables que estén dispuestos a ser preseitados como títeres, y que a cada pregunta urruman un

"sí" humilde a los órdenes comunistas. El poder es el ejército bajo los comunistas peca con los comunistas, y no con los oficiales profesionales. Bajo el comunismo, el oficial no se atreve a tener ni un sentido de deber, ni un sentido de honor, ni un sentido de patria. Irreflexivamente no debe tener absolutamente ningún sentido. Lo único que se le exige, y se le exige hasta no más, es que sea un instrumento servil a cualquier brisa política que soplo del cuartel general de los comunistas. Debe estar preparado para ejecutar un día a un amigo, al simiente, a un hermano, y sufrir la pena de muerte al tercer día, por haber ejecutado a su amigo y a su hermano. Vamos a recapitular: Bajo el comunismo, no hay cuerpo profesional de oficiales, hay sólo comunistas encargados de las tropas comunistas.

En cambio, el oficial inteligente debe comprender que, si sigue con su conducta actual de colaboración con el comunismo, las fuerzas democráticas victoriosas lo someterán, cuando sea apropiado, a un consejo de guerra. Debe estar perfectamente claro en la mente del oficial que su historia de colaboración se conoce, que ha sido archivada con escrupulosidad y que, cualquiera que sea el tiempo que pase, saldrá a la luz del día su crimen en forma de una denuncia formal, respaldada por bastante fuerza, para llevarlo a las cortes marciales o consejos de guerra. Las fuerzas de

La democracia son insuficientes, pero su fidelidad no llega al punto de ceder a la tentación de cualquier cosa que se parezca remotamente a ella. Los comunistas, una vez más, los únicos oficiales que se preparó y se prepararán bajo un régimen de ocupación, son los que han cumplido con su obligación de mantener decidida a un grado de ocupación y han hecho todo de su arte para restaurar el espíritu de la democracia.

Hay una diferencia obvia entre estos dos peligros que confrontan al oficial ordinario. El peligro comunista es espantoso en sus potenciales, pero hay poca esperanza de que se haga una realidad. El peligro a él de las fuerzas democráticas es mitigado por las decencias de la justicia y la ley, pero su retribución es cierta.

Hay otra diferencia, igualmente obvia. El soldado que tiene dentro de sí una triza de decencia se inclina naturalmente a las fuerzas democráticas, pero ha estado remiso en su deber a causa del peligro temporal del comunismo. Pero los mismos comunistas a los cuales se inclina, nunca lo aceptarán con sinceridad, nunca le darán seguridad genuina. Y la misma gente, las fuerzas democráticas que abandona ahora, son las que lo rehabilitarán y las que lo rehabilitarán en el honor y la dignidad de su profesión.

Aun es tiempo de pensar, en tiempo de guerra, todos los oficiales viejos a las seguridades del servir.