

~~SECRET~~

~~RYBAT~~

5 March 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, WH Division

SUBJECT: Selection of Site for Sherwood Program.

1. All factors involved in the selection of a site for the Sherwood program have been examined. Basic factors to be considered in the selection of a site are technical feasibility, political tenability, and problems of security.

2. The basic requirement of the Sherwood program is to deliver a short wave propaganda broadcast to the target area during the hours of maximum listener potential. A daily program of thirty minutes to one hour in duration when properly written and presented will build up the desired listening audience. During the latter stages of the PBSUCCESS operation it will be necessary to be able to present a program at any time during a given 24 hour period.

3. Realizing that a radio broadcast is the most likely to be successful medium for establishing contact with the target audience, it is understood that the following is the proposed utilization of the program:

a. Psychological conditioning of the target audience in the pre-attack period. The programming and/or tenor of the broadcast content will be modulated progressively from mild to warm and in the final stages and for a short period, to hot inflammatory nature.

b. Control through complete notional programming of true situation during the attack phase. Phasing out the notional into the real as circumstances permit in such a manner that from the hour of the attack it will appear to the listening target audience that the anti-communists were completely successful and that further resistance would be futile. This aspect of the program is considered vital to the success of the attack owing to the importance which is attached to radio news under such circumstances as demonstrated under similar situations in recent history.

c. Encouragement, control, stimulation and advice and guidance to the partisan forces being organized throughout the target area during the Stage IV period. It is desired that this medium be utilized to include in its normal clandestine broadcast as in Para. a. above such identifying phrases or words which underground cells would recognize as pertaining to them. This aspect of the radio program is considered essential and vital to the paramilitary effort as no other means will be available to substitute for this and is a very pertinent part of any such effort.

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM  
RELEASE AS SANITIZED

~~SECRET~~ RYBAT

2003

~~SECRET~~

RJAT

-2-

4. Technically, broadcasts can be made from almost any site in the Western Hemisphere. The number of hours a day that a broadcast will be heard in the target area from these sites will vary from a few minutes daily to full 24-hour coverage. To be able to present a program at any time during the day, it is necessary that the site be located within a radius of approximately 250 miles of the target area when using medium power transmitting equipment. When using high power transmitting equipment, the site can be located within a radius of approximately 700 miles. The installation of high power transmitters requires large power generators and a relatively extensive antenna system. Using either high or low power transmitting equipment, the installation cannot be clandestine in any sense of the word.

5. If a determined effort is made by the opposition, the broadcast site can be located. This is a basic assumption which will be true for any site that is selected. The broadcast site could be located through use of direction finding equipment, local surveillance, local security leaks, and defection and penetration in indigenous groups knowing the location of the site. Although the broadcast site can be located and will become a target for counter-propaganda, it will be extremely difficult to document a case that would stand up in a world court. Documentary proof could only be gained through a neutral inspection team or through actual capture of equipment, tapes and broadcast engineers.

6. With the realization that any broadcast site can be located, KUBARK must be prepared to protect the selected site by delays, denials, and counter charges.

7. It must be realized that the precedent for jamming as a counter measure to propaganda broadcasts has been set in Europe and in Asia, particularly by governments under Soviet influence. Further, the Sherwood program is particularly vulnerable because the major target is located in one metropolitan area which could be commanded by relatively few low power ground wave jammers.

In the event that jamming occurs, a certain limited effectiveness could be maintained by the use of a modified evasion technique.

8. To meet the basic requirements of Sherwood and within the technical limitations, the following sites have been considered:

A. KMFLUSH

With the program sponsored by the CALLIGERIS' group and under the protection of [ ] U.S. Government interest would not be disclosed.

Under the protection of [ ] the installation could be made with a minimum of personnel and activity cover problems.

~~SECRET~~

RYBAT

[ ] has previously denied KUBARK permission to base Sherwood in his country and even if persuaded to change his mind, could have complete control over the program and could terminate it at any time.

With the installation known to [ ] and his associates and to CALLIGERIS and his staff, the dangers of the program being blown through security leaks are very great.

The movement of broadcast technicians and equipment into KMFLUSH and the installation of SHERWOOD would attract attention with the resultant security dangers.

B. SHIPBOARD

Operating from a ship would give complete control of the broadcast installation, thus improving physical security.

Broadcasts from a U.S. Navy ship would disclose U.S. Government interest.

To maintain the Sherwood program for an operational period of 2-6 months, it is necessary to have two ships assigned to the project. Two installations of equipment would be necessary.

The security problems inherent in the use of two Navy crews are many. Past experience indicates that there will be security leaks even though efforts are made to indoctrinate the Navy crews in the necessity for security.

C. VARIOUS FOREIGN OWNED ISLANDS

There are various foreign owned islands in the Caribbean that are suitable as a site for the Sherwood program. The advantages and disadvantages of each are approximately the same. There are no suitable islands that are uninhabited.

Approval of Sherwood by the country involved would be required prior to the installation of radio station capable of making the desired broadcast.

To make the installation tenable when located by the opposition, the sponsoring country would have to be prepared to weather the propaganda blasts and accusations.

The sponsoring country could have complete control over the program and could terminate at any time.

The movement of men and materials on to the island and the

~~SECRET~~

RYBAT

-4-

installation of the equipment would attract much attention with the resultant security dangers.

U.S. Government interest could possibly be concealed but the necessary use of U.S. technicians to operate the station would identify the installation as U.S. sponsored, at least in the eyes of the local populace.

D. ADJACENT COUNTRIES OTHER THAN KMFLUSH

Adjacent countries other than KMFLUSH have been considered as possible sites for the Sherwood program. In each country the local physical security problems are very great and political tenability is impossible or doubtful.

E. SANTA FE

Although it is understood that there are no problems in securing permission for use of island as a site, and no political approval would be required, official liaison with the Weather Bureau and CAA will be necessary.

Complete control over the installation with the resultant maximum tenability.

There is a total of 25 people on the island - 10 U.S. Weather Bureau/CAA personnel and 15 natives. This is a minimum that can be expected for any site. These personnel can be security cleared and controlled to a certain extent.

Santa Fe is relatively remote and removed from the usual inter-island shipping traffic, thus improving physical security and lessening the chances for local security leaks.

Because there is a large radio installation already existent on Santa Fe, the installation of a new radio does not radically alter the appearance of the location. Only through a careful comparison of aerial photographs could the new antenna installation be detected.

The exact location of Santa Fe can be kept from the CALLIGERIS group, thus dangers of security leaks through penetrations and defections are eliminated.

U. S. Government interest will be disclosed when the broadcast is located as originating at Santa Fe. There is some possibility that the opposition will not undertake to locate the broadcast during the mild early period. If not located during this period there is the possibility that the opposition will be too occupied with other aspects of PBSUCCESS to attempt to locate the broadcast

~~SECRET~~

RYBAT

during the latter stages.

Although the Weather Bureau and CAA personnel at Santa Fe can be security cleared and can be controlled to a limited extent, there is no adequate control over unintentional security leaks through personal mail and official Weather Bureau and CAA reports, both written and radio.

9. Recommendations

After careful consideration of the advantages and disadvantages of all possible sites and of the extreme importance you have attached to the Sherwood program in its support of the PBSUCCESS operation, it is recommended that approval be granted to proceed with the installation of Sherwood at Santa Fe.

It is pointed out that because of a shortage of broadcast technicians, KUCIUB is unable to make two installations simultaneously. However, following the completion of the Sherwood installation at Santa Fe, it is recommended that consideration be given to the installation of a diversionary or secondary broadcast transmitter in KMFIUSH under the protection and sponsorship of [ ]

[ ]  
Communications Project Officer  
PBSUCCESS

I have reviewed the above paper and concur in the analysis of the factors involved in the selection of a site and with the recommendations contained therein.

[ ]  
Assistant Director for Communications