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### ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Routing and Record Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM: **CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM**  
**QW4 RELEASE AS SANITIZED**

NO.

DATE

*5 February 54*

**2003**

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE	OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
1. <i>Estadine</i>		<i>9 Feb 54</i>	[ ]	<b>SECRET EYES ONLY</b> <b>PBSUCCESS</b> <i>File in chronos ?</i>
2. [ ]			[ ]	
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29 January 1954

SUBJECT: Meeting with RUFUS and [ ]

1. A meeting was held in House B on 28 January 1954 at 1930 until 0030 on 29 January with RUFUS and [ ] Present for the entire period was GALBOND and present for part of the period was MYLKES.

2. The discussion began with emphasis on the importance of the forthcoming OAS Conference in Caracas and the need for further detailed and documented material to be used in building up the case against WSBURNT. RUFUS was given a deadline of 20 February for the material to be delivered to the group. Pablo, scheduled to arrive the evening of 29 January, is bringing with him specific material which may be used for the OAS Conference and also for charges against WSBURNT in the UN. RUFUS is agreeable to the presentation of the UN material either by his group or through any channel we care to indicate.

3. Visit to Perez Jimenez, Trujillo and possibly other heads of countries in the Caribbean.

A. RUFUS does not wish to visit PEREZ JIMENEZ unless he has fair assurance of success. He has never been to Caracas; he does not know PEREZ JIMENEZ and would not like to go there and cool his heels and return with empty hands. Before reaching a decision he will consult by phone, talking in a pre-arranged code, with [ ] [ ] who was the official guest of PEREZ JIMENEZ between the approximate date of 8 and 23 January and who discussed aid to RUFUS. If aid is forthcoming, RUFUS believes it will be in the form of money for the purchase of planes. The estimated amount is \$150,000.00. The string PEREZ JIMENEZ would probably attach to this money is a promise to support action against FIGUERES of Costa Rica subsequent to the establishment of a new government in WSBURNT.

B. TRUJILLO's ambassador to Honduras is returning to Cd. Trujillo to present a favorable report to the Generalissimo on RUFUS. While doubtful of the aid which he might obtain, RUFUS believes that now would be a most opportune time to re-approach TRUJILLO. He is afraid that TRUJILLO would impose unacceptable conditions. These conditions would give TRUJILLO a certain amount of political control over WSBURNT.

C. Although BATISTA might be in sympathy, a visit to him at this time would be useless because he is seeking, rather than giving, aid. BATISTA is much concerned about the plots against him.

D. No other countries were discussed.

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4. New approach to [ ] for establishment of a clandestine radio station; alternatives. RUFUS would like to see KISSLING in order to obtain technical arguments to use with [ ] in a new request for permission to establish a clandestine radio station. He is doubtful of the success of this approach because [ ] clearly stated that he did not wish to open himself to attacks which might follow from the discovery of such a station in view of the commitments he has already made, [ ]

[ ] On/about 18 January, [ ] encouraged RUFUS to establish a clandestine radio station in his country. This is in addition to the overt station now used by the group in exile for relatively mild programs. [ ] said that this new station, since it would be clandestine, could be more aggressive and direct and use names.

5. Recent arrests in WSEURNT. These are serious but not irreparable. The greatest loss is [ ] RUFUS expressed confidence that [ ] would not disclose his knowledge of their plans even under torture because they had previously worked out a substitute plan to be disclosed in just such a case. The blame would be put on YDIGORAS FUENTES. Need for increased security was stressed. Both RUFUS and [ ] made the statement that they and they ONLY would be aware of the entire plan and that RUFUS' lieutenants would be informed on a strictly need-to-know basis. When the name of SOLORZANO was mentioned, it did not ring a bell. Neither knew a JUAREZ SOLORZANO. There was no discussion of details on replacements for those who were arrested. This should be explored by MYLKES. The DELGADO, recently reported in a cable from WSEURNT as working for the government of that country, was interrogated by RUFUS just prior to RUFUS' departure and subsequent to the report of his being a D/A. DELGADO was aware of the charges against him, stated that they were false and for the purpose of separating him from RUFUS and that he would welcome a thorough investigation of his case. He submitted to RUFUS a detailed account, in writing, which was shown to GALBOND. RUFUS said that account is sufficiently clear to permit a thorough investigation and that he has an open mind about DELGADO. This is the same DELGADO who made a forced landing in Cuba several months ago.

6. Finances. There was no discussion on finances except at the very end of the meeting RUFUS brought out a large manila envelop filled with receipts which he wanted to show to GALBOND. This was left for the following meeting.

7. Timing of the movement. GALBOND stated that at least 60 days would be required to obtain delivery of some of the essential arms and that a further period of weeks would be needed to get these arms in the hands of the users. This was accepted without debate by RUFUS. RUFUS likewise agreed to the necessity of training of commo teams and sabotage squads and that this necessarily took time. RUFUS emphasized the need for careful selection of the commo men and said he would rather have ten(10) of unquestioned loyalty

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than twenty(20) with 1/2 of doubtful loyalty. This was the reason, he said, for delay in getting the number asked for. However, he expected to fill the quota. He is trying to get men with some previous training. There is no question in the minds of either RUFUS or [ ] that the earliest day for action must be subsequent to the OAS Conference.

8. Arms requirements. The list of arms and munitions prepared yesterday was left with RUFUS for study and comment at the second meeting. He thought the quantity of rifles indicated was adequate, as well as machine guns and mortars. He said that a few flame throwers might be worthwhile for their psychological effect, if nothing else.

9. The Guatemala City military garrison. There are approximately 300 officers between the Palace Guard and the two regiments stationed in the city. These were roughly broken down into three groups:

A. 100 sympathizers to RUFUS;

B. 100 on the fence who, through psychological warfare and other activities might be brought to the RUFUS side; and

C. 100 supporters of the WSEURNT government. This group consists of approximately 20 Communists and 80 who for other reasons are supporting WSEURNT. Some of these latter were involved in claims against RUFUS' associates and would never come over to his side because of fear of reprisals when he is victorious.

10. Roberto BARRIOS PENA. Neither [ ] nor RUFUS believe BARRIOS PENA is any longer a problem to them in the field. It was explained that he is still capable of doing some damage to their cause in this country by his charges against them which reach high levels in the U.S. government and that therefore it would strengthen their position if he could be brought into line. RUFUS said that he knew him well enough and thought that their relations were not too strained to permit a direct approach if we approved. The danger of such an approach was pointed out and suggestion of ALFONSO as a possible liaison was mentioned. This should be explored further during RUFUS' stay here.

11. YDIGORAS FUENTES. Although this person seems to have come more in line and has lost support, he continues to spread false charges against RUFUS and cannot be trusted.

12. ARENAS and OCANA. OCANA is constantly attempting to communicate with [ ] in hopes of persuading [ ]

OG/gb

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