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VIA: AIR  
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

SPATCH NO. HGG-A-619

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CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, WHD

DATE: 1 JAN 11 1954

FROM : Chief of Station, Guatemala, C J

INFO: Lincoln

SUBJECT: GENERAL— PBSUCCESS

SPECIFIC— Memorandum of Conversation - C J

1. Enclosed are copies of a memorandum of conversation between C J and an Embassy officer.
2. This and similar memoranda are being forwarded to illustrate the attitudes and positions of individuals of possible interest to PBSUCCESS.

C J  
Kenneth S. Givloch

Enclosure:  
Memo as noted

7 January 1954

KSG/cmh  
Distribution:  
3-Wash w/att  
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1-Files w/att

**CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM  
RELEASE AS SANITIZED**

**2003**

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

December 30, 1953

Participants: [ ]  
John Calvin Hill, Jr.

[ ] called at the Embassy this morning and identified himself as the former private secretary to General Miguel IDIGORAS Fuentes, the conservative who was defeated by Colonel Arbenz in the 1950 presidential elections. [ ] said he was educated in the United States and was now the owner of a finca in Malacatan on the Mexican border.

[ ] said he came in to ask if the United States was prepared to do anything about Communism in Guatemala, which he described at some length as a growing menace. He said that he had come in to see Ambassador Richard C. Patterson during the 1950 elections to warn him of the Communist danger if General Idigoras lost, but Ambassador Patterson merely showed him a regulation which forbade the United States to interfere in the affairs of foreign countries. Now, he continued, the Communism of which he had warned had obtained control of the country. Guatemalan anti-Communists were too weak to act for themselves and unless the United States helped, all would be lost. Surely the United States must see the danger to the Panama Canal and its other interests, and he could not understand why the United States seemed unwilling to act.

I told [ ] that Ambassador Patterson had been quite correct in pointing out the U.S. policy of non-intervention--which was still our policy--but, I continued, he was quite wrong in thinking that the U.S. was not seriously concerned about the Communist problem here. Indeed, our country had given much to keep free countries from going under Communist domination; Assistant Secretary Cabot and others had made our concern with Communism in Guatemala abundantly clear in recent speeches; and we were now seeking means to combat Communism on a hemispheric basis through cooperation with the other Latin American nations at the forthcoming Caracas Conference. It was clear that we wished to help those Guatemalans who did not wish their country to go under Communist domination within the limits of international law. The days of landing Marines were over. Guatemalans who oppose Communism had to do their part. He had told me that the Idigoristas did not trust CASTILLO Armas. This showed the problem that confronted the U.S. those who opposed Communism often seemed to us, as outsiders, to be more interested in their own factional fighting than in a common effort to get the job done. There was much that the U.S. could do, short of violating its policy of non-intervention, to support those elements who opposed Communist intervention, but it was useless to discuss which of the many ways and means would be appropriate unless there were a unified Guatemalan movement with which the United States could cooperate.

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C J admitted that the anti-Communist movement was weak and divided, and said he did not know how this could be overcome. However, he intended to report this conversation through confidential channels to General Idigoras Fuentes and would let me know the result.

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In talking in this vein to C J it was my intention (a) to give him the impression that the U.S. had no concrete plan for intervention in the domestic affairs of Guatemala and continued its non-intervention policy, and (b) that unity in the anti-Communist movement was an essential pre-requisite to discussion of any ways and means for the U.S. to cooperate in combatting international Communist influences in Guatemala. It was my hope that this insistence on unity would be passed on to anti-Communist leaders.