

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE IN FULL

2003

Copy

IX

~~SECRET~~
Security Information

Callaghan for Subford
21 July 52

Supplement "B"

I. Arms for the Interior:

1. Intentions - It is indispensable that an adequate shipment of light arms be introduced into the interior, before "D" day, in order to guarantee the capture of key positions, which will save time and sacrifice and which will hinder the enemy from moving freely.

2. Distribution - This will be done in accordance with the importance which each place has in our plans and the difficulties which will be encountered to capture them. It is estimated that the following minimum quantities must be assigned:

a. For the Capital:

- 1) 50 submachine guns
- 2) 200 pistols
- 3) 400 hand grenades, explosive
- 4) 50 hand grenades, incendiary, to attack Communist centers
- 5) 20 time bombs, to blow up some buildings
- 6) 15 land mines, for roads and railroads
- 7) 5 signal pistols

b. For "C":

- 1) 25 submachine guns
- 2) 50 pistols
- 3) 100 handgrenades, explosives
- 4) 5 signal pistols

c. For "B":

- 1) 50 submachine guns
- 2) 100 pistols
- 3) 200 handgrenades, explosives
- 4) 50 hand grenades, incendiaries
- 5) 10 time bombs, in order to blow up the police buildings, etc.
- 6) 5 signal pistols

d. For "Z":

- 1) 50 submachine guns
- 2) 200 pistols
- 3) 400 hand grenades, explosives
- 4) 5 signal pistols

~~SECRET~~
Security Information

Original with

~~SECRET~~

Security Inform.

- e. For "J"
- 1) 25 submachine guns
 - 2) 100 pistols
 - 3) 200 hand grenades, explosives
 - 4) 25 hand grenades, incendiaries
 - 5) 10 land mines for roads
 - 6) 5 signal pistols

- f. For "Q"
- 1) 50 submachine guns
 - 2) 200 pistols
 - 3) 200 hand grenades, explosives
 - 4) 10 land mines for roads
 - 5) 10 time bombs for blowing up buildings
 - 6) 5 signal pistols
 - 7) 25 hand grenades, incendiaries

- g. For "M"
- 1) 10 submachine guns
 - 2) 50 pistols
 - 3) 100 hand grenades, explosives
 - 4) 5 signal pistols

3. Summary:
- | | | |
|-----------------------------|---|--|
| Submachine guns | - | 260, with 1,000 cartridges for each |
| Pistols, 45 calibre | - | 900, with 200 cartridges for each |
| Hand grenades, explosives | | 1,600 |
| Hand grenades, incendiaries | | 150 |
| Time bombs | | 100 |
| Land Mines | | 25 |
| Signal Pistols | | 35, with 10 cartridges, red, for each. |

II. Communications:

1. Intention: To maintain direct contact between the Revolutionary General Headquarters and the commands of the Interior, El Salvador, and Mexico, during the days which precede "D" day, and the development of the operations. To prevent the enemy from using the communications which he has at his disposal.

2. Distribution: This must be such that it permits direct contact from each one of the sectors of primary importance to the Revolutionary General Headquarters, in accordance with the Military Plan which will be put in action. Thus, it is estimated:

- a) Two radio transmitters in the Capital
- b) one in "C"
- b) one in "B"
- d) one in "Z"
- e) one in "J"
- f) one in "Q"
- g) one in "M"
- h) one in El Salvador

~~SECRET~~
Security Inform.

~~SECRET~~
Security Information

- i) one in Mexico
 - j) two in the General Headquarters
3. Destruction:
- a) In the Capital:
 - 1) the national telephone plant
 - 2) the electric high tension lines
 - 3) radio transmission stations which have their own generators
 - 4) general telegraph offices
 - b) In C, B, Z, J, Q, and M all the communication centers must be captured and not destroyed.

Note: Presently we have two radio transmitters in the Capital, with the following characteristics:

One of 50 watts, works on bands 32 and 40 meters, and has its own power generator.

Another of 75 watts, works on bands of 32 and 40 meters also. Both apparatuses have an international communications range, but we need someone here to test them and to be able to utilize them in periodical communications with our friends of the interior.

~~SECRET~~
Security Information

~~SECRET~~
Security Information

Reminder for Friend P

Of all that we have spoken and studied with the intention of finding the best solution possible for the complex situation which exists in Guatemala, I want to make clear to you finally, the particular importance of the points which I have extracted for you:

1. To judge all the merits of the prior introduction of arms in the proposed minimum quantities, at the same time assuring with it a total triumph in a short time, economizing forces, lives, and other sacrifices which all involve prolonged civil war for any country, even more so when it pertains to nations where so much hatred has accumulated, as occurs in this case.
2. Whatever be the plan which is approved, it must give due importance to the organization of an efficient Intelligence Service, in the General Headquarters of Honduras as well as in the Interior, in order to follow closely all the steps of the enemy, before "D" day, and in order to be sure of the secrecy of our operations, because on this secrecy will depend the surprise which is achieved.
3. Also meriting special attention is the naming of a person who is an expert in the organization of an Intelligence Service and in matters of sabotage; or two if it were possible, one for each branch, for the one as much as the other is of great importance in achieving a sure triumph.
4. Rating particular importance is the making of firm negotiations and obtaining the complete collaboration of a friendly government, such as that of Nicaragua or that of Honduras, with the objective of not being exposed to a sell-out or lack of support, indispensable for the organization and training of our principal groups of attack.
5. Once more we must point out that it is indispensable not to lessen those expenses which will assure us of success, since we will be in a position to return double that which is invested now, if it were necessary, since the salvation of our Fatherland has a value infinitely greater.
6. To obtain as soon as possible a firm promise from the group, to realize the plan which is believed the most feasible, with the objective of stopping any movement which is being organized now in Guatemala, and does not have the necessary backing.

1. Neelection matter
2. Pineda matter
3. Infiltration in Honduras matter.

~~SECRET~~
Security Information