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TO: LINCOLN

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FROM: Chief of Station, Guatemala

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SUBJECT: GENERAL— Operational

SPECIFIC— Weekly Psych Intelligence Report, 26 April - 2 May 1954

Reference: HULA-40

1. Once again reporting period was marked by a mood of expectancy from all quarters, but this time it was tinged with a feeling of uneasiness. Widespread talk concerning possible revolution or government overthrow slackened - a silence taken by most politically informed Guatemalans to mean that something may actually be brewing - and a realization that unpleasantness and danger may possibly lie ahead began to penetrate.
2. While enemy forces appear to have strengthened their weakened position somewhat during reporting period, this has not been done at the expense of friendly elements which, to the contrary, have continued to solidify their recent gains. Government advantages were arrived at primarily through exploitation of the U.S. note on behalf of the UFCO, the attention given May Day activities, and the pressure brought to bear on independent broadcasting stations.

ESTIMATE OF THE ENEMY SITUATION

While enemy circles found some "ammunition" during reporting period and were no longer in quite the defensive position mentioned last week, they did not regain a sense of confidence or control over the local situation. Although the Communists and the CGTG were on the offensive, there was dissatisfaction and a lack of unity in other pro-government political parties, rumors concerning the possible removal of high government officials were circulating, and the government appeared unable to reach a clear decision with regard to its policy toward anti-government activity and propaganda.

With the reappearance of the official daily newspaper, Diario de Centro America, on 26 April, the government had an additional outlet to vent its wrath against the U.S. claim on behalf of the fruit company and TORIELLO's remarks were given wide publicity.

Continuing efforts were made throughout the week to arouse interest and support for May Day activities and Guatemala City, at least, was flooded with banners, posters, and signs painted on sidewalks requesting participation and decrying foreign intervention.

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The May Day parade proved long and colorful although the number of participants, estimated to be from 10 - 15,000, fell far short of the 100,000 predicted by its sponsors. As in previous years, a great number of the marchers were confused campesinos who followed along as directed. Although many of the floats bore messages directed against the U.S. and the fruit company, a significant number were concerned with objections to the government's failure to provide salaries and other benefits as promised.

It is believed that President ARBENZ' May Day address took a much milder form than his last major speech presented 1 March at the opening of Congress. From his text, which devoted some two paragraphs to the "32" campaign and warned against underestimating the strength of the reaction, he appeared to be somewhat uneasy as to Guatemala's political future.

The CGTG and the Communist Party took advantage of their publicity and prestige as May Day sponsors to come out against certain DAN proposals as being anti-agrarian and to request greater representation in the Frente Democratico Nacional, and consequently in Congress, respectively.

Confusion in the leadership of pro-government political parties was indicated by the conflicting statements issued by the PAR on successive days and the failure to unify the RN factions in dispute.

Although CRUZ Wer denied reports of his removal from office and complicity in a Communist plot against the government, rumors concerning the government's desire to replace him continued during the week. Also, the outbreak of rumors concerning the removal of Alfonso SOLORZANO as head of the IGSS appeared to have some foundation.

While the police relented somewhat of its policy of pursuit and arrest of "32" painters (see below), the government took harsher measures to prevent unfavorable publicity when it announced that it would enforce a decree (No. 372) long since promulgated but not carried out to the effect that all private radio stations must submit copies of their programs to the Ministry of Government.

#### ESTIMATE OF THE FRIENDLY SITUATION

Last week's report stated that friendly forces "showed a confidence and strength not previously demonstrated." It is believed that this trend has continued during present reporting period and has been accompanied by a consolidation or "settling in" of opposition elements and a developing singleness of mind directed against the government. While anti-Communist or anti-government events or action have heretofore quickly ceased to be a matter of interest, interest and coverage of recent developments, and particularly the "32" campaign, have been sustained.

That public opinion had evolved strongly in favor of the "painters and against police tactics in arresting those who painted 32s was indicated by the fact that the Guardia Judicial announced on 30 April that

it would no longer arrest individuals so engaged unless they were found to be defacing government buildings. This followed the arrest and detention of 5 pupils from the San Sebastian school and a protest parade by fellow students wearing 32s painted on their backs and bicycles, which received wide press coverage, and reports from outlying provinces indicating that the campaign had "caught on" in other target areas including Quezaltenango, Puerto Barrios and San José.

The opposition press continued its aggressive stand against government measures to control press and radio channels and the Asociación de Periodistas de Guatemala (APG) also came out with a vigorous protest. Although Francisco BAEZA's daily program was dropped by the director of station La Voz de la Telefonen (see previous report), it was quickly picked up by Radio Universal.

Support for the archbishop continued to appear from such small outlying towns as San Juan del Obispo and Palencia and it was announced that Guatemala would be represented at the anti-Communist congress in Mexico by the CEUA.

Despite the unqualified success of the "32" campaign, it is believed that the interest <sup>that</sup> was generated and the spirit of opposition associated therewith will soon subside unless the full significance of the campaign - to make 32 a symbol of revolution - is brought to public attention with the same effectiveness that was exhibited during the marking campaign itself.

[ Clara M. Heagey ]

3 May 1954

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