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2003

AIR POUCH

HUL-A-614

~~SECRET RYBAT PFSUCCESS~~

2 MAY 1954

Chief of Station, Guatemala  
ATTN: PAGE  
LINCOLN

INFO: WASH

Operational  
K Program

REF: HGO-A-928

1. LINCOLN genuinely regrets the delay in responding to your extensive and illuminating dispatch of 20 April. Please be assured that the delay was not occasioned by idleness, but by the rigors of another ruling "review", at the highest levels, of this operation. Once more, we have received the flickering "green light" and are able to turn our minds to operations. In the following paragraphs we shall therefore respond to your memoranda.

2. We are somewhat puzzled by the early departure from Guatemala of SOGGER. Clarification of this has been requested by cable and we trust that the necessary amplification will follow by dispatch.

3. As indicated by our cables, we wish to back PAGE's judgment in making straight for [ ] Obviously, if the approach to [ ] is successful, the approaches to a good many other individuals should be facilitated. On the other hand, if only for the purpose of maintaining a flexibility of concept and approach, it should be pointed out that an alternate logic could be followed, namely, that successful approaches to smaller fry than [ ] could pave the way to more certain success with [ ] Perhaps PAGE will be able to, or find it convenient, juggle between these two extreme approaches. That is, it may be possible to conduct exploratory conversations with [ ] then parlay these into a half-defection of someone else, go further with [ ] on the basis of the other success, and thus pyramid the whole affair quite neatly. We mention these alternatives because, just like PAGE, we do conceive it possible to make the K Program succeed without [ ] and would not like to see a very promising and well prepared program founder on the [ ] rock, should it prove impregnable. Naturally, PAGE's operational judgment would be the determining factor in the matter; the only wish to interject pertinent

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abstract considerations.

4. PAGE notes, in paragraph 6 of HQG-A-928, that [ ] may be "adverse to countenancing any invasion of Guatemala from contiguous countries and that certain reservations about CALLIGERIS may be attributable to the fact that [ ] is tying him in with interventionist project, aided and abetted by the United States." We should like to caution against taking this position of [ ], even if he expresses it personally and vociferously, too seriously. It is the most natural thing for the man on the inside to sneer at and smear the exile; similarly, we would expect CALLIGERIS to protest that the men on the inside were tainted by collaboration. These alleged scruples about "invasion" and "intervention" should in no case be taken as evidence of a moral position on the part of [ ] BUT RATHER as gambits in his bargaining. We do not think they are very good gambits. In dealing with this issue, it may be useful for PAGE to make a sharp distinction between [ ] identification with the anti-invasion argument and the popular utility of an anti-invasion slogan. That is, intimate to [ ] on the one hand, that you do not take his scruples seriously; on the other hand, assure [ ] that, for the benefit of the general public, pains will be taken to avoid any appearance of an invasion. LINCOLN has already given PAGE the necessary ammunition for the latter point in a previous dispatch.

5. In paragraph 8 of HQG-A-928, PAGE again raises the issue of [ ] co-equality with CALLIGERIS. PAGE then goes on to state that "this would bring us down to the issue of whether this advance stage we are still prepared to consent to a broadening of the JUNTA". It would appear to us that there is a big gap <sup>between</sup> [ ] demands for co-equality and our accession to that. In that gap, PAGE should make the most systematic and careful exploration of [ ] real or pretended assets. It can be candidly explained to [ ] that CALLIGERIS ~~WOULD~~ have been dropped long ago had he not given proof positive of a substantial following and of a real capacity to organize and energize that following. We respect [ ] the man, but we know little about [ ] the political and military force. [ ] status, vis-a-vis CALLIGERIS or in the JUNTA will depend on precisely how many divisions he has. It will also be useful to tell [ ] that it is quite likely that he and CALLIGERIS may claim the same assets. Certainly the issue of [ ] precise role can be postponed until some exploration of the assets may help to suggest that role.

6. The foregoing must, of course, be seen in the light of a certain basic approach, namely, that CALLIGERIS could succeed even with [ ] If this concept is followed out, it would imply that [ ] assets, no matter how substantial, were somewhat inferior to those of CALLIGERIS. This, in turn, would imply a secondary position in the JUNTA for [ ] - We advance this to PAGE as a bargaining position and as a lever to facilitate his exploration of [ ] assets, and not as a foregone conclusion. What we do wish to emphasize, perhaps quite unnecessarily, is that the K Program, although a separate and independent effort, can nevertheless draw on PBSUCCESS assets in order to lead from strength. The K Program need not plead but can quietly try to command.

7. We have cabled our reservations about a direct meeting between CALLIGERIS and [ ] In the foregoing paragraphs we have tried to explain what we think should be the pre-conditions of a determination of [ ] status or of such a meeting. When we know more about [ ] then we can determine what his role and rights should be, perhaps without a meeting. At the present stage a meeting or the proposition of a meeting would be little more than a makeshift for our lack of clarity.
8. In the very near future we will comply with paragraph 11 of HOG-A-928.
9. Paragraph 12 of HOG-A-928 has been answered provisionally by cable.
10. Unfortunately, the recruitment of the "labor assistant" has hit a snag. The issue was moved on to so high a level that early and easy untangling appears impossible. In view of this regrettable development, LINCOLN wonders whether you could make some progress through ESERALDIYE-1 alone. Could GLOWER possibly pose as a fairly low level American organizer? Needless to say, this is a suggestion born of nothing but necessity. Another complicating factor in the labor picture is that ESERALDIYE himself will leave Mexico for a trip to Montevideo on 2 May. While it is relatively cold comfort, we suggest that PAGE follow as closely as possible the events of the 1 May conference of Latin American labor leaders in exile in Mexico City. The support shown to Guatemalan labor exiles at that conference may assist somewhat in the labor defection program.
11. As long as PAGE and BANNISTER concur, LINCOLN has no objection to dropping the ESODIGs. Likewise, as regards ESPOUSER, LINCOLN is rather happy to see this step taken.
12. CADICK will reply separately on the matter of possibly defecting the Air Force pilots with their planes. We would like, at this point, to repeat for PAGE's benefit that the use of napalm, no matter how often urged, is not contemplated. CADICK will likewise reply separately on the matter of intercepting Communist reinforcements from the Esquintla area.
13. One more point in the labor field: BANNISTER obviously has a closer appreciation of the character and role of CASTILLO Flores, but for the present we would like to point out that a jurisdictional dispute between CASTILLO Flores and GUTIERREZ could quite readily be manipulated into something more serious. If ideologies are as relatively feeble/as some people claim, then a jurisdictional quarrel - that is, a quarrel over power - might loom just as large in CASTILLO Flores' mind as the ideological matter.

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Jeremy T. MUTTING/gfb  
1 May 1954