

~~SECRET~~

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

APR 26 1954

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "To" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "To" column. Each officer should initial (Check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Record and Routing Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM:

NO.

H66A-933

DATE

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
		REC'D	FWD'D		
1. []		26 April 26		[]	
2. []		27 Apr		[]	1-2, 3: <u>Very</u> interesting dispatches.
3. []				[]	Note especially British legation
4. []				[]	employee para 18, who is, I believe, the channel RNDMPLE used to warn <u>over</u> man about Salama.
5. []				[]	I agree completely with them . 2nd part para 18 estimate by Station.
6. []				[]	
7. []				[]	Para 14 shows [] & RNDMPLE spanning about "consulting their principals," but I don't recall their ever having reported it to us.
8. []				[]	
9. []				[]	
10. []				[]	
11. []				[]	
12. []				[]	ESQUIRE
13. []				[]	RNDMPLE - ESCOMSON
14. []				[]	[]
15. []				[]	INBUB-2

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
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2003

PBS file

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Washington

AIR

HGG-A-935

RYBAT/PBSUCCESS/SECRET

Chief, Lincoln

Chief of Station, Guatemala

Info: Washington

Operational
ESQUIRE

Reference - GUAT 305, 554; LINC 1649, 1755

1. In accordance with LINC 1649 an effort was made to enter into contact with ESQUIRE through JMBLUG-2 as had been suggested by HUL-A-90. Unfortunately, our efforts through the intermediary JUMBLUG-2 proved fruitless since ESQUIRE had departed the capital. []
2. In view of the apparent gravity of the situation with respect [] and his plans, Adrian B. Kidwell and I traveled on 8 April to ESQUIRE's finca where I held a short but interesting conversation with him. During this conversation, ESQUIRE stated that following the Salamá incident he had become convinced that it would be better for him to avoid all further contact with ESCONSON, through whom he had previously reported, and as a result, he had also refrained from contact with any ODYORE representatives until he began having some labor difficulties in connection with his finca. Because of these labor difficulties, he approached the predecessor of JMBLUG and asked to be placed in contact with someone knowing something about agrarian matters. JMBLUG's predecessor introduced him to JMBLUG-2. In subsequent meetings with JMBLUG-2 ESQUIRE gave JMBLUG-2 whatever political information he had but insists that he did not reveal his previous contact with ESCONSON or with []
3. During this first meeting, ESQUIRE stated that though he had never met him, he maintains contact with CALLIGERIS through [] in Guatemala known to have contributed heavily to CALLIGERIS in the past.
4. ESQUIRE was questioned during this first meeting concerning [] He stated that approximately five years ago he entered into a business association with [] and organized a firm to make [] ESQUIRE first distrusted [] thinking the latter dishonest, but he stated that he had subsequently learned that he was wrong and now has great trust in him.

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[] first came into the picture when [] suggested that [] might be of aid to them in obtaining financial assistance from the INFOP. Nothing, however, was done with respect to [] but little by little [] began telling ESQUIRE about statements made by []. According to ESQUIRE and as best he understands the matter, [] regards [] as a neutral, spends much time at the latter's home and confides in him as he would not confide either to a co-national or to a U. S. citizen.

5. ESQUIRE apparently gave considerable attention to the statements made by [] with regard to [] and, knowing about [] past stand vis-a-vis communism, he long ago sent word through [] to [] that something should be done against the communists and stated that if [] so desired, he would put him in touch with people with the necessary money. (It must be borne in mind that ESQUIRE believes that [] did not reveal his identity to [] We consider this a doubtful point.)

[] allegedly told [] that he did intend to do something with respect to the communist menace but that the lack of funds was not the important point and that he was simply waiting for the proper time to act. Later, [] allegedly told [] that the time was ripe, but he did not do anything. ESQUIRE then sent word to [] that it would be convenient for him to enter into a working agreement with CALLIGERIS; [] replied that he did not like CALLIGERIS' methods but he did not explain why.

6. ESQUIRE again stressed the following points: (a) that he is convinced that [] did not reveal to [] his identity, and (b) that he, ESQUIRE, had acted on his own initiative in making these suggestions to []

7. In view of the information contained in GUAT 305 and believing it extremely possible that [] had the intention of launching a movement against the present government while taking into consideration the fact that ESQUIRE had previously passed information through [] to [] I decided to have ESQUIRE enter into contact with [] and have him advise [] that he, [] had friends who were aware of his intentions and though inclined to favor these intentions, nevertheless feared that he would be unsuccessful at this time and that his failure would result in a disaster similar to the Salamá affair.

8. Accordingly, ESQUIRE entered into contact with [] and gave him this message, but it was not until mention was made of Colonel GONZALEZ Segui that [] took the matter seriously. He then told [] to thank his friend (ESQUIRE) and to tell him that he would be extremely grateful if he were to be advised in the future of any such matter. It must be borne in mind that ESQUIRE was told to take and apparently took advantage of the opportunity to stress to [] that there was no desire to cut him out but that, to the contrary, he would be contacted in due course.

9. By error or misunderstanding on our part, we gathered the impression that ESQUIRE had specifically stated to [] that he was representing CALLIGERIS. Subsequently, and in our second meeting with ESQUIRE held on the night of 10 April, it was learned that ESQUIRE had specifically stated that he did not represent CALLIGERIS although ESQUIRE was of the impression [] and [] possibly or even probably suspected that he had acted as a CALLIGERIS representative.
10. On the night of 10 April 1954 I held a long meeting with ESQUIRE and Adrian B. Kidwell took down shorthand notes of the salient points of this conversation.
11. I started off by asking ESQUIRE to give an account of how he first happened to enter into the picture. ESQUIRE stated that his brother had entered into contact with [] who is married to ESQUIRE's [] and has lived for many years in []. ESQUIRE had little to say concerning [] except that he has often aided OBIJOKE, particularly with respect to Germans prior to World War II. [] put ESQUIRE's brother in contact with an individual named [] who recommended him to []

In these negotiations ESQUIRE's brother was acting as the representative of RNDINDLE. ESQUIRE's brother returned to Guatemala and told RNDINDLE that he should go to New York to enter into negotiations with []. By accident ESQUIRE met RNDINDLE in New Orleans and they subsequently conversed in Atlanta. ESQUIRE introduced RNDINDLE to [] who said that he was looking for someone who was prepared to act and that the first WSBURNT citizen willing to do something would get his backing. RNDINDLE was desirous of obtaining this backing, but TRUJILLO supported Roberto BARRIOS Peña and RNDINDLE accepted the latter as the boss.

12. Meanwhile, and back in WSBURNT, ESQUIRE was attempting to get RNDINDLE together with [] who, according to one [] was running a big operation in WSBURNT [] was described by ESQUIRE as an American living in Pasadena and the nephew of an individual named [] who is the owner of a finca name []. In his desire to do something to alter the situation in WSBURNT, ESQUIRE appealed to [] for funds, but he obtained nothing and the only result was that he revealed to [] knowledge of RNDINDLE's activities.
13. ESQUIRE stated that [] was also part owner of a finca and at a party at this finca [] spoke to [] told him about ESQUIRE, and [] then asked [] to arrange for an interview between him and ESQUIRE. Apparently ESQUIRE had two or three contacts with [] and during this period ESQUIRE suggested that the various groups should work together. Allegedly and according to ESQUIRE, these groups consisted of the following: [] RNDINDLE, BARRIOS Peña, and a group called Los Coroneles. ESQUIRE, however, was unable to identify or give any information concerning the last group.

14. In the two or three meetings between [] RNDINDLE, ESQUIRE, [] allegedly agreed in principle to work with RNDINDLE but both [] and RNDINDLE claimed that they would reach no agreement without consulting [] They agreed, however, that if one group started a movement the other would aid this attempt.
15. ESQUIRE was asked concerning [] and he gave the following impressions. He stated that [] is a shrewd, apparently honest, very capable and highly respected individual who had lost a son in the struggle against communism. [] apparently was in contact with [] It was ESQUIRE's impression that [] though disclaiming any intention [], was desirous of having CALLIGERIS lead a movement, triumph, put himself in as provisional president of a junta, pacify the country, and []
16. Meanwhile, ESQUIRE met Bob JACKSON and, during his conversations with JACKSON, ESQUIRE received the impression (though nothing definite was told him) that JACKSON and another unidentified companion favored the plans of [] Though ESQUIRE himself believed that RNDINDIE was a better man, he was willing to cooperate with any group desirous of combatting the communists and he agreed to pass along information concerning RNDINDLE's activities to JACKSON through ESCONSON. He remembers that on one occasion he asked for \$10,000 which was needed but after a couple of days he received word that it was impossible to give these funds but was promised that some propaganda funds might be available at a later date. ESQUIRE says that he sent word that it was essential for someone outside to prod the various WSBURNT factions into working together in the common cause.
17. Suddenly, ESQUIRE received word through [] that the Salamá affair had broken out and further that Esquire should not only stay out of the matter but that it would be advisable for him to leave the city.
18. When asked concerning [] ESQUIRE stated that [] is the head of the propaganda office [], is an intimate friend of RNDINDLE's [] and had been used by RNDINDLE as a contact between himself and ESQUIRE. She is also a close friend of [] with whom both RNDINDLE and ESQUIRE were associated. ESQUIRE said that [] is a WSBURNT citizen, highly intelligent, very courageous, about [] years of age, and []

I specifically asked ESQUIRE if he had any suspicion that [] is a [] He replied that he considered it unlikely that she even advised the [] concerning her contact with himself and RNDINDLE. My belief is that he is overly optimistic.

NOTE: The information given above is the result of questioning on my part and was given by ESQUIRE in a somewhat disjointed manner, since one question would lead to another. Moreover, his line of thought would frequently lead to individuals not necessarily of importance in the present setup. It was obvious that ESQUIRE has been a free-wheeling agent who, in his desire to do something with respect to the local situation, had gone round and round in circles. It was noted with approval that he is well aware of this and that there is reason to assume that he learned a great deal from his past and somewhat unfortunate experiences.

19. I then questioned ESQUIRE in detail concerning his 8 April 1954 meeting with [] ESQUIRE stated that he had returned to the city after his meeting with me and had seen [] at about 7 p.m. He stated that he had learned from [] that [] now lives [] one of the residential districts of the city, his new home being just back of the [] residence. Since [] had brought up the fact that [] had taken another house, ESQUIRE then asked him if he believed that [] was planning a revolutionary movement. [] laughed and said that he was positive such was not the case.

ESQUIRE then told him that he had reason to believe such was not the case and that it would be very wise for him to get in touch with [] and tell him that he, [] has powerful friends who knew that he was involved in a plot due to explode in the near future. Furthermore, that these friends are in a position to state that such a plot would probably fail with disastrous consequences. However, ESQUIRE stressed that [] would not be cut out of the anti-communist movement and, to the contrary, would be advised in due course.

20. ESQUIRE delivered the rest of his message as previously mentioned in this dispatch. Apparently, [] took the matter much to heart and seemed very excited. He made the following statement (as repeated by []: "Caramba, no sabia que habia gent tan adelantada en eso." (NOTE: Two interpretations can be given to this: (a) that he did not know that outsiders might be so well informed of his plans, or (b) that other people might be so far advanced in the preparations without his knowledge.) [] stated that [] gave the impression of a person who was completely flabbergasted and visibly relieved. According to [] seemed very pleased to hear that he would be advised in due course and that there was no intention of cutting him out.
21. We have no way of judging whether or not [] played [] and ESQUIRE along or whether, as he appeared to be, he was sincerely grateful and very interested in the information which he received. The foregoing statement is also based on the assumption that [] actually gave his message to [] However, ESQUIRE believes that [] is honest and truthful and therefore he also believes that the account [] gave him is correct. It also follows that ESQUIRE believes that [] was deeply impressed, grateful, and moreover, anxious to be contacted.

22. I am sorry that we cannot give greater or more specific details concerning this matter at this time. Nonetheless, and prior to ESQUIRE's approach to [] through [] we received independent and confirmatory information strongly indicating that [] would launch a revolutionary movement against the present government during Holy Week. Since ESQUIRE's message to [] we have received no information indicating that [] still plans such a course of action.

[]

Earle N. Bannister

16 April 1954

Distribution:

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