

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

UNCLASSIFIED

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~~SECRET~~

2003

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer's name should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Routing and Record Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM: *WH/PBS/Estelina*

NO. \_\_\_\_\_  
DATE *22 April 1954*

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
		REC'D	FWD'D		
1. <i>L ]</i>				<i>[ ]</i>	<p><b>BY HAND</b></p> <p><i>1-5 Clarks</i></p> <p><i>file</i></p>
2. <i>Estelina</i>				<i>[ ]</i>	
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22 April 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR: [ ]

SUBJECT : Items for Inclusion in CE Report

1. The following items are considered worthy of consideration for inclusion in the CE report you are preparing for Mr. Wisner.

A. The fact that Raul Sierra, perhaps the best informed man on Calligeris operations in Nicaragua, up until 3 April appears to be closely identified with the Honduran aspect of the operation. Latest indications are (HULA-471, att. 2) that Calligeris has not accepted the results of the polygraph examination conducted in Tegucigalpa and consequently has not interdicted him. \* The plan suggested by Calligeris in the above reference to have Sierra conduct several men to Managua for polygraph appears to be unsound. Equally unsound in the writer's opinion is the suggestion by Calligeris that he personally conduct the polygraph interrogation. Refusal to accept incontrovertible evidence cannot and will not improve the status of this operation. It can only serve to lead us blindly into the enemy's camp.

B. The Duarte incident (the Nicaraguan Immigration officer who took asylum in the Guatemalan Embassy in Nicaragua) points up the fact Guatemala may have widened their knowledge of the current operational situation in Nicaragua. Whether Duarte was knowledgeable of the paramilitary and communication training areas is an unknown factor. That particular information, however, was available to Raul Sierra. Duarte may have known:

- (1) how the black flights were arranged;
- (2) the contents of the cargo;
- (3) nationality of the crews;
- (4) the fact that certain Americans were coming into Nicaragua black, i.e. communications people for Sherwood.

C. It is interesting to note that Juan Rafael Alvarado Valverde, the man recently removed from the Scranton training area for security reasons is listed as a former member of the Vanguardia Popular (VP, Communist Party) in Costa Rica. This information, coupled with his action at Scranton, clearly indicates the wisdom of Station Lincoln in preventing this man from returning to Costa Rica as he desired.

\*This is a repetition of Calligeris' position when he first learned of Delgado's defection. Only when confronted with the most conclusive and damning evidence did Calligeris reluctantly accept the fact that Delgado had sold out to the enemy.

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D. Information was received from the Guatemalan Station (GUAT 237, 23 March 1954) that Carlos Enrique Lorenzano was apprehended on 22 March just prior to his take-off from the Guatemala City airport for Tegucigalpa. The police searched his baggage and turned up several letters to Calligeris. On the afternoon of 23 March a Guatemalan newspaper made mention of the episode and hinted at a new plot. On 2 April ESSENCE sent a cable (GUAT 290) through the station requesting that Calligeris send no more letters to group members unless the couriers were completely reliable and able to avoid seizure and body search. These two cables evidence the fact that Guatemala has been reading into a portion, at least, of the current operation.

E. A negative factor worthy of consideration is contained in a cable sent by Cadick on 9 April from [redacted]. Cadick said, "Am convinced that [redacted] can and will make some move designed to counteract Calligeris if dropped unceremoniously." This is a matter which must be given careful consideration or it can prove to be a vital factor in the security of the operation.

F. The question has been raised from time to time as to whether Calligeris might be aware of the fact that the U.S. Government is backing PBSUCCESS. Two instances are worthy of note:

(1) When Calligeris made a trip to the U.S. at the end of January, he carried with him a letter which Jacob R. Seekford requested be delivered to Lincoln. The letter was addressed as follows: CWH - Pass to the Director.

(2) Some weeks ago a package of photographic material was passed to Calligeris by the [redacted]. Inadvertently a copy of the pouch manifest was left with the material. The document contained on its face the statement "via Diplomatic Courier". This document may have given Calligeris a pretty good indication that he had official U.S. backing.

G. The writer has analysed the information contained above in addition to other information not contained in this report. As a result of this analysis the writer has developed the following hypothesis:

That the Guatemalan Government is well into the details of PBSUCCESS and that they have decided to let the operation proceed undisturbed until they have prepared and documented a brief for presentation to the OAS. This brief in the light of Mr. Dulles' statements at Caracas properly presented could cause irreparable damage to U.S. prestige in the eyes of the non-Communist world. The writer considers that Guatemala has assumed a calculated risk in allowing the operation to proceed unmol-ested. It is a risk, however, that they are apparently willing to assume, probably based on their estimate of the Calligeris operation.

JACOB D. ESTERLINE

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