

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE AS SANITIZED

Estimate: Juan Pico

~~SECRET~~

file

I. APPRECIATION

A. Guatemala

Bissell

Present strength of Communists.

On whose side is Time?

B. Neighbors

Bissell

Current strengths and attitudes of Honduras, Nicaragua and

Salvador, and effects upon them of continued march of Communism in

Guatemala.

C. Assets

Barnes

What have we now

Outside the country

Inside the Country

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2003

and what are our capabilities in the fields of intelligence and


CE, psychological warfare and political action, EW, and PM and

defection.

How well can we hold together what we now have, and develop

additional assets.

~~SECRET~~



II. POSSIBLE COURSES OF ACTION

Lincoln

A. - Continue plan in present form, stressing PM and working for earliest possible action.

*Wesner
Bissell*

B. Continue and accelerate intelligence, propaganda, political and economic action and defection, postponing PM action until October or later.

King

There could be a vigorous and coordinated program of overt and covert action with emphasis, in the latter field, placed upon:

penetration

golden bullets

"small" harrassments including sabotage and strong arm stuff.

intensified propaganda to keep the refugees, if no one else, happy and busy.

sufficient movement of arms to keep PM assets in being and enemy on edge.

Leedy

C. Slack off on covert action of more vigorous (and attributable or compromised) nature, abandon Rufus et al, rely on overt action - speeches, OAS, Rio pact, foreign ministers etc. - to do the job.

D. Recognize the Guatemalans as agrarian reformers and clutch them publicly to our bosom, ^{and} smother them with care, kill them with kindness.

III. RECOMMENDATION

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file

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
*[]
Barnes*

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~~SECRET~~

D. Security




Penetrations

Enemy intentions

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*State
Jeddy*

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