

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM  
RELEASE IN FULL

Air Fouch

2003

HUL-A-449

~~SECRET/RFBAT/PBSUCCESS~~

9 April 1954

Chief, Western Hemisphere

LINCOLN

X-Program  
SOCCER Briefing

1. SOCCER's mission should, to the casual outsider, appear as a natural sequence to his three-year tenure in Guatemala. He is returning in the company of his wife of absence from the [ ] His status is that of an American tourist on leave interest in political developments and, although no longer in an official capacity, is desirous of bringing his knowledge of current affairs up-to-date. [ ]

2. SOCCER's actual mission should be laid out along the following lines:

a. [ ] contacts with ranking Guatemalan Army and Air Force officers deemed defectable;

b. He will elicit from them statements regarding their political leanings and views regarding the paramount issue of growing communist ascendancy;

c. He will strive to determine whether and to what extent those individuals are prepared to translate into action their professed oppositional leanings (without implying that an overthrow of the regime would be accomplished by means other than indigenous);

d. He will ask leading questions designed to ascertain whether they are already in league with some oppositional faction or resistance movement. Such questions can be asked within the context and subject to the limitations set forth in Sub-paragraph c.

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3. As a general rule, SOCCER will not be required to go beyond the pale of a purely exploratory approach. However, within the bounds of propriety befitting his position as an active [ ] officer, subject will be authorized in a given case to create all the prerequisites for a defection approach to be undertaken by a third person preferably without any direct reference to SOCCER. It must be anticipated that there will be time to refer a given case, once the exploratory phase has been completed, to LINGGLN/Headquarters for decision. It is important, however, to indoctrinate SOCCER now with the imperative need of not getting carried away and not straying into the defection domain without specific authorization. The decision as to whether the importance of a given case is overriding enough to take calculated risks should as an inflexible rule not rest with SOCCER.
4. While a complete briefing on HSUCCESS would at this time, i.e., prior to commencement of actual operations, serve little purpose, it should be borne in mind that selected members of the Embassy staff have already been briefed in broad outline and that complete ignorance on his part might place him in awkward situations.
5. Inasmuch as SOCCER is on record as entertaining somewhat derogatory opinions regarding GALLIGHER, he should be told that the latter enjoys HBRIME backing and that he is being provided with expert technical guidance sufficient to make up for some of those shortcomings as a military leader to which SOCCER, admittedly influenced by his sources, is taking exception. In this context and in words of your own choosing, SOCCER should be admonished that the basic concept under which he and Graham L. HAN will be operating has been decided upon with finality and that it should under no circumstances be tampered with. This does not mean that SOCCER will be required to align his reporting into conformance with that concept but merely that the active pursuit of alternate solutions would be academic at best and damaging at worst.
6. SOCCER should be told that his mission will be governed by a decision taken on the highest level of the United States Government that the current trend in Guatemala toward a fullfledged communist dictatorship will have to be stopped by all methods short of outright and attributable intervention. He should be fully read in on the requirement of "plausible denial" and all that it entails in terms of operational techniques and spotting gambits. In briefing him along those lines, due care should be taken not to throw too much cold water on his enthusiasm and not to curtail his natural style. On the contrary, not meeting his contacts in an official capacity as heretofore, should enable him to be a great deal more outspoken in his condemnation of the regime and in his interpretation of public opinion in the United States regarding the communist threat, than diplomatic propriety would otherwise demand. It would be next to impossible to devise a standard operations procedure, and SOCCER should be told that much will depend on his perspicacity in sizing up the person he is talking to, and on his forensic skill.

7. The relationship between Graham L. PAGE and SOCCER will in some ways be unprecedented. He should be told that PAGE is visiting Guatemala in an unofficial capacity ( ) and without the protection of diplomatic immunity. For that reason the true nature of his status should be kept under wraps unless a given operational situation demands that it be implied or disclosed. Only a very few people will be read in on PAGE's cover. Regarding PAGE, he should be told the following: He is a ranking official of KUBARK with many years of practical operational experience in the field, with considerable practice in the exercise of command functions, and with a complete knowledge of the basic plan underlying SOCCER's and his own mission. SOCCER can rest assured that he will be given the best possible guidance and that, while it will not always be possible to adduce reasons, he can rest assured that even an unintelligible or seemingly arbitrary decision may have cogent reasons behind it.

8. SOCCER should rest assured that PAGE will apply the operational responsibilities vested in him in a judicial manner. While, operationally speaking, it is only fair to admit that SOCCER is being used as a cat's paw and that the risks attendant to his mission may be greater than those incurred by PAGE, he should rest assured that his judgment, especially on matters touching upon his own security, will be respected. His views on any given problem within the purview of his mission will be reported by PAGE, but SOCCER should realize that there can be only one report/command channel and that for the duration of the project he might as well consider himself under KUBARK jurisdiction. In presenting this set of problems to SOCCER, you will no doubt be able to present PAGE's prerogatives in their correct perspective, i.e., as not meant to derogate in any way from the importance of SOCCER's assignment, or to unduly restrict his operational latitude.

9. As regards SOCCER's personal finances we should like to recommend that both he and his wife be paid a per diem in accordance with prevailing rates. This is only fair in view of the fact that her attendance will be requested by us not as a matter of personal convenience to SOCCER, but for specific operational purposes. If it should become necessary to take the children along, we do not think that the agency should demur. Operational expenses will be defrayed by Graham L. PAGE and most likely SOCCER will be provided with a revolving fund so as to enable him to meet unforeseen contingencies. You should inquire of SOCCER whether he will be in need of an operational house. If so, the necessary funds will be allocated to him.

10. It will not be possible to discuss operational detail in terms of specific defection opportunities prior to PAGE's departure. This will have to be put off until the two meet in Guatemala. The meeting will be laid on by Marie E. BARNHARTER, concerning whose identity and position SOCCER should be briefed, and whom he should contact immediately upon his arrival. No objections should be raised if SOCCER wishes to drop some of his friends in Guatemala a line, announcing his impending arrival. Everything should be as natural as possible and devoid of the customary trappings of cloak and dagger. SOCCER may also want to take presents along and he should be encouraged to do so. The necessary advances should be provided by you.

[ 11. We wish to suggest that you discuss with SOCCER in considerable detail

We are confident that this and related problems can be ironed out by you in conversation with SOCCER. SOCCER should be cautioned not to divulge the specific nature of his mission or discuss assignments unless such move has been cleared with PAGE. It may be advisable for WHITING to write Ambassador PECHINOV setting forth the relationship between SOCCER and KUBARK.

12. We should like to submit for your consideration that you provide SOCCER with an easily digestible compilation of briefing material. As an example, the OISD report on "Communism in Guatemala" (February, 1954) should be made available to him. You may also want to brief him orally on latest developments in Guatemala.

13. The above-mentioned points, if discussed between you and SOCCER, should fully serve to prepare him for his assignment and for the kind of setup he will be faced with in Guatemala. Broadly speaking, it will be most important that SOCCER, during the short period for reflection left him, try to adjust his thinking to the entirely new concept under which he will be operating, no longer, but as a visitor on sufferance. You may also wish to impress him with the thought that while KUBARK is intensely desirous of seeing his mission crowned with success, he should under no circumstances allow himself to be swayed by professional ambition to the extent of taking unwarranted risks. As least as important as success will be the complete preservation of the clandestine character of the operation. While things may go wrong due to circumstances beyond his and our control (a possibility with which he might as well acquaint himself), it would be doubly harmful if this could have been avoided by an exercise of moderate care.

14. Should there be any other issues which you consider controversial or worth taking up, do not hesitate to use your own judgment, but keep us advised on what was discussed and what decisions were reached.

JACOB C. BURGESS

JCB/CLP/csf  
9 April 1954  
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